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Brazil is a large country which has been in a process of exten-
sive industrialisation since the Second World War. Industrialisa-
tion requires an abundant and reliable supply of electrical energy, 
and Brazil has depended on its long tradition of utilisation of hy-
droelectricity in order to guarantee this necessary power supply. 
As the hydraulic sites close to the industrial centres have 
become fully exploited, Brazil has had to turn to more distant re-
gions for hydroelectric power development, thus requiring long dis-
tance transmission of large blocks of electricity. This has led to 
the construction of some of the world's-largest hydroelectric power 
stations, such as UHE Itaipu and UHE Tucurui, in some of the most 
isolated and inhospitable places on earth, with their attendant prob-
lems in construction and project co-ordination. Not for the first 
time is Brazilian hydroelectric power development taking place simul-
taneously with technological and advancement - at present, in the 
field of long distance transmission. However, it is, for the first 
time encountering the problems of international power sharing. 
The lessons to be learnt from Brazil's most recent experiences 
in large scale hydroelectric power development are mainly relevant to 
its own future projects, but some general lessons are applicable to 
such developments in other regions of the world. 
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The published literature on Brazil is extensive. The bulk of it 
is, however, published within Brazil and remains untranslated from 
the original Portuguese. Certain topics have attracted considerable 
foreign interest. Of these the best known are the vastness of the 
Amazon Basin, with its particular human and environmental features, 
and Brazilian development, both from the point of view of its heroic 
proportions and the intensity of the poverty in the North East of the 
country. 
To turn to the specific subject of this thesis, it is soon 
observed that the literature on the power industry in Brazil, in the 
English language, is sparse. There are a few, short, articles but no 
comprehensive review of the industry and its growth. The nearest is 
"Electric Power in Brazil Entrepreneurship in the Public Sector" by 
Judith Tendler,(1968). This is a detailed study of the battle of the 
private companies within the electrical power industry, and its 
effect on Brazilian economic developrnent(1). 
When the literature search was extended to Brazil, access to 
libraries was readily granted, but it was soon found that their 
collections were of a variable standard and less than comprehensive, 
especially with respect to journal collections, which were often 
incomplete or not up to date. The main exception to this was the 
library at the Centro de Pesquisas de Energia Eléctrica (CEPEL), 
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which, although new, was comprehensive and well organized. Much of 
the useful documentation was found to be in the form of internal 
reports, and access to such documents depended largely on personal 
goodwill on the part of the librarians and other officials of the 
organizations visited. The majority of requests for material were 
acceded to and, as a result, the literature base of this thesis forms 
the largest collection of unique material available in the United 
Kingdom. However, as with all collections of documents, there are 
inevitable gaps where information was not made available due to its 
confidentiality. 
A brief survey of the literature available, which has a bearing 
on the Brazilian electrical power industry, together with a longer 
section on water resources development for power production, is given 
below. 
Brazil - General 
For a good general introduction to those aspects of Brazil 
broadly associated with the development of the country, in an overall 
sense, the publications by the Foreign Service of the Brazilian 
Embassy in London (now discontinued) give an adequately detailed 
introduction. Factually correct, although sometimes over optimistic, 
they give a reasonable. insight into the country (2-16). These 
publications cover all aspects of Brazilian society and organization, 
including the roles of the Church and the State, inflation and 
economic growth, foreign policy, resources, communications and 
energy. Within this series of publications, No.14, uB raz il_A 
Geography" contains a short bibliography of those books which give a 
good insight into the way in which Brazilian development has 
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proceeded. 
Important general books published in the United Kingdom include 
Brazil" by J.P.Dickenson (1978)(17), "Brazil-A Giant Stirs" by 
R.P.Momsen (1968)(18), and "Brazil : A Political Analysis" by P.Flynn 
(1978)(19). The more substantial nespapers are good sources of up-
to-date information, in particular The Financial Times regularly 
prepares reports on Brazil which comment extensively on large scale 
resource exploitation, financial problems and the status of industry 
(20-26). The Brazilian newspapers are useful for data acquisition and 
for a Brazilian view of events. The runs of local papers consulted 
included "Journal do Brasil "(27),"Folho de So Paulo"(28) and "0 
Globo"(29); on the whole they were well written and informative. 
Statistical information is available from the publications of 
the Instituto Brasileiro do Geografia e Estatstica (I.BGE), which 
publishes the national censuses(30), as well as a wide range of 
informatory books, maps and, pamphlets. The United Nations 
Statistical Handbooks also contain much useful information(31). 
Brazil - Development and Economics 
Development and economics problems are the aspects of Brazil 
which generate the most interest for research workers. The best known 
translated works are, probably, "Development and Underdevelopment" by 
the Brazilian, Celso Furtado (1964) (32), and his later work "Economic 
Development in Latin America"(1970)(33). The three National 
Development Plans give the best insight into the Brazilian views of 
the needs and intentions of developrnent(34-36). Many works 
concentrate on the adverse side of economic development, such as "Säo 
Paulo:Growth and Poverty" published by C.I.I.R.(1978)(37), 
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"Irrigation in the Brazilian North-East :Anti-Drought or Anti-
Peasant" by A.Hall(undated)(38). Others hold up Brazil as an example 
to the Third World, and are typified by an anonymous article in the 
Brazilian journal Comércio e Mercados "Terceiro mundo tern no Brasil 
urn exemplo de desenvolvimento"(1973)(39).Many of the available 
publications deal with the direct relationship between Brazil's 
economy and industry, politics, or inflation. These include "The 
Brazilian Industrial Economy" by W.G. Tyler(1981) which is the most 
recent(40), and "Inflation and Economic Development in Brazil, 1946-
1963" by R.Kahil (1973)(41). A number of Brazilian journals such as 
"Comércio e Mercados" (42) and "Planejamento e Desenvolvimento"(43) 
proved useful in obtaining an insight into the current Brazilian 
views. 
Brazil - Energy 
In Brazil, energy has been regarded as a great force behind the 
country's development (see p.26). Increasing use of electrical 
energy has been hailed as a great indicator of economic 
progress (44),and the National Development Plans have all outlined 
energy developments(45-47). Due to the great hydraulic resources 
available increased •hydropower is regarded as a mark of progress, as 
in, "Ilha Solteira : urn marco do progresso", Energia Elétrica 
(1979)(48). However, the lack of indigenous oil and coal are seen as 
slowing Brazil's development, see, for example, "Inflaco no Brasil e 
a OPEP de 1980" by P.Cotta(1980)(49). In Brazil, the result of the 
world oil crisis has stimulated the alcohol substitution 
programme(50) and increased interest in nuclear power(51). It is 
almost impossible , however, to find out details of Brazil's 
attitudes and plans in the latter respect. It is a very politically 
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emotive subject, and even within the state utility, Empresas 
Nucleares Brasileiras S.A. (NUCLEBRAS), there is little information 
given to the employees(52). 
The bulk of the information generally available in Brazil on the 
topic of energy, particularly of hydraulic origin, is contained in a 
number of specialised journals. The most important of these is "Mundo 
Elétrico(53) which publishes articles on all aspects of Brazilian 
power. uConstruço Pesada"(54), a mainly civil engineering journal, 
prints articles on various large dams under construction in Brazil, 
with a number of special issues on Usina Hidrelétrica Itaipu (UHE 
Itaipu). "The Revista Brasileira de Energia E16trica"(55), produced 
by the government utility Centrals Elétricas Brasileiras 
(ELETROBRAS), now no longer published , not only described the work 
of ELETROBRAS but also appraised the organization and its aims, and 
those of the electrical power industry in general. A number of other 
journals are also useful in providing occasional information, 
including "Relatório Reservado"(56), "Revista do Clube de 
Engenharia"(57), and "Energia El6trica"(58). 
On many aspects of the power industry, the only information 
available was from personal interviews and private reports generated 
within government departments and ELETROBRAS . Amongst these may be 
included the report prepared by the Canambra Engineering Consultants 
Ltd.(CANAMBRA)(1966 & 1969)(59,60), the Plano de Atendimento dos 
Requisitos de Energia Elétrica ate 1990 (Piano 90)(1974)(61), the 
Piano de Atendimento aos Requisitos de Energia Elétrica (Piano 
95)(1979)(62), the Tucuruf (Estudos Basicos) report (1972)(63) and 
the 1980 plans of the Grupo Coordenador de Operacão Interligada 
(GCOI)(64). 
The best comprehensive books available in Brazil are a special 
edition of Mundo Elétrico "Setenta e cinco anos de energia elétrica 
no Brasil"(1976) (65) and "A Energi'a Elétrica no Brasil"(1977) 
published by the Biblioteca do Exército Editora (the army publishing 
house)(66). Each of these gives a good review of the historical 
development of the electrical power industry in Brazil, and were used 
as a basis for much of the work in Chapter 3. Other sources of data 
were supplied from the various end-of-year reports published by the 
electrical power utilities in Brazil , such as ELETROBRAS, Centrals 
Elétricas de Furnas (FURNAS) and Centrals Elétricas de So Paulo 
S.A.(CESP), as well as the public relations documentation which these 
organizations were always willing to hand out. 
The easiest subject on which to obtain material was UHE Itaipu 
which is to be the the largest hydroelectric power station in the 
world. However, much of it proved repetitive (it is a popular topic 
and there is little new to say about it). In consequence, UHE Itaipu 
vesno longer a topic requiring further study, unlike UHE Tucurui' 
which, because it has never been effectively documented, was chosen 
as a case study for the purpose of this thesis. 
As mentioned above, Tendler(1968) provides an excellent guide-to 
the economics of the Brazilian electrical power industry in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Civil engineering details of various Brazilian dams are 
published in International Water Power and Dam Construction(68), and 
historical details are occasionally to be found in the Proceedings 
* UHE - Usina Hidrelétrica, is the Brazilian acronym used to 
denote a hydroelectric power station, and has been adopted here in 
order to maintain clear differentiation between hydroelectric 
power stations, construction sites and companies. UTE - Usina 
Termelétrica has similarly been adopted to denote thermal power 
stations. 
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and Journals of the Institution of Electrical Engineers (London) and 
the Institute of Civil Engineers (London)(69,70). Such material is 
limited, as most participatory interest in the early Brazilian power 
industry was American or Canadian, and very little was recorded in 
the British journals. In addition, except for international 
conferences, most Brazilians publish in their own national journals. 
Water Resources Development for Power 
When water resources are developed for the production of power, 
it usually means that a river is dammed or diverted. When this 
happens there is a great impact, not only in the area adjacent to the 
dam and its impounded waters, but often hundreds of kilometres 
distant. For example, with all of the schemes discussed in this 
thesis the construction of a dam across a river has resulted in the 
creation of a man-made lake, often inundating many hectares of land. 
When a river is dammed with the explicit purpose of producing 
electricity, many of the other possible uses for the man-made lake, 
such as flood control, irrigation, navigation, urban water supply and 
waste disposal are largelyignored. 
Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of building a dam for 
the provision of hydroelectric power, the impact of the dam will be 
felt in the distant areas where the power is consumed; downstream of 
the dam; upstream in the upper parts of the watershed; in particular, 
in the region of inundation; and throughout the economic and 
political life of the nation(s).(71) 
In the "Third World" such dams, and reservoirs, are responsible 
for the provision of electricity and improved living standards for 
city dwellers(72), loss of homes(73), and culture for rural 
peoples(74); power with little pollution(75), but erosion and 
sedimentation problems(76) as well as lake eutrophication(77); 
improved water supplies(78),contaminated water supplies(79); better 
health(80), increase of parasitic diseases(81); improved 
agriculture(82), loss of fertile land(83); flood control(84), 
catastrophic flooding(85) and earthquakes(86); preservation and 
introduction of new animal and plant species(87), some of them 
damaging to the environment (88), local extinction of animals and 
plants(89); new jobs(90), loss of livelihood(91); prestige for the 
government(92), and financial loss for the government(93). 
There are good and bad aspects about water resources development 
for power, but, with a little care and less emphasis on maximising 
power production, many of the problems could be avoided. Many of the 
above aspects are apparent in Brazil, but little documentation 
exists. 
The standard of living of the middle class urban dwellers in 
Brazil is high. The city centres are well supplied with electrical 
power and many of the trappings of the developed world, including 
electrically operated transport systems(94). Most of Brazil's 
reservoirs for power have not required the resettlement of great 
numbers of people. UHE Sobradinho, where 70 000 people were moved, is 
an exception(95), but there is currently unrest over the proposed rio 
Uruguaf basin developments(96)(see p.108) and controversy over the 
Amerindians to be resettled as a result of the impoundment of lake 
Tucuruf(97)(see p.287). 
At UHE Furnas, measures are being taken to prevent erosion by 
the planting of grasses and trees(98). Many'of Brazil's rivers carry 
a heavy silt load, and, presumably, some reservoirs must be filling 
up with sediment, but this is not a phenomenon on which there is much 
published material. The improvement of water supplies in Brazil, as a 
result of water resources development for power, tends to be 
incidental rather than intended. In some instances, there is improved 
water supply, as a result of construction of water treatment plants 
for the towns developed as part of the power station infrastructure, 
such as at UHE Itaipu(99) and UHE Tucurut(100). But, for those not 
resident in the townships, burgeoning slums in the villages outside 
and the use of available water by increased numbers of people, 
coupled with poor sanitation, leads to contaminated water supplies. 
At most of the hydroelectric power station sites health 
programmes have been in operation, even during the 1910s (see p.'q), 
and at UHE Itaipu and UHE Tucurul well equipped hospitals and health 
centres have been built(101,102). The workers coming to the sites, 
and their families, are given a health screening. However, those 
moving into the villages outside remain unscreened . All 
the common waterborne diseases are prevalent in Brazil : malaria; 
schistosomiasis; filariasis; yellow fever; onchocerciasis, a disease 
of African origin has spread to Surinam and is now reported to be on 
the increase in the state of Parâ, Brazil(103); the enteric diseases 
transmitted by poor hygiene - dysentery, gastroenteritis and 
diarrhoea; and hepatitis. 
Two diseases which pose a threat to the poorer Brazilian 
communities, especially under the boom town conditions which exist in 
the villages close to the construction sites, are bubonic plague and 
Chagas' disease. The former is transmitted by the bite of an infected 
rat flea(104), and the latter - American trypanosomiasis, is 
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transmitted by a reduviid bug which lives in the walls of mud and 
thatch dwellings(105). 
There are no recorded instances of induced seismicity as a 
result of the construction of B'razilian dams, although fears have 
been expressed about UHE Itaipu( (106). Catastrophic flooding has 
occurred, however, on a number of occasions in Brazil, as a result of 
water resources development.. Two dams were overtopped and breached in 
1977, as a result of the non-opening of the floodgates, and this 
caused considerable damage downstream. The two dams, Euclides da 
Cunha and Armando de Salles Oliveira, are being rebuilt(107). The dam 
at Sobradinho was intended to alleviate flooding in the rio So 
Francisco valley, but the 1980 floods, experienced after the 
completion of the dam, were the worst ever recorded(108). 
At the behest of the World Bank, Brazil now undertakes 
environmental impact reconnaissance surveys for all its major water 
power development projects. All of the surveys so far executed have 
recommended that certain measures be taken to protect the environment 
and the people, and that investigations should be made of the 
multiple uses which could be made of the reservoirs(109-111). Both 
the available literature and observations made on site visits give 
the impression that such surveys are ignored. 
Multiple use of reservoirs in Brazil is not common. Of 23 
reservoirs with a storage volume greater than 10 6m3 of water, all 
were used for power production, 11 for flood control, 8 for supply of 
water to industry or urban populations, four for effluent disposal, 
three for commercial navigation, 15 for commercial fishing, seven for 
intensive fish culture, seven for vazante agriculture and seven for 
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irrigation(112). The best established fishery is at UHE Furnas, where 
several species of commercial fish are bred at the fish station and 
then released into the reservoir(113). 
/ 
Environmental issues are increasingly becoming more important in 
Brazil, and the Departamento do Meio Ambiente, within the Diretoria 
de Coordenaçäo of ELETROBRAS undertakes studies of some of the 
environmental ramifications of power production(114). However, 
despite such studies, the final decisions in Brazil are almost always 
based on the economic and political factors involved in electrical 
power production. To date, none of Brazil's hydroelectric schemes 
have been serious financial disasters, but the escalating costs and 
increasing debts for UHE Itaipu and UHE Tucuruf could change this 
situation. It is likely, however, that they will probably be 
overshadowed by the financial burden caused by the nuclear power 
stations which are also currently under construction. 
Geography of Brazil 
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world. It has a total 
area of 8.5x10 6 km2 , almost as large as that of the USA. It shares 
15 719 km of frontier with ten of the twelve South American republics 
(save Chile and Ecuador). Its coastline is 7 408 km long. The 
estimated population in 1978 was 113x106 with an estimated growth 
rate of 2.9% in 1977(115). By the year 2000 AD this is expected to 
have risen to approximately 210x106 with a slight slowing down of the 
growth rate to 2.75% between 1980 and 1990 and to 2.58% from 1990 to 
the year 2000(116). The average demographic density is 13 inhabitants 
km - 
2,  but this masks significant inter-regional differences(117). In 
the Amazon region much of the land is uninhabited, with an average 
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population density of 1.5 inhabitants km' 2. In the central states of 
Gois and Mato Grosso this rises to 2.7, and in the highly populous 
South-East it rises to 203 inhabitants km" 2 in the state of Rio de 
Janei ro(117). 
Brazil is a Federative Republic, comprising 22 states, one 
Federal District (the capital Brasflia) and four Federal territories, 
see figure 1.1. Each state and territory is self governing, with 
overall control being exercised by the Federal Government. 
Five eighths of Brazil is covered by plateaux, the remainder is 
plain. The Brazilian Highlands have an average altitude of 500 m, and 
the highest mountain, Pico da Neblina in the Guiana Highlands, rises 
to 3 014 m. The highest edge of the Brazilian Highlands, known as the 
Great Escarpment or Serra do Mar, descends steeply into the Atlantic 
Ocean, forming an almost impenetrable barrier from the sea coast for 
almost 3 200 km, from Salvador, in the state of Bahia, to Rio Grande 
do Sul. This difficulty of access to the interior of Brazil has often 
been cited as the reason for its delayed development(119). The 
northern half of the country is dominated by the immense forests of 
the great Amazon river basin. 
Climate 
The climate in Brazil varies widely. Most of this large country 
lies in the tropics, with the equator passing through the city of 
Macap, in the territory of Amapä, in the north, and the Tropic of 
Capricorn crossing Brazil just north of So Paulo city. The Amazon 
region experiences an annual average temperature of between 22 °C and 
26 °C, with small seasonal variation between the warmest and coldest 
months. The area is generally damp, with the average humidity in 
- 13 - 







DF Distrito Federal 
ES Espirito Santo 
GO Goiãs  
MA Maranhão 
MT Mato Grosso 
MS Mato Grosso do Sul 






PJ Rio de Janeiro 
PG Rio Grande do 
No r  e 
PS Rio Grande do Sul 
P0 Rondônia 
PR Roraima 
SC Santa Catarina 
SP So Paulo 
SE SergiDe 
Source : Guia Podoviaria do Brasil, April 1980 
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Manaus between 80% and 90% and an average regional rainfall greater 
than 2 000 mm. The North-East shows a greater seasonal variation. In 
some areas temperatures greater than 37 °C are common, but, on 
average, the annual temperature does not exceed 28 °C. Unlike most of 
Brazil, which has a moderate rainfall of 1 000 to 1 500 mm per year, 
much of the North-East is subject to prolonged droughts, and the 
average annual rainfall is often less than 600 mm. As a result, this 
agriculturally dominated region is poverty stricken. 
On - the Atlantic coast from Recife to Rio de Janeiro the mean 
temperatures range from 23 °C to 27 °C but in the interior, on the 
higher plateaux they are lower, ranging from 18 °C to 21 °C. The 
rainfall on the coast is high in places and the area is humid, due to 
the effect of the Serra do Mar on the Trade Winds. In the interior 
there is a distinct dry season. The south of the country experiences 
a more temperate climate. The average temperature ranges from 17 °C 
to 19 °C, and frosts, even snow, occur regularly during the winter. 
Vegetation 
The climate has a profound effect on the range of vegetation. 
There are several distinct' types; the most extensive being the 
primaeval tropical rain forest covering 5x106 km 2 of the Amazon 
basin, both in northern Brazil and neighbouring countries. The arid 
North-East, despite quite fertile soil, is covered by ucoatingau  or 
scrubby woodland, and is difficult to farm successfully, due to the 
commonly occurring droughts. Until this century, the most fertile 
region was a narrow belt of semi-deciduous forest, which stretched 
from Natal, in Rio Grande do Norte, to Porto Alegre, in Rio Grande do 
Sul, widening in southern Minas Gerais and So Paulo States. 
- 15 - 
However, 	lack 	of soil 	conservation 	has 	reduced 	its 	value 
considerably. South of the Amazon forest and west of the semi-
deciduous forest, most of the interior is covered by woodland 
savannah known as "campo cerrado". It is unsuitable for crop growing 
without the use of fertilizers. The "pantanal", a mixture of wet 
savannah and palm trees, is located in the flood plain of the Alto 
Rio Paraguay, and, in the dry season, it is used for cattle grazing. 
The temperate zone in the South is, in terms of vegetation, quite 
distinct from the rest of Brazil. In the far south are the grasslands 
used for cattle raising and wheat growing, and, north of the rio 
Urugual, it is thickly forested with semi-deciduous pine trees and 
broadleaf deciduous trees. Much of it has been reforested with 
eucalyptus and softwoods. 
Regi ons 
The country can be divided naturally into five large regions 
(see figure 1.2). The North is the largest and least inhabited, and 
includes the states of Parã, Amazonas andAcre, and the territories 
of Amapá, RoraTma and Rondãnia. The North-East is the poorest region 
in Brazil, with extremely low income levels. It comprises the states 
of Maranho, Piaui, Cearä, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, 
Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia. 
The richest and most densely populated region is the South East, 
(sometimes referred to as South Central). It is the industrial and 
economic heart of the country, and comprises the states of Rio de 
Janeiro*, Espirito Santo, S&o Paulo and Minas Gerais. The South is 
*The present state of Rio de Janeiro replaces the old federal dis-
trict of the same name and the state of Guanabara. 
- 
Figure 1.2 	Regional Divisions in Brazil 
300 km 
Source : Guia Rodoviaria do Brasil, April 1980. 
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very European and includes the states of Paran, Santa Catarina and 
Rio Grande do Sul. The sparsely populated, and often "forgotten" 
Centre West region consists of the states of Golas, Mato Grosso, Mato 
Grosso do Sul and the new Federal District (Distrito Federal) of 
Brasfl ia. 
Principal Cities 
The centre of the Brazilian Federal Government is in the new 
capital, Brasi'lia.This specially designed city was inaugurated, in 
1960, as a showpiece of modern Brazilian architecture and town 
planning. It is situated almost in the geometric centre of the 
country, and it was intended to open the way for the development of 
the interior. Its population has reached almost one million 
inhabitants. Rio de Janeiro was the old Federal Capital for 200 
years. Many describe it as the most beautiful city in the world. It 
is a great industrial, cultural and tourist centre, with a population 
of approximately five million. 
The largest city in Brazil is the sprawling conurbation of So 
Paulo. It is the major industrial and commercial centre, with a 
population variously estimated as between seven and ten million. If 
there is no decrease in its growth rate of 350 000 per year it will 
be the largest city in the world by the end of this century. Belo 
Horizonte, a new, characterless city, the capital of Minas Gerais, is 
growing fast as an industrial centre and forms the third apex of the 
industrial triangle formed with the cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro. Recife is the most important industrial city in the North 
and Salvador, a cultural and tourist centre, was the very first 
Brazilian capital. Manaus, in the heart of the Amazon basin, was an 
important city during the rubber boom of the nineteenth century, but, 
after a long decline, it is currently being bolstered by the 
Brazilian economy and has been created a "zona franca" (free trade 
zone) (120). 
History of Brazil 
Brazil was discovered by the Portuguese navigator Pedro Alvares 
Cabral in 1500 A.D.. The original inhabitants were Tupi-Guarani 
Indians, and the first European settlement was in Salvador, Bahia. In 
1494, before the discovery of Brazil, Pope Alexander VI, in an 
attempt to forestall territorial disputes between Spain and Portugal, 
had drawn up the Treaty of Tordesillas. This established an imaginary 
line, the Tordesillas Line, running from the North Pole to the South 
Pole 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. Lands to the east of 
this line were to belong to Portugal, and those to the west to Spain. 
This should have put most of Brazil under Spanish control, however, 
with no frontiers in their way the Portuguese explorers pushed into 
the hinterland, and when, after a period of 60 years under the 
Spanish Crown, they recovered their autonomy in 1640, they refused to 
relinquish the lands they had occupied west of the Tordesillas Line. 
The frontiers of Brazil which were recognised during its time as a 
Portuguese colony were retained after its independence in 1822. 
The varied racial mix to be found in Brazil is as a result of 
the settlement patterns which have emerged over the years. The first 
settlers were wealthy Portuguese who established large sugar 
plantations, in the North East, and imported slaves from West Africa 
and Angola to work them. As a result, the dominant racial type in 
that region is a mixture of European and negro. The South and South 
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East received large numbers of immigrants from Europe, principally of 
Portuguese, German, Italian and Slav descent, as well as some Arabs. 
In fact, immigration only effectively began after 1850 and different 
groups settled in different regions. 
The Germans and some of the Italians went to the South, as small 
scale agriculturalists, whereas the Portuguese and other Italians 
concentrated in the South East as industrialists. In addition, a 
large influx of Japanese into Brazil between the two World Wars gives 
So Paulo city the largest population of Japanese in any city outside 
Tokyo. They have retained their racial identity, and have been very 
successful as farmers and market gardeners. In the Amazon region the 
racial mix is between Amerindian and European, but only within the 
cities has there been any intermarrying(121). 
Brazil tries hard to portray the picture of being a homogeneous 
society, where there is no social or employment prejudice, despite 
the complex variety of ethnic types. In many ways this is the case, 
but it is an undeniable fact that the rich and powerful are white, or 
predominantly so, the poor tend to be black, and the Amerindians are 
definitely third class citizens. As time passes, the situation is 
becoming more explosive(122). 
The first system of government adopted by the settlers was a 
form of feudal principality, which was then replaced by a viceroy in 
1572. In the same year. the colony experimentally divided into two; in 
the main, settlers from the north of Portugal went to the north of 
Brazil, capital Salvador, and those from south Portugal to south 
Brazil, capital Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro was made the sole 
capital in 1763. A colonial constitution remained in force for three 
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hundred years, and it was not until towards the end of the eighteenth 
century that nationalism arose, and the settlers began to resent 
paying revenue to the Portuguese Crown. However, independence 
resulted mainly from the enforced exile of the Portuguese Royal 
Family in Brazil in 1808. In 1815 the United Kingdom of Brazil and 
Portugal was established, and in 1822, Prince Pedro, heir to the 
Portuguese throne, gave in to the pressures from the ruling sectors 
of the colonial society and declared Brazil an independent Empire. 
He abdicated in 1831 in favour of his five year old son, Dom 
Pedro II, who was placed in the charge of a regent.Dom Pedro II ruled 
for nearly 50 years after assuming power in 1840. He was a good ruler 
who encouraged agriculture, promoted education, increased 
communications and stamped out corruption. He also encouraged the 
use of electricity (see p.72). He abolished slavery in May 1888, and 
it was this act which lost him his crown. He was banished to Europe 
in November 1889, and Brazil became a Federal Republic, divided into 
states. 
The period of the First Republic lasted until 1930. It was a 
comparatively eventless time of expansion and reasonable prosperity. 
Presidents were elected and succeeded each other in office. In 1930 
the Government was overthrown, by force, by a revolutionary movement 
led by Getullo Vargas, Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, who assumed 
executive power as dictator. He introduced a new constitution in 1934 
and gave the vote to women. As a result of the social measures he 
introduced he became known as the "Father of the Poor", but was 
forced to resign in October 1945. He was succeeded by Eurico G. Dutra 
as elected president. However, Vargas was elected back into office as 
President in 1950, only to commit suicide in 1954 during 
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investigations of corruption within his administration. Jucelino 
Kubitschek came to power in 1955, and his main claim to fame was 
probably the moving of the Federal Capital to Brasilia. 
The early 1960s were years of political unrest, with the 
resignation of President Jnio Quadros after seven months, and, in 
1964, a military takeover of the Government deposed President Joo 
Goulart and put General H.A. Castello Branco into power. Brazil has 
been under military rule ever since, although moves are being made to 
return to a civilian government. This is planned for 1985(123) but 
there are doubts that the current Government, under President Joo 
Batista Figueiredo and his supporters, will then hand over the 
power(124). 
The political climate is changing from the somnalent euphoria of 
the "economic miracle" years of the later 1960s. The world energy 
crisis, followed by the world economic recession, has hit Brazil 
hard. The widening gap between the rich and the poor has brought 
about social unrest with strikes in key. industries(125). The fear 
that civilian power will not return is encouraging the emergence of 
political activists. For the period of study covered in this thesis, 
Brazil has remained in a relatively stable situation, except for the 
early 1960s, but there is no guarantee that this changing mood will 
not, in the future, affect proposed plans and developments. 
Resources 
i. Minerals 
Brazil possesses substantial deposits of minerals, some of which 
have already been exploited, starting with the gold and diamond rush 
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of the eighteenth century in the state of Minas Gerais. This state is 
still the centre of the mining industry, where it is the main 
Brazilian producer of iron ore, bauxite, niobium, beryllium, 
zirconium, quartz crystals, graphite, mica, marble and talc. Copper, 
lead and tungsten are mined in other states. The existence of 
extensive mineral deposits in the Amazon Basin is suspected, but, as 
yet, there has been no large scale attempt to exploit them. 
Brazil's major mineral assets include some of the largest 
reserves of high quality iron ore - located in the "Iron Quadrangle" 
of Minas Gerais, and in the Carajäs mountains in the Amazon basin. 
Mining of the latter has only recently begun(126), but, in 1974, 
75 190 metric tons of ore weie mined in Minas Gerais, of which 
59 429 metric tons were exported(127). Reserves of bauxite are 
extensive. The Trombetas and Paragominas reserves in the Amazon basin 
are extremely large (over 10 9 tons), and the utilisation of these 
reserves was the original reasoning behind the construction of UHE 
Tucuruf (see chapter6 ). Despite coniderable bauxite reserves in 
Minas Gerais as well as the Amazon region, Brazil still has to import 
aluminium metal, as its own production is insufficient to meet 
internal demand. 
Niobium is a major Brazilian export. The largest reserves in the 
world of pyrochlore (the ore) are found in Brazil, which supplies 60% 
of the Western World's total consumption of the ore. There are a 
number of large reserves of nickel and titanium ores which, as yet, 
cannot be exploited as they are in a form where commercial extraction 
is not yet possible. The reserves of copper ore are very small and 
inadequate to meet the country's demands. However, the two principal 
mineral deficiencies, from which Brazil suffers, are very small 
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reserves of poor quality coal and an almost complete lack of oil. The 
major coal reserves are to be found in Santa Catarina, and a major 
development programme is in progress to increase production for use 
in the steel industry. However, the ash content of the coal must be 
reduced before it can be used(128). 
It is difficult to obtain accurate information on Brazilian oil 
reserves, estimates are often coloured with optimism. Evidence of oil 
is periodically located, but there have been no announcements of 
major finds. Much of the search is operated by means of risk contracts 
awarded to foreign companies exploring the continental shelf off the 
north east coast of Brazil(129). The situation precipitated by the 
world oil crisis in 1973, sharply affected the balance of payments of 
this oil importing country(130) and is responsible for the adoption 
of Brazil's ambitious alcohol programme, where sugar cane and cassava 
are processed to produce alcohol of a grade suitable for use in cars 
(see p.30)(131,132). 
Agriculture 
Agriculture forms a vital part of the Brazilian economy. In 1977 
it accounted for 14% of the gross domestic product, 60% of exports, 
and 44% of the country's workforce. Despite some modernization it Is 
still a low productivity industry. However, 95% of the domestic food 
needs were met by internal production, with the exception of wheat. 
The principal export crop is coffee, closely followed by soya beans, 
and then sugar, cocoa, maize, tobacco, cottonand fruits(133,134). 
Industry 
The industrial sector has been the most dynamic sector of the 
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Brazilian economy since the end of the Second World War. This has 
been due partly to government policies, but also to external 
influences. Until 1930, industrial growth was slow, and Brazil 
depended on its coffee exports for foreign exchange earnings. The 
Wall Street Crash in New York, in 1929, meant the collapse of the 
coffee market with the result that the government encouraged 
investment in manufacturing instead. By 1939 a growth rate of 5% per 
year had been achieved. 
The Second World War was accompanied by a restriction of the 
international markets for, the traditional agricultural goods, and 
made importation of other goods difficult. This boosted the 
industrial growth rate to 5.5% per year. After the war Brazil adopted 
a policy of importation of industrial equipment, and essential raw 
materials, and introduced selective import controls on consumer 
goods. From then, until 1961, the average industrial growth rate was 
9.7% per year. Inflation in the early 1960s caused stagnation of 
industry and in the rest of the Brazilian economy. Until that time, 
the economic policies pursued had relied on the belief that 
stimulation of industrial growth would create the necessary 
conditions for national development. 
After the 1964 revolution new economic policies were adopted. 
Foreign investment was 'attracted back into Brazil with a reduction of 
the rate of inflation and a reformation of the fiscal and money 
systems. The manufactured goods and consumer durables industries 
expanded. , But the oil crisis, and the accompanying increase in oil 
prices in 1973, led to a reappraisal of Brazilian industrial policy, 
and a reduction in the importation of oil, in order to improve the 
balance of payments. According to the Second National Development 
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Plan, development will be concentrated in certain basic industrial 
sectors, including capital goods, petrochemicals, electronics and the 
steel industry(135). 
It is noticable that this policy of import substitution is 
having a dramatic effect in the electrical power industry. Whereas, 
in the 1960s the heavy generating equipment and other machinery 
imported for the UHE Furnas project was 95% imported(136), 90% of it 
is produced in Brazil for the UHE Itaipu project(137). The net result 
of this industrial expansion has been a rapid increase in the need 
for electrical energy, and much of the Brazilian energy programme is 
aimed at meeting these needs. 
The main industries in Brazil are centred in the industrialised 
state of So Paulo, and include motor cars, shipbuilding, metals 
(principally steel), foodstuffs,textiles and chemicals(138). 
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CHAPTER 2 
Electrical Energy in Brazil 
Energy Profile of Brazil 
"It will not be possible to grow rapidly without a rapid 
expansion in the supply of energy ... In the long run Brazil must have 
its own basic sources of energy. A strategy aimed at this objective 
will take at least a decade and will depend essentially on the 
results of prospecting for petroleum, exploitation of shale, 
discovery of important deposits of uranium and on the best solution 
which world technology finds for the principal new form of energy as 
a substitute for oil"(139). 
This statement from the Brazilian Government's Second National 
Development plan shows the emphasis which Brazil puts upon energy as 
a development tool., and the line of thought being taken as to 
possible energy sources. It neglects the country's primary source of 
electrical energy, hydroelectricity, as it is "taken for granted" 
that this source will be developed to the full. 
When Brazil entered its accelerated phase of post-Second World 
War industrialization there was an exodus of rural peoples to urban 
centres, and an increase of the per capita energy consumption(140). 
According to Goldberg, the energy consumption as a function of per 
capita income increased in a similar manner to the increase observed 
in the developed countries, and Brazil adopted the energy-intensive 
consumption patterns of the great industrial countries(141). 
From figure 2.1 it can be seen that the relative importance of 
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Figure 2.1 	Energy Consumption in Brazil, 190-190 
100% 
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Source : Goldemburg J. "Brazil : Energy Options and 
Current Outlook", Science, Vol.200, i+ April 1978, 
p. i60. 
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biomass decreased dramatically, whilst the consumption of oil, 
which at the time was still cheap and abundant, rose considerably. 
Coal maintained its traditionally insignificant role, but the share 
of hydroelectric power increased to 	20% of total 	energy 
consumption(142). 
As a result there is an increase in the importation of petroleum 
oil, and from figure 2.2 the estimates indicate that consumption of 
petroleum oil and similar products will continue to rise, although 
Brazil has to import most of that which it consumes. The contribution 
of biomass remains almost constant, showing just a slight increase, 
but although consumption of hydroelectric power and nuclear power are 
expected to rise sharply, so is the consumption of petroleum and 
other liquid fuels. 
Table 11.1 	Non-renewable Energy Resources in Brazil 
Resource Reserves Total Energy % of 
1972 Content Total 
x106 tons x1015 J 
Crude oil 106.5 4 687 11.1 
Natural 	gas 35.8 .1 468 3.3 
Shale oil 497.0 21 868 52.0 
Coal 688.0 32.7 
Uraniumk 0.0032 309 0.7 
Source : Goldberg (J.), Science, 200 (April), 1978, 162. 
t 
From tablell.i, which shows the proven reserves of Brazil's non- 
renewable energy resources, it may be seen how disappointing the oil 
reserves are. Despite there being over 3x106 km2 of onshore 
sedimentary basins and 800 000 km 2 of offshore continental shelf in 
Brazil, the results of oil exploration have not been encouraging. 
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Since 1939, more than 3 900 wells have been drilled, but the 
recoverable reserves are only 106x106 tonnes, and annual production 
covers less than internal needs. The rest has to be imported(143). 
The Second National Development Plan projected a massive 
prospecting programme on the continental shelf and a production 
programme to raise the investment by the Government from 1975-1979 in 
this area by 225% over that in the period 1970-1974. It was expected 
that total investments in oil would be at least Cr$ 56x10 9 (1979 
prices)(144). Much of the prospecting being undertaken is by means of 
risk contracts awarded to foreign companies(145). 
In addition to trying to increase internal production of 
petroleum oil, Brazil has embarked upon a programme of 
electrification of the railways(146), and, in 1975, the Programa 
Nacional do Alcohol (PNA) was launched. Brazil's first experiments, 
in the 1920s, with gasohol, a mixture of petrol and alcohol, were so 
successful that in the next decade it became mandatory for alcohol to 
be added to petrol. This was not an energy conservation measure, but 
a means of ensuring the market for sugarcane products. However, the 
PNA is a conservation measure, and originally it was intended to 
establish the addition of up to 20% of alcohol to petrol as a 
national goal. 
With the implied expanded market for ethanol, there has been 
considerable research into alternative feedstocks for alcohol 
distilleries. Of the existing or approved projects, as of July 1978, 
there were 208, sugarcane was the primary raw material, but also 
approved were cassava, sweet sorghum and babassu (a native Amazonian 
palm)(147). In fact, the first commercial plant in the world for the 
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production of fuel alcohol from cassava was started up byPETROBRAS 
(the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation) in December 1977(148). Despite 
high investments and even higher initial costs, alcohol fuels would 
appear to have good prospects, and be able to recover capital in 
terms of the savings made on petroleum imports(149). Although the PNA 
programme has to overcome a number of problems, "it holds much 
promise for providing substantial energy and technological 
independence for South America's largest country"(150). 
In 1977, petroleum accounted for 43% of Brazil's primary 
consumption, in a period of only a decade (1966-1976) it displaced 
biomass as the major primary energy source(151). However, Brazil is 
now urgently implementing petroleum substitution programmes as a 
result of the sudden escalation of the price of petroleum oil in 
1973. In 1977, foreign petroleum alone consumed approximately 40% of 
Brazil's export revenues; with a resulting problem in the balance of 
payments, increased rate of inflation and a slow down in the GNP 
growth rate. Although the crisis occurred in 1973, the 
price of petroleum continues to rise, putting a severe financial 
strain on oil importing countries, especially those in the "Third 
World"(152). Inflation in Brazil has risen at an alarming rate, 
exceeding 100% in 1980(153). Much of this rapid inflation has been 
blamed on the rising price of oil(154). 
By 1979, Brazil's external dependence on petroleum oil for the 
transport system and for industry (including the petrochemical 
industry) had surpassed 80%, and it was suggested that if 1% of the 
national territory be dedicated to the cultivation of sugarcane, 
cassava and other crops for alcohol production, the energy produced 
would be greater than three power stations the size of UHE 
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Itaipu(155), however, the environmental problems, in terms, of land 
use and food production would be immense. In 1979, not only was 
alcohol mixed with petrol, but there were cars running solely on 
alcohol ,and a number of Government agencies were maintaining fleets 
of such cars(156). 
In December 1976, the Federal Government created the Projeto 
Ipiranga in order to study alternative sources of non-conventional 
energy, such as micro-hydrostations, alcohol power stations, and the 
use of wave and wind power, solar energy and animal wastes. Most of 
these power sources, if established, would be for isolated systems in 
the North and North East regions(157). Other than fuel for transport, 
and use of wood for cooking in some areas, most, of Brazil's energy 
consumption is in the form of electricity. 
Coal 
Less than half the coal consumed in Brazil is used to generate 
electricity. Brazilian coal is of poor quality, with a high ash and 
sulphur content. The coal mined in the state of Santa Catarina is of 
better quality, and can be used for the production of metallurgical 
grade coking coal, whereas that from the states of Rio Grande do Sul 
and Paranä is only suitable for power stations. 
Brazilian coal is expensive due to the mining difficulties, the 
requirement for treatment before use, and expensive transport costs 
as a result of poor transport facilities. Therefore, coal-fired 
power stations are uncommon, and tend to exist close to the mines or 
near to the ports where coal is imported. (Ironically, imported coal 
is cheaper than that produced locally)(158). At the beginning of 
1974, there were only seven coal-fired power stations in operation in 
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Brazil, with a total installed capacity of 518 MW. Of these it was 
planned to retire three from operation that year (total capacity 62 
MW), but a further two were under construction with installed 
capacities of 250 MW and 300 MW respectively. All of these coal-fired 
power stations are in the South region. It has, however, been decided 
that reserves in the region of Candiota, Rio Grande do Sul are such 
that it would be economical to construct a 1 200 MW coal-fired power 
station there, with a fuel cost competitive with that of nuclear 
fuel. The cost of use of coal in Santa Catarina was not considered 
competitive with nuclear fuel. 
The high market projection for proposed generating installations 
for 1975-1985 suggested increasing the installed capacity of the two 
largest coal-fired stations, UTE Jorge Lacerda, in Santa Catarina, 
and UTE Candiota II, in Rio Grande do Sul to 482 MW and 432 MW 
respectively by 1980(159), but, according to the expansion programme 
in progress, UTE Jorge Lacerda is to have an installed capacity of 
482 MW by mid-1980, and UHE Presidente Medici, in Rio Grande do Sul, 
is to undergo expansion, in 1983, to reach an installed capacity of 
452 MW(160), instead of the previously proposed expansion of UTE 
Candi ota. 
Oil-fired power stations 
The continuing increase in the price of petroleum oil has had a 
marked effect on the economic viability of Brazil's oil-fired power 
stations. In 1974, the cost of firm energy from such stations was 
17.75 US$mill/kWh and has risen steadily. There are seven principal 
oil-fired power stations in operation, in the states of Rio de 
Janeiro, So Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. A further 125 MW station is 
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under construction in Minas -Gerais. The total installed capacity is 
1 155 MW, and a further 107 MW are operated by autoproducers. The 
two largest oil-fired stations are the old 'Light' stations of UTE 
Santa Cruz (560 MW) and UTE Piratinga (410 MW)(161)/. No new oil-fired 
stations are planned, and all the operation plans are trying to 
maximise the use of hydraulic energy. 
Nuclear power 
One of the most controversial aspects of Brazil's electric 
energy programme is the move towards nuclear power. It is a difficult 
subject upon which to acquire accurate information, even for those 
employed in the industry(162). ELETROBRAS is responsible for all 
electricity generation, but Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S.A. 
(NUCLEBRAS) is the state holding company with responsibility for the 
Brazilian nuclear programme. At present, none of Brazil's electricity 
is nuclear generated, and there are only two nuclear power stations 
under construction, Angra dos Reis I and II. 
Many countries suspect Brazil's motives for developing a nuclear 
power programme, especially as it refused to sign the treaty of non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1968(163). Brazil, however, 
states its intention is to ensure that it will be in a position to 
meet its future energy needs without depending on external sources of 
supply( 164). 
The Brazilian Government first announced its proposal to 
initiate a nuclear energy programme in 1965. The first station was 
proposed to have a potential of 500 MW and to be installed in the 
South East region. It was to start operation in the middle of the 
1970s as a pioneering project to develop technical experience and 
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expertise in the planning, construction and operation of nuclear 
power stations, as well as to speed up the introduction of the 
specialised technology needed by Brazilian industry(165). 
The original plans, drawn up in the early 1970s, called for 60 
nuclear power stations by the year 2 000, with an installed capacity 
of 75 GW. Its scale reflected the optimistic mood which prevailed at 
the peak of Brazil's "economic miracle". The number was soon reduced 
to a more realistic figure of eight(166). In 1972, the American 
company, Westinghouse Electric, was awarded the contract to build 
Brazil's first commercial nuclear power station at Angra dos Reis, 
150 km south west of Rio de Janeiro. It is a pressurised water 
reactor (PWR) with a generating capacity of 626 MW. It was originally 
scheduled to start operation at the end of June 1976(167), but it has 
continually been beset with problems and surrounded by controversy. 
The reactor is the standard PWR type sold by Westinghouse, and its 
construction has required no contribution from national manufacturing 
capacity. The share of local suppliers i.n the project has only been 
8, and this comprised civil engineering works. 
The site is reputed to be in Brazil's only known seismically 
active area, and there have been persistent problems with the 
foundations, due to the inadequate geological survey work originally 
done. The old Indian name for the beach on which construction is 
taking place, Itaorna, should have given a clue to the state of the 
bedrock, it means "rotting stone". By 1980, the start up was 
scheduled for 1981(168), in the third quarter(169), but to date there 
have been no newspaper reports that this has occurred. 
It must be remembered that at the time of the world oil crisis 
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in 1973, the technology for extremely long distance transmission of 
electricity was not well developed, thus the enormous reserves of 
hydraulic potential available in the Amazon Basin could not be 
considered as readily exploitable for supply to the industrial market 
of the South East region. As a result the almost universal cry from 
the electrical power industry was for nuclear power(170-172). 
Technical studies carried out in 1973-1974 concluded that Brazil 
needed to have 10 GW of nuclear power on stream by 1990. Therefore, 
two further plants were scheduled to begin operation in 1982 and 1983 
respectively, each with an installed capacity of 1.25 GW. It was 
decided that two light water/enriched uranium reactors should be 
built, using West German technology. In June 1975 an agreement was 
signed between Brazil and West Germany for the latter to supply the 
former with a total of eight nuclear reactors, an uranium enrichment 
plant, and a plant for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel(173). 
The German agreement thus encompasses all, the aspects of nuclear 
technology, and the Brazilians are able to reach the capability of 
operating the complete nuclear fuel cycle. The uranium enrichment 
plant would break the North American monopoly, and the fuel recycling 
plant would enable the extraction of plutonium, which could be used 
for nuclear weapons(174). 
However, at present, Brazil's main concern is the problem of 
constructing Angra II, on the same site as Angra I. Necessary 
reinforcements to the foundations have caused considerable delay, and 
the current schedule for start of operation of Angra II is mid-1986, 
and for the third station Angra III is mid-1987(175). These three 
power stations will be operated by Centrais Elétricas de Furnas 
(FURNAS),which has had to bear the excessive extra costs which have 
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been incurred as a result of modificatiôhs and delays, mainly in the 
form of interest payments, totalling more than US$ 320x106 (1980 
prices). As a result, when Angra I does come on stream, FURNAS will 
have to raise the price of its electricity to cover these costs. 
The costs of the projects have tripled since the original 
estimates, and the financing loan of US$ 1.7x10 9 (1980 prices) is the 
largest ever obtained for a Brazilian project. As a result, there is 
a difficulty in persuading any of the electricity utilities to build 
the fourth nuclear power station. The Federal Government and 
NUCLEBRAS are pressurising CESP, but it prefers to build 
hydroelectric power stations at a quarter of the cost(176). 
This difficulty has resulted in rumours that the Brazilian 
Government is going to renege on its agreement with West Germany. 
Certainly Brazil now sees no need for any extra nuclear power before 
1995, other than from Angra's 1,11 and 111(177), and the impression 
given is that it is quietly trying to forget that it has a nuclear 
programme. There is now serious opposition to nuclear power by the 
Brazilian public, and although Brazil reaffirmed, in 1977, that it 
had no intention of reviewing its 1975 agreement with West 
Germany(178), there is much pressure to do so(179). However, in an 
interview, in 1980, the then Minister of the Ministério das Minas e 
Energia (MME), César Gals, reiterated that the Brazilian nuclear 
programme is important, as it is predicted that after the year 2 000 
Brazil will have to rely on nuclear power(180). 
Hydraulic Resources 
Brazil has an enormous potential for hydroelectric power 
generation, and increased use of this potential was one of Brazil's 
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responses to the 1973 oil crisis. In fact, the World Bank has 
estimated that 60 developing countries plan to add 100 GW of 
hydrocapacity in the 1980s, although this is only a fraction of •their 
estimated potential of 1 200 GW(181). 
Estimates of the available hydraulic potential increase with 
time as improved methods of measurement and more precise information 
become available(182). In the.4940s, Brazil was ranked fourth in the 
world after the USSR, USA and Canada. Its estimated potential was 
then 15 GW. However, it was considered then, and it is still true, 
that estimates of water resources potential for power are unimportant 
without reference to the people who might use that power. In the 
1940s, the potential available at the Iguaçu and Guiara falls in the 
state of Paranâ was considered of little value, as the power could 
not be transmitted further than 400 km at that time, and there were 
no industrial towns within that radius to use the power. One engineer 
was quoted as saying 
"Talk of the establishment of great industrial centres in 
the future in these remote and isolated places remains 
largely in the field of real estate promotion -....The map of 
population is of more basic importance than the map of 
waterfalls in any attempt to interpret the potential power 
reserves of a country like Brazil"(183). 
Until the 1960s, figures given for the hydroelectric potential 
in Brazil were essentially guesses, based upon very little verifiable 
information (due to the scarcity of accurate hydrological, geological 
and other data), and they were constrained within the maximum 
possible transmission distances. 
It was only in the last twenty years, with the beginnings of a 
comprehensive electrical power industry in Brazil, that river basin 
hydroelectric potential inventories began to be made (see p.I8). The 
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Table II.ii : Historic Evolution of Brazilian Hydraulic Potential 
Year Firm Energy MWav Potential Inventories 
MW Known 	Estimated Total 
Up to 1955 - 	 - 7 500 15 000 None 
1955 - 	 - 13 000 26 000 
1961 17 000 33 000 50 000 100 000 1st Amazon est. 
1966 42 000 	33 000 75 000 150 000 CANAMBRA inv. 
1978 56 900 47 600 104 500 209 000 All 	Amazon est. 
Source : Schulman (M.), Energia Elétrica, Ano 2 (20), 1979, 66. 
first surveys were carried out by CANAMBRA, and, later, by ELETROBRAS 
and its subsidiaries. Of major importance to Brazil, in the 1960s, 
was the hydroelectric potential available in the industrial South 
East region and, as a result, CANAMBRA's first. studies were in this 
region(184), followed by further studies in the South region(185). 
The CANAMBRA consortium was then contracted to extend its studies to 
the Northern region, under the co-ordination of the Comitê 
Coordenador de Estudos Energéticos da Amazonia (ENERAM), in order to 
survey the hydroelectric potentials near to the development poles in 
the region (see p.159). This was soon followed by an inventory of the 
potential of the basin of the rio So Francisco, co-ordinated by the 
Comitê Coordenador de Estudos Energêticos da Regio Nordeste 
(ENERNORDE)(186). Finally, attention was turned to the whole Amazon 
basin, with studies being made by ELETRONORTE. 
An inventory of the Amazon Basin has only recently become 
worthwhile, partly due to the possibility of long distance high 
voltage d.c. transmission, and partly due to the exhaustion of the 
hydroelectric potential in the industrial South East(187). Attention 
is also being refocussed on the rio Uruguay basin, as the change in 
j 
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base conditions - the rise in oil prices, and the South East region 
power interconnection, have made development of this river more 
economically attractive than when first studied by CANAMBRA in the 
late 1960s(188). 
Previously economic alternatives for power production in some 
areas are now extremely expensive, with rising fuel costs for the 
Amazonian oil-fired power stations making this form of energy 
prohibitively expensive.(189). In addition, a new philosophy has 
arisen in Brazil with respect to hydroelectric power development. The 
original surveys of river basins were purely to assess the potential 
for power but, more recently, there has been the evolution of the 
Brazilian awareness of the wider role of water than solely for the 
production of energy. This has led to the first efforts in the 
standardisation of the studies of water resources, through the 
development of integrated planning for the utilisation of the natural 
resources of the river basins. An example of this occurs in the rio 
So Francisco basin, where measures are being taken to regulate the 
river flow and to prevent the occurrence of serious floods(190). 
This new and broader perspective on water resources planning can 
also have the effect of improving the economic viability of 
developments intended primarily for hydroelectric power production. 
This is particularly true in the basins of the rio Paralba do Sul and 
the lower rio Doce, where the hydro-generation could be 
advantageously combined with urban water storage, effluent disposal, 
navigation and irrigation. The construction and operation costs would 
be shared between the various utilities involved, thus making some 
small hydroelectric schemes more economically attractive(191). 
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Brazil can be divided into eight principal hydrographic basins, 
as shown in figure 2.3. The divisions chosen are fairly arbitrary as 
there are a number of large rivers in the country, thus, the division 
of Brazil into principal basins depends mainly on topographical 
evidence, and also upon the economic and political importance of 
different regions. (Although separated out, the Urugual basin is a 
sub-basin of the ParanS basin, and the Tocantins-Araguaia basin is a 
sub-basin of the Amazon basin). The largest, and least exploited, 
basin is that of the river Amazon. The most exploited is the second 
largest, the Paranâ basin, in whose headwaters are most of the So 
Paulo river development schemes. 
Table 11.111 : Hydraulic Potential in Brazil, by Region 
River Basin 	 Ara *2 	 Estimated Potential GW 
xlO km 1971 * 	 1978 -f 
/?(h• 2 
) N.E. 	Atlantic 885 0.4 
S. 	Francisco 631 14.6 
E. 	Atlantic 569 7.8 - 
S.E. 	Atlantic 224 2.4 - 
UruguaI 178 2.0 
Paranä 1 237 45.7 
Tocantins- 803 0.7 
Araguaia 
Total(est.+dev.) - 79.3 209.0 
Sources 
C.Log. SQ 	 69 
* Anon., Mundo Elétrico, Ano 12(139), 1971, 29. 
# ELETROBRAS public relations document "Brazil 209 milhöes de kW" 
From to-&tesIi.iii and II.iv, it is apparent that more than 
half of Brazil's hydroelectric potential is estimated, not firm. This 
a 
is principally because 72.2% of the potential in the region of 
r 
ci fe 
- 1+2 - 
Figure 2.3 	Principal Hyd.rographic Basins in Brazil 
1 - Amazonas Basin 
2 - Tocantins Basin 
3 - Basins of the NINE Atlantic 
1+ - Sao Francisco Basin 
5 -,Basins of the E Atlantic 
6 - Parana Basin 
7 - Uruguai Basin 
8 - Basins of the SE Atlantic 
Pa - Rio Paraná 
Pg - Rio Paraguai 
Pn - Rio Parnaiba 
S - Rio Solirnes 
SF - Rio So Francisco 
T - Rio Tocantins 
U— Rio Uruguai 
X - Rio Xingu 
Source 	Mundo Eletrico, Ano 18, no.207A, December 1976, p.86. 
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Table II.iv : Hydraulic Potential, by Subsidiary 
Region 	 Installed Potential 
0ev. or 	 Inv. 	 Est. 	Total 
constr. 
GW 	% 	GW 	% 	GW 
ELETRONORIE 4.1 4.4 21.1 23.4 70.8 72.2 96.0 
CHESF 8.3 48,5 5.6 47.9 0.5 3.6 14.4 
FURNAS 23.2 41.3 18.5 35.3 13.4 23.4 55.1 
ELETROSUL 13.3 29.3 16.5 43.3 13.7 27.4 43.5 
Total 48.9 22.0 61.7 32.4 98.4 45.6 209.0 
Source : Schulman (M.), Energia Elétrica, Ano 2 (20), 1979, 68. 
operation of ELETRONORTE has yet to be assessed. In the industrial 
South East, the region of operation of FURNAS, the high figure for 
the percentage of estimated potential, 23.4%, is a result of the 
non-inventoried areas in Mato Grosso do Sul, and of the re-appraisal 
of some regions previously rejected as economically non-viable. 
The usually quoted figure for the hydroelectric potential in 
Brazil is 209 GW. Of this approximately 90 GW are to be found in 
Amazon basin(192,193) Although it is likely that a considerable 
amount of the available potential will eventually be used from the 
north flowing tributaries of the river Amazon, development of the 
south flowing tributaries is likely to be only in isolated areas, in 
order to satisfy individual markets. 
The total figure for the estimated hydroelectric potential of 
209 GW, puts Brazil in third place in the world, behind China and the 
USSR, in terms of available hydroelectric resources. For calculation 
of the firm energy Brazil uses a capacity factor of 50% for 
conventional power stations, which gives a value for the firm energy 
H- 
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of 104.5 GW av.. This estimate does not take into account the 
possibilities of the inclusion of pumped storage or mini-
hydroelectric schemes(194). 
Pumped storage is now being considered in Brazil as it appears 
to be economically attractive. The topographical and geological 
conditions are particularly advantageous, with substantial pumped 
storage sites being available close to the main load centres. Pumped 
storage facilities, for peak-power supply on a daily/weekly basis, 
are economically attractive due to their low investment costs and the 
low marginal prices of the energy consumed in the pumping cycle. The 
investment costs in the industrial South East would be in the range 
of US$ 200-260 per kW installed (1981 prices), including interest 
charges during construction. There would also be a minimum saving of 
US$ 150 per kW in transmission costs, which would add significantly 
to the total benefits(195-197). 
Electrical Energy in Brazil 
The general economic decline which occurred in Brazil and 
precipitated the 1964 revolution, was also mirrored by a decline in 
the electric power industry. Operating with tariffs based on the 
historic cost of investments, most of the enterprises involved were 
in the process of economic and financial destruction. The standard of 
service offered was inadequate and suffering from stagnation (see 
p.119). The transmission and distribution networks were not expanding 
to meet needs and, in some areas, there arose the paradox of energy 
being available but with no means of supplying it to the consumer. In 
June 1964, the revolutionary government defined a new policy for the 
electric power industry, outlining the courses of action to be taken 
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Table II.v : Installed Generating Capacity in Brazil 
Year 	Hydro 	 Thermal 	Total 	Annual 
Increase 
GW 	 GW 	 GW 	 GW 
1962 4.126 72.0 1.603 28.0 5.729  
1963 4,479 70.5 1.876 29.5 6.355. 0.626 10.9 
1964 4.894 71.5 1.946 28.5 6.840 0.485 7.6 
1965 5.391 72.7 2.020 27.3 7,411 0.571 8.3 
1966 5.524 73.0 2.042 27.0 7.566 0.155 2.0 
1967 5.787 72.0 2.255 28.0 8.042 0.476 6.3 
1968 6.183 72.2 2.372 27.8 8.555 0.531 6.4 
1969 7.857 76.6 2.405 23.4 10.262 1.707 20.0 
1970 8.828 78.6 2.405 21.4 11.233 0.971 9.5 
1971 10.244 80.9 2.426 19.1 12.670 1.437 13.0 
1972 10.756 81.4 2.450 18.6 13.206 0.536 4.2 
1973 12.500 81.0 2.936 19.0 15.436 2.230 16.9 
1974 13.757 81.3 3.162 18.7 16.919 1.483 9.6 
1975 16.184 82.7 3.385 17.3 19.569 2.650 15.7 
1976 17.675 83.9 3.385 16.1 21.060 1.491 7.6 
1977 19.038 84.1 3.599 15.9 22.637 1.577 7.5 
1978 21.576 . 	 85.6 3.627 14.4 25.203 2.566 11.3 
Source : ELETROBRAS 1978 report,p.lO. 
by the authorities responsible for the industry. The new policy was 
based upon existing laws and suplemented by new standards of 
administration. Its directives were 
- general adoption of economic costing (Article 180 of the 
Código de Aguas and decree no.41019 Article 164). 
- adequate levels of protection of investments against 
inflation, aimed at recovering the confidence of investors and 
prevention of the systematic destruction of capital(198). 
Since 1964, there has been a massive expansion in the installed 
capacity and gross electric energy production in Brazil (see tables 
II.v and II.vi ). From 1962 to 1977 the installed capacity rose from 
5.7 GW to 22.6 GW, and the gross energy production rose from about 
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Table li.vi 	Gross Enemy PiodbctJon in Brazil, 1962-1978 
Year 	 Hydro 	 Thermal 	Total 	 Annual 
TWh 	 TWh TWh % increase 
1962 20-662 76.1 6 	41 9b 27.158 
1963 20.728 74.4 7.141 27.869 2.6 
1954 22.097 75.9 6.997 29.094 4.4 
1965 25.515 84.7 4.513 30.128 3.5 
1966 27.906 85.4 473 32.654 8.4 
1967 29.189 85.3 5.049 34.238 4.8 
1968 30.550 80.0 7.631 38.181 11.5 
1969 32.692 78.5 8.956 41.648 9.1 
1970 39.863 87.7 5.597 45.460 9.1 
1971 43.274 84.9 7.714 50.988 12.2 
1972 51.407 90.2 5.588 56.995 10.5 
1973 58.289 90.2 6.352 64.641 13.4 
1974 65.492 90.5 6.904 72.396 12.0 
1975 73.836 92.0 6.457 80.293 10.9 
1976 82.361 92.9 6.259 88.620 10.4 
1977 92.430 91.9 8.187 100.617 13.5 
1978 100.111 90.1 .10.999 111.110 10.4 
Source : ELETROBRAS 1978 Report,p.12. 
27 TWh in 1962 to over 100 TWh in 1977. A percentage increase of 295% 
and 270% respectively. Comparing the percentage annual increase of 
both installed capacity and production, it would appear that while 
both are increasing they are not in step. Over the period considered, 
the total percentage increase in installed capacity is greater than 
that for the total percentage increase in electricity production; the 
capacity factor has declined. This is most likely as a result of a 
reduced transmission loss. 
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Table II.vii 	Transmission Lines 1970-1978 (km) 
Year 	230 kV 	345 kV 	440 kV 	500 kV 	Total 	% increase 
1970 11 316 2 681 1 096 - 15 099 - 
1971 11 429 3 330 1 096 - 15 855 5.0 
1972 11 493 3 456 1 096 - 16 045 1.1 
1973 12 005 4 081 2 329 - 18 415 14.7 
1974 12 725 4 431 2 708 360 20 224 9.8 
1975 13 409 4 962 2 982 360 21 713 7.3 
1976 14 714 5 301 3 225 1 693 24 933 14.8 
1977 16 234 6 204 3 225 3 089 28 752 15.3 
1978 18 269 6 904 3 514 5 310 33 997 18.2 
Source : ELETROBRAS 1978 Report 
The increase in installed capacity has been due to the increase 
in hydroelectric generating capacity. The thermal generating capacity 
has only increased very slowly from 1962 to 1977. This has been due 
to the policy of use of renewable energy resources and, since the oil 
crisis, the reduced use of petroleum derivatives for electricity 
generation (see p.33). Most of the thermal generation is from the 
isolated generating systems of Amazonia, or from the use of thermal 
stations in the southern regions at times of low river flows. The 
hydroelectric percentage of installed capacity rose from 72.0% in 
1962 to 84.1% in 1977(199). 
Table II.viii shows the breakdown, by region, of the installed 
generating capacity in Brazil in 1978. Except for the northern 
region, hydroelectric capacity is dominant. In the industrial South 
East, 93.6% Of installed capacity is hydroelectric. In the Southern 
region the percentage is lower due to the existance of coal-fired 
power stations in Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. It is 
interesting to note that the estimated figure for the 1978 installed 
capacity, 25.203 GW, as quoted by ELETROBRAS(200), is some 8% higher 
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Table II.viii : Installed Capacity, by Region 
Region Installed Capacity (GW) 
Hydro % Hydro Thermal Total 
North - 0 0.259 0.259 
North East 2.153 88.4 0.282 2.435 
South East/Centre West 16.887 93.6 1.153 18.040 
South 2.003 77.2 0.593 2.596 
Total 21.043 90.1 2.287 23.330 
source : ELETROBRAS, Piano 95, 1979, p.2.1 
than the actual installed capacity quoted in the Piano 95(201). The 
difference is mainly in installed thermal capacity. From Table II.ix, 
Table II.ix : Programme of Works in Progress 
Year 	North 	North East 	South East 	South 
1979 - 	 UTE Salvador So Simo C UTE J.Lacerda E 
UTE So Luis A.Vermelha C Itaba C 
Sobradinho E.da Cunha R 
P.Afonso IV A.S.Oliveira R 
Igarapé 
1980 - 	 - Itumbiara Salto Osório C 
Angra I Salto Santiago 
Foz do Areia 
1982 - 	 B.Esperanca C Emboraco - 
1983 Tucuru 	- T.Irmos Candiota 
1985 - 	 Itaparica - - 
1986 - 	 - Angra II - 
1987 - 	 - Angra 	III - 
C Complementation 	R Repair 	E Expansion 
Source : ELETROBRAS, Piano 95, 1979, p.2.1 
it can be seen that three thermal power stations are expected to be 
operating in 1979. If one, or all of these had originally been 
scheduled for completion in the last quarter of 1978 this would 
explain the difference in the figures. The discrepancy in the 
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hydroelectric figures can be explained by the delay of entry into 
operation of two units of UHE São Simäo(202). 
Electricity Consumption 
Table II.x : Electricity Consumption, by Consumer 1962-78 
Year Indust. Res id. Comm. Others Total Annual 	% 
TWh TWh TWh TWh TWh increase 
1962 11.269 4.528 2.944 3.116 21.857 - 
1963 11.555 4.843 3.051 3,169 22.618 3.5 
1964 11.958 5.123 3.126 3.314 23.521 4.0 
1965 12.108 5.320 3.372 3.468 24.268 3.2 
1966 13.597 5.739 3.570 3.588 26.494 9.1 
1967 13.861 6.327 3.824 3.976 27.988 5.6 
1968 16.116 7.070 4.325 3.888 31.399 12.2 
1969 17.266 7.763 4.778 4.707 34.514 9.9 
1970 19.613 8.522 5.286 4.889 38.310 11.0 
1971 22.302 9.398 5.802 5.534 43.036 12.3 
1972 25.056 10.117 6.525 6.179 47.877° 11.2 
1973 29.714 11.159 7.377 6.852 55.102 15.1 
1974 33.678 12.301 8.310 7.649 61.938 12.4 
1975 37.790 13.507 9.176 8.452 68.925 11.3 
1976 43.621 14.894 9.927 9.039 77.481 12.4 
1977 50.189 17.112 10.525 10.018 87.844 13.4 
1978 55.817 18.968 11.670 11.292 97.747 11.3 
Source : ELETROBRAS 1978 Report,p.9. 
During the "recovery period", when the electric 
power industry was recovering from the stagnation of the 1950s and 
early 1960s, industrial consumption accounted for approximately 50% 
of the total Brazilian electrical energy consumed. From 1970 this has 
gradually risen to 57% in 1977. Increase in industrial, demand was for 
a variety of reasons. The early 1970s were the years of the "economic 
miracle"(203), with an accompanying industrial expansion. 	Expansion 
of the elctrical power industry also aided industrial expansion. 	In 
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the later 1970s, the policy of import substitution was more forcibly 
enacted, with a consequent expansion of new industries and their 
energy requi rements(204). 
However, all classes of consumer showed an increase in 
consumption. Residential consumption rose by 278% over the period 
1962-1977, but maintained its percentage of the total at about 20%. 
Commercial consumption is lower, maintaining about 13% of the market. 
Table II.xi shows the evolution of the rates of increase in 
consumption of electrical energy by region. The large increase by 
industry in the North and Centre West regions, in 1976, is 
responsible for the increase in total Brazilian consumption. The 
increase in the Centre West region was due to expansion of the 
ceramic industry(205). Increase in the North, North East and Centre 
West regions has consistently been above the national average, but 
has not had a significant effect on the overall increase in 
consumption, because the demand is predominantly in the highly 
populated, highly industrialised South East and South regions of 
Brazil. 
Not only is most of the installed capacity concentrated in the 
South East region (see table II.viii), that region is also the 
location of the main consumer market. The close relationship between 
industry and hydroelectric power development in Brazil has been a 
long one. Hydroelectric power Was first developed to satisfy 
industrial needs (see p.74 ). The accelerated industrial development 
in the South East was only made possible because of the abundance of 
power available following the completion of the Serra do Mar project 
in 1926 (see p.94). The energy infrastructure provided in the North 
East of the country was the essential basis for all industrial 
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Table II.xi : % rate of increase of consumption by region, 1976-1979 
Regions 1976 1977 1978 1979 
NORTH 
Total 19.7 14.9 16.0 15.3 
Residential 12.7 180 17.4 21.6 
Commercial 13.4 16.2 17.6 22.5 
Industrial 37.4 12.0 15.0 14.0 
NURH LASt 
Total 16.9 16.5 17.5 13.1 
Residential 14.9 18.1 14.6 15.9 
Commercial 16.1 16.2 14.6 15.0 
Industrial 19.1 18.7 19.2 12.7 
SOUtH LASt 
Total 13.1 11.4 10.6 11.7 
Residential 11.5 14.7 9.7 9.6 
Commercial 8.4 2.0 6.9 8.4 
Industrial 16.0 12.9 12.2 13.6 
SOUTH 
Total 17.1 16.4 9.2 14.5 
Residential 14.0 15.8 8.6 12.9 
Commercial 14.2 15.7 4.3 12.2 
Industrial 21.6 16.8 10.8 14.6 
CENTRE WEST 
Total 16.9 20.4 16.5 16.1 
Residential 18.8 17.9 18.1 17.4 
Commercial 12.6 19.7 17.8 16.2 
Industrial 31.0 28.8 20.3 17.0 
BRALIL 
Total 14.2 12.8 11.5 12.4 
Residential 12.4 15.4 10.6 11.3 
Commercial 10.1 6.3 8.1 10.5 
Industrial 17.1 14.1 13.0 13.7 
Source : Anon., Mundo Elétrico, Ano 21 (246), 22-25. 
development programmes, and industrial development in Minas Gerais 
rose above stagnation once there was a reliable supply of 
energy(206). 
Electrical power consumption in Brazil has grown steadily at 
very high rates for a long time, with a 10.4% annual increase over 
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Table II.xii : Net consumption of electricity per capita 
Units KWh 
1 955 1958 1960 1962 1965 13j9 1975 i980 
Brazil 	 188 	22+5 	263 	291+ 	296 	1+07 	51+9 	760 
SE Brazil 	 315 	1+28 	1+35 	51+5 	562 	827 1078 1365 
Rest of 	 98 	ilk 	105 	111+ 	107 	108 	165 	309 
Brazil . 
Source : Canambra Engineering Consultants Ltd. "Power Study of 
South Central Brazil, 1969. 
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Consumption - ELETROBRAS 1978 report. 
From figure 2.4, a linear relationship can be observed between 
electricity consumption and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The point 
which is not on the line represents an above average increase in 
electricity consumption for 1970 as a result of a 20% increase of 
available generating capacity over the previous year (see table 
II.v). 
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Market Forecasting 
The structure and distribution of national and regional income 
give important indicators for the forecasting of electricity 
consumption and the overall expected behaviour of the market. 
Estimates of the future increase in the economy have been based on 
traditional econometric models, considering factors such as the 
formation of capital, balance of payments and productivity of the 
work force. In view of the limitations of such models in the actual 
world economic context, reliance has been placed on more qualitative 
studies based on scenarios and other forecasting techniques(208). 
For the purpose of calculation of the forecasts of the 
electricity market, the rate of increase of GDP, for the high 
projection, was taken as 10% per year for the periods 1974-1979 and 
1979-1990. In the case of the low projection, a rate of increase of 
8% was used(209)*. There is however, an anomaly in the figures used. 
Figure 2.4 clearly demonstrates a linear relationship between 
electricity consumption and GDP, all figures being obtained from 
reliable sources(211,212), but according to the figures in the 
Piano 95, the mean real increase in the GOP, from 1974 to 1978, was 
6.3% per year, and in spite of that, the increase in consumption of 
electricity was maintained at over 12% per year. This would suggest 
a non-linear relationship over the whole period considered * 
Although the economic references used by the Departamento de 
* For total energy balance calculations, including petroleum im-
portation, the MME is also using a GOP correlation, but is making 
three projections based on increases in the GDP of 5%, 7% and 9%, 
and using the intermediary rate of 7% as the base(210). 
* According to the World Bank, the average annual growth of GOP in 
Brazil from 1970-1977 was 9.9% (213). 
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Table U.xiii :Increases in Electricity Consumption and GOP 
Period 	% increase in 	% increase in 
electricity consumption 	GOP 
1970-74 	 12.9 	 12.2 
1974-78 12.4 6.3 
Source : ELETROBRAS, Plano 95, 1979, p.2 
Estudos do Mercado (DEME) adopt a figure of 8% or 10% for the rate of 
increase of GOP in their estimates, it can be observed in the Piano 
95, that if the rate of increase in the Brazilian economy is 
maintained at the growth rate of GOP of 6-7% per year, the 
requirement for increase in generation will be at a mean rate of 
12.7% per year, in order for the dynamism of the industrial 
electricity market to be maintained in the face of increased 
substitution of petroleum derivatives by electricity. The exception 
to this relationship will be in the North region, where large, 
localised, industrial loads are forecast to be developed in the mid-
1980s. 
The forecast produced by DEME for electrical energy consumption 
until 1995 is shown in table II.xiv. From this, it can be seen that 
until 1983, the growth rate of consumption will be greater than in 
the subsequent period up to 1995. This is explained by the nature of 
the growth of the economy. Certain kinds of industry, especially the 
energy intensive such as the electrochemical and electrometalluryical 
industries, will be responsible for major increases in energy 
consumption when they are established. From 1977-1995, the total 
Brazilian annual consumption is expected to rise from 87.8 TWh to 
438.7 TWh, with a corresponding rise in the annual per capita 
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Table U.xiv 	Forecast of electricity consumption by region until 1995 (TWh). 
Year 	Brazil 	North 	N. East 	S.E & C.W. 	South 
1977 	87.829 1.307 10.203 	65.478 	10.841 
1983 167.726 3.803 23.820- 117.004 23.099 
169.436 * 5.381 * 23.952 * 
1995 	438.727 27.572 67.203 	278.559 	65.394 
440.662 * 28.154 * 68.555 * 
Source : DEME, Referëncias Econömicos para o Planejamento, 1979, and 
* ELETROBRAS, Piano 95, 1979, p.1.2 
consumption from 755 kWh to 2 490 kWh - a strong indication of the 
qualitative alterations in the economy and standard of living. 
Growth in the South East region will be slower than in the other 
regions by virtue of the accelerated industrial development occurring 
elsewhere. The contrast will be greatest in the North, where 
consumption is expected to rise by 625% from 1983 to 1995. 
Table II.xv : Forecast % increase in electricity consumption,. 1977-1995 
Brazil 	North 	N. East 	S. E. & C. W. 	South 
Residential 
1977-83 9.6 12.6 13.7 8.5 11.0 
1983-95 6.5 9.1 6.2 6.3 7.0 
Industrial 
1977-83 12.6 33.3 15.5 11.4 15.6 
1983-95 10.1 51.7 11.7 8.6 11.1 
Total 
1977-83 11.7 18.8 14.5 10.5 14.4 
1983-95 8.7 19.1 9.6 7.8 9.3 
Source : DEME, Referëncias Econômicas para o Planejamento, 1979. 
Of this increase in the North, 51.7% will be as a result of increased 
industrial consumption. The concentration of large blocks of 
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electrical energy in the less developed regions is the policy of the 
Brazilian Government with the intention of reducing some of the 
inequalities between regions(214). 
By 1976, of the 450 dams which have been constructed in Brazil 
since 1901, nearly 150 have been for hydroelectric power generation. 
Many of these dams are small, under 15 m high, and the power output 
from the associated hydroelectric power stations, is low. Some are no 
longer operating(215). In 1974, the number of Brazilian hydroelectric 
power stations 'in operation with an installed capacity greater than 
15 MW, was 54, and a further 12 were under construction. The 
installed capacity was 9.73 GW, with a further 14.29 GW under 
construction(216). By 1978, the installed hydroelectric potential 
was 21.58 GW, and by 1985, this is planned to be approximately 
doubled to 43.48 GW, and increased further to 62.81 GW by 
1990(217) (see table II.xvi). 
Table II.xvii shows the new construction works, scheduled to 
1990, for the interconnected systems. This will add a further 
18.4 GW. The major Brazilian hydroelectric power stations are shown 
in figure 2.5. 
Financing in the Electrical Power Industry 
Until the 1950s, the electricity supply industry in Brazil was 
in the hands of then private sector, and, so, responsible for 
financing itself. With the advent of government intervention in the 
industry (see p.127) it was necessary to formalise its financing. 
From 1943 to 1953, the installed capacity increased by an 
average of 1.95% per year, whereas production increased at an annual 
Table II.xvi : Growth of Installed Capacity, 197.8-1990 






Year Hydro Thermal Total Hydro Thermal Total Hydro 
Thermal . 	Total 
1978 21 575 3 654 25 229 - - - - - - 
1979 24 134 4 332 28 466 2 .559 678 3 237 - - - 
1980 27 265 5 086 32 351 3 147 754 3 901 - - - 
1981 32 151 5 170 37 321 4.886 84 4 970 - - - 
1982 33 097 5 175 38 272 976 5 981 - - - 
1983 35 967 5 400 41 367 2 530 165 2 695 340 
60 400 
1984 40 237 5 560 49 042 3 390 160 3 550 880 
- 880 
1985 43 482 5 560 49 042 2 890 - 2 890 355 
- 355 
1986 48 175 6 805 55 520 1 730 1 245 1 945 3 632 
320 3 952 
1987 53 047 8 370 61 417 710 1 245 1 945 3 632 
320 3 952 
1988 56 127 8 370 64 497 - - - 3 080 
- 3 080 
1989 58 952 8 370 67 322 - . - - 2 825 
- 2 825 
1990 62 807 8 370 71 177 - - 	 . - 3 855 
- 3 855 
Interconnected - - - 22 808 4 231 27 039 18 085 320 18 405 
1/2 Itaipu 6 300 - 6 300 6 300 - 6 300 - - - 
Isolated - - - - 105 105 385 60 445 
Total 69 107 8 370 77 477 29 108 4 336 33 444 18 470 380 18 850 
c7 
-4j 
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Starting Programmed Programmed 
MW MW 
South 1986 liha Grande 11+ x 100 1 1QQ 
Se-redo 3 x 350 1 050 
D. Francisca 2 x 62 121+ 
1987 Candiota (T) - 320 
1988 Machadinho 4 x 265 1 060 
1989 Salto Caixas 1 x 250 1 000 
SE/OW 1983 Santa Branca 2 x 30 60 
Nilo Pecanha 1+ x 65 . 260 
1984 Taquaracu 3 x 100 300 
Rosana 3 x 80 21+0 
1985 Porto Primavera 11 x 100 1 100 
C. Dourada 3 x 85 255 
1986 C. Magalhaes 2 x 55 110 
Fecho da Onca 2 x 125 250 
Corumba 2 x 150 300 
Nova Ponte 2 x 16. 8 356 
Sapucaia 3 x 136 1+08 
1987 Miranda 2 x 211 1+22 
Canoas 2 x 100 200 
1988 Aimores 3 x 100 300 
Igarapava 3 x 50 150 
1989 Sao Felix 1+ x 265 1 060 
Capim Branco 2 x 208 1+16 
Simplicio 1 x 119 119 
Descalvado 3 x 55 165 
1990 Formoso 2 x 100 200 
Funil 2 x 82 161+ 
Peixe 1+ x 18+ 736 
Ourinhos 2 x 25 50 
Eldorado 3 x 30 60 
N.East 1987 Xingo 5 x500 2 500 
North 1987 Tucurui (units 9 & 2 x 330 660 
10) 
	
TOTAL (incuding additional load capacity) 	 18 1+05 
Note 	This was the schedule as planned in 1979, UHE Itaipu was 
assumed to be fully operational. The economic situation in 
Brazil since 1979 has resulted in a number of changes. 
Source 	ETROBRAS "Piano 95", 1979, table 3.1 
Figure 2.5 : Shernatio Rsprs&utjn of t)'%e 31 tom ofi Brazilian H.ydroelectric Power kitations.  
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- 	and Piano 95,1979. 
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average -of 2.56%. This caused a gradual reduction in the available 
reserve of generating capacity until it compromised the reliability 
of the system. By the beginning of 1953, the national aggregated 
deficit with respect to demand was 100 MW, and it is reasonable to 
assume that most of this, occurred in the South East. In many states, 
substantial portions of their budgets were put towards the cost of 
electrification works, but this was still inadequate to permit them 
to cover even emergency programmes aimed at reducing the deficiencies 
of electricity supply in their own' territories. The state of Rio' 
Grande do Sul created a supertax upon nearly all the state taxes, the 
"taxa de eletrificaço", in order to finance its electrical power 
industry. 
Expansion in the private sector was little better. The rates of 
industrialisation and urbanization were higher than had been 
estimated and, at the same time, there were difficulties in the 
importation of equipment in the inflationary climate which was 
beginning to prevail. The electrical power industry was one where its 
ability to invest was reflected by its profits. These were based, by 
law, on the historic value of the investments, which limited the 
interest for private initiative(218). 
The use of historic value had been laid down in the Código de 
Aguas in 1934, when it allowed a 10% return on a power company's 
investment. The return was calculated on a capital base evaluated at 
the original cost, and the basic rate was set so as to yield that 
return. However, the original, or historic, cost of the company's 
investment was continuously eroded by inflation, and, without 
provision for a periodic correction to the value of the company's 
assets, it became an inadequate basis for the calculation of a fair 
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return. This was the root cause behind -the rate problem experienced 
by 'The Light', when it refused to invest in the sector, because of 
the low rate it had to charge for the electricity it produced(219) 
(see p.121). 
The foreign capital enterprises, which, at the time, supplied 
electricity to the richest areas of Brazil, and which could guarantee 
income through the controlled interest from exchange conversion, were 
disinclined to undertake the urgently needed expansion of the 
electrical power industry by producing new capital from abroad. As a 
result, the Federal Government had to resort to capitalization by a 
fiscal route. This was proposed by the Congresso Nacional in 1953. 
As a result, law no.2308, of 31 August 1954, was passed creating 
the Fundo Federal de Eletrificaço (FFE, Federal Electrification 
Fund) and the Imposto Unico sobre Energia Elétrica (IUEE, special 
electricity tax). The law determined that 40% of the IUEE would be 
for use by the Federal Government, and 60% would be given to the 
states and towns for the expansion of the electrical power industry, 
corresponding to quotas and criteria as set out in the special law. 
The Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Ecômico (BNDE) was authorised 
to use the Federal resources from the FEE in order to finance the 
more urgent programmes, and to allocate, to the various states, sums 
in accordance with their quotas for the same purpose. 
The BNDE had been established in 1952 as an independent federal 
agency, subordinate to the Ministério da Fazenda, to serve as a 
financial instrument for the execution of government policy. At the 
same time, the Plano Nacional de Eletrificaçâo was proposed, with the 
intention of programming works of construction, unification of 
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frequency, and stimulation of electrical material industries. This 
plan was not adopted, but the BNDE was entrusted with administration 
of the FFE for five years. 
Prior to the creation of the FFE, the BNDE had been involved in 
supplying finance to the electricity concessionaires, including 
external loans, in the name of the Tesouro Nacional (National 
Treasury). With time, the federal 40% of the IUEE, operated by the 
BNDE, did not generate sufficient returns with which to meet the 
increasing outlays, because the taxations of the IUEE were not 
corrected to absolute values at the same level as the increase in the 
cost of works. 
As a result it was necessary to complement the collection of the 
IUEE with the financial resources of the BNDE itself, especially from 
the Fundo de Reaparelhamento Econömico (Economic Reconstruction 
Fund). When state enterprises proposed construction works and applied 
for federal resources, they were only granted such funds on condition 
that there was the greatest possible contribution from the Fundos 
Estaduais de Eletrificaço (State Electrification Funds). If 
resources were required for private projects, the bank could only 
supply funds from its own resources. as private application to the 
resources of the FFE were prohibited. 
However, private initiative still received federal support by 
means of loans. In fact, practically all the significant loans for 
electrification which were granted after 1953 had the support of the 
BNDE, either directly, with financial resources or active 
participation, or indirectly, with the payment of guarantees either 
in the name of the BNDE or the Tesouro Nacional (National Treasury). 
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The establishment of ELETROBRAS in 1962, and the later 
consolidation of the financial structure of the electrical power 
industry by the strenghthening of the FFE and the creation of an 
Empréstimo Compulsório (Compulsory Loan), enabled the BNDE to remove 
itself from financially supporting the electrical sector in order to 
concentrate on other development areas. In addition, there was a re-
assessment of the fixed assets of the concessionaires, and this re-
evaluation was incorporated into the cost of services and the 
tariffs(220). 
When ELETROBRAS came into existence, the financing of large 
projects depended on national funds. With the development of national 
technology and industry, in medium scale undertakings, such as UHE 
Boa Esperanca and UHE Cachoeira.-Capivari, national financing was as 
high as 82%. In 1964, the director of ELETROBRAS, Manual Pinto de 
Aguiar, stated that the expansion of the electrical energy sector, on 
which Brazil's future depended, hinged on the effort of the Brazilian 
people. International loans, although important, he considered as 
only supplementary and complementary to the national effort(221). 
In order to sustain the expansion of the electrical power 
industry law no. 4156, of 28 November 1962, instituted the Empréstimo 
Compulsório in favour of ELETROBRAS. This loan was to attract 
interest of 12% per year, and would be recoverable after ten years. 
The same law redefined the method of collection of the IUEE, 
introducing differential quotas for rural, residential and industrial 
consumers, and adopting the tariff as the base of the calculation, to 
be recalculated each quarter. The introduction of this concept of an 
ad valorem tax represented an important mechanism for the prevention 
of the reduction in value of the IUEE, as had occurred between 1954 
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and 1962, as a result of the tax originally being set at a fixed 
value per kWh and thus gradually eroded by inflation. According to 
law no.4156, 40% of the Imposto Unico belonged to the Federal Union, 
and was credited to the FFE, 50% went to the states, Distrito Federal 
and territories, and the remaining 10% went to the municipalities. 
All of it was for use in the electrical power industry expansion 
plans, which were elaborated by ELETROBRAS. 
Later legislation required the tariff to be adjusted quarterly, 
based on the data from the previous month. The IUEE tax was set at 
50% of the tariff for the residential consumers, 60% for the 
commercial consumers and 16% for industrial consumers whose monthly 
consumption was less than 2 000 kWh. Consumers exempt from the 
payment were those served exclusively by thermal generation, and 
those whose monthly consumption was less than 30 kWh. 
Further legislation, again in favour of ELETROBRAS, gave 
validity to the Empréstimo Compulsôrio until 31 December 1983.(As yet 
there is no information on what will happen after that date). The tax 
falling upon the industrial consumers with a monthly consumption 
greater than 2 000 kWh is based on a quota of 32.5% to be applied to 
the tariff. The sum is recoverable in a period of 20 years, and the 
annual interest rate is 6%. Monetary corrections are made according 
to the re-evaluation index of the fixed assets of the enterprises. 
For those industries with a very high consumption of electricity, a 
reduction of the loan is made as a function of the relationship 
between the payment for electricity and the value of sales. The 
policy of rationalization of the use of energy, adopted at the end of 
1977, makes the Empréstimo Compulsório payment heavy for those 
autoproducers with an installed capacity for electricity production 
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greater than 500 kW, if they are using petroleum derivatives for fuel 
when an alternative supply of power is available from the local 
concessionai re(222,223). 
The system of Empréstimo CompulsOrio has been very unwieldy and, 
in 1975 it was modified to reduce administrativetasks and the volume 
of paper. At that time there were in circulation approximately 
7.3x106 ELETROBRAS bonds, with a total of 28x10 6 titles issued in 34 
series of different values - representing 63 tons of paper. With the 
launching of three or four series a year, the increase will reach 
2x106 titles annually, with approximately 110x106 coupons (cupons de 
juros) in circulation. As a result, the system has been computerised 
and the interest paid will be recorded on the reverse side of the 
shares. Previously, the maximum value per title was Cr$ 10 000, but 
this has been increased to Cr$ 50 000 under the new system(224). 
Generation of finances by this method, has, however, not been 
sufficient. 
In the 1968 ELETROBRAS report, the intention to double the 
installed capacity in Brazil in the next few years was expressed at 
the same time as the admission of financial problems requiring study. 
The estimated deficit for the Plano Energético Trienal was 
Cr$ 500x106 (1968 prices). As a consequence of ELETROBRAS's 
investment in pioneering areas, it became necessary to depend on a 
third source of funding. This was obtained in the form of loans 
totalling Cr$ 224x10 6 in 1968, with an operational income of only 
Cr$ 139x106 , and a further Cr$ 22410 6 from the FFE. This proved 
unsatisfactory, as the loans had to be repaid by means of 
amortization and redemption, with inevitable extra financial burdens 
on the already limited resources(225). 
REM 
Brazil had already turned to foreign sources of financing. The 
two major examples of this being the loan to FURNAS from the World 
Bank, and the loan from the United Nations Development Fund for the 
CANAMBRA studies. In fact, FURNAS has always relied upon the World 
Bank as its principal source of external finance. The first loan in 
1958, for US$ 73x10 6 (1958 prices), was for the construction of UHE 
Furnas and the associated transmission system (see p.101). However, 
this loan was only to cover importation of equipment, materials and 
services which had to be paid for in foreign currency. 
In 1965 and 1966, FURNAS received two further loans from the 
World Bank, totalling US$ 96x10 6 (1966 prices), for the financing of 
UFIE Estreito and its transmission system. For the first time, in 
Brazil, the contracts included clauses allowing the use of these 
resources to purchase equipment on the internal Brazilian market with 
payment in national currency. For UHE Marimbondo the investment was 
US$ 287x106 , of which US$ 106x106 came from the World Bank and the 
rest from local resources. The loan was for engineering services and 
acquisition of materials and permanent equipment. 
In 1969 the World Bank proposed a new scheme of joint financing, 
to the Brazilian Government, involving some European countries, the 
USA, Canada and Japan. All these had some interest in partly 
financing the materials and equipment, which they would be allowed to 
supply, if they could meet the criteria of international competition. 
This proposal was accepted in principle by the MME, the Ministério da 
Fazenda, ELETROBRAS and FURNAS, subsequent to a meeting in Paris, in 
March 1970, between the countries interested, the World Bank and 
Brazil. 
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Present at the Paris meeting were delegations-from West Germany, 
Belgium, Canada, the USA, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Sweden 
and Switzerland, together with representatives from Holland and 
Spain. The meeting reached an accord in which each participating 
country was to finance 50% of the orders it won after international 
competition. These orders would individually amount to less than 
US$ 200 000, but combined would total US$1x10 6 (1970 prices). The 
World Bank was to finance the other 50%, in addition to •being 
responsible for the financing of 100% of the remaining purchase 
orders. 
The credits to be conceded by the co-participating countries had 
to meet the following conditions 
a minimum period of amortization of ten years, and 
a maximum period of debt of eighteen months, counted from 
the date of shipment of equipment. 
For its part, the World Bank was obliged to adjust, within 
certain limits, the scheme of amortization of its loan, so that the 
total of the annual amortizations to be paid to the World Bank and 
co-financers would be approximately equal to that which would be paid 
in the case of the World Bank being the sole financer. In the 
opinion of FURNAS, this kind of financing carried an excessive 
administrative load, in terms of negotiating and operating numerous 
loans of different origin destined to the financing of a single 
project(226). 
The opening up of the world financing market had much to do with 
the evolution of this new method of payment for large scale power 
industry projects in Brazil. The most industrially developed 
countries,, such as Japan and Germany, having undergone a large 
expansion, were beginning to have problems with the placing of their 
products. The competition for new markets had become increasingly 
intensive with the advent of Japan on the scene as a major producer 
and strong competitor(227). 
Although the mechanism for external borrowing had been 
established by 1974, 80% of the financing of the Brazilian electrical 
power industry was internal, the foreign contribution being US$250-
300x106 (1974 prices). Such credits, although only 20% of the total, 
were, 'however, vital to the structure of the financial sector. By 
this time, the sector depended upon three types of provision 
i. 	the external 	exogenous, 	resulting from loans obtained jointly 
from international 	financing 	agencies and suppliers 	of 
equipment, 
the internal exogenous, which was provided from Federal and 
state budgets, and 
the endogenous, generated by the sector itself. 
For UHE Paulo Afonso IV, for example, ELETROBRAS provided Cr$ 4.6x10 9 
(1974 prices), and the other 20% was provided jointly by the World 
Bank and the Inter American Development Bank(228). 
Brazil, now in the midst of another economic crisis, has been 
strongly affected by the world recession. It has large outstanding 
loans, principally being used to finance the power industry expansion 
masterminded by ELETROBRAS. The cruzeiro has been devalued regularly 
over the last few years (see app.2), but the maxi-devaluation of 30% 
in December 1979 created large problems for the electrical power 
industry. Although ELETROBRAS had expected there to be a major 
devaluation of the cruzeiro, against the US dollar, it had been 
expected that this would have taken place gradually over two or three 
years, and not in one large move. 
In 1978, the company borrowed a large amount of foreign capital. 
Its total investments were US$ 6.0x10 9. Equipment and service imports 
rose to US$ 1.0x109 , and there was an extra US$ 1.410 9 in new 
overseas loans, hence the net inflow of foreign loans was US$ 2.410 9 
in 1978 (1978 prices). In terms of total loans, ELETROBRAS owed 
approximately US$ 6.5x10 9 to the international banks, and the maxi-
devaluation of 30% induced a severe financial crisis within the 
company(229). 
In 1976, ELETROBRAS received three loans from the International 
Development Bank (1DB) - US$ 64106 for UHE Salto Santiago, 
US$ 35x106 for the expansion of the UHE Paulo Afonso transmission 
system and US$ 74x10 6 for the construction of UHE Foz do Areia (1976 
prices)(230),In 1977, the 1DB gave a loan to CEMIG of US$ 69.8x10 6 
(1977 prices) for the construction of UHE Emboraco. At that time, 
the total cost was estimated at US$ 732x106 , of which the 1DB had 
supplied 9.5%, CEMIG 45.7% and ELETROBRAS 33.3%. 
From the 1978 ELETROBRAS financial statement, it is interesting 
to note that the contribution of the IUEE was lower than in the 
previous year, but the external financing rose from Cr$ 5 542x10 6 in 
1977, to Cr$ 12 366x10 6 in 1978 (1977 and 1978 prices respectively). 
At the end of the 1978 financial year, ELETROBRAS had current loans 
9 from 16 foreign organizations, consisting of US$ 1.0x10, DM 0.3x109 
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and Yen 15.0x10 9 - a total of Cr$ 29.Ox10 9 (1978 prices). At that 
time, the capital stock of -the company was valued at Cr$ 36x10 9 
(231). 
During 1979 the situation deteriorated, with ELETROBRAS having 
to seek a US$ 400x10 6 syndicated loan, without government guarantee. 
It was thought to be the first time that this had happened. The funds 
were earmarked for the purchase of 'The Light'(232). With a soaring 
Brazilian trade deficit of US$ 988x10 6 in 1978(233), ELETROBRAS was 
lucky to raise the US$ 400x106 medium term loan which it required. 
This demonstrated a marginal improvement in Brazil's creditworthiness 
in the Euromarkets(234), and by March 1979, the situation had 
improved further, with Brazil able to renegotiate the terms of a 
US$ 250x106 loan, originally taken out in 1977, with a banking 
consortium led by the Bank of Arnerica(235). 
However, at the end of March, the Brazilian Government, as an 
anti-inflation measure, put an absolute ceiling on foreign borrowing 
by state run concerns of US$ 3.0x10 9. This was 33% less than in the 
previous year, and a reduction of US$ 800x10 6 on the original loan 
forecast. It was also decreed that there be a new cut from the public 
spending in the Federal budget of US$2.0x10 9. This included 
US$ 350x106 from the Economic Development Fund, which is used in the 
fields of education, transport and energy. OPEC price rises will, 
however,add a further US$400x106 to Brazil's annual bill for imported 
crude oil, and raise the total to nearly US$ 5.0x10 9 (236). Yet, 
despite the ceiling on foreign borrowing, in May 1979 the Swedish 
firm ASEA was awarded a US$ 900x10 6 contract for the HVDC 
transmission lines for UHE Itaipu. However, 50% of the equipment is 
be 
toAmanufactured locally(237), and support for this contract was set 
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up through a large financial package of Eurocurrency loans and export 
credit facilities(238). 
Two major projects which are absorbing both internal and 
external resources are UHE Itaipu and UHE Tucurui. The costs for both 
are escalating but, as both are priority projects, funds are 
continuously being injected into them, at the expense of other 
projects. Their final costs are expected to be billions of dollars 
(239,2+o). 
As a result of Brazil's balance of payments deficit and 
inflation, both of which are reducing the country's credit standing, 
the financial situation of ELETROBRAS remains precarious, especially 
with such large sums of money continuously on loan. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Development of the Brazilian Electrical Power Industry 
There are one hundred and forty thousand Brazilians directly 
employed in the Brazilian electrical energy sector. There are two 
hundred thousand others who work on the construction of new schemes 
and equipment" (241). In 1978, investments in the electrical energy 
sector were Cr$ 70.8x10 9(1978 prices) and the total assets of the 
companies in the electrical power industry increased to Cr$ 400x10 9 
(1978 prices)represented by cumulative investments in construction 
and equipment, a third of them being in projects under 
construction(242). The electrical power industry in Brazil is a major 
industry. 
Early History 
Pioneering has long been a characteristic of the Brazilian 
electrical power industry. This was as true in the 1880s, when the 
industry had its beginning, as in the 1980s, when new ambitious 
projects are being undertaken. The parallels between the problems 
encountered in S.E. Brazil a hundred years ago and those in the 
development of the hydraulic resources of the Amazon region today are 
extremely close. 
Despite its reputation as a developing country, Brazil has often 
been at the forefront of the world electrical power industry since 
1879, when Thomas Edison constructed the first commercial dynamo in 
New York. In the same year, as a result of the patronage of Emperor 
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Dom Pedro II, regular illumination was inaugurated at the Estaço 
Central do Rio de Janeiro (central, railway station) by the company 
Estrada de Ferro Central do Brazil, using six arc lamps of the 
Jablochkov type. This was the start of electricity generation in 
Brazil using prime movers(243). At the end of the nineteenth century, 
Brazil was introducing, almost simultaneously, the same electrical 
services as the more industrially advanced countries of Europe and 
the USA(244). 
In 1881, permanent electrical Street lighting was installed in 
the Praça da Républica, in the cityof Rio de Janeiro, using sixteen 
Jablochkov lamps operated by a steam engine and two dynamos. This was 
followed two years later by public lighting in the city of Campos, 
So Paulo state, supplied from a thermal power station, with three 
dynamos and an output capacity of 52 kW. This remained in operation 
for eighteen years, with only one cessation of operation, for two 
nights, in 1901. The first public supply of electricity in Great 
Britain was in 1881, using hydroelectric power to light the streets 
of Godalming, but unlike in Campos, the supply was discontinued three 
years later(245). 
Edison patented his incandescent carbon filament lamp in the USA 
in 1879, and early the following year the first commercial 
incandescent lamps were demonstrated in London(246). In January 1884, 
the Bush Swan Electric Light Company of Cleveland, Ohio, USA, 
demonstrated arc and incandescent lamps in Brazil, and by April the 
Imperial Palace in Rio de Janeiro was lit by electricity. 
In the autumn of 1882, the first hydroelectric station in the 
USA, at Appleton, Wisconsin started operation. Brazil followed, 
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almost immediately, with a small private hydroelectric power station 
at Diamantina, Minas Gerais, established on the small river, ribero 
Inferno, in 1883. The dam created a 5 in head of water, and the power 
house was equipped with two Gramme generators rated at 8 hp (6 kW) 
each. These ran at 1 500 rev/mm, and were driven by two water wheels 
of 3.25 in diameter. The power was transmitted a distance of 2 km, by 
the then longest transmission line in the world, and used in the 
extraction of gravel. A few months later it was used for 
illumination(247). Another private hydroelectric power station began 
operation in Minas Gerais in 1887. Again, the power was used for 
mineral operations, but this time for ventilation and illumination of 
the galleries in a gold mine, and for the lighting in employees 
houses. The installation was owned by the French company Companie des 
Mines d'Or du Faria, and consisted of two Gramme dynamos operated by 
a large water wheel with 20 blades, under a head of 40 m, and a 
maximum mechanical power of 500 hp (370 kW). 
The first Brazilian hydroelectric power station to enter into 
public service was UHE Marmelos-zero at Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais. 
The work was pioneered by Bernado Mascarenhas, and was installed on 
the rio Paraibuna, close to another mark of Brazilian progress at 
that time, the Uniao-Industria highway. These development initiatives 
led to the expansion of Juiz de Fora, which became nicknamed 
Manchester Brasileira" due to the textile industries which followed 
the power supply to the town. 
The hydroelectric power station consisted of two single-phase 
alternators, rated at 125 kW each, which operated at a voltage of 
1 kV and a frequency of 60 Hz. Seven years later, a second power 
station, Marmelos-1, was installed at the same site(248). In the 
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1880s, the capacities of the generators which could be built were so 
small, that they were used largely to supply the needs of fazendas, 
which operated cereal mills, saw mills, and other small industries, 
including textiles fabrication. Little by little, the installed 
capacities were augmented so as to give greater profitability to the 
power stations. Industrial autoproducers also began constructing 
distribution networks and supplying electrical power to the 
populations in the areas where they were developing their 
manufacturing activities(249). At this time, various Brazilian cities 
were installing public electricity supplies. In most cases they were 
substituting electric lighting for gas lighting, and providing for 
electrical power and traction. Such supplies of electricity were 
generally made available by private concerns, both national and 
foreign, using equipment and materials imported from abroad(250). 
By the end of 1892, electricity became more exploited by 
Brazilian industry with the establishment of small industries close 
to areas which had falls of water and to centres of production of 
primary materials. Until that time Brazil had been, almost 
exclusively, an agricultural country but the advent of electricity 
gave birth to manufacturing industry, which attracted previously idle 
wealth. As seen 'in tabljIt-i, the installed capacity in Brazil 
increased substantially between 1883 and 1900. 
In 1900, the numbers of thermal and hydroelectric power stations 
installed were similar, but 'the nominal installed capacity of the 
thermal stations was about 6.6 MW against 5.5 MW for the 
hydroelectric power stations. At the turn of the century the flow of 
resources towards the electrical power industry became more rapid and 
hydropower began to predominate. The number of companies generating, 
- 76 - 
Table TILl : Installed Capacity in Brazil, 1883-1900 
Year 	Installed Capacity MW 
1883 	 0.052 
1889 4.618 
1890 	 5.020 
1900 12.085 
Source : Anon., "A Energia Elétrica no Brasil, 1977, p.55 
transmitting 	and distributing electricity 	in 	small 	locations 
multiplied rapidly, and with this there came a certain concentration 
and delimitation of zones of influence, which gave an early 
definition to the structural development to the power industry in 
Brazil (251). 
Although Brazil was at the forefront of world users of 
electricity, it did not suffer the same initial problems as were 
experienced in the USA and Great Britain, where much of the 
development work was taking place. Many of the men involved in this 
work were not scientists or engineers, but were business men. They 
had little theoretical or practical understanding of the subject, but 
had a strong commercial sense, as in the case of Thomas Edison(252). 
This is, perhaps, less surprising when it is recognised that there 
were still some major gaps, and even errors, in the knowledge of the 
processes involved in the conversion between mechanical and 
electrical energy. 
As the new power and light industry grew, there arose a need for 
men both technically competent and possessing business acumen. "The 
first and probably most versatile of the new breed of men in the 
electrical industry were the arc light salesmen. These men had to be 
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a combination of missionary and promoter because they were selling 
something - electricity...."(253). Whether or not one agrees with the 
writer of this statement, it is an undeniable fact that the 
Brazilians were susceptible to such "salesmen". They did not have the 
worries of developing the new "product", but they were in the 
position to make use of what was available. As a result Brazil 
offered a ready market which the "salesmen" wanted to exploit 
rapidly, hence the early development of an electrical power industry 
in Brazil. 
"The Era of the Kilowatt" 
The construction of power stations at this time required a great 
pioneering spirit, the work often taking place in isolated locations 
without adequate access or services. All equipment and much of the 
materials had to be transported by manpower (possibly slaves) over 
inhospitable terrain(254). Diseases amongst the workers were common, 
with malaria, yellow fever and gastro-intestinal diseases rife in the 
states of So Paulo and Minas Gerais. Despite improved technology and 
facilities, the isolation and inhospitable climate of the areas being 
exploited today presents many of the same problems as were faced by 
the early pioneers. 
The technological progress achieved by Brazil, since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, in the fabrication of large 
hydroelectric generators, construction of dams and transmission 
networks must be regarded within the context of the peculiar position 
of energy reserves within Brazil. Although the absolute magnitude of 
the hydraulic potential of the country was not known with any 
accuracy (see p-39), those involved in the energy sector recognised 
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the great possibilities offered by the hydraulic generation of energy 
as against the use of mineral coal, of which there was no indication 
of large reserves. These premisses of 80 years ago have remained 
substantially correct, with little good quality coal having been 
found but an enormous firm hydraulic potential measured. As a result, 
most of the early initiatives in the Brazilian electrical power 
industry were in the use of hydraulic energy. 
The use of hydraulic energy required the first electricity 
companies to establish themselves either in the vicinity of the areas 
to be developed for power, or in the large consuming centres. In the 
remainder of the country, including the state capitals, the supply of 
electricity was sparse, with restricted use or limited supply from 
small diesel units,and low efficiency gas and wood burning thermal 
power stations(255). 
From 1882, electric lighting slowly began to replace gas 
lighting in the central streets of Rio de Janeiro, with a more rapid 
increase from 1884 to 1887. In So Paulo, although electric lighting 
rapidly increased so did the numbers of gas lights. However, 
legislation in that city in 1916 authorised electrical illumination 
of some of the streets, and by 1930 all the gas lights had been 
replaced by electric lights. In 1887, the same year as electric 
traction was first introduced in the USA, in Richmond, Virginia(256), 
the Conipanhia Ferro do Carril do Jardim Botänico built a 62 kW 
thermal power station in Rio de Janeiro, to power Brazil's first 
electric trains. 
The company repeatedly tried to expand its services to supply 
certain establishments with light and power, but this was always 
- 79 - 
countered by remonstrations from the Sociedade Anônima de Gas which 
also opposed the installation of electric light in the Teatro Lirico 
in 1894, and won the case in the tribunal. Meanwhile, the Cia. Jardjm 
Botnico was permitted to supply electricity under licence from the 
S.A. de Gas, to those who requested it. 
In 1904 and 1905, the Braconnot enterprise, acting on behalf of 
S.A. de Gas, erected a small thermal power station in order to supply 
electric lighting to avenida Central (now avenida Rio Branco) in Rio 
de Janeiro. This service entrusted to the Braconnot enterprise closed 
down at the beginning of 1907, when the provisional generator of UHE 
Fontes, on the ribero das Lages began to be operated directly by 
S.A. de Gas. Despite operating an electricity generating station, the 
company still continued increasing the number of gas burners, 
reaching a maximum of approximately 22 000 in 1909, when substitution 
by electric lighting was begun in earnest. However, Rio de Janeiro 
was not entirely illuminated by electricity until 1924. 
'The Light' 
It was at this time, that companies, financed by foreign capital 
and under its control, entered into the Brazilian electrical power 
industry and maintained foreign domination of the industry until the 
late 1960s. The situation was ideal for this kind of domination. The 
country had only the beginnings of a national economy, the hydraulic 
resources were distant (for that era) from the centres of 
consumption, and there was strong competition from the gas utilities. 
Two major electrical energy utilities arose in the two principal 
consumption centres with the names of So Paulo Light and Rio Light, 
the only subsidiaries of a Toronto holding company, "Brazilian 
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Traction, Light and Power"(257). On 9 October 1899, 'The Light' as it 
is now called, began to operate in the city of So Paulo under the 
name of "The So Paulo Railway, Light and Power Company Limited"*, 
assuming the rights and obligations of the concession contract for 
public service electricity supply. The contract was first signed on 
28 September 1899, between the company and the Prefeitura de So 
Paulo. A similar contract was signed on 20 May 1905, between the 
company and the then Distrito Federal for the supply of power to Rio 
de Janeiro, under the name "The Rio de Janeiro Tramways, Light and 
Power Company Limited". The contract gave the company the right to 
exercise active control over the S.A. de Gas do Rio de Janeiro which 
had, until then, held the concession for illumination of the city by 
gas and electricity. 
Various other companies became integrated with these two 
Canadian owned companies, and they expanded to cover much of the 
state of So Paulo, and part of the old state of Rio de Janeiro. In a 
shOrt time a considerable generating capacity and distribution 
network for electricity supply was installed in the concession areas 
of these companies(258). The interests of 'The Light' remained 
extensive, and in 1930 it was claimed that the existence of the 
public light, power, transportation, gas and telephone services of 
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Santos and the surrounding regions were 
directly due to the endeavours of 'The Light'(259). By 1962, almost 
half the power generated in Brazil was supplied by the two companies. 
They covered only 0.4% of the area of Brazil and served only 15.2% of 
* 'The Light' was established as a Canadian limited company, and 
retained this status until 1967, when the various companies be-
longing to the parent company Brascan amalgamated in 1967, when it 
assumed the Brazilian status of a Sociedade Anonima (see p.161). 
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the population, yet they were responsible for 46.9% of the energy 
sales(260). 
* 	The company served the major industrial markets of Brazil. The 
South East region was the centre of the post-war economic boom, which 
occurred there largely due to the good supplies of electricity 
enabling industrial expansion(261). The monopoly held by 'The Light' 
in this region meant that this Canadian company wielded considerable 
power. American capital in the electrical power industry in Brazil 
did not become important until the late 1920s when extensive 
purchases of small companies outside the jurisdiction of 'The Light' 
gave American ownership to approximately one sixth of Brazil's 
developed water power(262). 
The American Foreign Power Company (AMFORP), a subsidiary of the 
North American group, Bond and Share Company, began operating in the 
interior of So Paulo state in 1924. It served the rich coffee 
producing zone, through the acquisition of various small 
concessionaires, which latterly had become the Companhia de Força e 
Luz S.A. (CPFL). At the end of 1927, the company bought control of 
various other existing concessionaires, and the public services for 
electricity in most of the state capitals and other cities in Brazil. 
AMFORP organised a company called Companhia Auxiliar das 
Empresas Elétricas Brasileiras (CAEEB), which supervised and 
administrated the concessionaires under its active control. These 
included Companhia Força e Luz Nordeste do Brasil (Natal and Maceió), 
Pernambuco Tramways and Power Company Limited (Recife), Companhia 
Energia Elétrica da Bahia (Salvador), Companhia Central Brasileira de 
Força Elétrica (Vitoria), Companhia Brasileira de Energia Elétrica 
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(CBEE)( Niteroi, So Gonçalo and Petropolis), Companhia Forca e Luz 
de Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte), CPFL (state of So Paulo), 
Companhia Força e Luz do Paranâ (Curitiba), Companhia de Energia 
Elétrica Rio Grandense (Porto Alegre), and the Rio Grandense Light 
and Power Syndicate Limited (Pelotas). As a result, CAEEB operated in 
all the major state capitals, with the exception of Rio de Janeiro 
and So Paulo. This gave the company considerable influence in the 
Brazilian electrical power industry, but it never had the same power 
as 'The Light'(263).. 
AMFORP was purchased by the Brazilian Government in 1965. An 
informal agreement to this effect had been made by the Brazilian and 
USA Presidents, Goulart and Kennedy in April 1962. This agreement had 
been made with the objective of improving Brazil's creditability in 
international lending circles, by the orderly purchase of AMFORP's. 
properties, in order to compensate for the expropriation of AMFORP's 
subsidiary, Companhia de Energia Elétrica Rio Grandense, by the 
governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, in 1959. 
The execution of the Goulart-Kennedy agreement was delayed until 
1965, with the result that AMFORP, knowing for three years that it 
would be leaving Brazil, undermaintained and neglected the 
replacement of equipment, so as to retain as much of its revenues as 
possible. The company let its systems run down completely(264). For 
Brazil, this led to further inadequacies in the electrical power 
industry. 
Hydroelectric Power. and 'The Light' 
The hydroelectric power station which marked the start of the 
activities of 'The Light' in Brazil was UHE Parnalba, on the rio 
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Tietê, which was constructed between 1899 and 1901. The capacity of 
the station was 2 MW, exceptionally high for that period, and it 
supplied the city of So Paulo (population 238 000) with power, not 
only for illumination, but also for electrically operated 
transport(265). The original installation consisted of three 
horizontal water wheels, operating with a head of 75 ft (23 m). The 
power was transmitted over some 17 miles (27 km) at a voltage of 
20 kV. The station was successively expanded until it reached its 
final capacity of 16 MW in 1912(266). 
In September 1912, maintenance of a reliable supply of 
electricity became increasingly difficult as a drier hydrological 
cycle was entered, which caused a succession of low flows in the rio 
Tiet. This led to an increased search for new hydraulic sites, but 
the thermal power station, UTE Paula Souza, was inaugurated at the 
same time (with two 2.5 MW generators), so as to relieve the 
emergency. The idea of constructing another hydroelectric power 
station, UHE Pau D'Alho, 39 km downstream of UHE Parnaiba was 
abandoned, and, in 1914, the first two generating units of 'The 
Light's' Ul-JE Itupiraranga, on the rio Sorocaba, came into operation 
with a capacity of 18.4 MW(267,268). Shortly afterwards, the third 
unit began operation, bringing the total capacity of UHE Itupiraranga 
to 22.2 MW(269). This led to a period of of relative stability within 
the So Paulo electrical system. The energy produced was transmitted 
to So Paulo at a voltage of 88 kV (high for the era) in order to 
maintain electricity supplies to the industrial South East, which was 
rapidly expanding as a result of the importation difficulties arising 
due to the First World War. With the purchase of the land needed to 
build UHE Itupiraranga, the company acquired the Empresa de Sorocaba 
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and the Banco Unio de So Paulo, which increased its control in the 
electrical power industry. 
'The Light' won a contract to supply power to the Companhia 
Paulista de Estrada de Ferro in order to electrify the railway track 
from JundiaT to Campinas. This, coupled with an overall increase in 
demand, necessitated further expansion of UHE Itupiraranga and in 
June 1925, a fourth stage was completed, adding an extra 
22.8 MW(270)*. The timing was inopportune for increasing the 
capacity of this station, as the area had been suffering a severe 
drought for more than a year, and the reservoir had been almost 
emptied(272). Measures had been taken to overcome the problem and two 
further generating units, totalling 5 MW, were added to UTE Paula 
Souza. However, the accelerating requirements for electricity meant 
that this thermal station already could not cope with the demand. 
The 1924 drought was the cause of the first major energy supply 
crisis experienced in Brazil. In the first eight months of that year, 
measurements from 52 meteorological stations showed that rainfall was 
only 58% of normal. Despite this, another new hydroelectric power 
station, UHE Rasgo, was built downstream on the rio Tietê. Two 
9.3 MW units entered into operation, two months apart, in 1925 only 
eleven months after the first proposal of construction(273). This 
action, of constructing a hydroelectric power station in the same 
hydrological area, was not going to solve the problems of supply, 
especially in dry years, to the fast growing demand of industrial So 
Paulo. It was necessary, therefore, to look to alternatives to ensure 
* This figure was put at 16.4 MW by another reference source(271), 
but the other figure has been adopted as more likely. There is 
no obvious reason for the disparity. 
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a cheap and abundant supply of electricity for the 730 000 
inhabitants of the city, which had increased three-fold in size in 25 
years (274). 
During the previous 25 years, supply in the two major cities had 
managed to keep up with demand, with very •little increase in 
capacity. 'The Light' had only installed one extra hydroelectric 
power station between 1914 (UHE Itupiraranga) and 1925 (IJHE Rasgao), 
and that was UHE liha dos Pombos (1924) to supply the city of Rio de 
Janeiro. The Companhia Paulista de Força e Luz (CPFL) had installed a 
small station, UHE JaguarI, in So Paulo state in 1917(275), but it 
was not until the burgeoning demand of So Paulo city began to 
dictate the market did further exploitation of hydroelectric sources 
take place. 
The Great Project : The Serra do Mar 
The first of the large modern power stations to be built in 
Brazil was UHE Cubato (UHE Henry Borden), otherwise known as the 
Serra do Mar development. "The Light" had taken advantage of the 
hydraulic potential of the head waters of the rio Tietë, near So 
Paulo city, and the rio Paratha and its tributaries, near Rio de 
Janeiro, in order to supply these two cities with electricity, but 
the most.important source of hydraulic power, for both cities, was to 
come from the Serra do Mar development(276). Long before the 
construction of UHE Itupiraranga (1914), 'The Light' had begun 
studies of possible energy developments in order to be able to 
maintain supply to the city of So Paulo. It had assessed the 
economic value of the hydraulic resources located close to the centre 
of consumption and, in 1911, it had acquired land in the rio 
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ItapanhaG basin, on the oceanic slope, with an outflow into the canal 
of Bertioga. In 1913, it also purchased the falls of the rio Juquia. 
The first of these acquisitions was the initial step towards the 
beneficial energy exploitation of the Serra do Mar(277). 
The Serra do Mar is the edge of the great central plateau of 
Brazil. This plateau slopes gently inland towards the centre of the 
country and most of the rivers, with their headwaters in the Serra, 
flow inland into the basins of the rios Paranâ and Paraguay, and, 
finally, reach the sea at the rio de la Plata. A small number of 
rivers flow down the coastal escarpment, formed by the Serra and 
directly into the Atlantic Ocean(278). On the sea facing slope of the 
escarpment the rainfall is one of the highest in Brazil, over 
2 000 mm per year(279). In the 1930s, accurate records were not kept 
for the region of the Serra do Mar which was to be exploited, but 
estimates ranged from an average of 5 000 mm per year(280) to a 
recorded maximum of 6 800 mm in 1929(281). Such a high rainfall made 
development in this region extremely difficult and ambitious. 
The plans of 'The Light' were to reverse the flow of some of the 
inland flowing rivers, at their head waters, and, by means of a 
complex system of dams, canals and pumping stations, use the head 
created for hydroelectric power generation at the base of the 
scarp(282). 
The original 	plan 	was to 	exploit 	the 	favourable 	conditions at 
the 	edge of 	the 	plateau, overlooking 	the 	Baixada 	Santista, by 
diverting the 	head 	waters of 	the 	rio 	Tiet@ 	and 	using 	the 	head of 
640 m 	at Itapanhaü. 	The engineer 	originally 	in 	charge 	of the 
project, Walter Charnley, also intended to make use of the waters 
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from the rio Paraibuna, a tributary of the rio Paraiba, by damming it 
upstream of Bairro Alto. The retained waters were to be diverted to 
the coast to a power station of 136 MW capacity, situated at the foot 
of the Serra in the valley of the rio Mococá. The studies of the 
ItapanhaQ scheme had reached an advanced stage, when the project for 
the expansion of electricity generation to supply the city of So 
Paulo was entrusted to the Canadian Vice President of 'The Light', 
Asa White Kenney Billings, who was renowned in the field of 
construction of hydroelectric power stations in Spain, Mexico and 
Brazil (283). 
Billings examined the difficulties which, in his opinion, the 
construction of IJHE ItapanhaQ would present, especially the 
transportation of heavy equipment and the geological conditions to be 
found on the site of the proposed powerhouse. He decided to employ an 
engineer, F.S. Hyde, to collect new data for the project, and to 
study alternative schemes along the escarpments of the Serra do Mar. 
Hyde pursued his studies under difficulties; accurate maps were not 
available, a condition existing today in the Amazon Basin (see 
p.240), infrastructure was lacking, as was knowledge of hydrological, 
climatic and geological data. After exhaustive research, he 
recommended damming the rio Grande, one of the tributaries of the rio 
Tiete, diverting the waters towards the rio Pedras and thus forming a 
reservoir. This plan was adopted in preference to the Itapanha 
scheme, because of its greater available head, greater storage 
volume, better local infrastructure and closer proximity to the 
market. 
Billings had become fascinated by the concept of diverting the 
courses of the plateau rivers over the escarpment, and believed that 
MUM 
such an "obvious" scheme should have been devised long before 
"At any time during twenty years this plan could have been 
easily determined from the topographic maps of this region 
of which thousands of copies were sold to the public. 
Anyone capable of tracing the contours on these maps can 
imagine the whole plan. Yet no-one did this and three 
independent investigations passed by the region as devoid 
of interest, even though it was on the principal highway 
and included the only cascade on the Serra which is visible 
from the sea port. This seems a somewhat remarkable 
fact" (284). 
However, Billings has also been reported as saying 
a dam 90 feet (27.7 m) high on the Tiet@ river a few 
miles below the city of So Paulo would back up this river, 
flooding a large part of the city as th water rose to form 
a lake of 106 square mils ,(275 km ) in area and of 
2 000 000 acre-feet (2.45x10 m) in volume at an elevation 
of 2 408 feet (734m) above sea level. When this elevation 
was reached,the impounded waters would commence to flow in 
the other direction to the ocean over the lowest depression 
in the almost imperceptible divide near the edge of the 
plateau. This flow could thus be made use of in the drop of 
2 380 feet (726 m) to the coast plain. It would be 
impracticable, however, to build such a lake, for it would 
flood most of the city and destroy the market for 
power" (285). 
This is an amazing conclusion for the man who was responsible 
for some of the major early hydroelectric projects in Brazil. Even at 
that time, the 1930s, it was obvious that the companies concerned 
were only interested in selling electricity and not in providing a 
public service. To quote, as the principal reason for non-
construction of a project, the loss of the market, as opposed to the 
loss of homes, agricultural land and livelihood is rather 
insensitive. 
The first step in the Serra do Mar project was authorised by 
Federal decree in March 1925, and by state law in December. In its 
original form it comprised a main reservoir on the rio Grande, a 
tributary of the rio Tiet, supplemented by twelve smaller reservoirs 
to be built successively asneeded. The surplus flow from each, after 
discharge of the "normal dry season flow", would be diverted by 
canals and tunnels to the powerhouse at the foot of the Serra. During 
the initial construction period, further study indicated that the 
reservoir level should be raised a further 22 feet (6.7 m), 
increasing the reservoir area from 26 sq.miles (67 km 2 ) to 
44 sq.miles (113 km 2 ), and the storage volume from 311 000 acre-feet 
(O.4x109 m3 ) to 835 0000 acre-feet (1.1x10 9 m3 ). Studies also 
suggested that all the proposed canals and tunnels be replaced by a 
single canal to conduct the surplus from the reservoirs, as well as 
the flood waters from the rio Tietë which would be pumped to the main 
reservoi r(286). 
The first commercial operation of UHE Cubato began in October 
1926, only one year after official authorisation of the project(287). 
However, the preliminary surveys undertaken before the start of 
construction required many months of work which was hampered greatly 
by the dense undergrowth. Pathways had to be carved through the 
packed vegetation to the extent that for the topographic survey of 
the major reservoir area over 4 000 km of trail had to be cut(288). 
This problem is very similar to that being experienced today in the 
Amazon basin, where men with chain saws are lowered into the forest 
from helicopters in order to prepare clearings and landing strips 
before survey work can begin. 
The most serious problem faced at UHE Cubato was, in the event, 
malaria. In the 1920s it was still highly endemic in So Paulo state 
(as it still is in the Amazon basin) and presented a serious threat 
to the success of such an ambitious enterprise. At that time malaria 
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was endemic on the coastal plain, and in a large part of the 
interior. However, it was absent in the region along the west of the 
Serra(289). The disease had already been responsible for the failure 
of a number of Government projects in the area(290), but it had not 
been found on the scale which caused the disaster in the building of 
the Panama Canal, where thousands died(291). As a precaution, 'The 
Light' employed an eminent health expert, Arthur Neira, to lead the 
fight against the disease. He was aware of what had happened in 
Panama, and disagreed strongly with the company's decision to place 
the 4 000 workers in night time camps at the foot of the Serra, where 
the incidence of mosquitos was high. Disaster was averted as a 
result of the constant vigilance of his team of doctors who were put 
into position of command by the company(292). 
At the time it was believed that the best way to fight the 
malaria was to prevent the introduction of carriers onto the work 
site. Every labourer was examined on recruitment and again before 
commencing work, to check for evidence of the disease, which was 
usually the benign tertian type mixed with some malignant tertian. 
Those men with an enlarged spleen, or other evidence of malarial 
infection were rejected(293). No prophylactics such as quinine were 
administered, no mosquito screening was used on buildings, but all 
open water was regularly inspected for mosquito larvae. Anyone who 
reported sick was sent to the doctors who would do a blood test if 
malaria was suspected. If it was diagnosed, the patient was sent to 
hospital for at least thirty days or until no trace of parasites 
could be found in the blood(294). 
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UHE Cubato 
Over the period 1925 to 1935, eight dams and two reservoirs were 
constructed for this scheme. The two reservoirs were Billings, on the 
rio Grande, and Pedras at the crest of the Serra. The storage volumes 
were, respectively, 1 230x10 6 m3 and 49x106 m3 , and they were 
connected by the Summit Canal, which was 16 km long. Only two of the 
dams had spillways, the Summit dam on the Billings reservoir, 
spilling to the Pedras reservoir and the Pedras dam on the Pedras 
reservoir(295). This ambitious scheme was modified during 
construction, and the addition of pumping stations allowed water to 
be transferred between reservoirs and abstracted from the rio Tietë, 
thus enabling the scheme to serve the dual purpose of generating 
power and alleviating the floods in So Paulo. 
Billings estimated that each square mile (2.6 km 2 ) of drainage 
area on the Serra do Mar provided from 600 hp to 2 500 hp (170 kWkm 2 
to 720 kWkm 2 ), averaging 1 000 hp (300 kWkm 2 ) at a 60% load factor. 
He believed that the Serra do Mar development should not be 
considered as a single installation but as a "flexible programme of 
many steps to be carried out when needed", which would be able to 
accommodate the growth of load for the next 20 or 30 years(296). 
Although this predicted additional potential has not been used, th 
only completed Serra developments are UHE Cubato and UHE Lages 
(built in 1924), the project was indeed flexible. Much of the work on 
UHE Cubato, in the 1920s, was innovative, especially with respect to 
the penstocks.. The first two, completed in 1926, were designed along 
conventional lines. A third was modified to give greater strength and 
a lower unit cost, but, despite the good performance, the engineers 
were convinced that the basis of conventional designs was far from 
- 92 - 
optimum, and an intensive study was therefore carried out, in mid-
project(297). 
Not only was the structure of the penstocks reviewed, but the 
problem of internal protection was studied. Bituminous enamels were 
used in order to reduce the periods when the penstocks were out of 
service for maintenance, but the enamels had to be able to withstand 
the temperatures of 73 °C which were reached when the penstocks stood 
empty in the sun. Whitewashing the outside could reduce the 
temperature by 16 °C but was insufficiently durable. Consequently, 
aluminium paint in spar varnish was used, although it only reduced 
the maximum temperature by 7 °C(298). 
The limited materials available in the 1920s, coupled with the 
novelty of the problems, were common features of all the 
hydroelectric developments of the period, and the pioneering spirit 
then evident manifests itself today in the similar problems arising 
in the Amazonian hydroelectric developments. The' comment made by 
Billings in his 1936 lecture to the Institution of Civil Engineers 
was valid then, and still is today, and it epitomises the continuing 
innovative nature of hydroelectric power developments. 
"It may be noted that hydroelectric work differs from other 
construction in that practically the entire design depends 
on local conditions, with the result that hardly any two 
plants are alike". 
Due to the variations in geology, climate and streamfiow, 
knowledge of which are fundamental to a hydroelectric scheme, 
detailed and long term observations of relevant parameters must be 
made. In Brazil, rainfall, evaporation and other hydrological factors 
are so variable that streamfiow cannot be estimated from run-off 
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expressed as a percentage of rainfall; it is always necessary to 
guage the actual streamflow. When UHE Cubato was built Government 
records were scanty or non-existent, and it was necessary for 'The 
Light' to maintain its own corps of observers, to obtain the 
necessary data (299). 
Despite all the problems encountered as a result of the 
innovative nature of the scheme, the first generator of UHE Cubato 
started commercial operation in 1926, with a capacity of 44.4 MW, and 
thus the climax of the evolutionary process which had begun in the 
last year of the nineteenth century was reached. This pioneering of 
hydroelectric power unleashed a process of intense interaction, in 
Brazil, between energy and progress. The consequent increase and 
diversification of the uses of electrical energy in So Paulo 
required the almost uninterrupted expansion of the installations on 
the rio Parnalba, until the limiting capacity of the Guarapiranga 
reservoir was reached. The first unit at UHE Cubato established 
itself as the focus of the subsequent works, which incorporated the 
abundant waters of the rio Tiet6 and utilized the rio Pinheiros, 
which flowed through a valley unsuitable for human habitation because 
of high rainfall and endemic disease. 
It also transformed the Serra do Mar from being a barrier to the 
economic growth of the country into one of the key factors in 
Brazil's development (300). The fact that 'The Light' managed to 
design and execute this project in such a hostile region with almost 
no transport system, between the coast and the city of Sâo Paulo, 
gave the company the reputation of being a major contributor to the 
development of the South East region of Brazil(301). 
After the installation of the first operating unit at UHE 
Cubato further generators were installed sequentially until the 
final one, the eighth, came into operation in June 1956. The final 
capacity of the station was 474 MW(302). When further extension to 
the powerhouse became impossible, a second powerhouseY, UHE Henry 
Borden, with six generators, was installed in a large subterranean 
cavern excavated close to UHE Cubatào. When complete, in December 
1961, this raised the overall capacity of the system to 914 MW. Like 
UHE Cubato, UHE Henry Borden was viewed as a development milestone. 
Its entry into service with its first unit in 1955, coincided with 
the period during which President Jucelino Kubitschek was defining 
the Federal Government philosophy on development. This gave priority 
to the economic expansion which was being experienced by the 
industrial South East at that time(303). 
UHE Fontes 
Not only was 'The Light' responsible for UHE Cubato, and the 
major supply of electricity to So Paulo, the company also played a 
similar role for the city of Rio de Janeiro with UHE Fontes. This 
work began much earlier, in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. It was intended to clean up the then rather insalubrious 
city and make it more attractive and modern. The terms of the accord, 
signed between Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company 
Limited and the government of the then Federal District, gave the 
company the right to exploit industrially the Cachoeira de Ribero 
das Lages (the falls of the small river Lages). Work began in 1905, 
and in 1907 a temporary powerhouse was completed in order to help 
meet the most urgent needs of the city of Rio de Janeiro. In March 
1908, UHE Fontes was inaugurated, with six generators giving a total 
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nominal capacity of 24 MW, with an overload rating of 36 MW. - The 
power was transmitted over the unusuallylong distance, for 1908, of 
81 km, at a voltage of 44 kV. The reservoir, with usable storage of 
182x106 m3 , equivalent to 112 GWh, was formed by closing the ribero 
das Lages by a 32 m high concrete arch spillway dam (one of the 
highest in the world at that time). 
The economic development of Rio de Janeiro during this period 
was due, in large part, to the availability of energy from UHE Fontes 
and, after only five years, it was necessary to augment the 
generating capacity of the station. This was effected, in 1914, by 
the first river diversion in Brazil in which the headwaters of the 
Pira, dammed by the Tocos dam, were diverted by gravity flow, 
through an 8.5 km long tunnel to the Lages reservoir. The diverted 
water supplied two additional generators, and the capacity of the 
station was raised to a maximum rating of 64 MW, and the transmission 
voltage was raised to 88 kV. For 15 yeãrsUHE Fontes served as the 
sole major electric power station supplying the Federal District of 
Rio de Janeiro and its outlying towns, but in order to cope with 
population increase and the extension of use of electricity, another 
station, UHE Ilha dos Pombos was constructed on the rio Paratha. 
Once again, the engineer in charge was A.W.K. Billings who, in 
27 years in Brazil, was responsible for an increase in Brazilian 
installed capacity of 800 MW. UHE liha dos Pombos was a run-of-the-
river scheme, with five generating units and a total capacity of 
167 MW. In conjunction with UHE Fontes it met, the needs of the 
Federal capital until the start of the Second World War. The onset of 
war in Europe, however, led to difficulties in the importation of 
manufactured goods into Brazil and to an immediate need for import 
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substitution. This led to an expansion of industry and the need for 
increased power generation. It was proposed, therefore, to raise the 
height of the Lages dam by 28 m, and so increase the available 
storage in the reservoir to 1 050x10 6 m3 (780 GWh). Such increase in 
height has rarely been undertaken and it involved very careful 
planning and close attention to technical details(304-306). However, 
the successful increase in hydraulic reserves allowed the expansion 
of UHE Fontes by 190 MW. 
The final development in the system of 'Rio Light' was begun in 
1948, with the ParaTba-PiraY diversion to the Lages reservoir. This 
was completed in 1952, and it supplied the sub-terranean power 
station of UHE Nilo Peçanha, with an installed capacity of 6x60 MW, 
and the enlarged UHE Fontes. Another hydroelectric power station was 
built 4 km downstream to use the discharged water from these two 
power stations. The 100 MW UHE Pereira Passos (Ponte Coberta) was 
inaugurated in 1962. This was the last power station to be 
constructed by 'The Light'. Thereafter, the company confined itself 
to distribution. 
This change in the role of Rio Light coincided with the 
reorganization, on a national basis, of the whole electrical power 
industry in Brazil (see p.160). In fact, at the time of the Lages 
diversion project, a transmission line from UHE Cubato to UHE Fontes 
came into operation and. unified the system of 'The Light', despite 
the frequency difference between the two systems (see p.133). This 
was effected by converting the 50 Hz to 60 Hz at the 50 MW Aparecida 
frequency conversion station. This transmission line, 330 km long, 
operating at 230 kV, was for many years the longest in South America. 
The 'Rio Light' and 'Sâo Paulo' systems finally amalgamated to form 
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the LIGHT - Servicos de Electricidade S.A. ('The Light'.) in 1967, 
with a total installed capacity of 1 950 MW(307). 
The expansion of the Lages system signalled the end of the era 
of hydroelectric power developments close to the consumer markets of 
the main industrial centres. Although future schemes were designed to 
meet industrial energy needs, planning changed from city oriented to 
river basin oriented. All new developments were to be geared to the 
best use in energy terms, of the available water resources. Between 
1948 and the early 1960s only two major hydroelectric power 
generation schemes were completed, although many smaller stations 
were built, often by private companies for their own supply. These 
two large schemes were UHE Paulo Afonso, on the rio So Francisco in 
Bahia, which began operation in 1955, and UHE Trës Marias, on the 
southern end of the same river, in the state of Minas Gerais. This 
began to generate in 1960(308). 
The rio So Francisco is the longest river wholly contained 
within Brazil. It rises in the heart of Minas Gerais, flows 
northwards and then eastwards, along the border between Pernambuco 
and Bahia, and then the border between Alagoas and Sergipe, for a 
total of 3 160 km before flowing into the Atlantic Ocean. There are 
no major ports on this river because of its general lack of 
navigability, but it supports three important hydroelectric power 
stations, UHE Paulo Afonso, UHE Tres Marias and UHE Sobradinho. In 
its course it crosses some of the most poverty stricken areas of 
Brazil, where the climate is harsh and subject to prolonged droughts. 
Initial studies of the river were made, by Henrique Guilherme 
Hanfield, in the middle of the nineteenth century, under the 
opm 
patronage of Emperor -Dom Pedro II. However, the first serious 
consideration of the hydroelectric potential was not made until the 
Companhia Hidrelétrica do So Francisco (CHESF) was created in 1945 
in order to build and operate UHE PauloAfonso. 
UHE Paulo Afonso 
This hydroelectric power station was built at the site of what 
used to be a natural waterfall with four cascades with a total height 
of 82 m. On seeing the falls the explorer Richard Burton has been 
quoted as saying "Power tremendous, inexorable, irresistible"(309), 
but the power station has largely destroyed them. The first 
hydroelectric power station at Paulo Afonso was inaugurated on 26 
January 1913, with a power rating of 1 600 hp (1 200 kW), in order to 
supply a small textile factory, but with the creation of CHESF the 
development of the Paulo Afonso site as a major electricity source 
began in February 1949. 
The works which were commenced at that time marked the first 
entrance of the Brazilians into the complex domain of water resources 
planning for electrical power(310). Much of the engineering was 
innovative, but the, project was successfully implemented(311). UHE 
Paulo Afonso symbolised the beginning of a Governmental presence in 
the electrical power industry and it gave a new dimension to the 
success of large mixed economy enterprises. For the first time it was 
possible to establish factories capable of manufacturing heavy 
electrical and mechanical equipment and begin the process of import 
substitution in this important sector of the economy. 
On 1 December 1954, the dam was closed. The powerhouse was the 
first sub-terranean one in Brazil, and it commenced operation with 
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two 60 MW generating units. This was, however, only the first phase 
of the overall plan. It was followed by UHE Paulo Afonso II, which 
also had a subterranean powerhouse and a capacity of 180 MW, and Ul-IE 
Paulo Afonso III which entered into service in 1974 with 2x216 MW 
generators. Work immediately began on UHE Paulo Afonso IV which, in 
its first stage, is planned to have 5x375 MW generators. The planned 
final installed capacity is 2 250 MW. Integral with the Paulo Afonso 
system is UHE Moxotó, built on a tributary of the rio So Francisco, 
This entered into service in 1977 with 4x110 MW generators. The 
transmission line from UHE Paulo Afonso to the Centro Industrial do 
Recôncavo Baiano was the first 500 kV line in Brazil(312). 
UHE Furnas 
UHE Furnas, and the FURNAS company, which was created to build 
the power station, both signify a turning point in the Brazilian 
electrical power industry. During 1956 the Conselho de 
Desenvolvimento (Development Council) which was responsible for 
national economic planning, pointed out, to the Federal Government, 
Brazil's increasing energy needs.. With the pioneering experience of 
UHE Paulo Afonso behind them, it was decided that the sensible 
economic step to be taken would be to concentrate resources on a 
large project, with the collaboration of the state governments of So 
Paulo and Minas Gerais, and the companies of 'Sao Paulo Light' and 
CPFL. The project was to be the construction of a 1.2 GW 
hydroelectric power station at the Furnas site on the rio 
Grande(313). The site had been discovered a few years earlier by 
CEMIG, but the size of the proposed project was considered too large 
for the CEMIG market alone. Therefore, the Federally sponsored 
company, Central Elétrica de Furnas S.A. (later to become Centrais 
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Elétricas de Furnas S.A., (FURNAS)) was established in 1957 in order to 
develop the hydroelectric potential of the Furnas site(314). 
The Federal Government regarded FURNAS as a means of entering 
the field of electricity production in the South East region, which 
had. been, until then, dominated by state and private enterprises. It 
wanted to try to overcome the crisis of electricity supply which was 
beginning to cripple the economic and industrial centre of Brazil. 
Existing power stations, and those under construction or planned by 
the private and state companies, were, for a variety of reasons, not 
able to meet the future needs of regional development. The electrical 
power industry in the region was stagnating(315). It had become 
increasingly urgent to install a further 1 000 MW of capacity, a move 
which was ambitious when it is considered that the total installed 
capacity at the time was only 3 000 MW. 
The World Bank granted a loan to finance the foreign exchange 
costs of the project (see p.66), and FURNAS was established, with 
three ex-directors from CEMIG in key positions. At the time of its 
inception, the company was proud of being the only authentic "mixed 
state "* enterprise in Brazil, a concept which is still important to 
Brazilians today (see p.140). Two private shareholders held 60% of 
the preference stock, but the percentage held by the majority 
shareholder, 'Sao Paulo Light' soon dropped to 1 or 2% as the 
Government assumed greater control(316). When FURNAS was created, the 
major shareholders were the Federal Government, the state governments 
of So Paulo and Minas Gerais, So Paulo Light and CPFL. However, the 
Federal Government, in the guise of the newly formed ELETROBRAS (see 
* mixed state or mixed economy enterprises in Brazil are those 
with capital backing from both government and private sources. 
- 101 
p.153), soon came to hold the majority of shares and Government 
participation is now greater than 95%. Before the start of the Furnas 
project, the Federal Government had little influence in the 
electrical power industry of the South East, but even before 
installation of the UHE Furnas generating units was complete, the 
role of the Government in the region had been established(317) 
Despite financial problems resulting from high rates of 
inflation, the Furnas scheme was considered a development success. In 
energy terms it was viewed as a dynamic component of Brazil's fast 
escalating economic development, and as a mark of technical 
achievement. It also led the way for the rapid development of the 
cascade scheme on the rio Grande(318). At the inauguration of the 
first stage of UHE Furnas on 12 May 1965, the president, Castelo 
Branco, simultaneously detonated a charge of dynamite and initiated 
the works for UHE Estreito. His words at the time mirrored the 
Brazilian view of the whole scheme. 
"...these are two eloquent and symbolic events, which 
express the country's determination to progressh'*(319). 
UHE Furnas not only met the immediate needs for additional generating 
capacity, but it also established a basis for meeting future demand 
in the South East region. It was instrumental in the interconnection 
of the three large consumption centres of Rio de Janeiro, So Paulo 
and Belo Horizonte, which form the vertices of the economic triangle 
of Brazil. Initially, Rio de Janeiro was excluded from the scheme 
because of its different operating frequency of 60 Hz, but it 
indirectly received power from the scheme through the frequency 
* "...ha nos dois acontecimentos eloquente simbolismo, expressiva 
imagem de continuidade nacional que, de rnodo categârico, afirrna 
invencIvel determinaço de progredir". 
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converter at Aparecida operated by 'The Light'. 
The rio Grande rises in southern Minas Gerais and flows west for 
1 200 km before joining the rio Paranaiba to form the rio Paranã. The 
Furnas site lies in Minas Gerais. The main dam is a rockfill 
structure, and the reservoir has backed up two rivers to inundate a 
total area of145 950ha.The regulating effect of this reservoir was 
seen as a key factor in the development of a further potential of 
7 GW on the rio Grande. The total installed capacity of UHE Furnas is 
1.2 GW. Despite difficulties in maintaining the schedule, the first 
generating unit began operation in September 1963, and the remainder 
followed as scheduled, to supply the region through more than. 
1 000 km of 345 kV transmission line(320,321). 
The first station of this cascade system was UHE Peixoto, which 
began operation in 1956 under the name of UHE Mascarenhas de Moraes, 
with a capacity of 477 MW. The cascade system now comprises five 
hydroelectric power stations, with a combined installed capacity of 
4.5 GW, which supply, in conjunction with three thermal power 
stations and one other small hydroelectric power station, a total 
area of 1.5x10 6 km2 (322). 
The technical success of UHE Furnas was probably due to the hard 
line taken by the FURNAS directors, especially its president John 
Cotrim (now chief engineer with Itaipu Binacional) (323). From the 
outset, the company never accepted the philosophy of co-operation 
with, or aid to Brazilian industry. Its stated objectives were low 
cost and reliability. The civil works and the engineering were all 
foreign, and 87% were paid for in hard currency. Nearly all the 
equipment was imported because, despite pressure exerted on the 
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Table III.ii : Energy Production by the Furnas Cascade 
Power Station 	Installed Capacity * 	Energy Production # 
MW 	 GWh 
Marimbondo 1 440 7 895 
Furnas 1 216 5 991 
Estreito 1 050 4 458 
Peixoto 476 3 162 
Porto Colombia 320 2 181 
Source 	* Public Relations Document, FURNAS 1977 
# FURNAS Annual Report, 1978 
company to buy Brazilian, Cotrim did not consider that the industry 
could meet the required deadlines or produce adequate reliable 
equipment. However, FURNAS endeavoured to be fair with the 
engineering companies, and if one proved reliable for small scale 
contracts, sizable ones would be awarded later. In fact with the 
latest FURNAS works, at UHE Itumbiara, all the engineers are 
Brazilian, as is 80% of the equipment(324). (It should be remembered 
that the current Federal Government is very strict with operation of 
its Brazilianisation" policies). UHE Furnas was completed on time, 
and since then has operated without serious problem. 
In the beginning, 	FURNAS had control 	of the 	largest 
hydroelectric power stations and largest reservoirs in Brazil, and, 
as it also had control of the regional water storage reservoirs and 
the interconnecting systems, it could guarantee the operation of the 
hydraulically interconnected plants. With such an interconnected 
system, controlled use of water in reservoirs and thermal power to 
complement the hydroelectric system, FURNAS was able to optimise the 
system, and it became the pioneer for computer optimization of power 
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systems in Brazil. 	However, in 1973-1974 ELETROBRAS put into 
06 
operation the Grupo Coordedor de 0peraço Interligada (GCOI) (see 
P-173) and FURNAS lost its strategic planning position(325). 
UHE Furnas signified the start of a. planned approach to river 
basin development. Previously, most hydroelectric sites had been 
developed individually with little thought being given to integrated 
schemes. However, in recent years, this process has been changed, 
especially since most of the prime sites close to the industrial 
markets have been utilized. The principal examples of this co-
ordinated river basin planning are the cascade system on the rios 
Tocantins-Araguaia (see.appendix4) and that on the wholly Brazilian 
stretch of the rio Uruguaf (see page 106). 
UHE Trës Marias 
At its inception, the hydroelectric power station, UHE Trës 
Marias, was regarded as the key project for a major power and 
reclamation development in Brazil. It was part of a joint undertaking 
by the Comisso do Vale do São Francisco (CVSF) and CEMIG. It was 
conceived during the era when other bold projects were in progress, 
including the construction of the new capital Brasilia, and the 
Belém-Brasilia highway through the Amazon jungle. 
The scheme was part of a large reclamation programme in the rio 
São Francisco valley, which had the aim of raising the economic 
standards in the valley. The CVSF was given authority to operate by 
the Brazilian Congress in September 1946, and its first large 
undertaking and principal project was UHE Trés Marias. All the 
hydraulic structures, such as the dam, intakes and penstocks 
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connected with river-flow control were financed by CVSF, and all 
power facilities, including transmission lines, were financed by 
CEMIG, who was responsible for the supervision of design and 
construction of all the works. 
It was necessary to control the river discharges to improve 
navigation of the river, and to prevent periodic flooding. This was 
done by means of the Tres Marias dam. This is a 2 700 m long 
earthfill structure 70 m high. Use of concrete was kept to a minimum 
because of its high cost, and every effort was made to maximise the 
use of local materials. The power output of the hydroelectric power 
station is not high, the total installed capacity being 520 MW. 
However, when initial construction began,in 1956, it was one of the 
larger power stations in Brazil. 
As the project was established in an isolated location, it was 
necessary to construct housing for the workers and access roads, 
however, the construction problems for this project were not as great 
as for other projects in Brazil. UHE Trës Marias is significant in 
being the first major power station integrated with general water 
resources development in Brazil(326,327). 
The Uruguai Basin 
The Uruguay Basin was first studied in 1968, by CANAMBRA (see 
P-184), when it was regarded as less attractive for power development 
than the rio Iguaçu, because of its uneven hydrological cycle of dry 
periods alternating with extremely high flows. The development of the 
river revolved around the possibility of having an integrated scheme, 
either with or without the diversion of the headwaters of the rio 
Canoas to the Atlantic Ocean. CANAMBRA selected as the most promising 
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project in the basin, the rio Canoas diversion, although it appeared 
that it might have an adverse effect on any other downstream 
developments. It also recommended further study of the Pinheiro 
scheme(328). In the event, no power development of the rio Uruguay 
was undertaken, because, at that time, there was little industrial 
demand for electricity in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa 
Catarina. 
In 1977, a second water power survey of the rio Uruguay basin 
was carried out by Centrais Eltricas do Sul do Brasil S.A. 
(ELETROSUL) (see p.158) and the Consorcio Nacional de Engenheiros 
Consultores S.A. (CNEC). These studies were aimed at selecting the 
best overall scheme for the development of the river basin for power, 
and, at the same time, defining the technical and economic parameters 
of the various power stations which would be components of the 
selected scheme. The financial resources for this study were supplied 
jointly by ELETROBRAS, the Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP) 
and the Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul (BRDE)(329). 
Increasing world petroleum costs, and the consequent escalation 
in the cost of oil-fired generation of electricity, have made 
previously unattractive hydroelectric schemes competitive. With the 
progressive expansion of electrical power generation in the South 
region, including such large scale projects as UHE Itaipu, UHE Salto 
Osorio, UHE Salto Santiago and UHE • Foz do Areia, the advantages of 
electrical connection between the two regions has become significant 
(see p.I). The increased utilization of the hydraulic resources of 
this region, by the development of the rio Uruguay, has become 
increasingly important for the industrial South East. 
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One of the objectives of the most recent study was to select the 
best alternative for promoting optimum use of the available hydraulic 
resources at a competitive cost, following proper consideration of 
the technical aspects and the socio-economic impli cations (330). For 
many years, the criteria for the choice of construction of a 
particular hydroelectric power station in Brazil have been to satisfy 
a particular demand or economic restrictions. However, it is now 
becoming increasingly common to consider social and environmental 
factors as well(331). 
The ELETROSUL-CNEC report recommended that the hydroelectric 
power stations UHE Machadino and UHE Itä be constructed, one for the 
reason of size and the other for the reason of the low unit cost of 
energy (around US$ 15/MWh, January 1979 prices). It was also 
recommended that work on UHE Machadino be started immediately. There 
was a strong reaction from the local people to this suggestion. On 24 
March 1980, some 250 farmers, representing the towns in the region of 
the upper rio Uruguay basin, met in the town of Concordia in order to 
discuss the problems which would occur as a result of the 
construction of the dams(332). This was not the first incidence of 
opposition to a power project, as demonstrations had previously been 
held in the North East of Brazil(333), but it may possibly be the 
first occasion on which it may be successful. 
The total scheme for the rio Urugual involves the construction 
of up to 20 hydroelectric power stations by the year 2000, but the 
farmers immediate concern was with the two stations now being built. 
Already, there has been damage to land and crops as a result of 
survey work. In some cases compensation has been offered but not 
paid. The farmers have not been told any facts about the situation, 
I; 
which is a difficult obstacle to overcome, as accurate details are 
not yet available. The decision to undertake the projects was 
undertaken at the preparatory survey stage, and further studies will 
have to be made before the projects are finalised. However, if all 
the twenty schemes are built, a considerable area of agricultural 
land will be inundated, and compensation to the farmers is a subject 
which will be avoided as long as is possible by the indemnifiers. The 
farmers believe that there will be little benefit for them from the 
increased generation of electricity, and they resent the fact that it 
will be the poor and small scale farmers who will suffer the greatest 
losses, not the large estate owners(334). 
The possibilities of multiple use of the river, such as 
navigation, irrigation and flood control were studied, but no 
specific recommendations were made, which in the words of ELETROSUL 
and CNEC, "... invests a superficial character in these analyses. 
The only use of the river considered important by the Brazilian 
Authorities is its harnessing for power(335). 
The development of the upper reaches of the rio Uruguay are of 
direct concern to Argentina and Uruguay. After the confluence of the 
river with the rio Peperi-Guacu it flows southwards, forming the 
international frontier between Brazil and Argentina. South of its 
confluence with the rio Quaral it forms the international frontier 
between Argentina and Uruguay. Any hydroelectric developments by 
Brazil on the upper reaches could have a considerable effect on any 
binational projects downstream. A Brazilian-Argentinian treaty on the 
hydroelectric development of their jointly owned stretch of river 
makes no specific reference to any projects, but it establishes the 
judicial and political bases on which projects may be executed. 
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Through the treaty Brazil is committed to guarantee that any 
construction undertaken does not prejudice any existing installations 
on the river, including the joint Argentinian-Uruguayan scheme UHE 
Salto Grande. Relationships are already strained between Brazil and 
Argentina over the Itaipu and Corpus schemes (see p.118), and the 
speed with which Brazil has decided to go ahead with the UHE 
Machadino and UHE Itá projects, with no feasibility studies having 
been made, is going to cause great concern in Argentina. 
UHE Itaipu 
UHE Itaipu is the largest hydroelectric power station in the 
world currently under construction. It is a giant binational project, 
on the rio Paranã, jointly owned by Brazil and Paraguay. To quote 
from one of its public relations documents 
"The Indian word Itaipu means the "singing stone". Because 
it represents the cultural background of both countries, 
its meaning shall forever be contained in its new 
significant dimension - Itaipu, the largest hydroelectric 
power station in the world"(336). 
This sentence suggests a unity which does not exist. Paraguay, 
Brazil's partner in the undertaking, has suffered considerable 
financial losses(337), and there has been little harmony with the 
downstream neighbour, Argentina(338). The significance of the 
project, however, lies in the technological and organizational 
achievement in its construction, and in the fact that its existence 
has unified the electrical power industry in Brazil (see p.116). 
Much has been written about this great project, most of it 
repetitive, and very little of it new. It is the project displaying 
the new Brazil to the world. Groups of tourists are readily shown an 
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the construction site by minibus. Booklets are available, and 1-
shirts are on sale with the motto 'itaipu, o major obra do mun do u 
(the largest construction in the world). Major Brazilian journals 
regularly produce special Itaipu issues, usually updating the 
previous ones or emphasising different aspects of construction. All 
emphasise the grandeur of the project(339-343). 
It was only after, several years of study of the binational 
stretch of the rio Paranâ, by both Brazil and Paraguay, that an 
exploitation agreement was made between the two governments. On 22 
June 1966, the Ata de Iguaçu" (Iguacu Act) was signed between Brazil 
and Paraguay, providing for joint study of the water resources held 
in common. The agreement was implemented by a Brazilian-Paraguayan 
Joint Technical Commi-ttee set up the following February, but it was 
not until 10 April 1970, that a Convênio de Cooperaco (Co-operation 
Agreement) was signed between ELETROBRAS and its Paraguayan 
equivalent Adminstración Nacional de Electricdad (ANDE) to establish 
the conditions for the technical and economic feasibility study 'of 
the development of the hydroelectric potential. This was to include a 
-  general appraisal of the multiple use of the water for power, 
navigation, human and industrial consumption, and irrigation(344). 
Detailed field investigations of the Itaipu site were begun at 
the end of 1971. As a result of a preliminary report submitted to 
both governments in January 1973, they proceeded with negotiations 
for the Tratado de Itaipu (Treaty of Itaipu). This was signed in 
Brasilia on 26 April 1973. It contained 29 articles which set out the 
regulations for the hydroelectric development of the rio Paranâ from 
the Salto Grande de Sete Quedas (Salto de Guaira) to the Brazilian 
city of Foz de Iguaçu(345). 
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The treaty created the entity Itaipu Binacional (see P.162) to 
co-ordinate the development of the civil works and the power 
station, and it also outlined a new structure for ELETROBRAS and its 
subsidiaries. It also ensured the Brazilian market for the power 
which is to be compulsorily purchased by FURNAS and ELETROSUL, who 
will then sell the power to the various electricity enterprises in 
the South and South East Regions of Brazil (see p.172). The Brazilian 
share of the power is primarily intended for the industrial South 
East of the country, with at least 50% of the power going to the city 
of So Paulo (346). However, some of the power is to go to the South 
region, and this has resulted in the speeding up of the electrical 
interconnection of these two hydrologically distinct regions. The 
deployment of power from the project is the mainstay of Brazilian 
electrical energy planning for the late 1980s, and all the current 
plans revolve around the power from Itaipu being available from the 
beginning of 1983(347). The GCOI plans have contingency allowances 
for a delay of up to six months of the entry into operation of UHE 
Itaipu, but there is no provision for any longer delay(348). 
UHE Itaipu is being constructed on the rio Paran, 190 km 
downstream of the Salto Grande de Sete Quedas. The average yearly 
flow (measured from 1931-1970) is 8 460 m 3s 1 9 with a recorded 
maximum of 28 400 m 3  s 1 and a minimum of 2 850 m 3s. The catchment 
area for the project is 820 000 km 2 . The net head of water at the dam 
site is 118.4 m. The civil structures will consist of a 1 234 m long 
concrete gravity main dam, maximum height 190 m, with a concrete 
volume of 6.6x106 m3 ; a right abutment concrete dam, 998 m long, 
maximum height 65 m, concrete volume 0.7x106 m3 ; a left abutment 
rockfill embankment, 1 984 m long, maximum height 70 m, and a left 
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abutment earthfill dike, 2 294 m long, maximum height 30 m 
The spillway, on the right abutment will have 14 radial gates 
and a discharge capacity of 62 200 m3 s 1-  There will be 18 water 
intakes in the main dam, each with a nominal flow of 698 m 3s* The 
internal diameter of each penstock will be 10.5 m, and the length 
110.2 m. The powerhouse will be situated at the toe of the dam and 
will house 18 Francis turbines (see p.115 ). The reservoir will be 
190 km long and at maximum normal level will inundate 1 350 km 2 . At 
absolute maximum this will increase to 1 460 km 2 , of which 835 km 2 
are in Brazil and 625 km  are in Paraguay. The maximum normal volume 
will be 29x10 9 m3 . 
The total quantities of the basic materials to be used are 
1.9x10 9 t cement, 0.3x106 t aggregate, 4.0x109 t sand and 214x10 3 t 
steel for the concrete, plus 225x10 3 t structural steel, the total 
concrete volume will be 12x10 6 rn3 . It is scheduled that 21x10 6 m3 of 
earth and 26x10 6 m3 of rock will be excavated(349). As of December 
1978, the scheme employed a total of 31 300 persons, and had provided 
8 923 housing units. In addition there were three medical assistance 
centres in operation, and a hospital under construction on the 
Brazilian side, together with four health centres, one medical 
assistance centre and a hospital in operation on the Paraguayan side. 
The scheme has also provided schools and shopping centres to meet the 
needs of the workforce. 
The contract for the execution of the first stage of the civil 
works was awarded in 1975 to a consortium of Brazilian and Paraguayan 
companies. Five Brazilian companies formed the Unio de Construtoras 
Ltda. (UNICON), and six Paraguayan companies formed the Consorcio de 
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Empresas Constructoras Paraguayas S.R.L. (CONEMPA). Together they 
made the consortium UNICON-CONEMPA. This initial contract, valued at 
approximately US$ 300x10 6 , was for the excavation of the diversion 
channel, and for the spillway and right wing dam; construction of the 
left rockfill and earthfill dams; and construction of the main 
cofferdams for the Paranä river diversion. The river diversion was 
completed on schedule in October 1978. The diversion channel is 2 km 
long, 150 m wide and 90 m deep. 18x10 6 m3 of rock had to be 
excavated. The whole undertaking was an impressive achievement for 
Brazilian and Paraguayan engineering, the largest river diversion in 
the world accomplished with national technology and manpower(350). 
In 1977, a contract was signed for the second stage of the civil 
works, consisting, primarily, of the construction of the main dam, 
spillway, rightwing dam powerhouse and erection bays. The opening of 
the diversion channel in October 1978, coincided with the awarding of 
a contract to the Consorcio Itaipu E1etromecnico (CIEM) for the 
delivery of the permanent operating equipment of 18 turbines and 
generators. By April 1979, the main cofferdams were complete, and the 
riverbed was drained in order to start on the excavation and 
foundation preparation for the main dam and powerhouse. The year 1979 
was considered as decisive in the construction of Ul-IE Itaipu, as the 
viability of the proposed start of generation depended upon the 
completion of riverbed work within the stipulated period of 
time(351,352). 
The work on the site is supported by a number of integrated 
industrial complexes on both sides of the river. These consist of 
rock crushing facilities; artificial sand and special cement units 
and clinker mills; aggregate cooling and flaked ice units; concrete 
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batching plants; an automatic overhead cable conveyor system, and 
tower cranes. Each complex has the capacity to pour 1 080 m 3 of 
concrete per hour. As the concrete must be placed at a controlled 
temperature of 7 °C, to prevent setting problems, in air temperatures 
which can be as high as 40 °C, it must be cooled prior to 
pouring(353). The two flaked ice plants, with a total capacity of 
40 t are the largest in South America. 
The electrical generation equipment will comprise eighteen 
Francis type turbines, rated at a maximum output capacity of 734 MW 
each, with a nominal continous rating of 715 MW. Nine of the 
generators will produce A.C. at a frequency of 60 Hz (for Brazil), 
and the other nine at 50 Hz (for Paraguay). The frequencies chosen 
have been debated with much argument and intractability(354). 
Although Paraguay will own half the generated power, Brazil will use 
nearly all of it. Consequently Brazil saw very little reason to 
generate it at a different frequency from the one at which it will be 
used. The effective capacity of the generators, at 95% efficiency, 
will be 700 MW, and the total installed capacity of the 18 machines 
will be 12.6 GW(355). The powerhouse will contain 56 step-up 
transformers to raise the voltage from the machine voltage of 18 kV 
to 500 kV or 750 kV for transmission. There will be, in addition, a 
further four turbines and generators, each with an installed capacity 
of 15 MW, to provide power for the project consumption. 
The transmission system will consist of two primary sub-
stations, one on each bank of the rio Paran, 93 m downstream of the 
powerhouse. The power will be transmitted by five circuits over a 
distance of approximately 890 km, from UHE Itaipu to the city of So 
Paulo. There will be three in line sub-stations at Ivaipora, 310 km 
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from UHE Itaipu, Itaberâ, 266 km from Ivaipora, and Tijuco Preto, 
313 km from Itaberâ. Interconnection between the South and South 
Eas.t transmission systems will be effected at Ivaipora. 
The nine 60 Hz generators will connect, through transformers, to 
three three-phase A.C. 750 kV circuits. This will be stepped down at 
Ivaipora to 500 kV, and again at Tijuco Preto, this time for retail 
distribution. The nine 50 Hz generators will generate A.C. which will 
be converted at a primary converter station to D.C. for transmission 
at a voltage of 500 kV to the So Paulo area. The D.C. will be 
converted to 60 Hz A.C. at a secondary converter station at Tijuco 
Preto. FURNAS is responsible for the financing and construction of 
the transmission system for the Itaipu project. At June 1976 prices, 
the direct investment required is US$ 1.5x10 9 , and the total cost of 
the transmission system, including contingency and indirect costs was 
estimated at US$ 1.9x10 9 . 
The rio Paranâ is used for river traffic and, although project 
construction is interfering with the navigation of the river at 
Itaipu, terminals are to be installed both upstream and downstream of 
the site. Ships will offload at the terminals, and the goods will be 
transported by road (to be constructed) and thenreloaded back onto 
other ships. It is possible that a lock and canal may be constructed 
once the initial project is complete and traffic demands are 
established. 
Table III.iii shows the allocation of the estimated total 
capital expenditure, which, in 1977, was expected to be US$ 7.6x10 9 . 
It is interesting that the highest percentage of the costs goes in 
interest payment on loans(356). 
- 117 - 
Table III.iii : Allocation of Capital Expenditure for UHE Itaipu 
Item 
Land rights and relocation 	 2.99 
Civil works 	 20.19 
Permanent electromechanical equipment 	14.16 
Installations and support work 	 17.19 
Navigation works 	 0.29 
General administration 	 5.56 
Engineering and supervision 	 5.56 
Exchange adjustment 	 0.49 
Unallocated costs 0.33 
Interest during construction 	 33.24 
Source 	Information memorandum on Jgaipu Binacional given to poten- 
tial financers of a US$ 1.8x10 medium term loan, 3 April 1978. 
The costs of the project are constantly risi-ng above the 
estimates. At September 1977 prices, the total cost was estimated at 
US$ 7.6x109 (357); whereas at December 1977 prices, the total cost was 
estimated as US$ 8.7x109 (358). The difference between the costs shows 
a 14.4% increase whereas the exchange rate between the dollar and 
cruzeiro only rose 6.9% between September and December 1977. By the 
end of 1978, the total investment in the project had been US$ 2.2x10 9 
(December1977 prices), and in 1980, the total project cost was 
estimated at US$ 12.0x109 (1980 prices)(359). Despite the escalating 
costs, the Brazilian Government gives the project financial 
priority(360). 
Estimates made in 1978 put the cost of this expensive project at 
US$ 690/kW, but the project is noteworthy for more than its size and 
cost. In the case of Paraguay it spells financial disaster(361). 
Paraguay's share of the cost is loaned from Brazil, who, in return, 
will purchase most of Paraguay's share of the power at an 
artificially low price for the next 50 years(362). As a consequence, 
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Paraguay 	now 	wishes 	to 	renegotiate 	the 	terms 	of 	the 
agreement (363). Most of the engineering projects have been 
awarded to Brazil(364), and two thirds of the senior and middle level 
employees are Brazilian(365). The project has also made it more easy 
for Brazilians to colonise Paraguayan land close to the river, and 
even further inland, which has been unpopular with the 
Paraguayans(366). 
There has been serious straining of international relations 
between Brazil and its downstream neighbour, Argentina, which claims 
that UHE Itaipu will detrimentally affect the operation of its own 
shared scheme with Paraguay, UHE Corpus. It is intended that UHE 
Itaipu be run as a peaking station, and this will affect the 
riverfiow downstream considerably. On various occasions Argentina has 
threatened to raise the height of UHE Corpus, thus reducing the 
effective head at UHE Itaipu, and therefore its efficiency. Brazil 
then threatened retaliation with the installation of an extra two 
turbines, which would allow an even greater disruption to the 
riverflow downstream. Eventually an uneasy agreement was reached, and 
an accord, allowing operational flexibility, was signed by all three 
countries in October 1979(367). 
Environmentally, the project will have a number of important 
impacts. The area to be inundated was assessed by a member of the 
Cary Arboretum, New York. He made a number of recommendations, 
including health protection measures, clearance of the forest, 
resettlement of peoples, and the creation of a wildlife park. He 
concluded that the problems which will be encountered will not be as 
disastrous as in many of the large African hydropower schemes(368). 
The greatest loss is considered to be the inundation of the Salto 
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Figure 3.2 : Location of UHE Itaipu 
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Grande de Sete Quedas by the tailwaters of the reservoir. According 
to some criteria these are the largest in the world, but they will be 
partially submerged by the reservoir(369). 
Although it is disputed by ELETROBRAS and FURNAS that the power 
from UHE Itaipu is essential(370) (see p.156), there is no doubt that 
the most fortuitous outcome of the project is the unification of the 
electrical power industry which has resulted. Only the future will 
tell whether this enormous project will be the engineering triumph 
the Brazilians predict(371), or a financial disaster. Whatever the 
outcome, it will still be a landmark in the development of the 
indigenous Brazilian electrical power industry. 
Rationing in the Electrical Power Industry 
For the first fifty years of the Brazilian electrical power 
industry, all initiatives had been taken by the private companies. 
The principal ones in the South East, 'Rio Light' and 'Sâo Paulo 
Light', had kept up with the growth in electricity demand until 1946, 
when, for the first time, the peak load equalled the installed 
capacity(372). Thereafter, the two companies were unable to satisfy 
all the demands made upon them, as peak demand outstripped increased 
capacity. (A full discussion can be found in Tendler(1968)(373)). 
In the period after the Second World War, the problem of lack of 
generating capacity, coupled with a rapid increase in 
industrialization and the consequent expansion of the electricity 
market, meant that the production of electricity fell well behind the 
demand. This deficiency in generating capacity, added to the cyclic 
occurrence of severe droughts, resulted in rationing of supply and, 
in some cases, damage of electrical equipment. There was loss of 
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industrial production and the deterioration of equipment, such as 
steel and glass-making furnaces. Electrically operated transport 
systems were seriously affected. The most serious rationing occurred 
in the cities of So Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
The first electricity supply crisis had occurred in 1924-1925, 
as a result of the drought in the state of Sâo Paulo which reduced 
the •flow of the rio Tietê and its tributaries. This crisis was 
alleviated by the rapid execution of the UHE Rasgo project (see 
p.84), and the establishment of electricity consumption rules by the 
So Paulo state government. However, with the advent of the Second 
World War, and the consequent difficulties in. importation of 
equipment, the installed capacity remained static whilst the demand 
grew. 
This problem was aggravated by rising inflation. 	The private 
companies were unable to cope adequately with the crisis. 'The 
Light', being a foreign company, was more concerned with protecting 
its own interests than with helping the situation in Brazil (374), 
and it adopted a disguised rationing policy by repressing demand. 
The industrial expansion in So Paulo was retarded by 'Sao Paulo 
Light' which delayed satisfying demands for new connections. Another 
measure adopted by the company was to drop the frequency to 95% and 
the voltage to 85% of normal at peak periods of demand. 
The situation became progressively worse, aggravated in the 
first half of the 1950s by a severe drought, which caused further 
rationing of the electricity supply. In the system of 'Rio Light', 
the electrical energy was almost entirely of hydraulic origin, from 
the rio Paralba basin. With only one thermal station, UTE Flutante 
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Piraquë, the region suffered badly due to the low flows in the river 
and the lack of installed capacity. In order to minimise the crisis, 
the Conselho Nacional de Aguas e Energia Elétrica (CNAEE) authorised 
the electricity concessionaires to adopt restrictive measures to 
reduce electricity consumption, but it demanded also that the 
companies present plans for the expansion of their generation 
systems(3.75). This was not well received by the private owners, as 
they were loth to invest money in expansion(376). However, the 'Rio 
Light' did execute the ParaTba-Pira diversion,' in order to supply 
water to the subterranean UHE Nilo Peçanha. In 1963, low flows in 
the rios Paralba and Piral, coupled with the need to preserve the 
level of water in the Lages reservoir in order to guarantee the 
drinking water for the city of Rio de Janeiro, resulted in electrical 
rationing in that city. In addition power had to be supplied from the 
'Sao Paulo Light' system via the Aparecida converter station. Four 
years later, in 1967, UHE Nilo Peçanha was inundated by a landslide 
and rendered completely inoperable. This resulted in stringent 
rationing in the city of Rio de Janeiro, with power supplied for only 
a few hours each day to this city of multi-storey skyscrapers and 
ai r-conditioni ng(377). 
Since the early 1950s, the electrical power industry in Brazil 
has never kept pace with demand. The "economic miracle" of the 
1960s(378) was accompanied by rapid industrialisation, expansion of 
the commercial sector, and a general rise in the standard of living. 
This was associated with an increase in the demand for electricity, 
but it is only now, with the construction of new large scale 
projects, that supply is catching up with demand. Although the major 
cities are assured of a reasonably constant supply of electricity, 
- 123 - 
the slums (favelas) on the outskirts only have power through illegal 
connections, and the bulk of the rural population has no electricity 
supplies at all, despite the rural electrification programmes in 
progress (379). 
Autoproducers 
Autoproducers are those who generate electricity for their own 
private consumption. The owner of the first Brazilian hydroelectric 
power station, at Diamantina, used to supply power for the extraction 
of gravel, was an autoproducer. Since that time there have been a 
significant number of autoproducers in Brazil.. The electricity 
supply crises of the 1950s and 1960s resulted in an increase in their 
numbers and an expansion in their capacity. They were not restricted 
to factory owners, but extended to hotels, cinemas, and large 
buildings, where private generators were installed. Very few went as 
far as constructing their own hydroelectric power stations, but, of 
those who did, the majority were in the states of Minas Gerais and 
So Paulo(380). 
The reasons given by autoproducers for generating their own 
electricity are various. In some cases there is no access to any 
other supply due to isolation, as in the Amazon Region. Others have, 
in the past, included excessive connection costs, insufficient 
guarantee of constant supply, and lack of faith in the regional 
suppliers ability to adequately meet their demands. In many cases, 
the autoproducers found it cheaper to generate their own electricity. 
In the sugar cane producing region of the North East of Brazil, 
bagasse is the energy source for almost half of the self generated 
power, whereas in the South East nearly half of the self produced 
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power is of hydraulic origin. See table III.iv. 
Table III.iv : Gross Autoproducer Generation, 1977 - GWh 
Region 	Hydro 	F.Oil 	Diesel 	Bagasse 	Wood 	Others 	Total 
North - 25.7 84.7 - 19.1 11.9 141.4 
N. East 70.3 147.5 80.0 277.0 15.4 28.5 609.7 
S. East 2 278.7 1 	821.6 183.3 457.7 10.1 173.7 4925.1 
South 309.7 451.8 35.0 36.0 177.0 37.0 1047.5 
C.West - 19.2 10.5 0.9 5.6 31.4 67.6 
Brazil 2 658.7 2 465.8 385.5 771.6 227.2 282.5 6 791.3 
Source 	ELETROBRAS - DEME "Geraço de Autoprodutores 1977/87H,  1978. 
Note : total gross production by autoproducers of 6.8 TWh represents 
6.8% of the gross production of electricity in Brazil, in 1977, of 
100.6 TWh(381).. 
From table III.iv and III.vi 	it can be seen that the gross 
electrical energy production by autoproducers has maintained a slow, 
but steady, rise since 1962. This is expected to continue, despite 
strong discouragement from ELETROBRAS. In June 1977, in accordance 
with decree no.68,419, those autoproducers who were also connected to 
the concessionaire networks, supplying electricity from the national 
csources, had to pay a compulsory loan to ELETROBRAS to the value 
of 32.5% of the fiscal tariff. This compulsory loan will be 
recoverable after 20 years, and will be subject to interest of 6% per 
year. However, the autoproducer will only have to pay this loan if 
his installed capacity is greater than 500 kW, and he is 
using petroleum derivatives as a fuel source, and 
he is generating in an area where energy from a national 
source is available. 
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This compulsory payment does not therefore, affect autoproducers of 
hydroelectricity(382). 
Autoproducers can exert a significant influence on the market of 
the government concessionaires operating in a given region. In an 
analysis carried out by CESP, published in 1974, it was revealed that 
8% of the generation in the state of So Paulo was represented by 
autoproduction. This percentage, however, can vary depending on the 
relative expansion of the autoproducer and concessionaire generating 
capabilities. The percentage of the market held by autoproducers in 
1974 was less than in 1973, because although there was in increase in 
generation of 11.6%, the concessionaires increased their generation 
by 17.7%. With the construction of the very large power stations, 
- such as UHE Itaipu, the percentage produced by the autoproducers will 
decrease further, although their generating capacity is expanding. 
The participation of autoproducers in the concession areas varies 
widely, as seen in table III.v.. 
Table III.v : Autoproducer participation by Concession Area 
So Paulo State, 1974 
Area 	Concessionary % 	Autoproducer% 
'Light' 	 79.1 	 20.9 
CPFL 63.8 36.2 
CESP 	 99.2 	 0.8 
Others * 	 77.6 22.4 
S.P.State 92.2 	 7.8 
* Only includes those concessionaires with autoproducers operating in 
their area of concession. 
Source : CESP uEstado  de So Paulo - Analise e acompanhamento do mer-
cado de energia elétrica dos autoprodutores" Diretoria de 
Distribuico, 1974. 
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In the CESP concession area, autoproducer generation is almost non-
existent, but in the area of concession of 'The Light', by tradition 
an inefficient supplier, 20% of the generation is by autoproducers. 
This is significant, when the industrial market is considered. In 
1974, 22% of the total industrial consumption of electricity in So 
Paulo state was by autoproducers(383). 
Table III.vi : Installed Capacity, 
Year Autopr. * Autopr. Brazil 
GW % of total GW 
1965 0.877 10.6 7.411 # 
1978 2.820 10.1 25.229 $ 
1985+ 3.233 6.2 49.042 $ 
1995+ 3.474 6.0 54.769 $ 
+ Estimated 
Source : * ELETROBRAS - DEME 24/1/80 
# ELETROBRAS Report 1978 
$ Piano 95 
There is one company involved in autoproduction which is 
refusing to change its policy of electricity production for its own 
consumption, and that is the Companhia Brasileira do Aluminio (CBA), 
a subsidiary of the Grupo Votorantim. CBA operates a fully 
integrated system, from the CBA owned bauxite to the finished 
aluminium cast, rolled or extruded product. It runs one 83 000 tonne 
smelter, and it supplies 75% of its own power from five hydroelectric 
power stations. A sixth is under construction. Up to mid-May 1980, 
the company had consumed a total of 621 GWh in 1980, of which 473 GWh 
were CBA generated, and 148 GWh purchased. 
The company commenced smelting in 1955, when it purchased power 
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from 'The Light'. but, by 1958, it had started to generate some of 
its own electricity. It was found to be cheaper, and a more reliable 
source of supply. However, in order to maintain a connection to the 
national network, in case of breakdown of its own supply, the company 
is obliged to purchase some power from 'The Light', even though it is 
more expensive, and often not required. CBA has constructed four 
hydroelectric power stations on the rio Juquia-Guaçu, and a fifth is 
under construction. In addition the company purchased UHE 
Itupiraranga from 'The Light'. A further three hydroelectric power 
stations stations are planned, one on the rio Paranapanema, (120 Mw), 
and the other two on the rio Juquia-Guaçu. 
The company is, by law, forbidden to sell any of its surplus 
power, and it must purchase power from 'The Light' at a price of 
15 mill/kWh (1980 price). It uses this compulsory purchase of power 
in order to regulate its reservoirs, purchasing more during the dry 
season in order to maintain levels. The cost of its own power is 
calculated as being 4 mill/kWh, even allowing for depreciation on 
structures and equipment(384). 
Government Intervention in the Electrical Power Industry 
One of the consequences of the deficit in the production of 
electricity was the start of government intervention in the 
electrical power industry. In the 1950s, the Federal Government was 
making ambitious, pioneering plans for national development projects 
which would create a need for more electrical energy, and it was 
anxious to be closely involved (see table III.vii). The very first 
state government participation in the Brazilian electrical power 
industry occurred in Rio Grande do Sul. Until the middle of the 
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Table III.vii : Government Participation in Electrification 
Date State Company Initial 	Purpose 
1943 R.G.do Sul CEEE Dev. 	Hy. 	Pot. 	& Coal 	Res. 
1945 N.E.Region CHESF P.Afonso & Dev. 	rio S.Francisco 
1952 M.Gerais CEMIG Electr. 	of state 
1957 M.Ger. 	& 	S.P. FURNAS UHE Furnas 
1957 Paranã COPEL Electr. 	of state 
1962 Brazil ELETROBRAS Braz. 	Electr. 	policy 
1966 S.Paulo CESP Co-ord. 	state services 
1940s, as common in other states, only the major urban centres had 
public electricity services of an acceptable standard. In the rest of 
the state, the municipal governments and a few enterprises struggled 
with the problem of electricity supply without either sufficient 
financial or technical resources. On 16 February 1943, the Comisso 
Estadual de Energia Elëtrica (CEEE) was created in order to develop 
and operate a general electrification plan for the whole state, 
utilizing its hydraulic potential and coal reserves. A pioneering 
plan, the Plano de Electrificaço do Rio Grande do Sul was presented 
to the CNAEE and the Diviso de Aguas of the Ministério da 
Agricultura for approval. 
In September 1948, the first power station to be entirely 
planned and constructed by the Comisso, the 1.5 MW UHE Passo de 
Inferno, commenced operation, supplying power to the industrial areas 
of So Leopoldo and Caixas do Sul. Other small hydroelectric power 
stations were to follow. A state law, no.1231, of 29 November 1950, 
made provision for major financial resources for the Piano de 
Eiectrificaço through the creation of the Taxa de Electrificaço 
(Electrification Rate). This was later abolished with the instigation 
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of countrywide tax reforms in 1969, and subsequent funding came from 
the Fundo Estadual de Investimentos (State Investment Fund). From its 
inception in 1943, the Comisso was gradually transformed and in 1963 
became a mixed economy society, called the Companhia Estadual de 
Energia Elétrica, although it retained the acronym CEEE(385). 
As described on page 99,the Companhia Hidrelétrica do So 
Francisco (CHESF) was created in 1945, in order to build UHE Paulo 
Afonso. In 1947, with the "awakening of the national conscience" to 
the problems of the North East, the Federal Government passed a 
decree specifying the role of CHESF as that of developing the stretch 
of the river between Juazeiro and Piranhas, in order to supply power 
to the concessionaires within a radius of 450 km of Paulo 
Afonso(386). 
Centrals Elëtricas de Minas Gerais S.A. (CEMIG), was founded in 
1952 by the government of Minas Gerais. It was initially established 
as a holding company, incorporating the shares held by the state 
government in the Companhia de Eletricidade do Médio Rio Doce, 
Companhia de Eletricidade do Alto Rio Grandé, and Central Elétrica de 
Piau S.A., which all became subsidiaries of CEMIG. It was a 
successful example of a mixed economy enterprise, and it proved to be 
a good solution to the problem of expansion of electricity supply, 
required due to rapid national development(387). 
For the first four years of operation, CEMIG concerned itself 
with the construction of four new hydroelectric power stations and 
their respective transmission networks, thereby adding a further 
168 MW to the system and nearly doubling its installed capacity. The 
decisive factor heralding the emergence of CEMIG had been the lack of 
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available installed capacity. At the time there had been a total of 
439 power stations supplying electricity to 688 localities. The total 
state installed capacity was 13 MW, and the average installed 
capacity per inhabitant was no more than 25 W(388). 
In 1957 CEMIG began construction of UHE Três Marias, with the 
help of the Companhia do Vale do So Francisco. At that time, the 
Três Marias dam was the fourth largest earth dam in the world, and it 
was built under difficult conditions due to its isolated location. 
The dam allowed partial regulation of the rio So Francisco, which 
permitted the addition of an extra 400 MW of installed capacity at 
UHE Paulo Afonso(389). It improved the navigability of the river, and 
It added a further 520 MW to the installed capacity of the region, 
and this stimulated further development of the electro-metallurgical 
and electro-chemical industries(390). 
In the first ten years of its operation, CEMIG transformed the 
energy scene of Minas Gerais, by increasing the installed capacity by 
a factor of 30, to 369 MW, and rescuing the industrial development of 
this mineral rich state from the virtual strangulation to which it 
was subjected by the lack of adequate supplies of electricity. The 
accelerated development of the state into a powerful one, with a 
large and diverse industrial base, is due largely to CEMIG. It was 
also responsible for pioneering rural electrification, when in 1962, 
it created the Eletrificaçào Rural de Minas Gerais S.A. (ERMIG) in 
order to operate a dynamic programme of state rural 
electrification(391), and to provide approximately 10 000 farmers 
with electricity. In no other area has been seen, in such an 
immediate form, the influence of electric energy on the process of 
social evolution as was seen in the area served by CEMIG and ERMIG. 
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The state became the fulcrum of the activities of the revolutionary 
movement the "Movimento de 64", which led the Brazilian nation on its 
development trajectory after the revolution(392). 
In recent years CEMIG has begun to wield considerable influence 
in the Brazilian electrical power industry, by operating eleven large 
hydroelectric power stations and several smaller ones. It is in the 
process of completing UHE So Simo (2 680 MW) on the rio 
Paranaiba(393). However, the most influential of the state 
electricity utilities is the Centrais Elétricas de So Paulo S.A. 
(CESP). So Paulo state is the major economic and industrial centre 
in Brazil, but, in the early 1950s, the electricity supply industry 
was not keeping pace with industrial development, and it was feared 
that the continuing rapid economic development of this state would be 
threatened by lack of electricity. Other sectors of the Paulistä 
economy urged the state government to help alleviate the situation by 
involving the state in the construction of generating stations and 
high voltage transmission lines(394). 
Until that time, the greater part of the electricity supply to 
So Paulo state had been supplied by 'Sao Paulo Light' and CPFL but, 
in 1949, the state government began the hydroelectric development of 
the rio Paranapanema. The mixed economy society, Usinas Elétricas do 
Paranapanema S.A. (USELPA), was created by state law on 19 August 
1953. Seven years later it was amalgamated with the Companhia 
Hidrelêtrica do Rio Pardo (CHERP) in order to study the power 
development of the lower and middle reaches of the rio Tiet. There 
were three other companies operating in the region, Centrais 
Elétricas de Urubupung (CELUSA), Bandeirante de Eletricidade S.A. 
(BELSA), and Companhia de Melhoranientos de Paraibuna S.A. (COMEPA). 
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It was decided that if all were combined it would offer a more 
integrated -and efficient system of electricity generation and 
distribution. As a result, the Companhia Energética de So Paulo 
(CESP) was given authority to operate as an electrical energy 
enterprise in December 1966, and, one month later, all the 
concessions of USELPA, CHERP, CELUSA, BELSA and COMEPA were 
transferred to CESP(395). 
Until recently, the rio Paranâ river system had been ignored by 
the electricity concessionaires because of its great distance from 
the industrial market, although, as early as 1952, the Comisso 
Interstadual da Bacia do Paraná-Urugua (CIPBU) was created to make 
studies of the rio Paranâ and the rio Urubupungã. In 1957, a state 
law founded the Companhia Paranaense de Eletricidade (COPEL), a mixed 
economy enterprise of which 60% belonged compulsorily to the state of 
Paranâ. It was to effect a systematic study of the existing 
generation sources and the probable demand. At that time, the 
priority was,and still is, given to the supply of power to the 
industrial South East. As a result, COPEL and USELPA made an 
agreement over the joint development of the rio Paranapanema, with 
40% of the power to go to go to the state of Paranâ. This was one of 
the first examples of inter-state co-operation(396). 
Other major examples of government participation in the 
electrical power industry are FURNAS, created in 1957 (see p.100), 
and ELETROBRAS, created in 1962 (see chapter 4). 
Frequency 
The choice of various frequencies for generation transmission in 
Brazil reflected the non-integrated electrical power system which had 
- 133 - 
spontaneously developed in the country. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, when Brazil began the more intense development of 
its hydraulic energy, Europe had already adopted a frequency of 
50 Hz, and the USA a frequency of 60 Hz. This frequency difference 
was reflected in the equipment imported from Europe and imported from 
from the USA. 50 Hz and 60 Hz became the dominant frequencies in 
Brazil, but others were adopted, such as 42 Hz in Curitiba, 40 Hz in 
JundaT and 125 Hz in Petropolis(397). 
The need to unify the frequency, came from the need to optimise 
the use of energy resources within the country, as well as for the 
economic convenience of standardization of equipment. This was 
apparent in the case of UHE Paulo Afonso, where generation was at a 
frequency of 60 Hz, but one of its major planned markets, Recifé, 
operated at a frequency of 50 Hz. This resulted in an apparent excess 
generating capacity at UHE Paulo Afonso and a lack of supply in 
Reci fé(398). 
The first studies of frequency diversity in Brazil date back to 
1929, when the Grupo Light anticipated the need to interconnect the 
two systems of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, the former operating at 
50 Hz and the latter at 60 Hz. 	Although the studies were not 
followed up, the question was not ignored. 	In 1938, article 23 of 
the Decree-law no. 852 stated that: 
"...electric energy obtained by means of transformation of 
hydraulic or thermal energy, will be produced in order to 
supply the Brazilian territory in the form of three phase 
alternating current at a frequency of fifty cycles 
(50 Hz)." Furthermore '...the electricity enterprises, 
individual or collective which supply electric energy to 
public services or for public use, or make a business of 
energy, must have all their installations function in 
accord with the stipulation in article 23, within eight 
years'. 
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In other words, a move had been made to unify the Brazilian supply 
frequency in 1938, but this was not successful. Only autoproducers 
were excluded from the obligation to unify the frequency, but the 
eight year time limit imposed was not respected, and, in May 1942, it 
was extended in accordance with article 6 of decree-law no.4295 for 
a period to be suitably fixed". At the same time, this decree made it 
possible for new installations to use both the 50 Hz or 60 Hz 
frequency(399). 
The advent of the Second World War made the acquisition of 
equipment from Europe more difficult than from the USA, and 60 Hz 
equipment began to predominate. In 1948 the Brazilian ambassador in 
the USA, Mauricio Nabuco, wrote to the Brazilian President, E.G. 
Dutra, alerting him to the need to unify Brazils frequency to 60 Hz. 
He stated, without explanation, that it was 16% more efficient than 
operating at a frequency of 50 Hz, and, because the USA operated at 
60 Hz, any equipment for use at 50 Hz ordered from the USA had to be 
specially made*. This letter acted as a further stimulus for 
frequency studies. It was decided to consult the interested parties - 
the electrical enterprise syndicates, the large concessionary 
companies, and the engineering clubs of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. 
They were posed the following questions 
i.The problem of standardization of frequency is of national 
importance, and, as such, a single frequency should be fixed for 
all the electrical systems in the country? 
* It is interesting to conjecture that the ambassador had suffered 
pressure from the electrical goods supply industry in the USA, in 
order to protect their market in Brazil. 
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Would it be a satisfactory solution to maintain the 
frequencies at 50 Hz and 60 Hz, by zones, in accordance with 
actual predominance? 
What advantages are there to a single standard frequency? 
Which frequency should be chosen, considering the technical 
and economic aspects of the problem? 
What damage will occur to the concessionaires and consumers 
operating at the non-chosen frequency? 
How can this damage be avoided? 
What conversion programme should be followed? 
How can it be efficiently carried out with least 
inconvenience? 
What reasonable time period would be required to accomplish 
this? 
What would be the costs of conversion (to an order of 
magnitude) from 50 Hz to 60 Hz and vice versa? 
The response to the questionnaire was good, but there was much 
variation in the answers. The major interested party was the 'Grupo 
Light', which employed a group of consultants to study the question. 
They finally gave their answer to the questionnaire in April 1950, 
when they recommended 60 Hz as the standard frequency, and concluded 
that it would take five years to convert the Rio system to 60 Hz, at 
a cost of US$ 27x10 6 or, approximately, US$ 50 per consumer (1950 
prices). 
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In 1954, the projected law for the Piano Nacional 	de 
Eletrificaçâo was before Congress, and, at the same time, it was 
proposed to adopt the standard frequency of 60 Hz as the cheapest and 
quickest to execute. However, in 1957, article 46 of decree no.41019 
did not unify the frequency, but adopted the two frequencies of 50 Hz 
and 60 Hz as standards in accordance with zones delimited by the 
Conseiho de Aguas. In 1961, the Conseiho set up a Comisso de 
Uniformizaçâo de Frequëncia, which recommended the creation of a 
Comisso Especial. The 1963 CANAMBRA report to the Comitè Coordenador 
da Regio Centro-Sul recommended the organization of technical 
personnel for the supervision of the frequency conversion programme 
in the system of the 'Grupo Light'(400). 
In 1964, ELETROBRAS created a Grupo de Trabalho para Mudança de 
Frequëncia (Work Group on the Change of Frequency), which presented a 
four stage plan to be undertaken from 1964 to 1967. It recommended 
approval of the Programme for frequency change in the 
Guanabara region, including the state of Rio de Janeiro, 
that ELETROBRAS should be co-ordinator of the change, 
confirmation of the Escritório Técriico para Conversâo de 
Frequëncia (COFRE), set up by the government of Guanabara state, 
as the entity especially responsible for examining the 
installations of consumers in that state, and 
that 'Rio Light' takes the necessary steps to expand its 
system at the same time as making the. conversion. 
Finally, 60Hz was adopted as the national frequency on 6 
November 1964, in accordance with law no.4454. Except in exceptional 
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circumstances, all new installations were to operate at this 
frequency. It was not until 1966, however, that the responsibility 
for the works necessary for the conversion finally fell upon the 
users of electricity, according to resolution no.3216, of 21 March 
1966. In order to accelerate the programme of change, the MME 
published law no.407, in May 1967, stating that 
1. ELETROBRAS was designated technical and financial co-
ordinator for the frequency conversion programmes, 
ELETROBRAS was authorised to maintain contacts and to assign 
conventions for the standardization of the frequency in 
government and private bodies, Federal and state, in the states 
of Guanabara, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo and Rio Grande do 
Sul , and 
the 	concessionaires 	were 	given 	responsibility 	for 
elaboration and execution of the frequency conversion plans. 
In October 1967, ELETROBRAS published the Piano Guia (Guide 
Plan), with the intention that the execution of the frequency change 
plans be complete by the end of 1971. Prior to publication of law 
no.407, only 3% of the 'Rio Light' system had been converted, but 
within two years this had risen to 53.2%, and by the end of 1970, all 
of the Guanabara region was using a frequency of 60 Hz. 
The conversion programme forecast the construction of various 
large scale transmission networks, such as from UHE Furnas to Rio de 
Janeiro. However, certain factories, which operated on a 24 hour day, 
seven day week, presented problems, as damage would occur if they 
interrupted production. This was overcome by means of a double 
C- 
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supply, at both 50 Hz and 60 Hz, allowing a gradual conversion. The 
situation in Rio de Janeiro was not helped by the total shut down of 
UHE Nilo Pecanha due to a landslide in 1967 (see p.121). A line from 
UHE Furnas had not been completed, and therefore to maintain supply 
to Rio de Janeiro, a connection was made with the CEMIG system, until 
UTE Santa Cruz, an experimental thermal station, was opened. The 
final stage of the Guanabara state conversion took place in August 
) 1970. It was in a highly industrialised area, which represented 25% 
of the total demand. The conversion took thirty days(401). 
The last region of Brazil to undergo frequency conversion was 
the state of Rio Grande do Sub. It finally became necessary, in order 
to effect an interconnection between the concession area of CEEE and 
the systems of the South East region. In some very isolated areas, 
with diesel generation, the change was deemed unnecessary. On 22 July 
1969, the Departamento de Converso de Frequëncia (DECOFRE) was 
established by ELETROBRAS, ELETROSUL and CEEE in order to plan the 
conversion(402). The process took eight years, with final conversion 
being completed in 1977(403). 
The standardization of the Brazilian operating frequency to 
60 Hz is perhaps the single greatest factor in the creation of the 
current perspective of the Brazilian electrical power industry. It 
has paved the way for interregional connections, and has established 
a single uniform power system for the generation and transmission of 
electrical energy. In addition it has made national electricity 
supply planning possible and furthered economic development by 
national energy sharing. International sharing of electricity 
however, presents a problem, as Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay all 
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operate at a frequency of 50 Hz. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The 	electrical 	power 	industry 	in 	Brazil 	is 	under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministério das Minas e Energia (MME), which is 
responsible for all energy matters. It operates through the 
Departamento Nacional de Aguas e Energia Elétrica (DNAEE) and through 
Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. (ELETROBRAS). The DNAEE has the 
responsibility for the granting of concessions to build power 
stations, and establishes the electrical power rates. It also 
oversees the operations of the concessionaire electricity companies. 
ELETROBRAS is a corporation, with both government and private 
capital, and is in charge of the overall planning, financing and co-
ordination in the electrical power industry. In addition it 
supervises construction programmes, as well as the expansion and 
operation of the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity(404,405). 
Historical Background 
In 1904, decree no.5407, established broad guidelines for the 
countrywide development of the hydraulic potential available for the 
production of electricity. This was followed, in 1906, by law 
no.1167, which gave authority to the President of the Republic to 
develop a water code (Côdigo de Aguas) to be submitted to the 
Brazilian Congress. The draft code was submitted in November 1907, 
but remained dormant in the Comissào de Constituiço e Justica da 
Cãmara (Parliamentary Commission for Constitution and Justice) for 
four years, until the left wing faction proposed that it be enacted 
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into law. As a result it was directed to the Senado (Senate) to be 
studied in conjunction with the proposed Código Civil (Civil Code). 
However, the Cmara Alto (Upper Chamber) of the Senado preferred the 
two codes to remain separate, and the proposed COdigo de Aguas was 
sent to the Cãmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies) where it was 
not reconsidered until 1916. 
The unamended 1907 proposal was given a second reading in 
December 1917, but the voting on the motion was not ratified until 
August 1920. A third discussion took place at the end of that month, 
and the proposal, with amendments, was then returned to a special 
commission, and the matter was dropped until the dissolution of the 
Congress in 1930. 
After the 1930 revolution, a decree was published, no.20 395 of 
15 July 1931, which prevented any act of alienation, tranference or 
harnessing of water courses. Finally, in June 1934, in accordance 
with decree no.24 643, the Código de Aguas came into force. This 
outlined the use of water resources, and gave a sense of unity to the 
electrical power industry. It established the legal system of the 
payment for servicing through pricing, but it was not until 1957 that 
full legal regulation of the activities of the organizations subject 
to the Cödigo de Aguas came into force(406). 
The Ministërio das Minas e Energia (MME) was created by law 
no.3782,in 1960, in order to administrate Brazilian energy policy, 
previously a function of the Ministêrio da Agricultura. The role 
given to the MME was of fundamental economic, social and political 
importance - the planning and exploitation of the Brazilian energy 
and mineral resources. In the same year the Conselho Nacional de 
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Aguas e Energia Elétrica (CNAEE), the Comisso Nacional de Energia 
Nuclear (CNEN) and the Departamento Nacional da Produço Mineral 
(DNPM) were also created. 
ELETROBRAS was authorised by law no.3890, of 25 April 1961, and 
this was followed in 28 November 1962 by law no.4156, which 
established the Empréstimo Compulsório in favour of ELETROBRAS (see 
P-63 ). The MME was reorganised in 1965, when law no.4904 created the 
Departamento Nacional de Aguas e Energia Elétrica (DNAEE). It was 
made responsible for the planning, co-ordination and execution of 
hydrological studies throughout Brazil. In addition, it was 
responsible for the control of, and the revenue from, water resources 
and electrical services. Soon after the creation of the DNAEE, CNAEE 
was abolished. Since 1962, many of the essential executive roles for 
the development of the Brazilian electrical power industry have been 
performed by ELETROBRAS, with the MME and CNAEE, followed by the 
DNAEE, providing secondary assistance(407). 
ri rrnflnnnr 
Until the creation of ELETROBRAS, the Brazilian electrical power 
industry had been in decline for some time. From 1934 until 1945, the 
industry had suffered from the restrictions of the Cädigo de Aguas, 
followed by the effects of the Second World War and the consequent 
equipment importation difficulties. In the following years, the close 
association between private and government initiative in the 
electrical power industry was tranquil, but it was soon succeeded by 
the stagnation of private initiative in the electrical power industry 
and the emergence of the mixed economy societies (408). It 
was, therefore, in an atmosphere of wrangling, between government and 
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private enterprise, over generation, distribution, deficiencies in 
electricity supply, and the rate problem that ELETROBRAS was 
eventually created(409). The process had taken eight years. 
In 1954, a motion was presented to the Congresso Nacional 
(National Congress), under President Getullo. Vargas, proposing the 
creation of an organisation which would determine the operation, 
either directly or by means of controlled and united enterprises, of 
the electrical power industry. This body would also be responsible 
for undertaking studies and projects, the financing of construction 
and operation of power stations, transmission lines, and the 
distribution of electricity. 
The motion, no.153, stated 
"The mixed capital society not only offers the directors 
the freedom of action vital to the accomplishment of the 
tasks to which they are committed, but it also allows the 
Federal Government to associate itself, in a simple way, 
with the states, Federal District and municipalities, in 
order to combine the financial resources, based on revenue, 
to solve the electrical energy problem*. 
However, this proposal was left for a further seven years, until 
the Congresso Nacional, under President Jan10 Quadros made it law on 
25 April 1961. This was followed by a decree in February 1962, in 
which the Minister of the MME was authorised to set up a work group 
to study the constitution of such a mixed economy organization. The 
studies were soon complete, and ELETROBRAS, created at a General 
"A sociedade de capital misto nâo 56 proporciona aos dirigentes a 
liberaçao de acao indispensãvel a realizacâo das tarefas que lhes 
sejam cometidas, mas tambem permitira ao Governo Federal 
associar-se, de forma simples, aos Estados, do Distrito Federal e 
dos municipios, para a conjugaçao dos recursos financeiros do on-
gem fiscal destinadas a soluçao do problema da energi.a 
elétri ca" (410). 
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Assembly of the CNAEE, was launched with an initial capital of 
Cr$ 3x109 (1962 prices), which were totally subscribed by the Federal 
Government. 
From its inception ELETROBRAS has been a holding company, and 
the nucleus of a group of concessionaires which are able to count on 
a fair degree of administrative autonomy, but at the same time they 
generate resources which enable ELETROBRAS to be the principal 
financing agency in the electrical power industry(411). 
In the seven years that the ELETROBRAS proposal remained in the 
Cãmara, some other Federal and state companies had been established 
and were engaged in constructing or operating sizeable-power stations 
(see p.100). Since that time, however, ELETROBRAS has progressively 
absorbed national and foreign enterprises operating in the electrical 
power industry. This has been an irreversible process, and has 
strongly influenced the present structure of the Brazilian electrical 
power industry. 
The creation of ELETROBRAS was not welcomed by the private 
electricity utilities, who were concerned that ELETROBRAS might 
interfere with their autonomy of operation. Once the company had been 
established, they tried to ensure that it became involved in areas 
far removed from their concession areas. A syndicate of electrical 
industries in So Paulo suggested that ELETROBRAS concentrate on 
development work in isolated regions of the country, and the FURNAS 
president recommended that ELETROBRAS concern itself with the 
construction of a power network in Brasilia, which had just been 
established as the new Federal Capital(412). It soon became apparent, 
however, that ELETROBRAS was not going to restrict itself to such 
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suggested areas of operation. 
In the first edition of the ELETROBRAS journal 	"Revista 
Brasileira de Energia Elétrica", the editorial page was given over to 
an interview with the new Minister of the MME, Gabriel Passos. It was 
entitled "Servir ao Brasil e nào servir-se do Brasil" - "To serve 
Brazil, and not to use it". He was quoted as saying 
'... I am certain that in the very near future, when we 
look back on what has gone before, we shall see a notable 
change in the Brazilian electricity policy. Until now, this 
policy has been dictated by the interests of particular 
large concessionary enterprises, but, in future, it will be 
dictated by ELETROBRAS, exclusively, according to national 
interest". 
A few months later the same journal quoted part of a speech, 
made by President Getulio Vargas to the Congresso Nacional in April 
1954, soliciting the creation of ELETROBRAS. 
"The creation of ELETROBRAS is one of the measures 
necessary in order to enable the Government to deal 
appropriately, with the grave problem of public supply of 
electricity" (414). 
In 1962, at the time of the creation of ELETROBRAS, the 
electrical power industry was under severe pressure from growing 
demand. It was failing to keep up with industrial development, and 
the situation was exacerbated by inflation of some 60% per year. The 
expansion indices of the electricity sector soon showed, that, 
despite the economic and social drawbacks current at the time, 
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ELETROBRAS was the best instrument to provide an electrical energy 
policy for Brazil; its ideology was payment of service through 
charges, as opposed to the previous system based on historic cost 
(see p.60)(415). The success of ELETROBRAS may be seen from Table 
IV.i. 
Table IV.i : Total electricity Consumption compared with Population 
Year Consumption Population 
TWh xlO 
1950 - - 
1962 21.9 75.3 
1975 64.1 110.1 





Source : 75 anos p.54 
The project outlined by President Getulfo Vargas, in 1954, 
stated 
'ELETR0BRAS will operate directly, or through organized 
subsidiaries or associated companies. It will function, 
therefore, as a holding company for the Federal 
enterprises, and will be entrusted with the federal 
services forecast in the Piano Nacional de Eletrificaço 
for the various regions in Brazil. It will also be 
associated with the enterprise, or enterprises which 
produce the materials, machines and indispensible equipment 
for the fulfillment of this national plan. If private 
initiative becomes disinterested in such an enterprise, a 
subsidiary will be created to take its place... The 
institution of Centrals Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. - 
ELETROBRAS, implies the adoption of a new economic 
direction for Brazil, which already has, to its credit, the 
creation of a steel industry, and is endeavouring to find a 
solution to the problem of p et ro l eum ...u(416). 
At the end of its first fifteen years, ELETROBRAS celebrated the 
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beginning of its operation in the electrical power industry. The 
installed capacity in Brazil rose from 5.8 GW in 1962 to 21.7 GW in 
1977. It was through ELETROBRAS that the Brazilian Government began 
to establish the "basic sector of national life". Since 1964, the 
electrical power industry has had administrative continuity which, 
for the first time, has permitted the development of long term 
planning programmes. The present form of ELETROBRAS has developed as 
the result of this continuity, and of the support provided by the 
Federal Government. 
"Without this continuity, without this careful planning, 
without this sense of priority, without the relative 
autonomy with which ELETROBRAS has acted during its 
existence, little would have been able to be done". 
In an industry where the construction of a power station, or the 
extension of a transmission line has great political-electoral 
significance, it is difficult for a government organised enterprise 
to resist the resultant pressures. But, in its first fifteen years, 
ELETROBRAS was reasonably successful in being impartial. 
"It has been an enterprise of technical experts, given over 
to them, directed by them, and for this reason it is able 
to commemorate with jubilation the fifteenth anniversary of 
its existence"(417). - 
From the very beginning, the planning methods which ELETROBRAS 
adopted were innovative. At the same time as coping with the 
reorganization of that section of the electrical power industry, over 
which it had assumed control, it also established the Comitë 
Coordenador dos Estudos Energêticos da Regiâo Centro Sul, which was 
partly financed by the United Nations Development Fund, in order to 
study the hydraulic potential of the South East region (see p.185), 
and the development of the energy market so as to prepare a basic 
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fifteen year plan. 
Today, in association with DNAEE, ELETROBRAS is the legal organ 
through which the Brazilian Government acts on matters concerning the 
electrical power industry. The administration of the DNAEE is direct, 
through the MME, and its workers are public employees. ELETROBRAS, 
however, is a company and, although the major shareholder is the 
Federal Government, it is essentially autonomous, with relative 
freedom in financial decisions and employment of personnel. It is. 
however, the role of the President of the Republic to appoint the 
President of ELETROBRAS. In routine activities, the company has 
complete freedom, but those decisions in the electrical power 
industry which have a direct bearing on the Brazilian economy are 
made by the Federal administration as a whole(418). 
Whereas, DNAEE is responsible for the granting of concessions 
for the construction of power stations, the establishment of 
electrical power charges, and the overseeing of the operations of the 
concessionary companies, ELETROBRAS has a number of other functions. 
Principally developed 'as a holding company, it also controls the 
operations of its four major subsidiaries, in which the Federal 
Government is also the major shareholder (see p.149). It is also a 
financing agency, supporting its subsidiaries and other electricity 
companies, principally state owned ones. It also has responsibility 
for the ce-ordination of foreign investment programmes, in which it 
guarantees loans and receives funds which are then transferred to the 
other electrical power companies. 
In its role as a co-ordination and administration agency, 
ELETROBRAS advises the MME on the establishment of long term 
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expansion policies in the electrical power industry (see p.201, and 
it guarantees the necessary funds for the investments in such 
expansion. It also co-ordinates the interconnection of different 
electrical systems (see p.173), and promotes agreements with 
neighbouring countries, for the purpose of electricity purchase or 
exchange( 419). 
ELETROBRAS Subsidiaries and State Enterprises 
As a holding company, ELETROBRAS operates through four regional 
subsidiaries FURNAS, ELETROSUL, ELETRONORTE and CHESF, all of which 
are responsible for the generation and bulk transmission of 
electricity. It also holds the controlling interest in three 
distribution utilities, Companhia de Eletricidade de Manaus (GEM), 
Espirito Santo Gentrais Elêtricas S.A. (ESCELSA), and Companhia 
Brasileira de Energia Elétrica (CBEE). In addition, it is the major 
shareholder in the Centro de Pesquisas de Energia Electrica (CEPEL) 
and 'The Light'. (A list of the other principal associated companies 
may be found in appendix 3 ). 
Politically, Brazil is subdivided into five regions, the North, 
North East, Centre West, South East and South (see p.16 ), but it is 
only subdivided into four electrical regions, as shown in figure 4,1. 
These regions were originally defined in 1973, in accordance with the 
Lei de Itaipu (see p.173). The area of activity of FURNAS was defined 
as covering the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro 
(and Guanabara), Espirito Santo, Goiãs, south of latitude 15°30'S, 
Mato Grosso south of latitude 18 0 S, and the new Federal District. 
ELETROSUL was to operate in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, 
Santa Catarina and Paraná (the political South region). CHESF was to 
0 
Figure 4.1 : Areas of Operation of ELETROBRAS 
Subsidiaries, 197 6 
Figure 4.2 : Redefined. Areas of Operation,1980 
Source 	1undo Eletrico, Ano 18, no.2071., 
December 1976 9 p.114 
Source : FUflNAS Boletim informativo, Ano 8, no.70, 
Jan-Mar 1980, p.7. 
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operate in the North East region, that is the states of Bahia, 
Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Parai'ba, Rio Grande do Norte, Cearâ, 
Piaui and Maranho. The area of activity of ELETRONORTE was Parâ, 
Amazonas, Acre, the three Federal Territories, Goiás north of 
latitude 15°S, and Mato Grosso north of 18 0 S(420). 
The Centre West region had been divided between FURNAS and 
ELETRONORTE, but since the definition of the regions of operation, 
Mato Grosso has been divided into two states, Mato Grosso and Mato 
Grosso do Sul, using the rios Itiquira and Corrente as the boundary. 
As a result, in March 1980, the areas of operation were redefined. 
Mato Grosso do Sul came under the jurisdiction of ELETROSUL, and, in 
return for this loss, FURNAS gained the region of Gois south of 
latitude 12°S, and in so doing gained control over the proposed 
hydroelectric development of UHE So Felix on the upper reaches of 
the rio Tocantins (see p.241). In return for losing part of Goiâs, 
ELETRONORTE now operates in the whole of the new state of Mato 
Grosso(421). 
It is interesting to note that the headquarters of ELETRONORTE 
are in Brasilia, which is inside the concession area of FURNAS. This 
is, probably, a result of the combination of better communications 
with Brasilia than with any major city within the concession area, 
and the fact that it was the furthest that qualified personnel could 
be persuaded to move from the South East region, where they had been 
previously employed. 
FUR NAS 
Centrais Elétricas de Furnas S.A. was created in 1957 to develop 
the hydroelectric potential of the Furnas site on the rio Grande (see 
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p.101). Over the years the role of the company has changed, and it is 
now responsible for bulk generation and transmission in the South 
East region of Brazil. 
In 1978, the total installed capacity of the FURNAS system was 
5.3 GW, which represented 37% of the total in the South East region. 
Work is currently in progress on UHE Itumbiara and the nuclear power 
station Angra I. These two power stations will add a further 5.2 GW 
to the total installed capacity of FURNAS, if they are successfully 
completed. The total length of high voltage transmission lines in 
this concession area was 9 150 km, 4% greater than in the previous 
year, but FURNAS is responsible for the D.C. transmission lines from 
UHE Itaipu to Sâo Paulo. When the D.C. system is completed, some 
1.000 km of transmission line will be added to the FURNAS network. 
From 1977 to 1978, the total installed capacity of the companies 
step-down substations increased by 3%, to 7.13 GVA. 
The total energy supplied from FURNAS in 1978 was 27.1 TWh. This 
comprised 24.9 TWh produced by the system alone, with the rest being 
purchased from CELG, and CFLCL, and received from the systems of 
CELG, ESCELSA, CESP and ELETROSUL for distribution. The major 
utilities consuming power from the FURNAS system in 1977, were 'The 
Light', CPFL, CEMIG, CBEE, CELF, CEP, ESCELSA, CEMAT, CFLCL, 
ELETROSUL, and the construction site for Angra I. With these ten 
utilities, FURNAS produced 24% of the total electrical energy in 
Brazil in 1978. 
During 	1978, the company's 	net operational 	income was 
Cr$ 6.6x109 (1978 prices), an increase of 47% over 1977, but this was 
within the inflation indices, as the operational costs only rose by 
- 153 - 
31.4% in the same period. 	Net earnings reached Cr$ 2.1x109 and 
dividends of Cr$ 1.2x109 were declared (1978 prices). A total 
disbursement of Cr$ 9.9x10 9 was made on the construction works 
essential for the expansion of the system, and the overall permanent 
assets, as of 1978, reached Cr$ 91.8x10 9 (422-424). By 1980, the 
situation had, however, changed and the financial situation of the 
company had become rather precarious. FURNAS depends for 85% of its 
income from ELETROBRAS, which, in 1980, following a massive 
devaluation of the cruzeiro in December 1979, was struggling to pay 
off international loans(425). Even as late as April 1980, FURNAS's 
budget for that year had not been finalised. 
For a time, FURNAS was the most powerful of ELETROBRAS's 
subsidiaries. Financially, it was in the strongest position, and 
indirectly, it served the greatest number of customers. It was 
operating before the creation of ELETROBRAS, and had established a 
clearly defined market for its power. More recently its position has 
been less clear, and its role as a subsidiary not well defined. It 
shares the South East region with two extremely powerful state 
companies, CESP and CEMIG, as well as 'The Light', now owned by 
ELETROBRAS (see p.161). Its regional mission was, originally, to 
build large scale hydroelectric power stations which would require 
an investment too great for the local concessionaires. It was also to 
ensure interconnection between existing systems. 
It has, to date, worked to the benefit of the South East region 
due to being able to achieve economies of scale. However, as FURNAS 
is only involved in generation and high voltage transmission, 'The 
Light' being responsible for the regional distribution, the company 
has the problem of trying to assess its market, in order to plan its 
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expansion, without any direct consumers. Specific expansion plans are 
not made for FURNAS, as an entity. A regional plan is prepared, and 
the share of the local concessionaires is subtracted so as to 
determine FURNAS's share of input to the implementation of the plan. 
As other concessionaires become more powerful, particularly CESP 
(see p.172), FURNAS is having an increasing struggle to maintain its 
market. The rapid expansion, accompanied by high energy demands, of 
the industrial markets in the states of So Paulo and Minas Gerais 
means that both CESP and CEMIG would be able to use all of the power 
from any new large power station without the need of FURNAS as an 
intermediary. This is the reverse of the situation which existed when 
FURNAS was first established. Also, there are few large projects 
remaining to be developed in the South East region, as most of the 
available hydraulic potential is now in the regions of ELETROSUL and 
ELETRONORTE. 
The establishment of ELETROBRAS also removed one of FURNAS's 
primary roles, that of a planning agency. The company used to be 
responsible for the strategic planning of large scale hydroelectric 
power stations and long distance transmission lines. It had a 
strategic planning department, and a specific planning department 
which considered the feasibility studies of proposed projects. Over 
the years it had developed great experience in formulating planning 
methodologies. However, it lost its role of strategic planning to the 
Grupo Coordenador de Operaco Interligada (GCOI) (see p.174) in 1973, 
and now concentrates on internal planning within the company. 
From 1976, the annual planning routine involved three stages 
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I. A fifteen-year long-term study of company development, 
Two five year tactical plans - the Piano de Grandes Obras 
(PGO), a system of expansion of large scale works, and the Piano 
Gerencial (PGE), looking at the company's own expansion, and 
Operational management - a one year plan on the above 
topic, 	but directly 	related to company investment and 
operations. In 1978, it was decided to drop the fifteen year 
plan, as it was a virtual duplicate of the ELETROBRAS fifteen 
year plan(P!ano 95 ). There is, however, a problem for FURNAS, 
because there is very little co-operation between the two 
companies. ELETROBRAS does not send FURNAS any planning 
directives or request comments on proposals. In practice FURNAS 
only receives plans, such as the Plano 95, when they are 
published. 
The FURNAS fifteen year plan was replaced by two reference 
documents. One, the Anãlise das Perspectivas de Expanso (APEX), 
outlines the alternatives for future expansion; it is not a plan, but 
a working document which is put before the board of directors. The 
other, the Programa para Referncia de Expansao (PEX), is the basis 
on which plans must be made and sent to ELETROBRAS for appraisal. The 
tactical planning period has been reduced from five to three 
years (428). 
The interview, which was the major source of the above 
information, gave the impression that there is a certain bitterness 
over the loss of FURNAS's co-ordinating role, to ELETROBRAS, and the 
reduction of the company's scope for expansion in the South East 
region. In 1980, a surplus of power was anticipated in the region, 
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and this has reduced the need for the large scale power stations 
scheduled for construction by FURNAS in the Piano 95, as there will 
be no market to supply. At the time of the interview, April 1980, no 
marketing studies had been commenced for that year, nor had any 
irrevocable steps been taken on any new projects*. 
C HE SF 
The Companhia Hidrelêtrica do So Francisco (CHESF), formed in 
1945 to build UFIE Paulo Afonso on the rio So Francisco (see p.99), 
and now operating as a subsidiary of ELETROBRAS, has responsibility 
for generation and bulk transmission in the North East region. In 
1978, its operating income was Cr$ 2.9x109 , with net earnings of 
Cr$ 0.6x109 and a declared dividend of Cr$ 0.4x10 9 (429). It came 
under the control of ELETROBRAS when the latter was created, and this 
move gave CHESF greater financial freedom to undertake construction 
of new power stations and transmission lines. By 1978, the installed 
capacity of the company had reached 2.4 GW, and construction of UHE 
Paulo Afonso IV was under way, as was the controversial UHE 
Sobradinho, further upstream. In accordance with the Piano 95, both 
these power stations should now be fully operational. The sixth 
generating unit of UHE Sobradinho was scheduled to be installed by 
mid-1981, raising the total installed capacity of the station to 
1.05 GW. The sixth generation unit of UHE Paulo Afonso was scheduled 
to be installed by the end of 1981, giving a total installed capacity 
of 2.46 GW. 
* This situation, as described by FURNAS, contradicts that implied 
by ELETROBRAS in the Piano 95, where it was considered of primary 
importance that UHE Itaipu should not be more than six months 
behind schedule, or a power shortage would result in the South 
East region (see p.119). 
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Two other large scale schemes are scheduled to be built on the 
rio Sâo Francisco. UHE Itaparica, is planned to begin operation 
early in 1985, and to be completed in mid-1986, with a total 
installed capacity of 2.5 GW (430). The other scheme is UHE Xingô, a 
4.0 GW hydroelectric power station, proposed downstream of UHE Paulo 
Afonso. It has been in Proj ect for quite some time, and it is likely 
that construction will now go ahead. The Piano 95 recommends it as 
the most economical solution to meeting the future demand in the 
North East region, once transfer of power from UHE Tucurul should 
cease, as forecast for 1987 (see p.253). A construction schedule was 
not, however, published in the Piano 95(431). 
In many ways CHESF has been instrumental in aiding the 
development of the economically poor North East region, although the 
detrimental social and economic effects of UHE Sobradinho have been 
the subject of much controversy (432). The position of CHESF as a 
subsidiary of ELETROBRAS is happier than that of FURNAS, as the 
market to which it is the major supplier is still undergoing 
considerable expansion. 
ELETROSUL 
Centrais Elétricas do Sul do Brasil S.A. was formed by the 
merger of pre-existing utilities in the South region in 1968. It is 
responsible for supplying electricity to this characteristically 
rural region which has little industrial development. The overall 
energy consumption is low, as well as the consumption of electricity, 
but both are now showing a tendency to increase(433). In 1978, the 
total installed capacity was 1.32 GW, which was supplied by two 
hydroelectric power stations and four thermal power stations (the 
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area of concession of ELETROSUL includes coal-rich Santa Catarina). 
For that year, its operating income was Cr$ 2.8x10 9 , with net 
earnings of Cr$ 0.5x10 9 . Dividends for 1978 were declared at 
Cr$ 0.3x10 9 (1978 prices) (434). This was an improvement over 1974, 
when the net earnings were only Cr$ 0.1x109 (1974 prices), and no 
dividends were paid. 
In an energy sense, the area of operation of ELETROSUL is 
becoming more important. With the growing lack of available large 
scale hydraulic potential in the industrial South East, and the 
greater economic viability of long distance transmission, the rivers 
in the South region are now being regarded as potential suppliers of 
electricity to the industrial South East. UHE Itaipu is an obvious 
example of this, the project is owned by Itaipu Binacional (see 
P-162), and has little to do with the ELETROSUL system, except that 
an interregional link is being constructed through the Ivaipora sub-
station (see p.116). Some of the power from UHE Itaipu will go to the 
South region, but the bulk of it will go to So Paulo city. 
ELETROSUL is constructing the 1.99 GW UHE Salto Santiago and 
2.5 GW UHE Foz do Areia on the rio Iguaçu, but there is a 500 kV A.C. 
connection from' both to the UHE Itaipu-So Paulo transmission line, 
and most of the power from these two stations will go to So Paulo. 
However, with rising energy demand in the South region, ELETROSUL, in 
collaboration with CNEC (see p.107) has just completed a preliminary 
study of the upper rio Uruguaf basin, and it is planned to construct 
two hydroelectric power stations on that river in the immediate 
future(435). 
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ELETRONORTE 
Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil S.A. is the most recently 
formed of the four ELETROBRAS subsidiaries. Its area of operation is 
the largest, as it covers most of the Amazon Basin, and 50% of the 
national territory, a total of 4.9x10 6 km 2 . Unlike the other 
subsidiaries, ELETRONORTE has no installed generating capacity which 
it has constructed. It is responsible, however, for the transmission 
lines and sub-stations for the existing power stations in the Amazon 
region(436). In 1980, the total installed capacity of the region of 
operation of ELETRONORTE was expected to be approximately 
600 MW(437), but each installation, by virtue of its isolation was 
operating independently. The current estimate of hydraulic potential 
in this region is 92 GW (see p.41 ) and, as the hydraulic potential 
in the rest of Brazil becomes exhausted, the importance of 
ELETRONORTE as an enterprise in the Brazilian electrical power 
industry will increase. 
ELETRONORTE was originally created by law no.5824, in November 
1972, in order to develop and build the 3.96 GW UHE Tucurui(438). The 
company will also be responsible for the construction of the other 
hydroelectric power stations in the Tocantins cascade (see app.4). It 
is to continue the systematic study of the hydraulic potential of the 
Amazon tributaries which was initiated by the Comité Coordenador dos 
Estudos Energéticos da Amazãnia (ENERAM)(439). The company is also 
conducting preliminary surveys of the rio Xingu. The estimated 
potential of this river is very high, but the idea of its 
exploitation is controversial because of its possible effects onthe 
large numbers of Amerindians who live along its banks (see p.228) 
(440). 
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Due to the isolated nature of all of the sites in Amaz6nia, the 
hostile terrain and climate, and the lack of communications 
infrastructure, much of the work of ELETRONORTE has to be innovative 
and pioneering. The market for electrical energy is, at the moment, 
domestic and commercial, but it is hoped that as the installed 
capacity increases industry will be attracted to the region. 
Financially, ELETRONORTE is dependent upon ELETROBRAS. In 1978, 
ELETRONORTE's reported assets were Cr$ 12.2x10 9 , and its net earnings 
were Cr$ 0.2x109 (441). However, the ambitious Tucurul project is 
suffering from rapidly escalating costs. The financial strain on 
ELETRONORTE is being lessened, however, by the injection of funds 
into the schemeby the Government, at the expense of other national 
projects, with the exception of UHE Itaipu.. 
'The Light' 
'The Light' has been operating in Brazil since 1899. 	It is a 
distribution company operating in both the states of Sao Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro. Originally it was involved in generation as well, but 
the problems-of the 1950s (see p.120), coupled with increasing anti-
foreign feeling in Brazil, led to an unofficial agreement that 'The 
Light' would restrict itself to distribution. As a result, it 
purchases 75-80% of its power from FURNAS and CESP. 
Until 1979, 'The Light' was owned by Brascan Ltd. of Canada. 
Originally, the Canadian enterprise owned nine companies in Brazil - 
'Rio Light', 'Sao Paulo Light', Companhia Fluminense and six small 
companies in the state of So Paulo. These were all amalgamated in 
1967 to form the company Light - Servicos de Eletricidade S.A., which 
retained the common name of 'The Light'(442). At that time it was the 
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last remaining major foreign controlled utility in Brazil, but early 
in 1979, the Brazilian Government purchased the 83% holding of 
Brascan for US$ 380x10 6 (December 1978 prices), of which US$ 210x10 6 
was paid on completion of the deal, and the remainder followed 90 
days later. 
The deal was expected to result in a book loss of US$ 466x10 6 
for Brascan, but unlike some other takeovers by the Brazilian 
Government, Brascan is being allowed to reinvest in Brazil if it so 
wishes(443). The Minister of the MME, at the time, Shigeaki Ueki, 
maintained that one of the motives for the purchase of the company 
was that the quality of 'The Light's' services had markedly 
deteriorated as a result of the company's inadequate investment in 
the electrical power industry. This problem has been the subject of a 
long standing argument since the 1950s(444). The bulk of 'The 
Light's' investment had been in routine maintenance with little 
investment in new plant. The response of Brascan to this was given 
at the annual shareholders meeting in Toronto, where Brascan claimed 
that it had invested US$ 1.5x10 9 in 'The Light' with the result that 
70% of the company's plant was less than ten years old. In 1977, 'The 
Light's' capital programme totalled US$ 285x10 6 , an increase of 10% 
over 1976(445,446). It should be noted, that, during the period when 
Brascan owned the company, dividends were paid half yearly to the 
shareholders, but in the first half of 1979, after the takeover, no 
dividends were paid and the money was reinvested(447). 
Despite the demand for electricity increasing at a rate of 10% 
per year in the region of concession of 'The Light', the company is 
obliged to purchase its power from FIJRNAS and CESP at rates set by 
the Federal Government. This means that any increase in output does 
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not flow through to earnings,, and 'The Light' had had to become 
increasingly dependent upon-the relatively short term funds available 
on the international capital markets, where, in 1978, repayments on 
loans rose by a factor of three(448). 
'The Light' does possess its own generating plant, principally 
UHE Ilha das Pombos, UHE Fontes and UHE Nilo Pecanha, all in the 
state of Rio de Janeiro, however, because of the compulsory purchase 
of power from FURNAS and CESP, these plants rarely run at full 
capacity(449). In 1978, 'The Light' generated 819.4 MWav, 7.8% less 
than in 1977, yet it purchased 3.9 GWav, an increase of 12.6% over 
the previous year(450). 
Itaipu Binacional 
Itaipu Binacional was created in accordance with article 3 of 
the Tratado de Itaipu, signed by the governments of Brazil and 
Paraguay on 26 April 1973. The binational entity is made up of 
members of ELETROBRAS, and its Paraguayan equivalent Administración 
Nacional de Electricidad (ANDE). This arrangement is for an 
indeterminate period of time, and the company has offices in Brasilia 
and Assunción. 
The initial objective of Itaipu Binacional wasto develop the 
hydraulic resources of the rio Paranä, from, and including, the Salto 
Grande de Sete Quedas up to the Foz do rio Iguaçu. The company was 
given the judicial, financial and administrative capacity, as well as 
the technical responsibility, to study, plan, direct and execute the 
works which constitute its objective. 
At the highest level, the administrative organs of Itaipu 
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Binacional are the Conselho de Administraco and the Diretoria 
Executiva, (Administration Council and Executive Directorate). The 
Conseiho de Administraco has twelve members, six nominated by the 
Brazilian Government ( of which, one will be chosen by the Ministërio 
das Relaces Exteriores, and two by ELETROBRAS), and six nominated by 
the Paraguayan Government (again one chosen by the Ministério das 
Relaçes Exteriores, and two by ANDE). The Conseiho is managed by a 
non-voting Director General and Assistant Director General. The term 
of office of each councillor is four years, but renomination is 
possible. 
The Diretoria Executiva is the organ responsible for the day to 
day practical administration. It comprises an equal number of 
nationals from both countries, with a Director General, and 
technical, judicial, administrative, financial and co-ordinating 
directors. Their term of office is five years, and, again, they can 
be renominated. The directors and assistant directors are nominated 
by the Governments of the two countries, after recommendations put 
forward by ELETROBRAS and ANDE. The Director General of the Conselho 
de Administraço is responsible for the direction, organization and 
co-ordination of the activities of Itaipu Binacional. It also falls 
to him to direct and co-ordinate the workof the Diretoria Executivo, 
and to supervise and co-ordinate the planning and execution of 
different areas of activity. 
In the city of Foz do Iguaçu, the representative of the Director 
General has, as a principal function, the role of arranging social 
integration of the Itaipu enterprise with the city and surrounding 
regions. The Diretoria Executivo has to implement the orders of the 
Tratado de Itaipu as well as the decisions of the Conselho de 
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Administracâo(451), (see figure 4.3). To date, the role of Itaipu 
Binacinal has been the construction of UHE Itaipu. The enterprise is 
responsible for the financing of the project, the selection of 
consultants, awarding of contracts and general co-ordination. It was 
formally inaugurated at a ceremony held at the border between Brazil 
and Paraguay, on 17 May 1974, in the presence of the two presidents, 
Ernesto Geisel and Alfred Stroessner(452). 
It is interesting to note, that the project was originally 
conceived under the government of Emilio Garrastazu Médici, this 
Brazilian president actually signing the Tratado(453). It is perhaps 
the largest project that will ever be undertaken by a Brazilian 
Government, and is a symbol of the Médici Government, which initiated 
a number of large projects during the years of the "economic 
miracle", including the construction of the Transamazônica Highway. 
CEPEL 
The Centro de Pesquisas de Energia Elétrica was created by 
ELETROBRAS for the development of technology applicable to electrical 
systems and equipment(454). The full entry of Brazil into the 
development of systems for generation, transmission and distribution 
of electricity stemmed from the change from importation of equipment 
to the manufacture of this equipment in Brazil by subsidiaries of 
foreign manufacturers. However, the concessionaires, preoccupied with 
the problems of the rapid expansion which occurred in the power 
industry after the Second World War, had neither the time nor 
resources to study the technical questions which were only indirectly 
connected to their immediate concerns. Technical difficulties were 
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solved as they arose, frequently with the aid of foreign consultants. 
The need for more formal research became more pressing during 
the 1960s, when Brazil began to build power stations on a much larger 
scale and prepare long term plans. At that time, some university 
departments had small units undertaking electro-mechanical research. 
The concessionaires also formed their own study departments and small 
laboratories, with the principal aim of improving maintenance of the 
protection and measurement instruments and equipment. Most of the 
research, however, was geared to solving immediate small scale 
problems. At the same time as long-term problems were growing, so 
was the interest in the establishment of a formal research 
organization(455). 
In June 1971, the MME stated the intention of creating a 
research centre, on the campus of the Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro, and in December of that year, ELETROBRAS was authorised to 
set up a Fundo de Desenvolvimento Tecnolögico (Technological 
Development Fund), with the objective of financing scientific and 
technological development initiatives of interest to the Brazilian 
electrical power industry. 
The initial studies for the creation of a research centre were 
given to FURNAS, which then made a consultation contract with the 
Canadian Institut de Recherche de l'Hydro-Quêbec (IRFQ), in order to 
define the basic concept behind such a project. As a result, CEPEL 
was created in March 1974, directly subordinate to ELETROBRAS, and 
responsible to the four ELETROBRAS subsidiaries(456). The basic 
objective of CEPEL was defined in law as 
...to provide an infrastructure for scientific research, 
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and to seek for the development in the country of an 
advanced technology in the field of electrical equipment 
and systems". 
As fundamentals of this objective, five medium and long term 
objectives were established 
to integrate CEPEL into the national electrical power 
industry, 
to establish Systems and Electrical Equipment Laboratories, 
to back up the requirements of the industry, 
to shape their own human resources and those of the 
electrical power industry, and 
to integrate CEPEL into the scientific community. 
In the first five years of its existence CEPEL acted jointly, 
with ELETROBRAS and its subsidiaries and some state companies, in the 
fields of supervision and control of electrical systems, isolating 
materials, corrosion, project optimization for transmission lines, as 
well as its own chosen areas of research(457). 
Two laboratories have been established. The Laboratärio de 
Sistemas Elêtricas (LSE), on the campus of the Federal University in 
Rio de Janeiro, and the Laboratório de Equipamentos Elétricos (LEE), 
in the town of Adrianópolis, Rio de Janeiro state, and sited close to 
the 500 kV substation of FURNAS. The LSE began operation in its new 
headquarters in 1979, and the LEE had been expected to commence 
operation at around the same time. However, it was still under 
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construction during 1980. With the progressive conclusion of works on 
the two laboratories, the scope of CEPEL's research has gradually 
expanded, and in 1978 the centre prepared its first three year plan 
(1978-1980) which-was subsequently approved(458). 
Some of the research being undertaken by CEPEL will have a 
significant effect on Brazil's future energy planning. One of the 
roles of the systems and materials department at LSE is the 
optimization of energy planning (see p.219), and in 1977 two research 
programmes were set up on the supervision and control of electrical 
systems. One is the elaboration of a remote programmable terminal for 
the acquisition of data, and the other is the development of a 
methodology and algorithms for the implementation of advanced 
mathematical functions in control systems. A prototype of the first 
programme was installed in one of FURNAS's substations which is under 
the direct control of the Sistema de Superviso e Aquisico de Dados 
do Centro de Controle do Sistema de FURNAS, (System for supervision 
and acquisition of data for the control centre of the FURNAS system). 
Preliminary results suggest that a plan of collaboration should be 
established between CEPEL and FURNAS with the aim of developing a 
prototype for a regional system of supervision and acquisition of 
data based on microprocessors(459). 
CEPEL is funded by ELETROBRAS, which invested Cr$ 250x1O 6 (1978 
prices) into the company in 1978(460). As well as this Federally 
sponsored company, oriented towards national progress in the fields 
of science and technology, as applied to the electrical energy 
services(461), there are two major state enterprises which play an 
important role in the Brazilian electrical power industry. They are 
CEMIG and CESP, and they wield much power within the industry. 
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CEMIG 
Centrals Elétricas de Minas Gerais is indirectly responsible for 
much of the outlook of the present day electrical power industry in 
Brazil. It has been the training ground for many of the top men in 
the various state utilities, especially FURNAS. Some of these have 
also moved on to Itaipu Binacional. It was CEMIG which discovered the 
Furnas site, but realising that the scope of its resources was 
insufficient to develop this promissing site, the company pressed for 
its development nationally, and thus began the gradual integration of 
the region and then the country as an electrical entity. 
Founded in 1952, CEMIG was the first mixed economy state company 
to be created in Brazil in order to fulfill an overall 
electrification plan. In its initial programme it installed 150 MW of 
generating capacity, and the associated transmission system. This was 
the largest works programme to have been attempted at that time in 
Brazil. However, as its resources for large scale capital programmes 
werenot large, the increase of CEMIG's installed capacity was slow 
during the 1960s. More recently, however, CEMIG has entered the world 
of large scale hydroelectric power station construction, and in 1978, 
UHE So Simo was inaugurated on the rio Paranatha. When all phases 
are complete it will be Brazil's fourth largest hydroelectric power 
station, with a total installed capacity of 2.7 GW. If the last 
generator was installed according to schedule at the end of 
1979(462), it will in fact be the second largest currently operating 
in Brazil (after CESP's UHE Ilha Solteira 3.2 GW). In 1978, the 
estimated final cost of UHE So Simo was US$ 1.0x10 9 (August 1978 
prices), and initially the power will be used to meet the demand in 
the industrial South East, as opposed to Minas Gerais state alone, 
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which at present has sufficient installed capacity to meet its 
current needs(463). 
In the case of UHE Emboraco, which CEMIG is building, also on 
the rio Paranalba, with the help of an Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) loan of US$ 70x10 6 (1977 prices), this 1.0 GW 
hydroelectric power station will supply the market of Belo Horizonte. 
The power is expected to help establish new industries, and create 
60 000 new jobs in the state of Minas Gerais. The loan from the 1DB 
covers 9.5% of the total estimated project cost, and CEMIG itself 
will be responsible for 45.7% and ELETROBRAS a further 33.3%. 
Included in the project is the modernization of CEMIG's supervision 
and monitoring network(464). 
This extensive Federal Government participation in the projects 
of CEMIG represents a new direction for the company. It has become 
necessary because of the enormous funds required for many of the 
current hydroelectric projects, and it is possible that the company 
may lose some of its autonomy if this financial dependence upon 
ELETROBRAS is maintained. Throughout its existence, CEMIG has 
developed an intense, increasing and uninterrupted programme of 
works, which has been fulfilled by up-to-date techniques, with a 
constant endeavour to keep costs to the lowest feasible. The company 
has contributed decisively to the increase of the state economy. 
Its motto is 
"Fazendo o progresso corn energiau'* 
and in the opinion of the journal Mundo Elétrico, CEMIG has surpassed 
the frontiers of an electricity enterprise by establishing itself as 
* Making progress with energy. 
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a development agency(465). 
CESP 
Centrais Elétricas de São Paulo was founded in 1966 by the 
amalgamation of eleven concessionary electrical power companies, and 
the takeover, in 1975, of the controlling interest in CPFL, which had 
a concession area of 212 000 km 
2.  Most of the company's consumers are 
in the state of São Paulo, with a small percentage in Mato Grosso do 
Sul and Minas Gerais. The concession area includes extremely poor and 
backward regions of São Paulo state, but also the extremely important 
industrial centres such as Carnpinas and São Paulo city. For this 
reason CESP wields considerable power in the Brazilian electrical 
power industry. 
In 1979, the company had assets of Cr$ 134x10 9 , of which 90% was 
invested in property connected to the production, transmission and 
distribution of electricity(466). Since 1969, CESP has been involved 
in an ambitious programme of expansion, and has increased its 
installed capacity from 1.3 GW to 8.3 GW in 1979, representing a 
total increase of 515%. This corresponds to an average yearly 
increase of 19.9%. Production of electricity rose from 3.0 TWh in 
1969 to 35.5 TO in 1979, an increase of nearly a factor of 12(467). 
(Compared to the increase in production for the whole of Brazil, over 
a ten year period, this is extremely high. 1968 production of 
electricity in Brazil was 38.1 TWh and this had risen to 111.1 TWh in 
1978, a factor of increase of just less than 3). 
In that period, CESP constructed three large hydroelectric power 
stations, UHE Jupia on the rio Paranã (1.4 GW)(1969), UHE liha 
Solteira (3.2 GW)(1973), on the same river, and UHE Agua Vermelha on 
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the rio Grande (1.4 GW)(1978). In addition to a number of small 
schemes, CESP is in the process of constructing the 1.8 GW UHE Porto 
Primavera on the rio Paranâ(468,469). According to the Piano 95, the 
station will start operating in 1985, but its total installed, 
capacity is given as 1.1 GW(470). 
When the statistics are studied, it becomes apparent why FURNAS 
is concerned with its potential loss of market. Not only are CEMIG 
and CESP (principally the latter) constructing hydroelectric power 
stations with capacities of greater than 1.0 GW, their shares of the 
regional - and Brazilian markets are rising whilst that of FURNAS is 
falling, as shown in Table IV.ii. 
Table IV.ii : % Participation in Energy Production 
1978 1979 
S.E.Region Brazil S.E.Region Brazil 
FURNAS 	 31.5 22.4 25.7 28.0 
CESP 38.9 	. 27.7 40.6 17.7 
CEMIG 	 14.2 10.1 19.0 13.1 
Source : Relatório Técnico 1979 
Note : CESP is the greatest single producer of electricity in Brazil. 
In accordance with the Lei de Itaipu (see page 173), FURNAS and 
ELETROSUL will have to make contracts with Itaipu Binacional for 
purchase of all the power from UHE Itaipu, in proportion to their 
respective markets, for - the next twenty years. In turn FURNAS and 
ELETROSUL will have to make contracts with the state companies, by 
which these companies guarantee to buy this power for the same 
period(471). This theoretically shifts the responsibility of use of 
the UHE Itaipu power to the state companies. A number, however, 
- 173 - 
notably CESP, have not slowed down their ambitious construction 
programmes, and there is a real danger of there being an excess 
capacity. CESP has been strongly opposed to the Itaipu law, and if it 
is changed in favour of the state companies FURNAS could have serious 
problems selling the power(472). The law was in fact revoked in 1980, 
and the concession areas of the ELETROBRAS subsidiaries altered, but 
there is no information available on any changes in purchasing of the 
power(473). 
Internal Structure of ELETROBRAS 
Following the Tratado do Itaipu signed by Brazil and Paraguay, 
on 26 April 1973, the lei de Itaipu, no.5899, was passed by the 
Brazilian Government to define the use of the energy from UHE Itaipu. 
As well as accomplishing this, the law also defined the subsidiaries 
of ELETROBRAS, and their areas of concession, and redefined 
ELETROBRAS's internal structure. 
UHE Itaipu is to supply power to the South East and South 
regions, and the operational co-ordination of these regions was 
declared to be under the jurisdiction of the Grupo Coordenador de 
0peraco Interligada (GCOI), and integrated through representatives 
of ELETROBRAS and the concessionaires(474). Law no.5899 was followed 
by Federal decree no.73102, of 7 November 1974, which defined the 
methods of application of the rules and recommendations in the lei de 
Itaipu. The decree has references on how to minimise operation costs, 
maximise hydroelectric generation, and the minimum allowable level of 
reliability. In accordance with this decree, GCOI must present an 
annual operation plan (Piano de Operacào)(475). 
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GCOI 
This is, essentially, a power council, comprising various state 
companies and the ELETROBRAS subsidiaries. Originally, CHESF and 
ELETRONORTE were excluded, but CHESF is now part of the council 
because its installations on the rio So Francisco experience the 
regulatory effect of CEMIGs UHE Trës Marias, which is situated 
upstream. ELETRONORTE is not included because, as yet, it has no 
significant transmission system. With the creation of GCOI, the South 
and South East regions became more strongly electrically connected. 
The structure of GCOI is similar to that of the Diretoria de 
Operaces of ELETROBRAS, the activities of the two are often 
parallel, and frequently overlap, but they are legally quite separate. 
For the overall structure of GCOI, see Figure 4.3. 
Conselho de Deliberativo 
The presidents of the various companies involved meet at this 
council. It serves no official function, and wields no power. 
Comitë Executivo 
This comprises the Operations Directors of all the participating 
companies. It is presided over by the Director of ELETROBRAS's 
Diretoria de Operaces and it meets regularly at three monthly 
intervals. 
Secretária de Superviso e Coordenaco 
The head of this has the same status as an ELETROBRAS director. 
The Secretäria operates within ELETROBRAS. It controls the Conta de 
Consumo de Combustiveis (CCC, the account for the consumption of 
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Figure 4.4 : The Operating Structure of GCOI 
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Source : GCOI Sudeste/Sul, Subcomit de Estudos Energticos, 
Piano de Operaço Para 1980. 
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fuels). All the companies affiliated to GCOI pay a sum into the CCC, 
and those companies which are operating thermal power stations 
receive a subsidy from the CCC to pay for the cost of the fuel. This 
is one of the aspects of interconnected operation which has arisen. 
The profits of each company vary widely, and this measure is an 
attempt to ensure that there is no cost differential between the 
electricity in each region. The national policy is to work towards 
regularising the cost of electricity throughout Brazil. At present, 
the tariffs in the North East and North are being held at an 
artificially low level, in order to try and stimulate industry. 
The Secretäria prepares weekly, monthly and annual reports on 
the operation of the Brazilian electrical power systems. The 
operation data is collected, and used to identify deviations from the 
planned schedule. However, the Secretâria does not analyse these 
deviations, it just compiles the data, and produces a computer 
printed report. Its role is in the process of changing. In 1979, it 
founded the National Control System (presumably Sistema de Controle 
Nacional), and the role of the Secretäria is the short term 
supervision and co-ordination of this System. It is slowly 
developing the attributes of the National Control System, and once 
this has been established it will take over the role of the Sub-
comitê de Estudos Energéticos (see p.177). and the role of the Sub-
comitê de Operaco (see p.177) will be taken over by the Secretãria. 
The Comitê Executivo makes the decisions for GCOI, and the 
Secretria is the organ currently responsible for their 
implementation. 
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Sub-comitë de Manutencào 
This subcommittee prepares the operation and maintenance 
schedules for the power stations. It studies the performance of the 
various power stations, and prepares the reliability indices. 
Sub-comitê de Comunicaco 
This deals with communications between the different companies 
which are interconnected, either directly by transmission facilities, 
or indirectly by power purchasing agreements. It develops the 
communications network from the power stations, with the use of 
microwave and telephone links. 
Sub-cornitë de Operaco 
This is involved with short term operation problems. 	It 
discusses the use of reserve power, and the criteria for its use. It 
schedules the interchange of electricity between companies. 
Sub-comitê de Estudos Elétricos 
This and the Sub-comitë de Estudos Energéticos are the most 
important of the subcommittees. This one does the electrical studies 
in order to verify the medium term planning - the monthly, tri-
monthly, and yearly plans. It studies load flow, stability, load 
schedule and makes short circuit studies. It defines the electrical 
constraints on the systems as well as the limits of energy 
interchange between companies at peak times. 
Sub-comitè de Estudos Energéticos 
This subcommittee is co-ordinated by the Departamento do 
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Operaço Energética (DEOP) of ELETROBRAS, and almost all the work of 
the latter is done in relation to this sub-committee, which operates 
through three commissions and three work groups. 
CEARP 
The Comisso de Estudos e Acompanhamento do rio ParaTha (CEARP) 
was set up to study the operation and use of the rio Paratha. It is 
one of the river systems in Brazil, that has been developed for 
multiple use, and it, therefore, requires operation co-ordination. It 
is an important river for the city of Rio de Janeiro, as it is used 
for power, drinking water, navigation and effluent disposal. 
Operation of hydroelectric power stations on this river is 
constrained by the need of the use of the river for water supply and 
navigation(476). (This is the only example of the multiple use of a 
Brazilian river where electricity production was not the principal 
concern). 
CEPIC 
The Comisso de Estudos de Programaço de Intercmbios e sua 
Contablizaco (Commission for the study of planning for exchange and 
accounts) was created as an impartial body to ensure that some 
companies do not gain financially at the expense of others. It 
determines the regulations for energy exchange between companies and 
arranges the accounts. (The money changes hands on paper, not in 
reality) It is involved with all of the exchanges which occur between 
companies, not just the energy exchanges. It acts as co-ordinator 
between companies which are not even electrically interconnected. It 
defines the criteria to maximise electricity production at minimum 
cost and arranges the substitution of thermal power by hydroelectric 
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power between companies. 
COMAM 
The .Comisso de Analise do Mercado (COMAM) was created to 
forecast the market demand. It monitors the performance of the 
forecast to verify the values used. It studies the growth behaviour 
of the market. The actual studies for load forecasts are made by 
DNAEE, therefore, the load forecasts made by COMAM have to be 
approved by DNAEE. Once a year, COMAM prepares a five year market 
forecast which is presented to GlEN for consideration. 
GTMC 
The objective of the Grupo de Trabalho de Metodologia e 
Critérios (GTMC, work group on methodology and criteria), is to 
develop a methodology and criteria using mathematical models and 
computer programmes. It is developing a system of programmes matched 
to the national control system of ELETROBRAS being developed in 
Brasilia. Sophisticated methods and programmes are being employed to 
plan operations, and the Brazilian electrical power system will 
itself be more sophisticated once UHE Itaipu and the nuclear power 
station Angra I begin operation. This work group develops and 
discusses the methodology behind the models required. 
GlEN 
The Grupo de Trabaiho de Estudos Energéticos (GlEN, work group 
on energy studies) uses the models and methodology of GTMC to produce 
the energy operation plans for one month, three month and one year 
periods. It also makes studies of the expected behaviour of the 
systems over the next five years. Every three months the medium term 
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plan is reviewed. Computer simulations of reservoir levels are made, 
and the generation levels of all the power stations are forecast. In 
any three month period, GlEN can forecast the most important 
operation values for the next three months, taking into account the 
load forecast, and the reservoir inflow estimate using statistical 
simulation. In the South East region, an hourly despatch is received 
from each large scale hydroelectric power station, and the operation 
and maintenance schedules can be revised, depending on the water 
flows at the time of the bulletin. 
Normally GlEN meets with the GCOI companies monthly to review 
the situation. Only in critical periods, when the behaviour of the 
system departs from the forecast, is the frequency of the review 
increased. One of the other roles of GlEN is to monitor the day by 
day operations of all stations. Information is sent by telephone or 
telex, and this acts as an important feedback on all the planning 
processes. 
GTEH 
The Grupo de Trabaihos de Estudos Hidrologicos (GTEH, work group 
for hydrological studies) was set up after a disaster when UHE 
Euclides da Cunha and UHE Armando Salles de Oliveira, both on the rio 
Pardo, were overtopped and subsequently breached in January 1977. 
This resulted in the destruction of 4 000. homes and the two 
hydroelectric power stations. Although much of the data was 
destroyed, it was estimated that the area suffered a 10 000 year 
flood(477). Naturally there was much public concern that this kind of 
disaster should be prevented, therefore the role of GTEH is to ensure 
the safety of the peoples and lands downstream of such large dams. 
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It defines the discharge limits from the hydroelectric power 
stations, using the available hydrological data, in order to minimise 
any adverse effects upon agriculture, fishing and navigation. It 
makes all the studies related to hydrology - the inflow data for the 
energy studies are prepared by GTEH. 
The differences between the work groups and the commissions is 
that the former are permanent, but the commissions may only be 
temporary. The Comitê Executivo and the subcommittees prepare the 
guidelines upon which the work groups and commissions operate. 
Reports prepared at subcommittee level and above are published. The 
Piano de Operacào, three monthly and annual is published by 
SCEN(478). 
ELETROBRAS - Planning 
The scope of ELETROBRAS is much wider than that of GCOI, as it 
is involved with the overall development of the electrical power 
industry, not just the co-ordination of the different enterprises 
within it. However, much of the work of the two does overlap, 
although the contact between the two is usually only through the 
various subcommittees, work groups and commissions, which are headed 
by ELETROBRAS personnel. 
It appears that there is very little inter-departmental 
communication within ELETROBRAS. In Rio de Janeiro, the company is 
spatially separated into three buildings, in different streets, and 
there is another office in Brasilia. 
There are five other directors working on the board of the 
company, in addition to the Director of ELETROBRAS. They are the 
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directors of the Diretoria de Integraço Regional, the Diretoria de 
Financiamento e.Economia, the Diretoria de Operaco, the Diretoria de 
Planejamento e Engenharia and the Diretoria de Coordenaco(479). 
Involved directly with planning are the Diretorias de Operaco and 
Planejamento e Engenharia. The Diretoria de Operaco is closely 
paralleled by GCOI, and the director co-ordinates the Comit 
Executivo of GCOI. Within the Diretoria de Operaço is the 
Departamento de 	Operaco Energético (DEOP), 	the head of which 	co- 
ordinates 	the Sub-comité de 	Estudos Energéticos. There are 	three 
di v i s i ons  within the DEOP. The Divi'sâo de Operaçâo Energético (DVON), 
which prepares the energy studies for operation planning. The chief 
ofDVON co-ordinates GlEN; the Diviso de Engenharia de Operaco 
(DVEO), whose chief co-ordinates GTMC, and the marketing division, 
which does marketing studies. Its chief is co-ordinator of COMAM, and 
the work of the two is almost the same(480). 
There are four departments within the Diretoria de Planejamento 
e Engenharia. The Departarnento de Estudos Energéticos (DENE) is 
concerned with computer modelling, and presentation of data, and long 
term programming for expansion. The Departamento de Sistemas 
Elétricas, the Departamento de Geracâo and the Departamento de 
Estudos de Mercado (DEME). DEME prepares the market studies to 
predict the national energy consumption. It acts as a consultant to 
the other Brazilian energy utilities. It makes demographic and 
economic studies for the market projects, in order to make 30 year 
predictions of population, numbers of households, and income. This 
is because IBGE only make ten year projections, and ELETROBRAS 
produces a fifteen plan with a thirty year horizon(481). DEME 
produces the economic references used by the other departments in 
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their planning(482). 
Within ELETROBRAS there are a number of other departments, 
including the Departamento do Melo Anibiente (the Environment) and the 
Departarnento de Eletrificaco Rural, but none of these are directly 
concerned with planning. With the help of its four departments, the 
Diretoria de Planejamento e Engenharia is responsible for the 
preparation and publication of the 15 year plans, such as the Plano 
95. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Planning 
Until 1965, public power in Brazil had been developed by a 
number of separate power utilities, some owned privately and others 
by mixed capital companies with predominantly Federal or State 
Government control. Some of the companies were fully integrated and 
provided a complete service, from generation of electricity through 
to distribution to the ultimate consumer. Others were primarily 
distribution companies, or changing their role to become so, e.g. 
'The Light' (483). Since the commissioning of the FURNAS plant, in 
1963, some utilities became primarily bulk suppliers, confining their 
activities to electricity generation and transmision(484). Each 
power concessionaire had developed its own independent transmission 
system, although, in some cases, there was incidental interconnection 
with neighbours. By the end of 1965, the total installed capacity in 
the industrial South East Region of Brazil was 5.086 GW and the 
market requirement at that time was 4.096 GW, giving an apparent 
surplus of 990 MW(485). 
It was not easy for the various concessionaires to work 
together. Some were state companies, some were foreign. They all had 
different primary objectives and financial resources. In terms of 
quality, some outranked others, e.g. FURNAS and CEMIG were 
successful, whereas CHEVAP was a conspicuous failure(486). 
CANAMBRA 
It was into this unstructured system, that Canambra Engineering 
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Consultants Ltd. 	(CANAMBRA), a consortium comprising Montreal 
Engineering Company Ltd. of Montreal, Canada; Gibbs and Hill Inc. of 
New York, USA; and G.E.Crippen and Associates Ltd. of Vancouver, 
Canada(487), was invited to make a survey of hydroelectric resources 
in South Central and South Brazil. In addition, using information 
gathered on both conventional and nuclear sources of thermal power, 
CANAMBRA prepared a programme of power station and transmission line 
construction in order to supply the power markets in those regions 
until 1980(488). It was to be the first long term, and wide ranging 
plan in the electrical power industry, ever to be considered in 
Brazil. 
Guidelines for the studies for the South Central Region of 
Brazil, divided into several sections, were described under the Terms 
of Reference for the "Power Study of South Central Brazil" dated 10 
April 1962, issued by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD, the World Bank). A survey of hydroelectric 
resources in the state of Minas Gerais, and parts of the Paranalba 
Basin in south-eastern Goiâs, including a feasibility study of 
selected sites, was to be carried out by CANAMBRA in collaboration 
with CEMIG, according to an agreement between the two organizations, 
dated 2 November 1962. 
The second part of the project, designated part B of the "Power 
Study of South Central Brazil" was carried out under the contract for 
Consulting Engineering Services between FURNAS and CANAMBRA, signed 
on 3 June 1963. This was made up of three principal components. Part 
B-i, completed early in 1964, led to an interim report for power 
developments in the region for the four-year period 1963 to 1966. The 
So Paulo study consisted of a survey of the hydroelectric resources 
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in the States of Säo Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, northern Paranã and 
eastern Mato Grosso, again with feasibility studies of selected 
sites. The Rio de Janeiro study was a market study and economic 
development programme for power generation and transmission. 
facilities in South Central Brazil. This was later extended, in 1965, 
to include a study of power supplies from hydroelectric power sites, 
which had been previously studied, on the coastal slope of the states 
of Paranä and Santa Catarina, and also thermal power development 
using coal from deposits in Santa Catarina(489-491). 
The "Power Study of South Brazil" was authorised by the Plan of 
Operation Agreement (PLANOP)(492), which was signed by 
representatives of the Government of Brazil, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, in Rio de Janeiro, 
on 7 August 1967. The contract for the South Brazil study, made 
possible by the PLANOP agreement, was signed in Washington, D.C. by 
representatives of CANAMBRA and COPEL the latter acting on authority 
delegated by ELETROBRAS, which was the authorized agent of ENERSUL, 
the name finally adopted by the Steering Committee(493). 
The Power Study of South Brazil included: 
an evaluation of electrical power sites, in order to prepare 
an interim report for a development programme to meet market 
requirements until 1972, 
an inventory of hydraulic power sites in South Brazil, 
feasibility studies of selected sites, 
iv. assistance in reorganization of regional 	hydrometric 
services, 
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a power market forecast to 1980 1 and a corresponding 
generation and transmission programme, 
a general survey of subtransmission and distribution 
requirements, and 
an evaluation of frequency conversion requirements in order 
to connect the state of Rio Grande do Sul with the rest of the 
South Region. 
The initial request for this estimated three years study, at a 
projected cost of US$ 3x10 6 (1964 prices), was refused by UNOP, 
which, instead, offered extra funds of US$ 0.2x10 6 to the Rio de 
Janeiro Study for the Paranâ and Santa Catarina evaluations. However, 
after visits from World Bank and United Nations representatives, the 
UNDP, finally, in January 1966, approved a grant of US$ 470 400 for a 
less detailed study of South Brazil. The Brazilians themselves, were 
to contribute an equivalent of US$ 1.410 6 , and the study was planned 
to take one and a half years. On reflection, it was considered that 
the sums and time allocated were insufficient, and, after a detailed 
review, agreement was reached in June 1966, by which the grant was 
increased to US$ 700 000 and the time scale to two years(494). 
The difficulties experienced by the South Region in obtaining 
funding for the project strongly reflect the attitudes towards 
Brazilian development. The South Central Region (or South East), 
containing the two large industrial cities of Rio de Janeiro and So 
Paulo, was a rich and powerful area in which it was in many people's 
interest to encourage industrial development. This region was an 
area on which the Development Banks and lending agencies could easily 
focus, through economically powerful individuals, all the major 
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companies, and the Federal Government. The South Region had none of 
these natural advantages. It was relatively unpopulated, with little 
industry, and, although, the rio Paranâ has subsequently been 
regarded as a source of hydraulic power, it is not for the South but 
for the industrial South East, which is to receive the power from UHE 
Itaipu(495). 
Much of the work performed by CANAMBRA was as a supplier of 
specialist consultants, e.g. at the offices in Curitiba, headquarters 
of the South Brazil Survey, CANAMBRA supplied a study director, 
project manager, reconnaissance engineer, hydrologist, geologist, 
market analyst, power supply engineer, transmission engineer and two 
design and estimating engineers, and in addition, five visiting 
specialists-_a power planning engineer, financial analyst, thermal 
power engineer and two transmission engineers. 
Surveys - inventory studies. 
The purpose of the inventory (assessment) studies was to 
tabulate the potential hydroelectric sites, their physical 
characteristics, and the power and cost characteristics of possible 
developments at these sites, in order to identify appropriate schemes 
of river development for power, and also to establish a preliminary 
classification of economic priority. The information was tabulated to 
show the reference data, physical characteristics and power and cost 
data on a "first-added" basis*, and to show how the power and cost 
data would be modified by full development of the river. Charges and 
* The terminology adopted by CANAMBRA when referring to the cas-
cade development of a river for power, used the term "first-added" 
to denote a hydroelectric power station which was the first of 
such a development scheme, and was financially and hydrologically 
independent. 
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credits between power and storage projects were distributed in an 
attempt to provide a balanced estimate of .costs(496). In the 
inventory studies, the primary energy potential of a project was 
computed as the maximum continuous output which could be maintained 
during a repetition of the driest recorded period of stream 
flow(497). The most important information from these studies was 
this preliminary estimate of the firm energy and the index of its 
cost. The main criterion for selection of a site was on economic 
grounds. 
The initial stage of. the process was the river basin hydraulic 
resources survey, after this, a preliminary appraisal was made, which 
consisted of the application of a simplified estimating procedure to 
the available site information. Those sites which showed no 
likelihood of meeting the minimum requirements on cost were 
discarded. After this appraisal, more detailed estimating procedures 
were applied to selected sites after' the completion of field 
reconnaissance and office studies. 
In the schedule of estimated capital expenditures, the average 
capital cost of hydro and oil-fired steam plants planned to start 
prior to 1980, for commissioning after that year was US$ 150/kW 
(498). Of the projects studied in the South Central Region the most 
expensive was estimated at US$ 437/kW and the lowest at US$ 124/kW 
(499), On projects shown to be attractive from the inventory study, a 
feasibility study cost estimate was made on the completion of more 
detailed site investigations and design studies. 
The inventory studies generally comprised: 
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- river profiles and maps, at various scales, as available from 
other agencies, andalso prepared and revised by the Group's 
aerophotogrammetry section, 
- site cross-sections and check level runs by CANAMBRA's survey 
section, 
- surface reconnaissance of foundation conditions and borrow 
materials by the CANAMBRA geologist. Some previous sub-surface 
explorations by other agencies were also available, and 
- regulated flows, design floods and tailwater curves derived 
from the hydrologic studies executed(500). 
The reconnaissance survey of hydraulic resources in the South 
Central Region took nearly two years, during which time, some 
10 000 km of river valley were inspected in a total area of 
500 000 km 2 Profiles were made for 7 500 km of the valleys, and of 
the order of 200 potential dam sites were examined. The field work 
consisted of two main phases. The first was an aerial survey to 
describe the general character of the rivers, and to note possible 
hydropower sites. This was followed by the second phase, a helicopter 
surface examination of the previously selected rivers. The dam sites 
were appraised, and elevation data obtained for the plotting of 
profiles and the vertical control of photogrammetric mapping. Any 
sites previously mapped by other agencies were again studied by 
CANAMBRA. The geological survey consisted of asurface examination of 
the dam sites and surrounding region. Sources of construction 
materials were sought, and where applicable, the depth of material 
overlying the bedrock was estimated. Sites were then selected by the 
field engineer with the aim of making optimum use of natural fall in 
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the rivers. 
Results of the field work were given to the Design and Estimates 
Group for their preliminary assessment. Promising sites were mapped 
by the Photogrammetry Section, unless they had previously been 
mapped. If the sites were considered too costly, or too small, they 
were eliminated from the study. 
The South Central Region survey of hydraulic resources covered 
an area of 500 000 km 2 , in a period of less than two years, and had 
to employ approximate or "short-cut" survey methods. Very little 
information was available prior to the survey; there were almost no 
suitable maps or geological information(501), and hydrological data 
was scanty(502). Therefore, some of the information presented in the 
inventories could not be regarded as accurate and, while the 
resulting site data made it possible to compare the relative merits 
of the sites, to arrive at a good preliminary estimate of the 
potential of the basins and a rough magnitude of the cost of the 
power, more studies were necessary in order to establish the optimum 
development schemes of the rivers, and to make accurate power and 
cost estimates. The upper and lower limits for including projects in 
the inventory were US$ 500/kw, with a minimum capacity of 10 MW 
continuous. Under circumstances differing from those which existed at 
the time of the study, some sites which were rejected at that time 
may prove more viable in the future. Nevertheless, the inventories 
provided a good overall picture of the magnitude of the hydraulic 
potentials of the river basins studied, the scale of costs and a fair 
method for the comparison of sites(503,504). 
A cost estimating procedure was established in keeping with the 
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available data. Cost curves were prepared to provide total generating 
station costs, including power house structures, turbines, 
generators, auxiliary electrical equipment, miscellaneous mechanical 
equipment, and step-up transformers. The estimates included all 
capital costs involved such as land acquired, rights of way, 
relocation of highways and railroads, access, direct cost of 
structures and equipment, contingencies, overhead or indirect costs 
and interest on money borrowed. The costs included the high-voltage 
side of the principal step-up transformers. 
Three types of project were considered; power and storage 
together, Power only, and storage only. Where power was involved the 
projects were considered both as "first-added" and "with upstream 
regulation". For the power and storage projects the cost was divided 
into a "power component" and a "storage component". The specified 
index capacity (55% capacity factor) was always stated at a reservoir 
head corresponding to mid-volume of live storage, and the 
installation then rated at maximum reservoir level. 
All the costs for the inventory estimates were in equivalent 
United States dollars. The cruzeiro portion was assumed to be 75% of 
the total cost, and was converted at the Purchasing Power Parity Rate 
(PPPR)* of US$1.00 = Cr$7.34 which is the rate used in the original 
conversion of cruzeiros to dollars in 1963. Conversions from 
cruzeiros to dollars, and vice versa, were made at the Purchasing 
Power Parity Rate of Exchange, based on US$ 1.00 = Cr$ 18.00 in 1937. 
The PPPR was constantly changing and, for many purposes, the 
* For a realistic rate of exchange to convert cruzeiros to dollars 
and vice versa the Purchasing Power Parity Rate of exchange was 
Used. This varies directly with Brazil's wholesale price index and 
inversely with that of the United States. 1937 was taken as the 
base year with an exchange rate of Cr$ 18 = US$ 1 (506). 
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inventory cost estimates had to be re-converted to dollar and 
cruzeiro portions, using the original 1937 PPPR, and then adjusted 
using the latest PPPR(505). 
Direct costs for each project included civil works (dams and 
spillways), land costs, storage outlet works, unit prices (using 
charts of what was considered to be representative unit cost for 
Brazilian construction), and generating equipment. In addition, 
contingency allowances were applied, generally 20% for underground 
work, 15% for other civil work and 10% for equipment. No allowances 
were made for provision of navigation facilities or for future 
expansion of generating facilities. The indirect costs considered 
were the cost of the camp and construction plant, including operation 
and maintenance, estimated at 13.5% of the total direct cost 
(excluding land), owner's administration and engineering costs, which 
varied between 20% and 45% of the total direct cost, depending upon 
the size of the project, the contractors' fees and administration 
costs, interest during the construction, computed at an annual rate 
of 10% on half of the total of the direct plus indirect cost for two 
years on a small plant extension, to six years on a 4.0 GW project, 
and, lastly, relocation costs for highways and railroads(507). It 
should be noted that no allowances were made for the costs of 
resettlement of peoples displaced by reservoirs, or for environmental 
protection. The sole aim of the CANAMBRA. studies was to identify 
hydraulic sites for power production alone. 
Surveys - Feasibility studies 
On completion of the inventory, those sites offering attractive 
prospects for inclusion in the development programme envisaged up to 
1980, were studied in greater detail, in order to define more fully 
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the engineering needs and to provide more reliable estimates of power 
capabilities and capital costs. These were called feasibility studies 
and comprised: 
- site maps at scales of 1:2000 or 1:5000, with 2 m or 5 m 
contours, 
- subsurface exploration by core borings, test pitting, auger 
boring and seismic profiles, 
- investigation and testing of quantity and quality of local 
construction materials 
- water surface profiles and soundings, and 
- regulated flows, design floods and tailwater curves as derived 
from hydrological studies(508). 
As in the case of the inventory studies, the primary 
consideration of a site was its economic viability. Estimates of 
capital costs included the direct and indirect costs together with 
contingencies and were based on the following assumptions: 
- international competition for contracts, 
- no imposition of import duties, 
- inflation of the cruzeiro in accordance with Index Number 2 of 
the Conjuntura Econômica of the Fundaço Getlio Vargas, 
- inflation of US dollars according to the indices of the US 
Bureau of Reclamation, 
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- interest rates during construction of 10% per annum, and 
- cruzeiro to dollar conversions, and vice versa, in accordance 
with the Purchasing Power Parity Rate of Exchange(509). 
According to the CANAMBRA definition, a feasibility study was: 
"A site study based on reliable topographic site maps, 
limited but reliable foundation and construction materials 
investigations and careful analysis of the best available 
hydrological data, for the purpose of establishing the 
technical feasibility of a project and of preparing 
reliable preliminary cost estimates. The feasibility study 
does not include determination of availability of a market 
and therefore does not confirm the economic feasibility of 
the project insofar as a market for the power is concerned, 
market studies being outside the scope of the study. The 
feasibility study ends at the low tension side of the 
step-up transformers"(510). 
A feasibility study of this type was intended to confirm the 
preliminary estimate of the cost of power from a selected project, 
and was to provide a basis for any future investigations, design and 
financial planning. It was designed to give information on which to 
base certain simplified assumptions: 
the cost of the firm power at a plant, capacity factor of 
45-50%, at lowest drawdown, as a first stage of development, 
the cost of providing, in the initial layout, for future 
additional capacity which will allow a plant capacity factor of 
the order of 40% when the upstream stages on the river are fully 
developed, and 
the cost of additional capacity in order to provide a plant 
capacity factor of 40%, to be installed in the future. 
The field investigations were to support the design and cost 
estimates for a selected scheme. They included: 
- 196 - 
- carriage of levels to the site, 
- 	 photogrammetric 	mapping using 	vertical aerial photographs, 
scale 	1:10 000, 	for 	the compilation 	of maps, 	to a 	scale 	of 
1:10 000, with a 10 m contour interval, 
- ground surveys, 
- river soundings and water surface profiles, 
- installation and observation of water level gauges, 
- core borings, auger borings and test pits, 
- seismic refraction traverses, 
- geological mapping, 
- collection and testing of construction materials, and 
- assessment of lands to be inundated. 
The feasibility studies were limited in that they did not ensure 
the economic feasibility of a project. They did not consider the load 
to be served, the system load factor, the cost of transmission, the 
function of the project in an integrated system, and the comparative 
cost to the power produced by other hydroelectric, thermal or nuclear 
powered stations. However, should any of the projects be built, the 
feasibility study information will provide a sound basis for further 
detailed work. CANAMBRA expanded and extended the studies to 
include: 
- foundation exploration and evaluation, 
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- location and testing of construction materials, 
- river soundings, 
- stage-discharge relation at tailrace, 
- establishment of optimum head and taliwater levels with 
respect to existing or future projects in cascade, 
- determination of the design flood, 
- reappraisal of land values, 
- installed capacity with respect to existing load and system 
conditions, 
- model studies of spillways and other hydraulic components, and 
- selection of civil structure types(511). 
The cost items included in the feasibility study estimates were 
the capital costs involved including purchase of land, rights of way, 
road and rail relocations, access, direct cost of structures and 
equipment, contingencies, overheads and interest on money spent 
during the operation. The estimates covered the system from 
generation through to the low voltage side of the main step-up 
transformers. For each scheme, two cost estimates were prepared, and 
occasionally a third one, if time allowed. 
The first estimate, considered to be the more representative, 
for each project feasibility study, was an estimate of the cost of 
providing the available power for run-of-river plants, at a capacity 
factor of 59%, at normal head. For plants with reservoir drawdown, a 
capacity factor of 65% was used at minimum head. Structural provision 
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was made for extension of the installation at a lower capacity 
factor, normally below 50% in the first case, and below 59% in the 
other. The second estimate was the cost of providing the available 
power at the lower capacity factor, and the difference between this 
and the first estimate gave the incremental cost incurred in the 
installation of the additional generating capacity. The third 
estimate was for the cost of installation, at a later date, of the 
additional generation capacity which had been provided for in the 
first estimate. 
The estimates consisted of two currency elements. All the 
services and equipment available in Brazil were costed in cruzeiros, 
whereas those which had to be obtained from overseas (assumed to be 
turbines, generators, electrical equipment accessories, part of the 
engineering cost and interest during construction) were estimated in 
US dollars. The latter generally amounted to 20% to 30% of the total 
project cost. The cost indices used for the feasibility study 
estimates were the same as for the inventory study estimates (see p. 
192 butall the estimates were adjusted to June 1965 figures, in which 
US$1.00= Cr$23.25. 
The items included for the direct and indirect costs of the 
feasibility studies were the same as for the inventory studies, but 
for the plant and camp (construction and operation) the allowance 
made in the first estimate was 5.5% of the total direct cost for 
construction with 3.75% of the total direct cost for operation and 
maintenance. These allowances were then increased by 15% for reasons 
of contingency. For the second estimate the operation and maintenance 
charges were increased in proportion to the extension of the 
construction period. The owner's administration costs were allowed at 
Mff S. 
2.75% to 12% of the total direct cost, according to project size, and 
owner's engineering allowances were from 1.75% to 8% of the total 
direct cost. In addition, a contingency allowance of 15% was added. 
The total interest during the construction and financing phase 
was paid at an annual rate of 10%. It was assumed that the interest 
would cease to be charged on units once they had been commissioned. 
As a result, calculation of interest would be on an increasing 
balance until the first unit was commissioned, and, thereafter, it 
would be calculated on a reducing balance. 
Methodology adopted by the Brazilian Power Planning Sector. 
Planning within, the Brazilian electrical power industry is 
currently undertaken according to guidelines set out by the Diretoria 
de Planejamento e Engenharia of ELETROBRAS, in "Metodologia para o 
Planejamento de Expanso do Sistema Elêtrica Brasileiro"(512). The 
objective of setting down these guidelines was to identify the 
development needs and the instruments and criteria for planning; to 
characterise the methodology for the planning of the expansion of the 
Brazilian electrical system; and, to identify the different stages in 
the planning process. 
The aim of the Brazilian electrical power industry was set down 
as: 
- to meet the electricity needs of the country, making the 
expansion of the power industry compatible with the market 
requirements, defined in terms of quantity and conditions of 
supply. 
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- to contribute to the development of Brazil by: 
participating in rationalization of the energy industry, 
promoting, wherever beneficial, the substitution of non-
renewable and/or imported sources by renewable and/or 
national energy sources, 
encouraging the more appropriate use of electrical energy, 
supporting the national equipment and service industries, 
and 
V. 	participating in multiple development programmes of energy 
resources(513). 
Expansion Problem 
Most of the hydraulic potential in the regions close to the load 
centres has been exploited. For further expansion of the generating 
capacity of the Brazilian electrical power industry, it has become 
necessary to look to more distant hydraulic sources or alternative 
sources. The principal alternatives, as outlined by ELETROBRAS, are 
the exploitation of the basins of the rivers Urugual, Iguaçu, 
Paranaiba, Jequitinhonha and So Francisco; the use of the rivers in 
the Amazon basin, which will require transmission of large blocks of 
energy over long distances; the construction of very small stations 
close to the load centres; the reduction of costs by multiple river 
use; use of existing coal reserves in the South; and use of nuclear 
power or non-conventional energy sources. 
It is important to note that ELETROBRAS considered the 
perspectives for medium and long term planning to be distinct. In the 
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medium term, the problem is centred on the choice between 
hydroelectric stations, situated in the river basins closest to the 
load centres, nuclear power stations and coal-fired stations, 
depending on availability of financial resources. In the longer term, 
however, the fundamental problem is one of the degree of 
technological development required, principally with respect to the 
transfer of energy from Amazonia and to the development of nuclear 
power.(Fig.5.I) 
The Planning Process 
Initially, planning within the Brazilian electrical 	power 
industry was guided by foreign consultants, e.g. CANAMBRA, but 
gradually, the principal concessionaires such as FURNAS (see p.154), 
formed planning teams which developed methodologies and criteria more 
appropriate to the Brazilian situation. 
The principal determinant in the proposed expansion of an 
electrical power system is the evolution of the energy demand. This 
requires a forecast of the long term energy requirements, but given 
the high degree of uncertainty inherent in such long term studies, 
which are dependent upon the analysis of the change in the broad 
macroeconomic and demographic factors, the forecast can only supply 
the most probable value for each year. The planning process is a 
continuous one, each plan, as it is developed, taking into account 
the future evolution of the system. However, the decisions taken 
according to one plan put constraints upon the elaboration of the 
next. Decisions for large generating plant must be given a lead time 
of about eight years, therefore, it is necessary to analyse the 
requirements which will have to be met over a period of some fifteen 
Figure 5.1 : 
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years in order to ensure that they are met on time. 
For transmission lines, the time between planning and operation 
is shorter, about three years. This implies that a sufficiently 
detailed analysis of the transmission network could be done over a 
five year period. However, decisions over a period of twenty to 
thirty years, are necessary to identify the potentials of, and 
complete developments in, river basins distant from the load cetres, 
development of the technology for long distance transmission of large 
power blocks, and advancement of new generation technologies. 
ELETROBRAS has recommended that the planning process consist of 
three principal stages, a long term analysis with a thirty year 
horizon, a medium term plan for the development of the first fifteen 
years and a five year plan covering the first five years. The long 
term plan would permit identification of the principal lines of 
development of the system and the fixing of the limits of the medium 
term expansion programme in terms of the generating capacity and the 
needs for development of technological and industrial processes. 
The medium term plan is seen as establishing the expansion 
programme of the electrical power industry and combining the results 
of the long term analysis with the current conditions. In the short 
term plan, adjustment is made to the expansion programme of the 
generating capacity, and a detailed programme of expansion to the 
transmission system is presented. 
Methodology and Planning Criteria 
Long term planning 
The initial 	analysis determines the composition of the 
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generating capacity at the end of the thirty year horizon, in order 
to ascertain the optimal economic participation of the various 
generation sources in eg2010 AD. The principal lines of necessary 
technological and industrial development are characterised, as a 
function of the minimum programmes of improvement of these sources, 
in order to establish the development of the system to 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2010 AD.(Plano 95 etc). 
The principal determinant of the expansion in the electrical 
power system is the growth of demand, and it is necessary to forecast 
the requirements of the market for any future period. Given the long 
term uncertainties, the forecast can only give a probable value for 
each year. In Brazil, detailed forecasts have to be made at the 
regional level in view of the wide geographical dispersion of the 
load centres. 
Long term forecasting of the Brazilian power market uses a 
single reference based on the likely increase of the economy and 
population. The role of energy of hydraulic origin will continue to 
be the most important for studies made. The information available on 
hydraulic sources can be divided into three categories; inventoried, 
non-inventoried, and existing small stations which can be expanded. 
Using information from river basin assessment, all projects with an 
energy cost index, excluding transmission, of less than 80 mills/kWh 
(double the actual reference cost), are considered. For the non-
inventoried river basins and small scale stations, preferably ones 
close to the load centres, in the absence of more precise 
information, the following classes of energy cost index have been 
defined 
- 205 - 
I. up to 20 mills/kWh, the basin is considered for immediate 
development, 
20-40 mills/kWh, considered for the future expansion 
programme, and 
40-80 mills/kWh, considered as an energy resource. 
(1979 figures) 
The other sources of electrical power in Brazil are coal and 
nuclear fuel. For coal fired power stations, (recommended by 
ELETROBRAS to be considered throughout the periods of study), the 
locations for installation of stations have to be identified. The 
potential generating capacity of the coal reserves is then estimated, 
and the corresponding cost indices calculated. At the time of the 
report (1979), it was considered that nuclear energy would become the 
second major Brazilian energy source. The main information necessary 
for long term nuclear energy planning is a knowledge of the possible 
locations for installation of the nuclear power stations, their 
economic size, the estimate of potential of the Brazilian uranium 
reserves, and the energy cost index. Of fundamental importance to 
this analysis are the prospects for the use of new technologies, in 
particular fast-breeder and thorium reactors. 
In a thirty year analysis it is necessary to consider the 
commercial development of new sources of energy for electricity. Not 
only must technological advances be made in electricity generation, 
but also in transmission, if the large energy potential of the Amazon 
basin .is to be tapped. Possible transfer of large blocks of energy 
from the Amazon to the load centres in the South East has an 
important role to play in delineating the degree of competition 
between the various sources of energy. It is necessary, therefore, 
- 206 - 
to estimate the unit investment costs for each possible transmission 
system. 
The basic cost elements for the various energy sources vary 
widely, e.g. capital costs for hydroelectric power stations are much 
higher than for conventional thermal stations, but the operation 
costs are much lower. However, over a thirty year period, it is 
likely that the relationship between these various cost elements will 
change, with a consequent change in the economic viability of the 
different energy sources. It is necessary to allow for this within 
long term plans, and corrections must be made to the long term cost 
indices. 
Medium term planning 
The medium term analysis is used to establish the programme of 
works for the period 1980-1995, and to identify principal 
restrictions to its implementation, and wherever possible,the 
alternative solutions. This study requires a more detailed probable 
forecast of the peak energy requirements,throughout the period, by 
region, and by enterprise. Owing to possible variations in the 
behaviour of the market, and in order to permit an analysis of its 
effects on the programme of works, high and low forecasts for the 
regional and overall requirements have to be made until 1990. 
The long term analysis indicates the general 	lines of 
development in the electrical system, and establishes the generation 
projects and principal transmission trunks to be considered in the 
medium term. The medium term plans are considered in greater detail 
to increase the degree of precision of the information on costs, 
physical characteristics and construction periods. 
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Theoperating costs of the system are strongly influenced by the 
consumption of fuel by the thermal power stations. Therefore, the 
costs of the fuel to be used, be it oil, coal or nuclear, must be 
estimated. The programme of works is then determined by the direct 
comparison of the alternatives. 
Initially, a minimum cost scheme is devised, and, gradually, 
alterations are made in view of the long term planning directives. 
The estimate for each programme is made in three stages: 
determination of the conditions required to meet the energy 
balance, 
detailed analysis of transmission, and 
economic and financial analysis. 
As well as studying the market requirements and the work needed 
to satisfy them, ELETROBRAS recognises that all planning depends on 
the existing conditions at the time of execution of works, with 
respect to financing, relationships between companies, general lines 
of future operation of the system, and legislation on matters 
concerning the electrical power industry. 
Short Term Planning 
All the decisions or possible courses of action to be taken in 
the short term are derived from the long and medium term studies. 
These have to be made along lines which make it possible for 
hypotheses to be transformed into decisions. Although the locations 
of power stations and other data are well known in the initial years 
of the planning period, and the number of possible strategies are 
limited, it is only in the short term that it becomes possible to 
complete sufficiently precise and detailed studies for each 
hypothesis. 
Plan of Action 
This is the resultant programme derived from the long, medium 
and short term analyses. It consists of: 
definition of the works which must begin in the period 
defined, e.g. 1979-80, 
definition of the projects which must be studied in detail 
at that time for execution in the medium and long term, 
outlining the alternative methods for choosing the various 
hypotheses for market forecasts and scheduling of works, 
definition of the programmes of technical -industrial 
expansion to be initiated in the defined period, e.g. 197940, 
suggestions for finance of the execution of the short and 
medium term programmes of works, 
suggestion for legislative changes in the electrical power 
industry, and 
definition of studies necessary for the improvement of the 
long, medium and short term analyses(514). 
Resources available, their effect on planning 
The provision of electricity for consumption within Brazil has 
been affected as much by the availability of natural resources as by 
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other determining factors of a political, economic and institutional 
nature(515). Assuming adequate financial resources, the decision 
making authorities have given preference to the different initiatives 
of the electrical power industry according to their origin (national 
or foreign, private or State, Federal or State). Other options have 
been between concentration or decentralisation of generation 
installations in local or regional systems. However, the market 
prospects, in terms of their size, geographic concentration, and 
dynamism remain the fundamental aspect of planning. 
Conversion of suitable forms of energy into electricity has to 
guarantee continuous supply, with stable costs. The useful life of an 
installation will be largely determined by whether or not the choice 
of site has been economically sensible, especially as generation and 
transmission systems cannot easily be converted to uses other than 
those for which they were originally planned. As a result, a forecast 
of future operating conditions should not lessen the useful life 
initially forecast, as a result of economic and technological 
obsolescence. Preference should be given to renewable sources of 
energy in order to avoid situations such as arose during the world 
oil crisis in 1973, when the cost of fuel for the oil-fired power 
stations rose drastically. 
For forcasting purposes, the useful life of an electrical power 
industry installation is normally taken as 20 to 50 years, and it is 
necessary, therefore, to have a compatible time scale when planning 
such installations, coupled with good knowledge of the primary 
sources of energy available, and their compatibility in economic 
terms. In Brazil, such knowledge is often limited. In the case of 
hydraulic resources, the available hydrological records for the North 
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East, South East and Southern Regions generally cover about 40 years, 
but in the Northern Region they cover considerably less and are often 
non-existent. Despite ELETROBRAS's complacency over the 40 year 
records, the hydrological data networks in most areas are far from 
comprehensive,although a great expansion did occur in the 1960s(516). 
However, ELETROBRAS uses the hydrological series available, in a 
general way, in order to estimate the available hydraulic potential, 
in addition to the hydrological characteristics upon which the design 
of the principal dam structures, such as spillways and escape 
channels, depend. In practice these estimates are based as much upon 
simulated situations, corresponding to those recorded, as upon 
situations which are statistically inferred from the recorded series. 
A major difficulty is to ensure the uniformity of the criteria 
for project estimation, and the compatibility of precision of the 
basic data. Such data must cover natural flows, conditions of supply 
and cost of primary materials, equipment delivery times, 
technological specifications, direct and indirect construction costs, 
cost of the land to be inundated behind the dam, and facilities for 
access to the construction site. Standard criteria were established 
in 1963(517), in the same year as the initiation of surveys in the 
South East Region under the supervision of the Comitë de Estudos 
Energéticos, which had been created for this purpose by the 
Ministério das Minas e Energia, along with representatives of other 
Ministeries. 
In Brazil, the vast hydroelectric potential is the most 
important aspect of any planning for the expansion of the electricity 
supply industry. Through predominance and convenience, 
hydroelectricity is well established as the primary source of 
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electrical power. However, the many hydroelectric power stations, are 
complemented by the various alternative, forms of thermal generation. 
Any planning of generation systems must, take into account not only 
the characteristics of the different generating units, but also the 
characteristics of the associated transmission systems. Long 
distance high voltage power transmission is now a feature of the 
Brazilian electricity supply. 
Of the alternative sources of electrical energy available, steam 
coal from Rio Grande do Sul is important because of its relatively 
low cost and the abundance of reserves. However, in the state of 
Santa Catarina the coal is preferred for use in the steel and carbon 
industries. In Brazil, coal tends to be used by the electrical power 
industry for the purpose of "thermal complementation", in which, 
beyond a minimum consumption,its use varies as a function of the 
hydrological season. 
The planning of the expansion of coal-fired power stations has 
to consider, simultaneously, the requirements of the electricity 
supply industry, and those of the coal sector in order to maintain an 
economic rhythm of use, as well as those of the steel industry which 
has to rely on a national coal supply for part of its requirements. 
The prospecting for coal is the concern of CPRM, together with some 
companies and state organs concerned with mineral research. Coal 
resource exploitation comes under the jurisdiction of the Conselho 
Nacional de Petrôleo (CNP) and the Sindicato Nacional da Indistria de 
Extraço do Carvo (SNIEC), which includes representatives of the 
private mining companies(518). However, except in the southern 
regions of Brazil, the quality and quantity of coal for use in power 
stations is so low that its use is not considered, in the overall 
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energy planning perspective, in the same way as hydraulic and nuclear 
resources. 
Economic References Used for Planning 
In June 1979, DEME 	produced the details of the economic 
parameters to be adopted by the Brazilian electrical power industry, 
particularly for the Plano 95, in order to guarantee the 
compatibility of the different regional plans being produced. For 
economic planning purposes the currencies used are the cruzeiro or 
the dollar, using the 30 June 1979 exchange rate of Cr$25.60 = 
Us$1. 00. 
In summary, the parameters outlined by DEME are: 
notes upon the Brazilian energy policy, based upon official 
documents and government studies, 
the historical evolution and perspectives of the macro-
economic totals, such as the GNP for Brazil, by region and by 
section of the population, 
the population increase; both urban and rural, including 
the growth of number of dwellings, 
the probable growth of the electrical energy market; this is 
outlined by class of consumer and by concessionaires; also 
included are the high market projections, as a function of an 
accelerated development of the economy an, alternatively, the 
substitution of petroleum derivatives by electricity, 
v. the rate of social exchange, in terms of purchasing power 
parity, observing the real cost of obtaining foreign exchange 
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credits for Brazil, 
the discount rate, in terms of the marginal efficiency of 
capital in the economy, keeping in sight the investment 
alternatives, 
the availability of petroleum, and forecasts of future 
costs, and their response to national and international events, 
the availability of uranium, and future costs for 
electricity generation, with respect to the tendencies of the 
costs of the mineral and fuel cycle to rise, and 
the availability of steam coal, and forecasts of future 
costs with respect to all its uses within the Brazilian 
economy(5.19). 
Many of the economic indicators used are calculated by DEME 
itself, and they differ from the projections published by the 
Fundaco •Getulio Vargas. Nevertheless, the Brazilian electrical 
power industry bases its estimates upon the DEME figures(520). 
Market Projections 
Three market projections are used by the Brazilian electrical 
power industry. These are the Mercado Provâvel (Probable Market), the 
Mercado de Programaço (Programmed Market), and the Mercado Alto 
(High Market). The forecasts for the future electricity markets are 
based on premises which have to be compatible with governmental goals 
and policies for overall, and sectoral, economic expansion. The 
premises adopted for the quantification of the Mercado Provâvel lead 
to average consumption levels, where the probability of these levels 
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being exceeded is of the order of 50%. However, if expansion of the 
electrical system is only programmed to satisfy the Mercado Provâvel, 
the risk of deficit to the system is also about 50%. 
In practice, an estimated security margin is adopted, and the 
final value used to programme the expansion of the demand is the 
Mercado de Programaço, which is the sum of the Mercado Provâvel and 
the security margin. The upper limit of the Mercado de Programmaço 
has been defined to correspond to the Mercado Alto, which would be 
reached in the event an accelerated expansion in the Brazilian 
economy, or from an extended substitution of petroleum derivatives by 
electricity. 
As the mobilization of the resources necessary for large scale 
petroleum substitution would have a negative effect upon the 
Brazilian economy, the hypothesis of high economic expansion 
occurring simultaneously with effective substitution is not 
considered. Therefore, the probability of the Mercado Alto being 
exceeded is considered to be very small. The Mercado de Programmaçao 
estimates, therefore, lie between those of the Mercado Provãvel and 
the Mercado Alto. 
Social Exchange Rate 
For planning purposes it is necessary to be able-to convert, to 
national currency, those costs defined in foreign currency, and vice 
versa. In any analysis of technico-economic alternatives comparisons 
of international prices are absolutely necessary. 
The alternative projects selected usually involve foreign 
currency exchange of some sort (capital loans, equipment purchase). 
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In order to assess its effect upon the national 	economy 
independently, of the fluctuations in the officia.1 exchange rate, a 
"social exchange rate" is used. The social exchange rate used in 
Brazil has been calculated according to two different theoretical 
bases, which both yielded similar values. The first is based upon 
the purchasing power parity (as used by CANAMBRA, see p.193) where 
the relative variation of the exchange rate between two currencies is 
said to be proportional to their purchasing powers in the respective 
countries. The other theory directly considered the balance of 
payments through the traditional model of partial equilibrium of the 
foreign exchange market. 
Discount rate 
Whichever concept is adopted for determination of this rate: the 
Keynesian argument derived from the theory of investment, and founded 
upon the concept of the marginal efficiency of the capital being 
equal to the rate of interest in a capital market in equilibrium; or 
the concept that this rate derives the social value of investment, 
involving considerations with respect to the redistribution of the 
income in favour of future generations; the concept of the discount 
rate is clearly different from that of the rate of interest. 
The discount rate adopted by DEME comprises, in essence, an 
element of the economic policy which directs the planning towards 
more capital intensive alternatives which have lower operating costs 
when the discount rates are low, and vice versa. Higher discount 
rates can lead to immediate policies which more strongly emphasise 
costs and benefits nearer in time, while lower values, according to 
DEME, no longer tend to reflect the scarcity of resources in the 
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economy. For the calculation of the marginal capital efficiency, the 
following parameters were considered: gross fixed capital formation, 
depreciation, liquid fixed capital, land values, nationally funded 
capital and return on capital. In the historical period considered, 
the discount rate was calculated using the concept that the marginal 
efficiency of the capital was 6.3% per year. Examination of the real 
value of the minimum market interest rates would lead to values of 
the same order of magnitude. 
Due to the lack of capital resources for public investments and, 
as a result of the structural changes occurring within the country's 
economy, which required the rapid expansion of the investments to 
higher levels, than those at the start of the 1970s, the rate used, of 
7% per year., was slightly higher(521). 
In addition to the economic references published by DEME, 
ELETROBRAS also publishes the "Orcamento Plurianual do Setor de 
Energia Elétrica" (Multiannual Budget) This summarises the 
information needed to estimate the the resources available for 
investment in the electrical energy programmes, which are forecast 
for a five year period and updated annually.. This economic and 
financial planning instrument aids the standardization of the 
reference data for the entire electrical power industry and, in 
particular, creates a standard data base, thus leading to a more 
refined system for selection of projects(522). 
It should be reiterated, that, until the Brazilian electric 
power industry became integrated, such reference data did not exist, 
but they are now facilitating the more complete integration of the 
industry. 
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Criteria of Supply 
In Brazil, the level of electricity supply available in any 
period is not constant. It depends on the randomness of the natural 
flows of the rivers supplying the hydroelectric power stations, and 
the occasional non-availability of conventional thermal and nuclear 
power stations. In formulating an expansion programme, it is 
necessary to compromise between the risk of not meeting requirements 
and the limits of the resources available. Due to the complex 
interrelationship of the electrical power industry with the rest of 
the Brazilian economy, it is impossible to know, a priori, the level 
at which this compromise must be made. 
Traditionally, planning of system expansion has focussed on 
meeting a pre-fixed criterion of supply. The Brazilian generating 
system is predominantly hydroelectric, and all emphasis has been 
given to the seasonal availability of water. The Brazilian criterion 
used for hydroelectric power planning is, " . . . the system must be 
capable of meeting the market requirements, for any hypothesis based 
upon the repetitions of the historic hydrological series 
recorded"(523). To date, thermal stations have been considered in a 
simplified form, with average factors of availability, but the 
analysis used is now being refined. This is to take into account 
thermo-nuclear stations, which have been found to have high breakdown 
rates and long periods of non-availability. 
The comparison between the availability of energy and the peak 
demand on the system, according to the market demands for each period 
within the horizon of study, is usually called the balanco 
energético"(energy balance). This indicates the availability of 
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energy and peak power for each possible configuration of the system 
taken separately. Such an analysis can be made using relatively 
simple mathematical relationships, or by using a computational 
process which simulates the behaviour of the energy configuration for 
each hydrologic sequence which has been recorded or postulated. 
For an hydraulic energy system, the firm energy of a particular 
configuration is defined as the greatest load possible which can be 
supplied, without interruption, in the case of a repetition of the 
worst recorded hydrological sequence. The critical period is defined 
as the time interval between the instant when the reservoirs are 
completely full, and the instant when they reach their minimum level, 
without a total intermediary refill. The guaranteed peak power 
capacity is the total which the system is capable of generating, and 
the minimum, value of the total available capacity of the system 
corresponds to the availability in the last month of the critical 
period, when all the reservoirs are empty. In a more precise study, 
a "balanco dinmico" (dynamic balance) is prepared, in which the 
energy balance at any instanted is computed directly by means of 
computer simulation models. 
The adopted supply criteria show a number of limitations. 
Deficits will occur in a situation of worse critical hydrological 
conditions than previously recorded. But, the probability of the 
repetition of the worst hydrological period is so small that, if this 
criterion were adopted for planning, it would result in excessive 
investment in the electric power industry. As a result ELETROBRAS has 
developed a planning methodology based on the case of probabilistic 
criteria as a substitute for the actual criteria previously used. 
Studies for the reformulation of the present criteria are in 
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progress, but are being set back by the increased computational 
effort required for analyses of this type. 
The Generation Models 
In the first stage of establishing the model, the sequence of 
entry into operation of the hydroelectric power stations is 
determined so as to guarantee the desired level of supply. The size 
of the power stations, and the time taken for the market to absorb 
their outputs totally, is not considered at this stage. They are 
regarded as being small relative to the total capacity of the system. 
The optimum level for the output of the thermal power stations is 
fixed by empirical criteria. 
Two simulation models are used for this phase: 
The Modelo de Ordenaco de Usinas Hidro e Termoelétricas, 
determines the sequence for stations to be constructed. This 
model orders the power stations considered in the expansion 
alternatives, using cost/benefit indices wi th respect to the 
energy configuration existing at the time of proposed entry of 
the power station into the system. 
The Modelo de Ava1iaco de Sistemas Hidrotérmicas (MASH), 
determines a simplified energy balance, which allows an initial 
adjustment of the dates of entry into operation of the planned 
stations. It adjusts, with time, the construction sequence for 
given stations, in order to meet the demand forecast for energy 
and peak power. Using approximate relationships this model 
automatically calculates the energy availability and peak power 
demand. Its flexibility allows a large number of alternative 
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initial operation schedules to be estimated, in energy terms. 
In the second stage, each alternative is simulated using models 
in which, for a particular energy balance, the market requirements 
will be matched to the availability of energy and peak power in the 
system. The principal models used are: 
I. 	The Modelo de Simulacào a Sistema Equivalente (MSSE), based on 
the representation of the total hydraulic system by a single 
equivalent station. It is used to determine the firm energy. 
The Modelo de Simulaco a Subsistemas Equivalentes (MSSSE), is 
an 	extension 	of 	MSSE 	in 	that 	it 	various 	equivalent 
interconnected systems and permits dynamic simulations. 
The Model 	de Simulaço a Usinas Individualizadas (MSUI) 
considers the operation of the system through a detailed 
representation of the generating system. 
The Modelo Linear de Intercãmbio entre Subsistemas (MISS) is a 
development ofMSUI able to incorporate the restrictions of 
energy flow between regions. 
There are also seven auxiliary models for the calculation of the 
reliability of the system, the determination of the policy for 
thermal station operation, and control curves for reservoirs levels. 
Two models are used in the financial stage of planning: 
i. 	The Modelo Econömico de Cálculo de Alternativa (MECA) determines 
the annual disbursements for the updated expansion programme, in 
addition to the average costs for energy and peak power, and 
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ii. The Modelo de Anâlise Financeira (MAFI) analyses the development 
of the financial situation of the energy sector for a 
predetermined expansion programme, and determines the average 
tariff. 
The methodology used is continually revised, and this has led to 
the need for the development of analytical processes for long term 
energy strategies(524,525). 
Despite the use of these computerised planning models for the 
best use of resources it must not be forgotten that the objective of 
ELETROBRAS and the Brazilian electrical power industry is to meet all 
the electrical needs of the country. One of its duties is to ensure 
compatibility between the expansion of the electrical sector and 
consumer demand and, at the same time, to direct this expansion in a 
manner which will contribute to the country's overall economic 
development. In practice the responsibilities of ELETROBRAS include: 
participation in the rationalization of the power sector, 
promotion of the advantageous substitution of non-renewable 
and/or international energy resources by renewable and/or 
national ones, 
encouragement of the more appropriate and economic use. of 
electricity, 
support of national industry for equipment and services, and 
support of programmes for the multiple use of water. 
This last duty is often in conflict with what, hitherto, has 
been been observed in practice. 	 To date, most hydraulic 
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developments in Brazil have been for power, and other uses have 
developed only latterly. In the case of the rio Paralba, which flows 
through a highly populated and industrial area, it has become 
necessary, in recent years to co-ordinate the multiple use of its 
water(526). More generally in the South East, rivers have been used 
for drinking and industrial water supplies and effluent disposal. 
Most of the operational models, as used in Brazil, are for 
analysing the use of water resources for power, despite the fact that 
the thermal power stations may offer considerable flexibility to the 
choice of operation policy. Except in the Amazon region, where they 
are used to supply isolated systems, thermal stations have up to now 
been seen as providing a power supplement to the hydraulic system in 
dry periods and times of major electricity demand. Their 
participation is relatively small, accounting for some 19% of the 
actual system output, but they are responsible for a major part of 
the operational cost of generation(527). This represents a relatively 
high cost for ensuring reliability of supply. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Hydroelectric Power Development in the Amazon Basin 
"The largest of the remaining natural areas left on this 
planet to succumb to man's insatiable hunger for power and 
domination, or to civilization's alleged material needs, is 
the vast Amazon region with its great yet extremely fragile 
equatorial rain forest ecosystem..."(528). 
Ever since its discovery, the Amazon region, or Amazonia, has 
caught the imagination of man. The area of Amazonia Legal* is 
5 057 490 km 2 9  59% of the area of Brazil. The river Amazon, from 
which the region takes its name, rises as a stream at an altitude of 
over 5 000 m in the Peruvian Andes, only 192 km east of the Pacific 
Ocean. Its exact length is disputed, but it is about the same length 
as the River Nile (6 500 km), which makes them the two longest rivers 
in the world. Its total watershed area is 7x10 6 km2 , of which 
4.7x10 2 km  are in Brazil. It has over 1 100 tributaries, 17 of which 
are greater than 1 600 km long. The region contains parts of six 
Brazilian states, and three territories. The estimated population in 
1970 was 7.5x10 6 , which gives an average population density of 
1.5 km 2 . The two major cities in the region are Belém, at the mouth 
of the river, and the free port of Manaus, sited just upstream of the 
confluence of the rio Negro and the rio Solimöes. It is at this point 
that the river takes the name Amazon. 
The mouth of the river is 320 km wide, and even 1 600 km 
upstream it attains a width of 11 km in places. It is navigable by 
ocean going liners to Manaus, 3 680 kin upstream of the mouth; and, 
* ATezonia 1_eqal includes the states of ATazonas, Acre, Para and 
tvto Grosso, the northern half of Colas and the t erritories of 
Rondonia, Rorairi-a and Irrapa. 
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including the tributaries, the length of navigable waterways in the 
Amazon Basin is greater than 80 000 km. From the base of the Andes, 
most of the river flows through land which is almost flat, the 
overall gradient is 2 cmkm, and, if considered from the base of the 
Andes,thisfalls to 0.4 cm km (529). 
The Amazon river is thought to have been first discovered by the 
Europeans at the end of the fifteenth century, and was first 
navigated, accidentally, in 1542. The indigenous inhabitants are the 
Amerindians, encompassing 100+ tribal groups, and 10+ different 
language types(530). From 1570, small settlements and Jesuit missions 
were established along the Amazon. The small agricultural clearings 
they made were worked by tamed " or enslaved Amerindians, however, 
many of the Indians died as a result of maltreatment, or exposure to 
European diseases; others chose to retreat further into the forest. 
The first ascent of the river was made from Belém, in 1685, by the 
Jesuit priest, Samuel Fritz. He mapped the region carefully and, 
until recently, his work had been the basis of all maps of the area. 
As the region is so large, study of it has tended to concentrate in a 
few small areas of specific interest or accessibility. 
The first scientific exploration of the Amazon began in 1736, 
with the measurement of the arc of meridian for the French Academy of 
Sciences, by Charles Marie de la Condamine. Two Brazilian 
naturalists, Lacerda de Almeida and Rodrigues Ferreira, visited 
Amazonia between 1781 and 1792, and their accounts whetted 
international scientific curiosity. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the Bavarian biologists, K.F.P.von Martius and 
J.B.von Spix, made extensive studies, and published the monumental 
flora "Flora Brasiliensis"(531). Such studies encouraged other 
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naturalists, 	including 	Henry 	Walter 	Bates, 	who studied the 
entomology (532), and Robert Spruce, who studied the botany(533). The 
visits to Amazonia by Alfred Russell Wallace stimulated him into 
formulating the theory of evolution by natural selection, which he 
and Charles Darwin published in 1858(534). 
It was not until the advent of steamships, and the resulting 
ease of communications, that Amazonia began to undergo integration 
with the rest of Brazil. Late in the nineteenth century, Amazonia 
rose to worldwide importance as a result of the commercialization of 
rubber. The rubber tree is native to Amazonia, and had originally 
been tapped by the Amerindians for its latex. With the development of 
the vulcanization process, which improved the properties of the 
rubber, the rubber boom began. There was no planting of additional 
trees, increased production depended on increased exploitation of the 
natural forest by the introduction of more labourers. Brazilians 
seeking work flocked to the region, many from the drought ridden, 
poverty stricken North East. This was the first time, but was not the 
last that the North Easterners have turned to Amazonia for refuge 
(see p.231). The rubber boom lasted from the 1870s until to the 
outbreak of World War I. but the successful introduction of rubber 
seeds in the Orient, and the subsequent establishment of plantations 
there signalled the end of the Amazonian rubber trade. 
Amazonia fell into a decline for half a century until the 
construction of the Belém-Brasilia Highway, in the 1950s. Up to that 
time, access to the region was restricted almost entirely to that by 
boat, and when, in 1942, the country's coastal merchant marine 
services were paralysed because of World War II, the region was cut 
off from the rest of Brazil for two years. 
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The first serious steps to develop modern Amazonia were taken, 
in 1953, with the creation of the Superitendencia para a Va'1orizaço 
Econ6mica da Amazonia (SPVEA, Superintendency for the Economic 
Evaluation of Amazonia), by President Getulio Vargas. Finance for 
this organisation came from 3% of the total tax revenues of Brazil 
used to fund its operation. However, the new organization ran 
into difficulties, the finances never materi -alised, and its first 
five year plan did not receive the approval of the Congresso 
Nacional. The SPVEA never established authority over the states and 
municipalities in the region, and its only achievement was the 
commencement of the construction of the Belêm-BrasIlia Highway. 
When Castello Branco became President, in 1964, he brought with 
him several years of Amazonian experience, and when, he was informed 
that SPVEA would, have to be completely overhauled, if it were to 
prove effective in the development of the region, he replaced it, 
in 1966, by the Superitendencia de Desenvolvimento da Amazonia 
(SUDAM, Superintendency for the Development of the Amazon). SUDAM was 
to be the main arbiter over the placing of all the new Federal funds 
for the region. The existing government rubber bank, the Banco de 
Credito da Amazonia, was simultaneously transformed into SUDAM's 
financial agent, and renamed the Banco da Amazonia S.A. (BASA). 
Generous fiscal incentives were introduced in order to encourage 
Brazilian investment in the region, e.g. under law no.5174, 
registered companies could enjoy a 50% reduction in tax liabilities 
if the money saved as a result was invested in approved SUDAM 
projects in agriculture, cattle breeding or basic industrial 
development. 
The Superitendencia da Zona Franca de Manaus 	(SUFRAMA, 
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Superintendency for the Duty-Free Port of Manaus), was created at the 
same time as SUDAM, and legislation allowed goods to be imported into 
Manaus from anywhere in the world, without the payment of import 
duty. Between 1967 and 1970, the importation of goods through the 
zone doubled. The new free trade zone of Manaus was intended to 
persuade international firms to establish small factories 
there( 53 5). 
Principles for agrarian policy for Amazonia were first laid 
down, in 1970, in the Programa de Integraço Nacional (PIN, Programme 
of National Integration). At the same time, the Instituto Nacional 
de Colonizacâo e Reforma Agraria (INCRA, National Institute for 
Colonization and Land Reform) was created. INCRA decreed, in 1971, 
that the lands lying along a 100 km belt on each side of the roads in 
Amazonia were indispensible for national development, and it drew up 
plans for their colonization. The whole scheme was an unmitigated 
failure(536). 
The construction of roads in the region has, probably, had the 
greatest impact. Not only have they opened up much previously 
inaccessible land, but also done immeasurable environmental 
damage(537). Essentially, any development programme in the region is 
hampered., not only by the general inaccessibility, but by land 
speculation by wealthy land owners, poor legislation over land 
titles, infertile soils and corruption. Those who come to the region 
poor, stay poor; those who come rich, get richer; those who were 
already there get driven off the land. As a result of such presence 
the environment of the region is suffering major and irreversible 
damage. 
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The Amerindians 
Possibly the most emotive subject, when discussing Amazonia, is 
that of the indigenous peoples, the Amerindians. There is no 
accurate estimate of their numbers, figures range from 50 000 (538) 
to 180 000 (539). However, there is little doubt that, in common 
with other aboriginal groups, their numbers have been drastically 
reduced. Before the European invasion of the 1500s, it is thought 
that there were over a million people living in the Amazon area. 
This was estimated to have dropped to half-a-million by 1940 and to 
100 000 by 1957 - all as a result of persecution and European 
diseases such as measles and the common cold (540). It is now 
reported that the Amerindian population is on the increase, possibly 
due to improved medical care and facilities, or possibly due to the 
desire to prove that Federal Government measures for protection of 
the Amerindians are working. 
All activities with respect to the Amerindians have been fraught 
by Iac3cof financial support and corruption. The government agency for 
administration of Indian policy is the Fundaco Nacional do Indio 
(FUNAI), and any beneficial effects which it may have had, have been 
due to the dedication of its staff, rather than to support by the 
government. The Brazilian constitution provides that land inhabited 
by the indigenous Amerindians is to remain perpetually in their 
possession, but there are several specific cases when authorization 
by the President of the Republic for relocation of Indian communities 
can be made 
- to end fighting between tribal groups, 
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- to combat serious epidemics threatening the survival of a 
native community, 
- to maintain national security, 
- to undertake public works of interest to national development, 
- to repress widespread disorder, and 
- to work valuable subsoil deposits of outstanding interest for 
national security and development. 
Legislation provided for Indian lands to be identified and 
demarcated by 31st December 1978, but due to budgetary and manpower 
constraints, coupled with the difficulty of locating uncontacted 
communities (without disrupting them) an1 identifying their area of 
habitation this has not been done(541).(See Fig 6.1) 
At present there are four government parks for the Indians, the 
Araguaia, Xingu, Aripuana, and Tumacumaque, covering 3.7xlO6ha and a 
further two are proposed. In addition, there are seventeen 
reservations scattered through Amazonia, and another seven are 
proposed (542). However, the clauses in the legislation allowing for 
relocation of the Indians makes their situation far from secure. 
One of the principal threats to the existence of the Amerindians 
has been the Brazilian Government's efforts to open up Amazonia by 
means of highways. Not only do the highways cut through many of 
their reserves, bisecting traditional hunting grounds, but the 
dangers of contact and conflict with the construction teams are 
great. On construction of the Northern Perimetal Highway, diseases 
carried by the highway workers resulted in the decimation of Yanomamo 
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villages, and the Indians were subsequently witnessed in a state of 
misery, sickness and shock(543). 
The highway development programme began in the 1970s as a result 
of an impromptu promise made by President Medici, in 1970, when he 
was on a visit to the North East, at that time in the grip of one of 
its worst ever droughts. Without thought or understanding, he 
promised to open up the untold riches of Amazonia to poverty stricken 
North Easterners. Each family was to receive 100 ha of land, and it 
was proposed to build new, low-cost housing along the highways(544). 
The intention was to settle half-a-million peasants along the 
Transamazonica Highway by 1980. By mid-1978, only 8 000 families had 
been settled. However, this was of no consolation to the 
Amerindians. 
Although many Brazilians claim to feel a great sympathy for the 
Amerindians, the settlers do not. It is a fight for survival on all 
sides. Many take the nineteenth century North America prairie view: 
"the only good Indian is a dead Indian", and it has been reported 
that, in many instances, FUNAI has all but given up protecting 
them(545). Land tenure in the Amazon is complex and, usually 
corrupt. Many of the small scale settlers have no title to the land 
they occupy, others have acquired title in good faith, only to find 
the land occupied by Indians, with the resulting conflict between two 
poor and under-privileged groups. 
FUNAI teams have accompanied construction crews during the 
building of the Transamazonica and other highways, in order to 
attempt to locate Indian communities, in advance of construction, and 
to resettle them on equivalent land in a peaceful way(546). This has, 
- 232 - 
in fact, resulted in armed hostility from the Indians in some cases. 
Although the official line is. "contact. but no conflict", violence 
does occur, and at least one survey party has been killed by 
mdi ans(547). 
In spite of the Indians non-damaging relationship with the 
complex eco-system of the forest and their extensive knowledge of how 
to survive successfully within it, without damaging the valuable 
biological treasures it contains, the Indians are frequently being 
relocated from their traditional hunting grounds. Although the 
Amazon is covered by tropical rain forests, it is known that many 
tropical organisms are confined to particular narrow areas. The 
Amazon could be described as .consisting of thousands of micro-
re.gions, each ecologically distinct in terms of flora, fauna and 
soils. 	An Amerindian tribe, understands its traditional haunts 
intimately, thus relocating 	in a different region with a 
different biota, a different climate and different diseases is often 
disastrous(548). The depths to which some tribes have sunk is well 
described in the report of an expedition/visited the tribes of the 
Amazon basin in 1972 (549). Such ecolgical factors may be as 
detrimental, to the Indians as is their conflict for land with the 
small scale settlers(550), 	although possibly there is a greater 
threat from the large scale colOnizers. 	The problem of the 
Amerindians and their integration into modern society is a difficult 
one, and admirably expressed by one of the correspondents of the 
Financial Times, Hugh O'Shaughnessy, 
"The 	indigenous 	peoples 	have 	a 	knowledge 	of 	and 
relationship with nature from which we ourselves in modern 
Western societies could learn. Their disappearance would be 
OUR loss. At the same time I am also opposed to those who 
might be called extreme conservationists, anxious to 
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maintain such tribal peoples in their pristine state like 
so many flies in amber. I feel it is unrealistic and indeed 
unfair to the people concerned to attempt to do this. For 
good or ill they and we live on the same planet where 
communications and contact among peoples are constantly 
increasing. And while they should be protected against any 
frontal assault on their civilization they ought also to be 
given the opportunity to benefit from the positive aspects 
of Latin American civilization - be these in the realms of 
medicine, agriculture or other fields"(551). 
Environmental Issues 
The Amazon region contains the largest standing primaeval 
tropical rain forest, and the most diverse biological stock in the 
world. With the exception of untapped Amerindian knowledge, very 
little is known or understood about the complex ecosystem, and basic 
research is only now being pursued, principally by the Institute 
Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazonia (INPA, National Institute for 
Amazon Research). 
There are many myths which have been perpetuated about the 
Amazon region; popularly, it has been regarded as a reserve of untold 
wealth, waiting to be tapped. In fact, most of its soils are of 
extremely low fertility and degrade rapidly once vegetation cover is 
removed. Although small clearings made by indigenous peoples will 
regenerate over the years, large, severely disturbed areas of rain 
forest do not have the capacity to regenerate (552). Not only does 
the forest not regenerate, but the land can normally only sustain 
crops for two or three years before being totally exhausted of plant 
nutrients. 
Another popular myth is that the Amazon tropical rain forest is 
the world's lung. It has been suggested that the forest is a major 
source of the world's supply of oxygen and that destruction will lead 
to a depletion of oxygen in the atmosphere. In fact, in the stable 
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ecosystem, 	as 	exists at present, 	the oxygen 	produced 	by 
photosynthesis during the day is reabsorbed by respiration at 
n.ight(553). However, it still makes news headlines(554,555). 
Possibly, the greatest danger lies in the build up of carbon dioxide 
in the upper layers of the world's atmosphere due to clearance of 
large tracts of the forest by burning, and more importantly, by the 
burning of fossil fuels. At present the photosynthetic process 
absorbs much of this industrially produced carbon dioxide, but if the 
atmospheric levels of this gas continue to rise there is the 
possibility of an enhanced "greenhouse effect" with a consequent 
warming of the earth(556). However, it is also thought likely that 
two thirds of the carbon dioxide released from fossil fuels dissolves 
in the oceans(557). 
Certainly the local climate could be affected by the replacement 
of the forest. Research in INPA has shown that about half of the 
rainfall in the Amazon basin is from water vapour released into the 
air as a result of transpiration. Replace the forest by grassland 
and there would be a drying trend in the climate, leading to 
desertification as has happened in north eastern Parâ(558). 
INPA is the principal research organ studying the Amazon region. 
It has divisions for botany, agronomy, medical sciences, ecology, 
fish and fisheries, chemistry and technology. There are 705 
personnel employed by INPA, 157 are researchers, 285 research 
assistants and 263 administrative personnel. The area they study is 
5x106 km2 (559). 	This represents a very small number of workers 
involved in 	trying to discover the secrets of a tropical rain 
forest which is being destroyed at a rate of2xIha per year. The 
forest complexity is indicated by the enormous variety of flora and 
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fauna, many species of which remain unknown to science, and it is an 
enormous pool of genetic material of great potential value. 
Entrepreneurship 
The most publicised form of entrepreneurship in Amazonia is the 
felling of trees for lumber, and in the popular press there are many 
il scare" stories(560). Foreign timber companies are apparently eager 
to exploit the wealth of the Amazon, and this is seen by the 
Brasilian Government as a way of helping reduce its foreign 
debt(561), and the Government has allowed the systematic plundering 
of the region for the last 10 years. 
A blue print for the preservation of Amazonia was prepared in 
1979. The intention was to place a new forest policy before the 
Congresso Nacional, in March 1980, based on ecological protection and 
development of economic potentialities. How much this will save the 
forest is debatable. Included in the blueprint were market studies 
of the internal and external use of wood resources, and studies of 
the economic viability of the use of the wood existing in the areas 
where deforestation will be necessary for public projects(562). 
There is concern, within Brazil and abroad, over how much of the 
forest cover is being destroyed. The Brazilian space research 
agency, the Instituto de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE) in co-operation 
with the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) is collecting data on the changes of the area of forest cover 
using the Landsat satellite'. It would appear that in the area where 
forest cutting has, to date, been concentrated, in fact, only 7.5% 
has been cleared, and although existing legislation permits no more 
than 50% of any property to be deforested, in reality, often much 
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less than this is cleared(563). 
In addition to clearing for the use of the timber, large tracts 
of the forest are cleared for cattle ranching. Many of the livestock 
projects which have hit the headlines are,in fact, in the savannah of 
the States of Mato Grosso and Goiãs. But for entrepreneurs with 
capital, large incentives have lured them and their enterprises into 
Amazonia. Incentives have included payment for land clearance, tax 
concessions, and easy credit facilities. Despite the fact that the 
land, once cleared, is unable to support agriculture for more than 
three years, the large land owners have usually made a handsome 
profit(564). 
The one project which must be singled out is that of the 
American Daniel Ludwig. He is reported to have invested about US$ 
1 x 10 in the Jari project, which covers nearly 1.6 x 10 6  ha on the 
rio Jari in the state of Amapä, about 400 km northwest of Belém. His 
original intention was to clear the whole area and set up an enormous 
tree and rice farm. The project was started in 1967 and two species 
of fast growing tree were planted in order to provide wood pulp for 
export. The whole project has been a financial disaster for Ludwig, 
an ecological disaster for Amazonia and a social disaster for the 
people who flocked there for employment. The project is being taken 
over by the Brazilian Government and several Brazilian companies, but 
its future is uncertain(565-569). 
The other large scale resource exploitation projects in Amazonia 
are those of the big mining companies. Some are underway, others are 
at an advanced stage of planning; the two principal minerals involved 
are bauxite and iron ore. 
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Electrical Energy in theAmazon 
At present, the generating capacity and consumption of 
electricity in Amazonia is small. Until 1976, the installed capacity 
was only 458 MW, and annual consumption 1 155 GWh, 2% and 1.5% 
respectively of the national total(570,571). The nuclei for 
electrical energy consumption in Amazonia are small and, usually, 
separated by great distances. There is a general lack of large scale 
industrial enterprises which accounts for the low level of 
electricity demand. This has had the effect of discouraging high 
initial investment in generation schemes. 
On the other hand, the cities have shown high rates of increase 
in electricity consumption, with a rise in demand for the 
installation of small and medium size generating units, which due to 
the restricted markets have tended to be oil fired(572). According 
to ELETRONORTE the development and integration of the region by the 
exploitation of its mineral and other wealth needs the support of an 
adequate supply of energy, "given the characteristics of its 
utilization as an instrument of progress. This integration and 
development should not be accomplished to the exclusive interest of 
the region, but should be part of the national development of Brazil 
as a who14(573). Such an attitude may be said to colour, 
significantly, the decisions concerning energy development in the 
Amazon region. The hydroelectric potential of the Amazon river 
system, considered at the level of technico-economic viability is 
comparable to that of the other primary sources of energy, and must 
be considered when trying to reet the ever- increasing needs of the 
-.. .dados as caracteristicas de sua utilizacao coro instruTento 
de progresso. E e suwiente iriportante que a integracao e 0 
desenvolvirrento da krazonia nao sejan entendidos ccrro de interess 
exciusivo da regiao. 
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energy markets in other regions of Brazil(574). 
However, until the oil crisis in 1973, Amazonia had been little 
considered for its energy potential, with one notable exception. In 
1965 the Hudson Institution in New York, suggested the creation of a 
network of Great Lakes by damming the Amazon river itself. This 
project was intended to open up a development area the size of the 
United States of America and to provide enormous quantities of 
hydroelectricity(575). The plan was to build a 30-50 km long dam, 
30 m high at Monte Alegre. This would have produced a man-made lake 
greater than 1000 km long, flooding all the low river towns betweens 
Monte Alegre and Manaus, including Santarem, and, in addition, almost 
all the currently cultivated agricultural zones in the region, with 
the displacement of at least 100 000 people. The electrical potential 
was calculated at 74.6 GW(576). Not surprisingly, this suggestion was 
attacked from every conceivable angle. Besides the extensive 
environmental and cultural ramifications such a scheme would have 
had, the Hudson Institute was accused of attempting to 
"...internationalise the Amazon for imperialistic purposes, 
of intending to settle millions of militant United States 
anti-white Negroes in the area, of developing the area for 
the United States survivors of a major thermonuclear 
exchange ....' (577). 
Despite the attempts of members of the Institute to clarify 
their motives, the only comment which can be made on this scheme is 
that it was ludicrous. 
Not only did the oil crisis have a significant effect on the 
energy perspective of Brazil, but it also had a considerable impact 
upon that of Amazonia. The principal cities of the region are 
supplied with 	electricity 	generated 	by 	oil-fired or diesel 
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generators. The generating costs must cover both the actual cost of 
the fuel' and also the cost of transporting it by boat to the 
consuming centres. As a result of high costs and low population 
density the great majority of the installed generators have 
capacities of between 2 and 100 kW. One possible solution to the 
problem of fuel costs is the substitution of diesel oil by vegetable 
oils, using the experience and technology of French Africa, or by 
increased dependence on wood and wood products. However, earlier 
experience with combustible solids, such as wood, did not prove to be 
successful. Experiments by Centrals Elétricas de Amazonia 
(CELETRAMAZON) 	collapsed in the face of erratic supply and the 
extremely variable price of wood. 	The same currently applies to 
Centrals Elêtricas de Acre (ELECTROACRE), and had done so for the 
Parä Electric Company as long ago as 1920, and Manaus Tramways & 
Light Company in the 1940s(578). However, for the future, and on the 
larger scale, the main answer lies in increased use of the 
hydroelectric potential available(579). 
The Concessionaires 
There are various electrical energy concessionaires in the 
region, mostly associated companies of ELETROBRAS. The majority of 
their fixed capital is state or Federal Government owned. Centrais 
Elétricas do Parâ (CELPA) is the state company for Par&, operating 
principally in Belém, and the interior of the state. Centrals 
Elétricas de Amazonas (CELETRAMAZON) operates in the State of 
Amazonas, and in the future may take over the supply to Manaus, 
currently in the concessionary area of the Companhia de Eletricidade 
de Manaus (CEM), a subsidiary of ELETROBRAS. The Federal Territories 
of Rondônia, Roraima and Amapâ are the concession areas of Centrals 
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Elétricas de Rond6nia (CERON), Centrals Elétricas de Roraima (CER) 
and Companhia de Eletricidade do Amapä (CEA) respectively. Centrais 
Elétricas de Acre (ELETROACRE) acts in Acre, Centrals Elétricas de 
Goiás (CELG) in Goiãs and Centrals Elétricas de Mato Grosso (CEMAT) 
in Mato Grosso(580). 
Hydroelectric Power in the Amazon 
ELETRONORTE was created in 1973 to study and operate the 
exploitation of the hydroelectric power potential of the Amazon 
region. At the inception of the company, the Federal Government 
intended to develop an ambitious and impressive energy programme in 
Amazonia, consisting of the construction of various large scale 
hydroelectric power stations, with the objective of supplying part of 
the consumer market of North, North East and Central Brazil. 
The first role of ELETRONORTE was to continue the work of the 
Comité Coordenador dos Estudos Energéticos da Amazonia (ENERAM), 
enlarging the surveys of the Tocantins-Araguaia Basin, and resuming 
the studies of the rios Trombetas, Erepeurui, Vatum, Jatapu, Cotingo 
and Jamari, plus all other tributaries and sub-tributaries of the 
Amazon(581). These surveys were very necessary. One of the reasons 
for the adoption of thermal generation in many areas, was that as a 
result of a shortage of data on the hydrology, geology, topography 
and cartography, hydroelectric projects could not be defined and 
thermal generation was the sole alternative. (It should be noted that 
the lower investment costs, the small transmission systems needed, 
the shorter installation periods and the smaller volume of works were 
also incentives, that is until outweighed by the rising cost of 
fuel)(582). There was also the financial incentive offered by the 
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Conselho Nacional de Petroleo, in which those concessionaires 
operating isolated thermal stations were exempted from payment of the 
Imposto Unico (see P.61 ). 
The projected development of the Amazonian hydraulic potential 
for power soon gained popularity and a number of large scale schemes 
were proposed, principally UHE Tucurui, 3.0 GW (in 1974), 300 km from 
Belém on the rio Tocantins and UHE Sao Felix, 1.2 GW, also on the rio 
Tocantins 250 km from Brasilia. The latter is to be interconnected 
with the South East region(582). The inventory survey of the 
Tocantins- Araguaia basin gave an initial estimated potential of 
18 GW,subsequently adjusted to 21 GW, and surveys of the river basins 
north of the Amazon river revealed 21 potential hydroelectric sites 
with another ten on the southern tributaries. ELETROBRAS announced 
that it was going to embark on "the greatest. hydroelectric programme 
in the world"(583). 
However, it was emphasised that the inventories formed only the 
foundation for energy planning, and less than six of the 31 potential 
hydroelectric sites would be initially developed before the middle of 
1977(584). This was reported in 1976, and in that year, in fact, 
development was begun on only three sites(585). 
The sites inventoried in the Tocantins-Araguaia cascade are shown 
in Appendix k. 
The six stations given initial priority were UHE Tucurul; UHE 
Couto Magalhes, which was to benefit the population of the north of 
Mato Grosso and Cuiabá; UHE Sao Felix, which was to meet the 
needs of Brasilia and northern Goiâs; UHE Santo Antonio II, which 
would be the first hydroelectric power station in Roraima; UHE 
Samuel, to supply the city of Porto Veiho; and UHE Balbina to supply 
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power to Manaus(586). Of these six stations, only one is under 
construction, UHE Tucur 4uf, and the others are still at the project 
stage. Although according to the Piano 95, UHE Couto Magalhaes is 
planned for operation in 1986 (110 MW), UHE Sao Felix (1060 MW) for 
1989 and UHE Peixe (736 MW) for 1990. It should be noted that the 
proposed installed capacity has been reduced considerably for all 
three stations, and all of them are close to the southern limit of 
Amazonia (587). 
The journal, Mundo Eiêtrico, commenting on the possibility of 
long distance transmission at voltages up to 1 500 kv, A.C., and the 
possibility of inter- connections between the North and South East, 
and North and North East, coupled with large scale mineral 
exploitation in Amazonia, reported that it would require the 
construction of 52 large and medium sized hydroelectric power 
stations, by ELETRONORTE, by the year 2005 (588). But according to 
the Piano 95, only four are scheduled to be in operation by 1990, but 
the further 52 are available for expansion of the installed potential 
(Piano 95. p.71.) 
Isolated Systems 
Many of the potential hydroelectric developments in the Amazon 
region could, economically, supply only a small isolated market. The 
two that have been completed are UHE Coaracy Nunes (40 MW), on the 
rio Araguaia in the state of Amap, 80 km north west of Macapã, which 
began operation in 1976, and UHE Corua-Una (10 MW) on the rio Corua-
Una, 70 km south west of Santarem, which started up in 1978. Of 
these two, UHE Corua-Una is so small that it is not mentioned in the 
ELETRONORTE annual report of 1978. The UHE Coaracy Nunes system was 
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able to commence operation as originally planned, in 1978, when the 
13.8 kV line to the community of Ferreira Gomes was completed, by 
CEA, together with the Santana substation, which was connected to the 
cities of Macapâ and Porto Santana(589).) 
The isolated transmission systems proposed for UHE Couto 
Magalhäes, UHE Balbina and UHE Samuel are currently under study, and 
the projects for the power stations are at various stages of 
development. For UHE Couto Magalhâes, on the upper rio Araguaia, 
work has already reached the preliminary design stage, for the 
underground power house and other principal works. As to the other 
essential works, studies are in progress for the various necessary 
infrastructures, including the Vila Residencial (township) and the 
various alternatives for the construction of the airport. 
UHE Samuel (216 MW), on the river Jamari 40 km south east of the 
city of Porto Velho in Rondônia, is being reappraised, by 
ELETRONORTE, on the evidence of new aerophotogrammetry data. The 
whole scheme is being revised, including the re-siting of the Vila 
Residencial. The preliminary transmission studies were completed 
during 1978 (590). 
UHE Balbina, 146 km from Manaus, on the rio Vatum, is urgently 
required to solve the problem of the costly production of oil fired 
electricity for the rapidly expanding city. The project was first 
suggested by ENERAM in 1973. It is extremely isolated and only 
accessible by boat up to Cachoeira Mo.rena, 20 km downstream of the 
site. From there the river is only navigable by small boats or 
motorised canoes. However, a road access is in the process of being 
built. The installed capacity will be 250 MW, and the associated 
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transmission system will comprise of 19 km of 230 kV line. 	The 
support works will include a Vila Residencial and 72 km of access 
road, from the BR 174 Manaus-Caracarai road. For such a small 
hydroelectric power station, the area to be inundated is very large, 
over 2 000 km 2 . The cost, as estimated in 1978, was US$. 558x106 
(December 1978 prices), including US$ 77x10 6 for the transmission 
system. This gives a unit cost of US$ 1 924/kW, excluding the 
transmission costs, which is extremely high. However, the forecast 
for fuel oil consumption by Manaus, in 1979, was 190 x 103  tonnes, 
and, if the generating park expands to meet the market purely by the 
addition of oil fired stations, this consumption would reach an 
annual value of 460 x 1tonnes by 1990 (591). 
UHE Tucurul 
History 
The first reconnaissance of the hydraulic resources of the 
basins of rios Tocantins and Araguaia was made, in 1964, for the 
Bureau of Reclamation, through the Agency for International 
Development of the United States Department of State, by the now 
defunct Comissào Interestadual dos Vales do Araguaia-Tocantins 
(CIVAT) (Interstate Commission for the Araguaia-Tocantins Valley). 
Between 1968 and 1972, the Departamento Nacional de Portes e Vias 
Navegâveis (DNPVN) (National Department for Ports and Waterways) also 
made studies of the rio Tocantins, as part of a general study of 
interior navigation routes within Brazil(592). Conflicting 
reports(593) suggest that the DNPVN studies were, in fact, made prior 
to those of CIVAT, but it is certain that by 1972 further studies of 
the region had been made by ENERAM. This committee in its final 
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report, recommended a systematic survey of possibilities to utilise 
the hydroelectric resources of the Tocantins basin, and the 
identification of those projects which would be able to meet the 
demand from the energy markets represented by Belêni, Brasilia, and 
part of the Centre West region, in addition to the demand represented 
by the proposed establishment of electro-metallurgical enterprises, 
and the interconnection with the CHESF system. 
In response to this report, the Minister of the MME, recommended 
that ELETROBRAS be responsible for these further surveys, which were 
resumed in July 1972, and subsequently taken over by ELETRONORTE (see 
p.159). It inherited the responsibility for the studies of the 
Tocantins-Araguaia basin, and for the development of the hydraulic 
- potential of the lower rio Tocantins, in order to meet the energy 
market, now specified by the city of Belém, and the heavy loads 
required by the proposed alumina-aluminium complex. 
The work which was accomplished by ELETRONORTE at this stage 
included the organization of the inventory studies of a number of 
hydroelectric sites in the rio Tocantins basin, and the feasibility 
studies for the So Felix, Santo Antonio and Tucurui schemes. These 
latter studies were based on aerophotogrammetry, hydrometric surveys, 
geological-geotechnical investigations, estimates of reservoir areas, 
socio-economic studies and surveys on the effects to be felt by 
towns, roads, forest parks, mineral resources and navigation 
facilities(594). The data gathered were used to make comparative 
studies of the various alternatives. 
As a result of these studies, the site of Tucurui was chosen as 
the one to best meet the requirements of the market. It had the 
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advantages of a high hydraulic potential and nearest proximity to the 
market of Belém. Studies of this site, therefore, passed from the 
feasibility stage, to that of the basic project stage. The 
feasibility studies had been carried out by ENGEVIX S.A. - Estudos e 
Projetos de Engenharia (the technical studies), and the economic 
studies had been undertaken by ECOTEC - Econórnia e Engenharia 
Industrial S.A.. Three years later, in 1975, ELETRONORTE awarded the 
contracts for the basic and executive design projects to ENGEVIX S.A. 
and THEMAG - Engenharia S.A.(595). 
These 	further studies 	were 	foliwed 	by 	more 	detailed 
investigations and included trials using a small scale model of the 
hydroelectric power station, and computer simulations for the 
optimization of the general arrangement of the works and the 
installed capacity. These considered the regulation of the water flow 
by UHE So Felix reservoir, as well as the case of UHE Tucurul 
operating without upstream regulation. The studies had the secondary 
purpose of finding ways to improve the navigability of the rio 
Tocantins as far as the town of Marabâ, which will be at the upper 
end of the Tucuruf reservoir. The stretch of river between Tucurui 
and Marabá is currently impassible due to rapids. 
Purpose and Market of Ul-IE Tucuru 
The concepts behind the scheme of UHE TucuruI have, of 
necessity, changed over the years. These are reflected the changes 
which have occurred in both Brazilian and world affairs. The 
underlying factors are 
i. the presence of a great hydraulic potential in the rio 
Tocantins basin, 
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the presence of large reserves of bauxite in the Trombetas 
and Paragominas regions, 
a small domestic and industrial market for power in the 
city of Belém, and 
a very large industrial market 3 000 km distant, in the 
South East region of Brazil. 
In 1973, Japanese engineers, from the Electric Power Development 
Company Limited proposed, to the then Governor of the state of Parâ, 
Fernando Guillon, that a large hydroelectric power station should be 
constructed on the rio Tocantins. This station was to supply the 
electrical energy necessary for a future aluminium smelter, for which 
permission for construction on the rio Trombetas had been sought. The 
proposed smelter was to have an output capacity of 500 000 tonnes of 
aluminium per year, with room for possible expansion up to 10 6  tonnes 
per year. Preliminary studies for the scheme had estimated a possible 
installed capacity of 3.0 GW, thirty times greater than the total 
installed capacity then existing in Bel6m(596). 
An agreement was signed between the Brazilian Government, 
through the CVRD, and a consortitmof Japanese aluminium enterprises, 
represented by the Light Metal Smelters Association. This resulted 
in the formation of Aluminio Brasileiras S.A.,ALBRAS, to produce 
aluminium, and Aluminio do Norte S.A.,ALUNORTE, which was to make 
alumina. The two processing plants were to be located in Baraceria, 
close to Belém, and were to require an investment of approximately 
US$ 1.4109 . 
At the end of 1973, the Secretaria Geral of the MME, Benjamin 
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Dias, confirmed that ELETROBRAS was already executing detailed 
studies on the available hydraulic energy in the Tocantins-Araguaia 
basin, where, it had been estimated, there was an hydraulic potential 
of the order of 7 GW(597). By early 1974, it was announced that the 
first large Amazonian hydroelectric power station would be 
constructed on the rio Tocantins, with an installed capacity of 2.5 
or 3.0 GW. It would begin operation in 1981, and would supply power 
to the aluminium smelter which was being planned for a site near to 
Belêm. 
During this same period, the President of ELETRONORTE, announced 
that the new techniques being developed for long distance 
transmission would make it both technically and economically feasible 
to develop the potential of the Amazon region, in order to supply the 
industrial South East with electricity. In so doing Brazil would be 
following the example of the USSR, which was planning to introduce 
transmission lines up to 2 400 km long. 
The hydroelectric power station proposed at Tucurul would be 
able to ensure a sufficient supply of energy for a 500 000 tonne 
smelter and still have sufficient additional capacity to provide 
power for transmission to the central region of Brazil. This would 
free the power stations of CEMIG and FURNAS, which were supplying 
this region, so that they could instead meet the growing demand of 
the state capitals of So Paulo, Rio de • Janeiro and Belo 
Hon zonte( 598). 
By mid-1974, the stated aim of UHE TucuruI was to facilitate the 
development of the bauxite reserves present in the region, and thus 
to transform Brazil into a great exporter of aluminium products(599). 
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Early the. next year, work on the dam site was speeded up so as to 
guarantee the entry into operation of the power station in time to 
meet the initial requirements of the aluminium smelting complex from 
the outset. At this stage, the construction of the final work camp 
was underway, and the access roads, airport and the dock, for the 
unloading of construction equipment, were close to completion. It was 
planned to start work on the first phase of the river diversion in 
the immediate future(600). 
However, this need for urgency was soon superceded by concern at 
the escalating costs of both the hydroelectric and aluminium schemes, 
and it was consequently suggested that the MME should look into the 
high estimated cost of the electricity to the proposed ALBRAS smelter 
at Baracena. In the processing of bauxite -to aluminium, one of the 
major costs is that of the electricity used. If UHE TucuruT was going 
to be an expensive power station to operate, this would be reflected 
in a high cost for its electricity, which could make the operation of 
the proposed aluminium smelter economically unattractive(601). 
The concern of ALBRAS about the electricity costs was clearly 
understood by ELETROBRAS, because in the 30th issue of its journal 
"Revista Brasileira de Energia Elêtrica", the article on UHE Tucuruf 
stated that the primary objective of the hydroelectric power station 
was to meet the power requirements of Belém, the projected increased 
consumption by eletro-metallurgical enterprises in the region, (there 
was no specific mention of aluminium smelting), and, additionally, to 
supply the future inter-connection with the CHESF system(602). The 
ALBRAS smelter was no longer considered as the primary market for UHE 
Tucurul. Perhaps it was already suspected, as in fact turned out to 
be the case, that the aluminium enterprise would fall through. 
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Whilst ELETRONORTE was studying the economic viability of the 
exploitation of the hydraulic potential in the Amazon region, 
ELETROBRAS was considering methods of using the power produced to 
supply the industrial South East. As the distances involved are 
greater than 1 500 km. ELETROBRAS was considering transmission at 
extra-high-voltage. With this possibility, UHE Tucuruf became to be 
regarded as having a significant role in the national integration 
policy of the Brazilian Government, in which the ELETRONORTE system 
would be linked to those of the North East, Centre West and South 
East regions(603). This plan was later modified to exclude the North 
East-South East interconnection, as it was considered that there was 
insufficient hydrological diversity between the two regions, 
especially when there will be no surplus power to send to the North 
East from the industrial South East(604). 
A statement was issued, at this time, by the President of 
ELETROBRAS, to the effect that UHE TucuruI would be built 
independently of the ALBRAS construction, using national resources. 
This statement echoed the decision of the Brazilian Government to 
construct the hydroelectric power station in order to meet the energy 
needs of the North and North East regions, which were considered to 
have expanded sufficiently to justify a new major source of power. No 
formal agreement had been made, with the Japanese partners of CVRD in 
the ALBRAS consortium, for the investment of US$ 700x10 6 in the 
smelter. A letter of intent had been signed on the occasion of a 
visit to Brazil of the Japanese ex-Prime Minister, Kakuei 
Tanaka(605), but that was all. In 1975, UHE Tucuruf was viewed as an 
example of governmental intent with respect to the plans of ALBRAS to 
exploit the bauxite reserves in Paragominas as opposed to 
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Trombetas(606). 	In 1976, it was announced that the Japanese had 
withdrawn from the scheme, on the grounds that the size of the 
proposed smelter was too large(607), but despite this, it was also 
announced that the turbines and generators for UHE Tucurul were to be 
provided by a Japanese consortium, comprising Toshiba, Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Fuji 
Electric Company, with Toshiba acting as the managing company. It 
was also expected that the Brazilians would receive a US$ 300x10 6 
loan from Japan, in return for purchasing the equipment(608). 
Nevertheless, this was the last that was heard of Japanese 
involvement in the schemes. 
By late 1976, it had become necessary to propose additional 
justification for the Tucurui scheme. In a statement from the 
Ministry for Transport it was declared 
"The geographical position, the natural conditions, the 
energy potential, the wealth already in the Tocantins-
Araguaia basin, and their proximity to Brasilia, are 
factors which predispose the rios Tocantins and Araguaia 
for development into first class waterways, with more than 
3 000 km of navigable river serving the states of Mato 
Grosso, Gois, Parã and part of Maranho"*(609). 
Submersion of the rapids at Itaboca by the Tucurui reservoir will 
remove the principal obstacle to navigation of the rio Tocantins as 
far as Marabâ. However, despite the optimism of the Transport 
Ministry, the project designs, published in 1976, by the consulting 
engineers, contained no designs for navigation locks(610). 
* "A posico geografica, as condicöes naturais, o potential 
energético, as riquezas jã presentidas em sua bacia e a situaco 
em relaço a Brasilia sao os fatores que credenciam Os rios Tocan-
tins e Araguaia a serem transformados em hidrovias de primeira 
classe, corn mais de 3 mil de kilometers de aproveitamento viário, 
servindo aos Estados de Mato Grosso, Goiás, Parâ e parte de 
Maranho". 
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Although President Ernesto Geisel inaugurated the principal 
works of UHE Tucurul in February 1977, the purpose of the 
hydroelectric power station had still not been clearly defined. At 
that time, it was expected to start generating at the end of 1981, 
with the intention of supplying power to the ALBRAS aluminium complex 
in Belém (despite the fact that the Japanese had withdrawn from the 
project). In addition, it had been decided that the power could be 
used to facilitate exploitation of the rich deposits of iron ore in 
the Serra do Carajas, a mountain range-to the south west of Tucurul, 
by providing the power for an electrified railway(611). 
It was not until ELETRONORTE published a summary report of the 
Tucurul scheme that any clear definition of the market for its power 
was outlined. This comprised 
the.interconnected system of Belém, 
The electricity from UHE Tucurul will be distributed to the town 
of Belém by CELPA, as well as to the 14 towns and villages in the 
north eastern region of the state, which are already interconnected 
with the Belém system. 
theNorthern Region of Goiãs State, 
CELG will be responsible for the distribution of the electricity 
to some of the more important towns in the north of Goiás, including 
Tocantinopolis and AraguaTha. 
the industrial projects. 
By 1977, two major industrial projects had been identified 
within the UHE Tucuruf area of influence. These were bauxite 
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processing and iron ore mining. 
The enormous reserves of bauxite in the rio Trombetas basin, and 
the smaller reserves near the town of Paragominas are estimated at 
over 3x109 tonnes. Exploitation of these reserves, originally 
suggested by the Japanese was intended to be the major use of the 
power from UHE Tucurul and, in 1977, it was believed that alumina and 
aluminium projects would be shortly established. Processing of the 
bauxite locally is still planned, but an actual scheme has not yet 
been finalised. 
The estimated iron ore reserves in the Serra dos Carajas were 
estimated at 18x10 9 tonnes in 1977,  which represents the largest 
concentration 'of good quality iron ore in the world. It is of 
excellent quality, with a metallic iron content of 66%. In order to 
exploit these reserves, the Brazilian Government created a subsidiary 
of CVRD, the Amazônia M'ineraco S.A. (AMZA). It is responsible 
for the mining of the ore, and for its transportation by an 887 km 
long electrified railway, from the mine to the deep water port at 
Itaqui in the state of Maranhâo. ELETRONORTE was 'supposed to be 
responsible for the supply of power from UHE Tucurul to the mine and 
to part of the railway. The remainder of the railway's demands were 
to be met by CHESF. Although exploitation of the iron ore has begun, 
the building of the railway has not yet started(612). 
iv. the interconnection with CHESF 
The electrical systems of the North and North East regions will 
be interconnected through the Imperatriz sub-station (see 
p.274)(613), but, as a result of the delay of start of operation of 
the hydroelectric power station, the interconnection is to be used 
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initially to supply the city of Belérn with electricity from the CHESF 
system. 
Justification of the UHE TucuruI Scheme 
The various proposals for the scheme have revolved around the 
existence of the large mineral resources which lie within the area of 
influence of UHE Tucurul. Many of the deposits have been mapped in 
detail, and only require the establishment of an energy and transport 
infrastructure to enable the exploitation to proceed. The mining 
itself does not consume large quantities of power, but the mineral 
processing industries, using electro-metallurgical methods for the 
production of aluminium and nickel, are sufficiently energy intensive 
to justify the construction of a large hydroelectric power 
station(614). 
Another company, Mineraco Vera Cruz S.A., has been considering 
the exploitation of the Paragominas deposits using power to be 
supplied by UHE Tucurul. According to ELETRONORTE, this has opened 
up the possibility of producing ferro-manganese and other ferrous 
alloys, as there are appreciable reserves of manganese in the Serra 
dos Carajas region. Although these additional uses of the power from 
UHE Tucurul may be available, the market and power balance forecast 
for the hydroelectric power station prepared by ELETRONORTE, in 1977, 
assumed that only the ALUNORTE/ALBRAS and AMZA projects would be 
fully operational by 1988. 
From tables VI.i and VI.ii, it would appear that approximately 
half of the power produced is intended for the CHESF market, with 
only a quarter for the. aluminium enterprises and an eighth for the 
city of Belém. This is a particularly interesting forecast of the the 
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Table VI.i : Market Forecast for UHE Tucurul 
Power 	Peak Demand 
MWav MW 
CELPA 218 398 - 
CELG 6 11 
ALUNORTE 17 24 
ALBRAS 571 584 
AMZA 43 72 
CHESF 1 000 1 000 
Total 	1 855 	2 089 
Table VI.ii : Power Balance 
Power 	Peak Demand 
MWav MW 
Market 1 855 2089 
Transmission losses* 55 66 
Reserve(1 unit) - 245# 
Total Requirements 1 910 2 400 
Available at Tuc. 2 090$ 2 940# 
Surplus 180 540 
* Approximately 3% 
# Under minimum head 
$ Firm energy, TucuruT reservoir only 
Source : Anon ttSistema Tucurui", ELETRONORTE, Brasilia, 1978. 
distribution of energy consumption within the market, as the 
principal consideration in the planning of UHE TucuruT was primarily 
to meet the needs of the aluminium enterprises and the city of Belém. 
It would appear that the eventual role of the hydroelectric power 
station will be quite different from the one originally intended. 
The situation has now arisen where a large (4 GW) hydroelectric 
power station is under construction, and, as yet, the market for its 
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power has not been properly identified. This has arisen a result of 
the initial haste with which the project was undertaken. There is 
little doubt that a suitable market for the power can be created, if 
adequate financing for the possible aluminium projects can be found. 
However, if no industrial market is established, there will be a 
considerable surplus of available power. 
Although there has been no finalisation of any bauxite 
processing schemes, most of the published reports still claim that 
the bulk of the power from UHE Tucuruf will be used for such 
processing. Even in mid-1978, when the project completion date for 
UHE Tucuruf had been delayed, the President of ELETRONORTE, Raul 
Garcia Llano, was forced to. admit that the hydroelectric power 
station would still enter operation before the ALBRAS/ALUNORTE 
projects. At that time, some US$ 2G0x1O 6 had been injected into the 
hydroelectric scheme, as it was, and still is, regarded as a priority 
project by the Brazilian Government, because of the importance 
attached to the power which it will be able to supply to the 
aluminium projects which, have been estimated, will consume 5 TWh per 
yea r(615). 
In 1978, although nothing had been signed, the aluminium 
projects were considered as having been launched, despite no basic 
plans having been prepared then, or subsequently. The September 1978 
report in Mundo Elétrico reiterated the supposition that the 
principal beneficiaries of the UHE Tucurul power would be the 
ALBRAS/ALUNORTE complex in the metropolitan region of Belém, the 
Carajas project and its railway electrifiction, and also the North 
East of Brazil(616). The September issue of International 
Construction, in the same year, reported that the construction of UHE 
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Tucurul was "going hand-in-hand" with the development of the 
aluminium industry in Be.lém. According to this report, two major 
processing plants were "under way" near Belém, and would be supplied 
with power from UHE Tucuruf. The costings for the ALBRAS smelter were 
estimated at US$ 1.6x10 9 (1978 prices), with 49% of this sum 
apparently being supplied by Japanese interests. The projected 
initial output of the smelter was set at 38 000 tonnes per year, in 
1981, and was expected to rise to 265 000 tonnes per year by 1985, 
when it was to employ about 8 000 persons(617). 
In 1978, Brazil was importing 120 000 tonnes per year of refined 
aluminium, but it was expected that, on completion of the ALBRAS 
smelter, there would be a surplus of aluminium on the Brazilian 
market. In order to increase the home demand for aluminium, a 
research programme was initiated to study the problems of creep, 
corrosion and welding of aluminium, with a view to using it as a 
substitute for copper, a metal of which Brazil has little(618). 
Early in 1979, a new name entered the scene, when the Grupo 
Ludwig signed an agreement with the DNAEE, ELETRONORTE and CHESF, 
stating the intention of the group to use the energy from UHE Tucuruf 
for the fabrication of primary aluminium at a smelter to be built in 
the state of Pa rä. The planned initial capacity of this smelter was 
to be 150 000 tonnes per year, with the possibility of doubling this 
capacity in the second phase(619). This has no doubt fallen through 
with the collapse of the Ludwig Amazonian Empire(620). By the third 
quarter of 1979, it had become obvious that the construction of UHE 
Tucuruf was well behind schedule, due to lack of finances, and that 
the ALBRAS project for a, now, 80 000 tonne smelter uncertain, with a 
result that alternative projects were being planned for the 
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beneficiation of the Trombetas and Paragominas baUxite(621). In .1979, 
with the further rise in OPEC oil prices, non-oil related energy 
sources were given a high priority in the Brazilian Government 
spending, and further funds were injected into the Tucuruf scheme. 
The use for its energy was still not clearly defined, although it was 
suggested that it would be used to supply a Trombetas bauxite-
alumina-aluminium complex to be managed by CVRD, and the iron ore 
mining project at Carajas(622). 
In 1980, the Minister of the MME, Cesar Cais, injected new life 
into the project, by suggesting that the second phase of the project, 
with its additional 2.74 GW of installed capacity should be brought 
forward by some years. This was intended to satisfy a projected 
demand at the Carajas mining projects of approximately 6 GW, (the 
total installed capacity of UHE 'Tucurul would be 6.7 GW(623)). 
Despite this optimism, it was apparent, during a visit to 
ELETRONORTE in March 1980, that plans for the second phase of the 
hydroelectric power station would not be implemented until 1990-93, 
and it is not mentioned in the Piano 95. During the visit, it was 
said that the market for the UHE Tucu.rui power was considered 
primarily to be the traditional market of Belérn and the surrounding, 
towns, and the industrial market close to Belém, which is was still 
hoped would be created by the establishment of an aluminium 
industry(624). 
Other aluminium companies, such as C.B.A., have recently shown 
some interest in processing the bauxite in the region(625,626), and 
Alcoa A'iuminio, wholly owned by Alcoa of the USA (68%) and Hanna 
Mining of Ohio (32%), signed an agreement with the Brazilian 
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Government, on 25 June 1980, for the development of an alumina and 
aluminium plant, in the state of Maranhäo, using bauxite from 
Trombetas. The annual capacities of the two plants were set at 
500000 tonnes of alumina, and 100 000 tonnes of aluminium(627). It 
is proposed to site this complex at São Luis, some 845 km distant 
from Belém, and approximately 450 km from Imperatriz, where the 
ELETRONORTE system connects with the CHESF system. Thus the Alcoa 
complex will receive the power from UFIE Tucurul indirectly through 
the CFIESF system. 
It appears reasonable to presume that the processing of bauxite 
in São Luis will preclude its being processed in Belérn. This being 
so, it would cut out part of the direct industrial market for UHE 
Tucuruf's power. 
Despite eight years of proposals for aluminium smelters and the 
signing of many agreements, in order to justify the construction of 
this very large Amazonian project, the only market for its 
electricity is that of metropolitan Belém, and the interconnection 
with the CHESF system. With the current slump in the world aluminium 
market there is little likelihood that the position will change in 




Position and Access 
The Tucurul hydroelectric project is situated at latitude 
3 °45'S and longitude 49 °41'W, on the rio Tocantins, in the state of 
Parã, approximately 7 km upstream of the old town of Tucuruf. It is 
300 km from Belém, which is the most important town within its area 
of influence. The site is extremely isolated, and was, until 
recently, without any social infrastructure. The nearest road is the 
Transamazonica (BR 230), an unpaved highway which connects with the 
paved Belëm-Brasflia highway at Estreito on the rio Tocantins. From 
Estreito it travels in a north westerly direction until it reaches 
the lower rio Araguaia, where crossing of the river is effected, 
upstream of the town of Araguatins, by means of a raft. The road then 
follows the course of that river until its confluencewith the rio 
Tocantins at Marabâ, and then onto Jatobal, where it proceeds in a 
westerly direction to Altamira (see figure 7.1). 
In order to create road access to Tucurui, ELETRONORTE 
constructed an extension of the unpaved road from Jatobal to Tucurui, 
a distance of 100 km, but, due to the climate, this is impassable for 
six months of the year. The Departamento de Estradas do Rodagem do 
Parâ (Parâ Highways Department) is constructing a new road, the PA82, 
from Belém to Parã and ELETRONORTE is to build an access road, the 
PA83 from it to Tucurul. Construction and maintenance of these access 
roads is solely the responsibility of ELETRONORTE, as the company is 
responsible for all the infrastructure for the hydroelectric power 
E±ure 7.1 	a' of the Loc 	On 
5r 	 50 	 4r 	 4. 44- 
odrc3 	LTONORTE Us!ni idrejetrjca do Tucuruj - rojeto 
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project (629). 
There is good river access to the site and, with the completion 
of unloading facilities and the creation of a small port, the bulk of 
the equipment and supplies will arrive by barge from Belém. The 
journey takes from a minimum of 16 hours to an average of two 
days(630). The road access can only be used for the very heaviest 
equipment, and even then for only half of the year. For personnel and 
small equipment access to the site is by air, and ELETRONORTE has 
built a small aerodrome (cryptically described as being the size of a 
football pitch(631)), complete with tarred runway, control tower and 
fire-fighting equipment. The route from Belém is plied by a small 
privately owned air company, VOTEC, flying 20-seater 1943 Dakotas, 
and by the,So Paulo state company VASP. It was rumoured during 1980 
that a jet-liner service was to be established between TucuruT and 
Rio de Janeiro, but-the available facilities may preclude this as the 
2 km long runway terminates in the tall trees of the tropical jungle. 
The isolation of the site cannot be stressed too greatly. It is 
in the heart of the Amazon jungle with distances from traditional 
centres of supply of industrial materials being 2 850 km from So 
Paulo, 3 250 km from Rio de Janeiro and 2 250 km from Recifé. 
The bulk of contracting plant, such as earth movers, cranes and 
lorries, and construction materials such as steel and cement are 
taken by boat to Belém, and then transferred to barges before 
travelling the final 300 km up the rio Tocantins to Tucurul. The time 
factor involved is great, and it can take months for essential 
supplies to reach the site. This not only includes the construction 
materials, but also foodstuffs, clothing, stationery, cars, buses, 
petrol, oil, in fact every possible requirement for a town of 26 000 
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people and a large construction site. 
When the original site surveys were undertaken, the original 
town of Tucuruf had a population of approximately 3 000. That number 
has now swollen to 10 000 as more people have flocked to the area as 
a direct result of the construction activities. In addition, a new 
town has been built by ELETRONORTE to house of 26 000 workers and 
families directly connected with the project. Unlike the old town 
(see p.265), this new town is supplied with all the necessary 
infrastructure required. 
The Site 
As noted earlier, the construction site not only includes the 
civil structures for the hydroelectric power station but also the new 
residential town, a port, an aerodrome and social facilities. All of 
- 	it is owned, operated and constructed by ELETRONORTE, which Js 
therefore 	affectionately 	referred 	to 	as 	'Mama' 	by 	senior 
official s(632). 
The New Town 
A small pioneer village, consisting of 120 houses, was 
constructed, as well as a hostel, a boarding house, and first aid 
facilities to accommodate the ELETRONORTE staff involved in the 
building of the residential town and the initial construction of the 
darn(633). 
Today, the town comprises three "villages", one of permanent 
houses, and two of temporary housing, called Temporaria 1 and 2. 
These latter two incorporate prefabricated wooden houses which can be 
dismantled once the power station is complete. The residential town 
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was planned to accommodate a maximum active labour force of 10 000, 
and their dependents - a further 25 000(634). By March 1980, 
ELETRONORTE had built 6 500 houses in addition to the hostels which 
were housing 14 000 workers, sharing six to a room. 
The houses are all supplied with free electricity, hot and cold 
running water, a separate bathroom and a sewage disposal system, but 
there is a hierarchy in the degree of luxury available to the 
personnel according to their position within the companies operating 
on the site. 
Two hospitals have been constructed, with a total of 245 beds, 
and a complement of 44 doctors, all specialists. There are nine 
schools, catering for 6 000 pupils. The two senior schools also cater 
for adults; at the High School classes are held for adults in the 
evenings and at the. Professional School students can learn technical 
skills such as general building, road building, soil mechanics and 
also business administration. The site has a resident psychologist to 
help retarded children. 
Each village is supplied with a commercial centre and a 
recreation centre, with facilities for a number of sports. Shows are 
frequently put on to entertain the inhabitants, including visits by 
nationally known celebrities. The two supermarkets are stocked with a 
wide range of goods, all of which have to be imported into the area. 
There are six "restaurants", but again the standard depends very much 
on the personnel being catered for. The new town sports two banks and 
an ecumenical centre, which is used for worship by all denominations 
at separate times. 
Worldwide telephone links have been established and there are 
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two telephone exchanges with the locals being served by four public 
telephones. Communications within the town include •tarred roads on 
which operate 35 local buses. In addition, there are 80 site buses to 
take the workers out to the dam site, together with 154 VW sedans, 35 
kombi vans, 28 "simple" lorries, five aeroplanes, and one helicopter. 
All these vehicles are in fact leased and not owned by ELETRONORTE, 
but they all still had to be brought to the site by barge. 
It must be emphasised that the establishment 	of the 
infrastructure for this town has been the sole responsibility of 
ELETRONORTE, and the need for such facilities in this isolated 
location has been instrumental in raising the costs of this already 
expensive project. It must also be reiterated that everything - from 
building materials, through vehicles to foodstuffs has to be brought 
in from at least 300 to 3 000 km away. 
Additional facilities in the new town of TucuruT include a water 
treatment plant, sewage disposal facilities and a 32 MW oil-fired 
power station - to supply electricity to the townand construction 
site(635). 
The Old Town 
The situation of the old town of Tucurul, 7 km downstream from 
the construction site is quite different. The population of this town 
was only 3 000 at the start of the construction of the dam. A 
conservative estimate now puts it at 10 000, with new people having 
been attracted to the area by the possibility of earning money as 
petty traders or from employment connected with the setting up of a 
new town and the construction site. Some have managed to gain 
employment, but most eke out a living by offering services to the 
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inhabitants of the new town. 
The facilities in the old town are poor, the roads are untarred, 
most of the houses are wooden shacks, and those on the river banks 
suffer from flooding. Open drains run through the streets, rubbish 
lies uncollected, and scavenging dogs and goats roam free. Some 
buildings are supplied with electricity from small, private 
generators, but there is no piped water or sewage disposal. Water is 
collected from the river in cans(636). 
The townspeople of old Tucurul soon became aware of the 
relationship between the new town and ELETRONORTE, and, in turn, they 
now look to the company for help. ELETRONORTE has already supplied 
milk and food, housed some people, and even built graveyards for the 
town. In 1980, the mayor informed ELETRONORTE that the old town was 
without running water, on the assumption that it was the company's 
responsibilty to rectify the situation(637). To date, ELETRONORTE has 
aided in the provision of vocational training in subjects such as 
carpentry, driving and technical skills, it has operated vaccination 
programmes and trained women in basic hygiene and household 
management. 
The Port 
The port at Tucuruf is one of the more important facilities 
provided by ELETRONORTE. As the majority of supplies reach the site 
by river, comprehensive unloading facilities are necessary and, 
eventually, two docks will be established, one for use by ELETRONORTE 
for the unloading of heavy goods such as turbines and other 
specialist equipment, and the other for use by the civil 
constructors, Camargo Corrêa, for offloading construction materials. 
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The port is situated. :on the left bank of the rio Tocantins, 5 km 
downstream from the construction site, and 2 km upstream of the old 
town. As of early in 1980, the facilities consisted of a single dock 
with two cranes for unloading, but handling facilities were expected 
to be improved by autumn of that year by the addition of a 50 t 
crane(638). 
The dock for use for discharge of materials will be used mainly 
for the unloading of materials, especially agglomerates, such as 
cement and ashes, and steel and wood. It is estimated that at its 
period of peak use some 1.5x10 6 t of equipment and 40 000 t of cargo 
will be handled per month(639). One of the problems encountered in 
planning the dock was how to cope with the fluctuating levels of the 
river throughout the year. A floating structure was chosen, 
comprising a floating quay of reinforced concrete, connected to the 
landing area by means of a metal bridge to a ramp. This arrangement 
can cope with wide variations of up to 17 m in the river level. 
Depending on the level of the water, the quay will be placed in one 
of four positions, each one corresponding to a prepared rock landing. 
It will be anchored by large ties and movement between landings will 
be aided by winches operating steel cables attached to the ends of 
the ties. It is expected that the quay will be moved four times a 
year with the upper landing being used only at times of exceptional 
flood. 
The special equipment dock will be equipped with a concrete ramp 
of maximum inclination 4%, in order to permit easy offloading of 
laden lorries. During unloading the barges will be stabilised by a 
system of anchorage or ballasting, and extra heavy loads will be 
unloaded from the fixed dock using a 250 t crane. 
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Barge transportation of equipment and materials from Belém to 
Tucurul is not an easy business. They - have to travel upstream against 
not inconsiderable river flows, the reported maximum in 1980 was 
63 000 m 3s, and have to meet certain conditions. In the dry season, 
the restrictions on draught of the barges is 1.5 m on the journey 
between Cametã and Tucurul. However, the barges have to be large 
enough to be stable during loading and unloading. The top-deck 
structures have to be reinforced to be able to withstand a maximum 
distributed load of 350 t(640). 
Project Data 
The isolation of the site of TucuruT has created enormous 
difficulties in attempting inventory and feasibility studies of the 
site. Much of the data obtained has been inadequate and even 
inaccurate, with the resulting need to modify plans even in the 
execution stage. For example, the statistical 10 000 year flood used 
to calculate maximum river flows was exceeded in 1980 by 9 000 m 3s. 
Similarly, the underlying geology was incorrectly assessed, 
necessitating foundation excavations for the main dam to be increased 
by a further 30 m(641). 
Hydrometeorol ogy 
The hydrographic basin of the rio Tocantins, see figure 2.3, 
extends some 2 500 km from its source to its mouth. It is located 
almost entirely between parallels 20  S and 18° S, and longitudes 46 W 
and 55 W. The basin is enlarged by the presence of the rio Araguaia 
which extends in a south-north direction, almost parallel to the rio 
Tocantins, and the confluence of the two is about 50 km upstream of 
Marabâ and 250 km upstream of Tucuruh The basin includes part of the 
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states of Goiãs, Mato Grosso, Parã, Maranho and the Distrito 
Federal. 
The rio Tocantins rises in the Planalto de Goiãs, in the 
vicinity of the Distrito Federal, and the total drainage area of its 
basin is 767 000 km 2 , of which 382 000 km2 correspond to the Araguaia 
basin. The topographic relief of the basin is monotonous, the 
altitude varying only between 200 and 500 m, except in the immediate 
region of the headwaters, where it rises to 1 000 m. Below Tucuru 
the altitude is always less than 100 m(642). 
The rio Araguaia rises in the Serra do Caipó, at an altitude of 
850 m, close to the headwaters of the Paranâ and Paraguaf basins. 	Its 
course comprises 	stretches of gentle slope cut by 	falls and 	rapids. 
In 	its central 	stretch 	is 	the 	large Ilha do Bananal, the 	largest 
freshwater island in the world, occupying an area of some 350 km by 
80 km(643). For the main part it is extremely boggy, and it naturally 
regulates the river flow by acting as a sponge. 
Climate 
The Tocantins basin may be divided into two climatically 
homogeneous regions. To the North of parallel 6 S, including the 
project site, it is covered with tropical moist forest, seasonal in 
the south and evergreen equatorial in the north(644). The mean total 
annual rainfall is greater than 2 000 mm. The southern two-thirds of 
the Tocantins basin, south of 6 ° S, lies in the seasonally dry 
savannah uplands of Central Brazil, and is important for the 
regulation of the hydrographic regime of the basin. The mean annual 
rainfall varies between 1 500 mm and 1 600 mm, all falling between 
the harsh dry seasons which may last up to six months. The Itacaiunas 
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basin, a sub-basin of the Tocantins, upstream of the project site, 
lies in a wet tropical belt and experiences annual rainfalls of up to 
3 000 mm, distributed throughout the year, with a slightly drier 
season of only one to three months duration(645). 
There is little temperature variation in the Tocantins basin, 
with values averaging 22 °C in the south and 27 °C in the north. The 
yearly maximum and minimum differ by no more than 14 °C. The 
relative humidity averages 76% over the whole basin, reaching a 
maximum of 85% in the equatorial zone north of parallel 6 °S(646). 
The evaporation is high, averaging a mean annual value of 825 mm in 
the region of Tucurul, and rising to 1 009 mm near Imperatriz(647). 
Mean Monthly Discharges 
Hydrological studies of the Tucuruf used basic data from seven 
fluviometric stations, but only one of these stations, Porto 
Nacional, established in 1949, has been in operation for any lenghth 
of time. Calculations of the discharges from TucuruT were based on 
the historic data available from this station, supported by the more 
recent records from the other stations. However, scarcity of flow 
data meant that simulation modelling was necessary in order to 
calculate the mean monthly discharges from Tucurui and the firm 
energy. 
The mean monthly discharge was calculated as 9 000 m 3 s 4 , and 
using statistical methods the design floods for Tucuruf, were 
51 000 m3 S_ for the diversion discharge, using a recurrance interval 
of 25 years, and 100 000 m 3s for the spillway discharge, 
corresponding to a 10 000 year flood. In fact, the diversion 
discharge had already occurred once since 1949, when a flow of 
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51 100 m 3s 1 was recorded at Porto Nacional in 1957. However- this 
value was exceeded by 9 000 m 3  s - 1. in 1980, when the diversion 
structure, which had already been built, successfully withstood the 
flow. As a precaution, its height was subsequently raised a further 
3 m(648,649). 
Area of Influence of UHE Tucurul 
The Tucurul system consists of the hydroelectric power station 
of UHE TucuruT and five load points - Belém, Vila do Conde, Tucurui, 
Marabä and Imperatriz(650). 
Belém 
This port at the mouth of the Amazon river, capital of the state 
of Parã, has935000 inhabitants, and is one of the major cities in 
Brazil. It was first developed for the export of rubber, and was the 
port of entry for the whole of the Amazon region. All economic 
activity which occurred in the region was reflected by the city's 
development. However, its privileged position was lost when Amazonia 
was opened up by highways giving direct access from the South East 
through Brasflia. In recent years, its development, in relative 
terms, has been inferior to that of other cities, but the proposed 
aluminium projects, and other industrialization, are expected to 
bring a new surge of economic activity to the city and surrounding 
towns, such as Bragantina and Salgado. 
Vila do Conde 	 V 
The proposed alumina/aluminium complex of ALUNORTE and ALBRAS 
was originally to be situated at Barbacena, just outside Vila dø, 
Conde. In addition to the industrial development, it was intended to 
- 
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install an urban nucleus for about 18 000 inhabitants, and a modern 
port able to handle boats of up to 35 000 t dead weight. The port 
would have to be able to handle supplies and equipment for the 
aluminium complex and also export aluminium, produced by ALBRAS, and 
bauxite, mined by Mineraco Vera Cruz S.A. (a CVRD/RTZ consortium) in 
the Paragominas region(651). 
Tucurul 
The load area of the two towns of that name will be supplied 
with power by CELPA (Centrais Elétricas do Parâ), from the auxiliary 
supplies of the hydroelectric power station. It is expected that the 
load area will grow continue to rapidly during the construction phase 
of UHE Tucurui, but it is difficult to forecast what the load growth 
will be once the work is concluded. 
Marabã 
Electricity distribution to this load centre will not be for the 
city alone, but will include the provision of supplies to AMZA when 
it begins exploitation of the iron ore deposits in the Serra dos 
Carajas. Marabâ, an important regional nucleus in the state of Parâ, 
is the principal centre for production of the castanha de Parâ 
(Brazil nut). It is also the subject of an ambitious project to 
rebuild the town on higher land to alleviate the effects of flooding, 
to provide accommodation for the labourers expected on the Serra do 
Carajas projects and to act as an overspill to the state of Maranho. 
It is expected that the 1976 population, of 55 000, will be increased 
by more than fivefold once exploitation of the Carajas deposits 
begins(652). The town is situated on the left bank of the rio 
Tocantins a little upstream of the tailwaters of the planned Tucurul 
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lake. It is currently served by the Transamazonica highway but, once 
the reservoir is filled, it will also be accessible by river from 
Belém. Together with the construction of the proposed AMZA railway, 
the improved communications with the area are expected to further 
stimulate the growth of the town(653). 
In recent years, there has been considerable social tension in 
the area due principally to land tenure disputes between powerful 
landowners and small scale farmers. This has resulted in imprisonment 
of farmers and demonstrations and riots in the streets. The town's, 
now swollen, population of 100 000 (1980) are reported to live in a 
climate of violence and "easy" money(654). 
Imperatri z 
The load area of Imperatriz includes the North East of Brazil, 
through the CHESF distribution network, and the state of Goiâs, 
through the CELG network. It will be connected to the ELETRONORTE 
network and to Tucurul. Imperatriz is well situated on the Belém-
BrasTlia Highway, and it is a prosperous town, in an area of great 
potential development. It is expected to expand with the rational 
exploitation of its major resource the babassu palm. 
The main effect of the Tucurul scheme on its area of influence 
is expected to be the expansion of the major towns, and an increase 
in their industrialisation. 
Transmission 
A total of 720 km of transmission line will be erected between 
Belém and Imperatriz, via Tucurul, and an estimated 10 000 t of 
construction materials will be required,( Fig. 7.3). 
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The Tucurul transmission system will comprise 
a transformer sub-station at the Tucurul power station, 
a switching station, on the right bank of the river, 
downstream of the powerhouse, 
the Tucuru - Vila do Conde 500 kV transmission line, 
the Vila do Conde sub-station, 
the Vila do Conde - Belém 230 kV transmission line, 
the Belém area sub-stations (Guamä, Utinga, Miramar), 
the Tucurul - Marabâ 500 kV transmission line, 
the Marabâ sub-station, 
the Marabâ - Imperatriz 500 kV transmission line, and 
the Imperatriz sub-station(655). 
The associated transmission system of UHE Tucurui will comprise 
three 500 kV double circuits connecting the step-up sub-station to 
the switching station, situated on the right bank of the river 
downstream of the power station. The power will be transmitted over 
three 500 kV circuits to Vila do Conde, where the voltage will be 
stepped down, and thence to Belém through a double circuit 230 kV 
line. All transmission links will use three-phase alternating 
currents. 
It is expected that considerable difficulty will be experienced 
in the erection of transmission lines. Much of the terrain is 
inaccessible and swampy, and there will be difficulty in placing the 
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footings to the towers. The underlying geology is not known, and it 
will be necessary to conduct surveys prior to erection. 
Much of the area is forested, and large tracts of land will have 
to be cleared prior to siting the towers and lines. As the biomass 
regenerates itself rapidly it will be necessary to spray the area 
with herbicdes from helicopters at regular intervals, in order to 
maintain access. In places, lines will have to span extremely wide 
rivers, with the consequent need for extra high towers. 
Technical Data 	(See also Appendix 5). 
When the first phase of UHE Tucuru, currently scheduled for 
1986, is completed, it will be the largest hydroelectric power 
station to have been built entirely on Brazilian territory, the 
second largest (after UHE Itaipu) to be operated by Brazilians. It 
will consist of an 85 m high earth dam on the right bank, a spjllway 
and power house on the left bank, with step up transformers inside 
the power house, and embankments on both the left and right banks of 
Table VII.i ; Related Transmission System 
Voltage (kV) 
Number of circuits 
Length per unit (km) 
Tucuruf 	Vila do Conde/ 
V. do Conde 	Belém 
	
500 	 230 
2 	 2 
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the river. The total length of the dam and concrete structure will 
be 4 855 m, and, including the two embankments, it will stretch a 
total of 11.5 km. The reservoir impounded behind the dam will 
inundate an area of 2 160 km2 at N.A. level 72 m, and the resulting 
lake will be 200 km long and extend upstream to the city of Marabâ. 
Due to the large number of 500 kV links between the power 
station and the switching station, it was decided to adopt three-
phase transformers with double windings, each conneèted to one 
generator. Each generator is connected to the respective 
transformers which in turn are connected through a circuit breaker to 
busbars. This system reduces the number of links between the 
switching station and the power station, making it possible to 
synchronise and disconnect each generator independently. 
The Spillway 
The spillway, 575m long, 85 m high and 85 m wide at the base, 
will be a concrete gravity structure, with its axis at an angle of 
14 °  with respect to the axis of the intakes, so as to reduce the 
interference effects of the discharge upon the operation of the 
escape channel. In the body of the spillway will be 40 openings, 
each 6.5 m x 13 in, capable of draining a total flow of 51,000 m 
3 
 s-  
during the diversion phase. Later, they will be shut off with 
concrete. Stop-logs on the surface of the spillway will permit the 
maintenance of the floodgates. 
The Powerhouse 
The power intake will also be a concrete gravity structure, 
consisting of 12 blocks, 30.5 in long, and corresponding to each block 
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of the power house. The top of the structure will be 13.7 m wide, at 
N.A. level 76 m, and the intake will be equipped with 12 steel sluice 
gates, operated hydraulically. The power house, of the open type, 
and semi-underground, will be 470 m long. It will be divided into 16 
blocks housing the twelve principal generating units of 330 MW each, 
and two 20 MW auxilliary each. They will operate at a frequency of 
60 Hz and a nominal voltage of 13.8 kV. The twelve Francis turbines 
will have a maximum capacity of 330 MW, and nominal capacity of 
316 MW. Under conditions of minimum head, the capacity will be 
250 MW. 
As the result of a financing agreement between the Brazilian and 
French Governments ( 656) all the main electrical equipment for 
UHE Tucuruf and its associated transmission system will be supplied 
by French companies. The turbines are to be supplied by Neyrpic-
Creusot Loire, and the generators by Alsthom Atlantique, in 
conjunction with Industrias Elétricas, Brown Boveri and General 
Electric S.A.. The electrical equipment contracts went to CGEE.. 
Alsthom, Thermatomé, Jeumont Schneider, Merlin Gerin and Merlin 
Gerin/Egic. However, the transformers will be supplied by the 
Brazilian companies Industrias Elétricas Brown Boveri and ASEA 
Elétrica S.A.(657-658). 
The Site 
The scale of operation and isolation of the site requires all 
facilities to be established at Tucurul. 
For construction of the concrete structures and the filters in the 
earth dams, a system of stone crushing has been established, with a 
nominal production capacity of 1650 t/hr. The crushed and graded 
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material is stored separately according to size(659). 
As a result of the large quantities of concrete being used, and 
the heat generated after placement, refrigeration plants are needed 
to cool the aggregates. Flaked ice, produced by four ice machines, is 
used for concrete production to keep temperatures down during 
concrete placement and setting. The three concrete plants are 
supplied by ten cement silos and six ash silos. The sand required is 
dredged from deposits on the bed of the rio Tocantins. A compressed 
air unit has also been set up in order to supply the compressed air 
needed for transporting agglomerates from the silos to the concrete 
plant. A water filtering station provides the necessary filtered 
water(660). 
Environment 
It must be emphasised that knowledge of the area to be exploited 
and inundated by TucuruT lake is almost completely non-existent. An 
environmental assessment was carried out by ecologist Robert 
Goodland, at the request of ELETRONORTE, in 1977 (661), but no 
detailed studies of the area have been made, and it is not known how 
many indigenous peoples live in the area, what species of flora and 
fauna are present and in what quantities. The composition of this 
region rich in life can only be guessed at. There is the certainty 
of substantial ecological disturbance, but its assessment can only be 
subjective in the absence of the essential base data usually 
available from pre-disturbance surveys. 
Human ecology 
One of the most serious and emotive problems with any 
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hydroelectric scheme which floods a large area is that of the people 
to be displaced by the water. At Tucuruf this is a particularly 
sensitive subject in that most of the peoples to lose their homelands 
are Amerindians, who have no political representation at any level of 
the Brazilian State organisation. The issue of rights of the Indians 
is a hotly disputed topic (662). The Parakanan and Gavio Indians in 
the south of the state of Para are in conflict with ELETRONORTE. The 
former will have their traditional lands flooded by the Tucurui 
reservoir, and the transmission lines will pass through Gaviâo 
territory, requiring the felling of many castanha de Parâ (Brazil Nut 
trees) on which the gathering and trading livelihood of the Gavio 
depends. They are demanding compensation from ELETRONORTE for this 
loss, but the company has refused, because it believes that it has no 
responsibility for the Indians, and there is little political 
pressure for it to do so. As well as the Indians, posseiros* are also 
in conflict with the company over the possession of land. 
It is often very difficult to estimate the number of Amerindians 
in an area as few are sedentary agriculturalists. Most move their 
villages from place to place in the forest as a result of their 
slash-and-burn methods of agriculture. Often it is reported by FUNAI 
that a hitherto uncontacted tribe has been located, but usually it is 
a splinter group from a previously known tribe which has attempted to 
preserve its way of life by penetrating deeper into the forest (663). 
It was originally stated by ELETRONORTE that it would draw up a 
* Poor peasant squatters from the drought ridden North East of 
Brazil, who have no tenure over the land which they farm, and who 
move from place to place as the fertility of the soil decreases. 
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detailed census and a cadastral survey for the region, around the 
dam, which has been declared 'Utilidade Publica'. It is, in fact, 
greater than the area of inundation. All properties would be 
inventoried for structures, land use, permanent crops, livestock, 
forest products. Towns and villages would be surveyed for existing 
public areas, public buildings, shops, markets, dwellings, community 
resources such as medical, educational and religious facilities, and 
basic amenities such as water, electricity and sewage disposal. In 
the case of the Tucurul, ELETRONORTE was to offer complete and full 
indemnification for all land and 'improvements', such as dwellings, 
fences, and plantations, at the prevailing market value. Similarly, 
the communities to be inundated would be indemnified, and their 
relocation to new sites would be aided by the Instituto National de 
Colonizaco de Reforma Agraria (INCRA) who would supply transport and 
arrange agricultural credit, assistance and incentives. 
When the environmental assessment was made there were no 
population statistics available. Seventeen settlements were to be 
affected by the water, see figure 7.4 All these are riverside 
communities, presumably dependent on fishing for their livelihood. 
The largest township, Itupiranga, with a population in 1970 of around 
5 000 will be only slightly affected by Tucurul lake. However, the 
town of Jacunda, which had a population of 2 200 in 1970, will be 
completely inundated. 
Due to lack of statistics, reliance must be placed on Goodland's 
several estimates for the population to be affected, which ranged 
from 8 500 to 15 000, excluding the Indian groups living in the 
forest. ELETRONORTE informed Goodland that it would honour in full 
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survey, inventory and cadastral plans had been formulated and were 
open to bidders for carrying them out. In the •words of Goodland, 
"this process is progressing in such a humanitarian and conscientious 
manner that it is not mentioned further". 
One wonders why such a remark was made. It is unlikely that its 
author was unaware of how easily such promises are made and then 
broken. Perhaps it was a 'placebo' offered to convince ELETRONORTE 
that, he was working on their side. There is no evidence to prove 
whether these surveys were conducted, but the 'throw away' remark of 
one of the ELETRONORIE personnel in 1980 that, 'the only people to be 
moved are 30,000 odd colonial rubber settlers' suggests that little 
has been done (664). 
If the indemnifiers are willing, settlement for loss of property 
and lands, and inconvenience is relatively simple, especially if 
there are legal guidelines. However, this is only the case if the 
claimants have a legal title to the land. Land tenure in Amazonia, as 
in the rest of Brazil, is extremely complex and its organisation is 
usually corrupt. Very few people have formal documentary or 
registered title to the land on which they work and, therefore, they 
have no legal claim to the land in the eyes of the Federal and State 
Governments (665). The only people who can afford to purchase land 
titles are the rich entrepreneurs from the south of Brazil or 
overseas (666). In the region to be inundated by Tucurui reservoir 
very few of the people possess registered and undisputed 
proprietorship to the land they occupy. 
Consequently, ELETRONORTE had decided to accept 'usucapion' - 
claim to title by uninterupted possession for a defined period. The 
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claimant must prove before a judge that the land has been exploited 
by him continuously for 40 years (prescricao acquisitiva 
quarentenaria' or ' praescriptio longisimi temparis') (667) as 
federal, unowned land, in addition to showing proper humility and 
having been law abiding. If the land is subsequently found to be 
owned the period is reduced to 20 years, or even 15 years on invoking 
the 'in good faith' clause of the 'Côdigo Civil', 1973. If 
'usucapion' is accepted, then the 'usucapient' is indemnified as per 
the proprietor. 
Non-settled users of land who live by extraction of products 
such as nuts, latex, timber and animal hides are 'ineligible for 
usucapion for twenty years'. The State of Para will therefore offer 
the land involved for sale at the prevailin-g rate, or INCRA will cede 
100 ha and will auction the balance. Posseiros (see page 281 ), 
because they are regarded as squatters are accorded no such rights, 
and it is proposed to only give them indemnification for any dwelling 
they may have built. 
A significant number of families, up to two-thirds of those 
affected by TucuruT reservoir, will have little or. no right to 
indemnification in the eyes of ELETRONORTE. Such treatment could 
bring great hardship to the already poor posseiros and, possibly, as. 
many as 10 000 will rr be affected in this way (668). Despite 
successful relocation of posseiros in the south of Brazil, by 
ELETROSUL at the Passo Fundo project in 1970, it does not appear that 
this example, where ELETROSUL provided basic accommodation, wells and 
septic systems, will be followed(669). Although the posseiros are 
prepared by the very nature of their existence for movement from one 
agricultural tract of land to another in a short time period, they 
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will still suffer from the enforced removal from the land without 
compensation. 
Many of the village dwellers along the rio Tocantins depend for 
their livelihoods on fishing, nearly all of them being riverside 
dwellers. Goodland suggested, therefore, that their experience be 
exploited in lake fisheries, and that they should be aided in setting 
these up, using different fish species and new fishing techniques. 
On the whole, Amazonia is not suitable for annual subsistance 
agriculture, the soil being too poor in nutrients to sustain adequate 
crop yields. Despite the land being covered by lush vegetation, the 
soil contains very few nutrients. These are all held in the 
vegetation and lost when it is removed. Loss of vegetation cover also 
leads to degradation of the soil as it is no longer protected from 
the penetrating rays of the sun. In addition, the problems posed by 
pests and weeds are considerable. 
The area to be inundated is rife with social unrest (see page 
274), with many land disputes being resolved through violence. In the 
five year period 1971 to 1976, half of such reported land disputes 
produced victims of violence, and of these more than half led to 
deaths. A greater number of people are killed than are wounded, and 
many more have their property destroyed (670). Poverty is widespread 
and endemic, as is reflected by the rising infant mortality. Crop 
yields are low, food prices are high and rising. All these problems 
are exacerbated by waves of new immigrants from the drought stricken 
northeast of the country. The whole situation is critically 
inflammable but is, as yet, played down by the media. ELETRONORTE has 
requested outside researchers not to delve into such sensitive topics 
as 'expelled officials, muzzled priests, imprisoned politicians, 
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subversion, murdered soldiers' (671), 	althOugh it is not directly 
implicated. 
It is within the power of ELETRONORTE to improve the local 
social conditions and, in fact, much has been done in the old town of 
Tucurul(672),(see page 266), but, equally, it is within the company's 
power to reduce the quality of life of many people by insensitive and 
unfair indemnification of real losses incurred as a result of the 
Tucurul scheme. 
Amerindians 
The plight of the surviving Amerindians of the Amazon Forest is 
a better known, and an internationally sensitive, problem. Knowledge 
of their condition is well known to anthropologists, who have been 
more assiduous in studying primitive tribal societies, than in 
studying the displaced poor created by the impact of the modern 
industrial society. The media, too, is undoubtedly more interested in 
the fate of tribal societies; it makes for better headlines. Despite 
this, the plight of the Amerindian is relatively worse. He is less 
used to fighting for his lands, he is certainly less versed in the 
ways of the large company and in adjusting to the modern world. The 
posseiro has learned to fight and those who survive move on. Often 
very few of the Amerindians survive when faced by the same pressures. 
How many Amerindians will be affected by the TucuruI scheme is 
not easy to estimate. The nomadic nature of many of these people, and 
their mistrust of the white man or non-forest dweller, coupled with 
the cover up operations of FUNAI and ELETRONORTE, make it difficult 
to assess the situation with any certainty. According to Goodland the 
three indigenous reserves which will by affected by the Tucurul 
project are the Parakanan, the Pucurul and the Mae Maria. The first 
two will be - inundated by the reservoir, and the transmission lines to 
Imperatriz will cut through the Mae Maria reserve, along with the 
Carajas iron railroad (if it is built) and the Tucuru - Belérn 
highway (673). 
The Amerindians in this area have already suffered the pressures 
of advancing pioneer fronts. From the 1950s onwards there has been a 
substantial influx of s c i v ili zadoss, and the opening -of the 
Transamazonica from Marabâ to Itaituba on the rio Tapajos. In order 
to mitigate the adverse consequences of the TucuruT project on the 
Amerindians in the region, FUNAI developed a plan of action, which 
was presented to ELETRONORTE in 1977. It included an aerial survey, 
to be followed by a land expedition designed to identify all tribal 
groups of Indians present, to estimate their numbers, and the size 
and home range of each tribe. 
A special FUNAI expedition was proposed in order to make an 
inventory of the Parakanan reserve, and to determine Brazil nut tree 
stands, fertile plots of land, holy sites and burial grounds. As part 
of the plan of action the Amerindians would be encouraged to take 
advantage of free medical services, including appropriate 
prophylactic vaccinations. No proposals were included however, for 
educational or agricultural assistence to be offered. The fifth part 
of the plan was the relocation of the FUNAI post from the Pucuru 
reserve. 
Despite the great cost of building the Trans-Amazonian highway, 
the Tucuruf reservoir will flood a 40 km section between Jatobal and 
Repartimento, in addition to the 65 km of the BR-422 connecting Vila 
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do Repartimento and Tucurul. The stretch 
inundated is at present the eastern 
reserve, and the shortest and cheapest 
would penetrate deeply into the reserve. 
that this would be even more harmful to 
than the projected inundation. 
of the Transamazonica to be 
boundary of the Parakanan 
re-routing of this section 
It is considered, by FUNAI, 
the survival of the Indians 
Even with the greatest of goodwill, indemnification of the 
Indians for their losses will be a difficult subject to deal with 
satisfactorily. In 1976, FUNAI submitted a calculation to ELETRONORTE 
of the indemnity required for the deforestation of a 19 km by 10 m 
strip in the Mae Maria reserve. However, it was then discovered that 
due to a bizarre legal anomaly there is an impediment to 
indemnification, with the result that ELETRONORTE asserted that there 
was no necessity whatsoever for it to pay any indemnity to the 
Indians for loss of use of the trees(674). In the end, the company 
suggested that indemnification should depend on the actual value of 
the destroyed trees, rather than on the ten year loss of future 
profits, as suggested by FUNAI, and that the payment was not to be 
made in advance. The impasse was not broken, and a Presidential 
decree was issued at the request of ELETRONORTE, authorising the 
company access to lands 'in the interests of national development'. 
There is now no need whatsoever for any indemnity to be paid. 
What the Amerindians will suffer and lose as a result of the 
Tucurul project can only be guessed at and accurate and honest 
reports after the event will be difficult to obtain. However, it is 
fair to assume that ELETRONORTE will pay out very little for what the 
Indians will lose. 
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Flora and Fauna 
The Amazon region is the richest in the world in terms of the 
variety of its flora and fauna. It is believed to contain many 
species as yet unknown to man, and, with the inundation daused by the 
Tucurui reservoir, some may be irretrievably lost. For any 
substantial development of the Amazon basin such a loss is inevitable: 
and incalculable. A few well known mammals will become further 
endangered, as will plants and insects and other forms of wild life 
in the area. But without detailed surveys little can be said of the 
losses which will occur. However, it is certain that habitats and 
species will be lost, and ecosystems disrupted. 
Judging from ELETRONORTE's response to other environmental 
aspects of the project it is extremely unlikely that there will be 
any animal rescue as was arranged at the other Amazonian project of 
Lake Brokopondo in Surinam (675). 
Social Problems 
The very isolated nature of the Tucurul scheme leads to a number 
of specific problems. The lives of the workforce are very much run 
by ELETRONORTE, which supplies everything, including the meals, and 
this has resulted in serious unrest. 
On Easter Friday, 4th April 1980, when tensions had been running 
high for some time, there was a fatal clash between the peons* 
working on the construction site, and the security agents of the 
construction company, Camargo Corrëia. The peons had made a "Judas 
*peon - manual labourer recruited from the North East and 
Goias. 
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doll", as was traditional, to be flailed on Easter Sunday, but they 
had dressed it in the uniform of the site internal security service. 
According to one report(676), more than 2 000 workers had been 
part .icipating in this "jest", and they had attempted to process with 
the "Judas", to which they had attached posters criticising Camargo 
Corrêia, to exhibit it in the principal square of the Vila 
Temporaria, in which reside about 12 000 of the workers and their 
families. 
Some of the security agents, on learning of the procession, 
attempted to interrupt it and to prevent the displaying of the 
"Judas" in the security agent uniform. The security agents took it 
upon themselves to arrest four of the leading demonstrators. The 
other demonstrators reacted to this, and in retaliation the guards 
discharged their revolvers in the air, but shortly followed by then 
shooting into the crowd, causing great confusion. 
A group of peons then resorted to vandalism, which rapidly 
escalated, with the setting on fire of two kombi vans, the raiding of 
a supermarket, the robbing of a restaurant and some of the hostels. 
The fire station was prevented from sending fire fighters to put out 
the fires which had been started. The situation became chaotic, 
"shots and cries were heard, and there was running in all directions" 
according to one eye witness(677). Another newspaper reported that 
eight peons were arrested and taken to the Delegacia (Police 
Station), and that by 2 a.m. 2 000 peons had overcome the security 
sentry box and the Camargo Corrëia security centre, setting fire to 
them both. 
Shots were fired at the demonstrators, but, by virtue of 
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numbers, they were able to overpower and disarm the guards. It was at 
this stage that it is believed that some deaths occurred. One report 
claimed there were six, one of which was a child(678). By 3 a.m., the 
Policia Militar (Military Police) had been called in, and they soon 
gained control of the situation, with the peons agreeing to return to 
their homes on condition that the prisoners who had been arrested in 
connection with the "Judas were released. The Delegado de Policia de 
Tucurul (Police Commissioner) agreed to this, and the first part of 
the rebellion was contained. 
• However, the continued presence of 60 members of the Policia 
Militar caused great tension throughout the districts of TucuruI and 
further arrests were made during the morning. The peons went to work 
as usual on the Saturday morning, but the situation became more 
inflamed when further police reinforcements arrived from Belém and 
Marabâ, together with twelve extra Policia Militar flown in from 
Belém in a specially chartered aeroplane. A new revolt started in the 
refectories, with the workers complaining about the food, and the 
compulsory deductions made from their salaries. These deductions are 
to cover the cost of food and bedding, and some workers often find it 
difficult to understand exactly what the ELETRONORTE deductions are, 
because, in some cases, it is claimed they reach as much as 70% of 
the total salary. 
Most of the permanent workers are obliged to remain at the site 
until the completion of their contracts. They have insufficient 
resources to make visits to their home towns, and have no control 
over the food with which they are supplied. At unskilled levels 1 
and 2, they are given rice, eggs and beans in the refectories; 
whereas workers at level 3 and above receive fish(679). At the 
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executive level the food is excellent with a wide choice of dishes in 
waiter service restaurants, (a personal experience). According to one - 
employee:"the work on the site is done under tension, the peon is 
rebelling because his money is deducted, because he eats badly and 
because he is treated badly by the security men". This was given as 
the explanation for the action of the peons with the "Judas". They 
wished to attack Camargo Corrëia and, especially, the security agents 
who, despite only earning the same as peons at levels 1 and 2, are 
armed and dressed in uniforms and treat the workers with violence and 
discrimination. The working conditions are the same in almost all the 
large projects in Amazonia. In 1973, peons at the Jari project made a 
protest about the food during a visit of President Medici to the 
company. In 1978, there was a mutiny amongst the peons at the mineral 
company, Rio do Norte, which is exploiting the bauxite at Trombetas. 
However, the riot at TucuruT is probably the more serious because of 
the large numbers of people involved and the heavy investment 
commitments made in this enormous project(680). 
In the end, the rebellion was contained by large numbers of 
police, because, according to the Delegado de Policia de Tucuru, it 
had been feared that the rebels would gain possession of the store of 
dynamite, which Carnargo Corrëia held for excavation of the river 
bed(681). 
The truth behind the whole episode is not completely clear. The 
headlines in the newspaper "Estado do Minas" were "Dez mortos na 
rebelio en Tucurui" ("Ten dead in the Tuc uruT .  rebellion"), although 
the report below later stated that on the site, the story was four 
peons and two security men were killed during the skirmishes and a 
child died, probably from a random shot or by crushing in the 
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general pandemonium. following the first shots(682). Whereas in the 
"Folho de Sao Paulo" newspaper, a death toll - ofsix was reported, one 
of whom was a child who died during the sacking of the 
supermarket(683). 
Camargo Corrëia headquarters 	in Belém initially claimed 
ignorance of the situation although a chartered aeroplane with 
Military Police reinforcements had been dispatched, under their 
auspices, from Belém to Tucurul. However, by Saturday afternoon there 
was a complete embargo by Camargo Corréla on the publication of 
information. All the journalists and press officers were called to 
the Director of Works, where they were told that : "There are no 
dead, only four injured,repeat, only four injured, three slightly and 
one more seriously"*. However, it was still reported in the popular 
press that deaths had occurred. A journalist, from the "Folha de Sao 
Paulo", present at the rebellion, estimated the numbers at five 
adults and one child, though he reported a Camargo Corrêia 
telephonist as puttinq the number up to eight, and an ELETRONORTE 
telex operator reporting no more than three. The report finished with 
the hope that an official notice from the Secretaria de Seguranca, 
expected later that day, would reveal the actual numbers of dead and 
injured(684)*. 
The consequences of this level of unrest could be extremely 
serious. In such an isolated location large numbers of rebellious 
* These two reports were displayed on the ELETROBRAS head office 
notice board by the Departamento de Assessoria for general infor-
mation. But, subsequent to copying down the information, no more 
notices appeared, and access was refused to the press cuttings 
file, so there was no available information on the outcome of this 
riot at Tucurui. 
- 295 - 
workers would be difficult to contain, and strikes would slow down 
considerably the construction work schedule, and jeopardise the 
several thousand million dollar investment. It is an extremely harsh 
environment in which to work, hot and, humid with almost prison 
conditions, and, therefore, poor food and poor management decisions 
are keenly felt. Many of the peons are from the drought ridden 
north-east of Brazil, and are grateful to escape from starvation 
conditions, but if the operating companies try to capitalize on this, 
the project may not be completed successfully. 
Forest Problems 
The lake which will be formed behind the Tucurui dam will be 
some 200 km long, and will inundate an area of 2 160 km 2 (685). The 
entire area to be flooded is almost totally primaeval tropical rain 
forest, and there is considerable controversy over the best method of 
dealing with the available wood, as the wider implications are not 
understood. At the engineering level it is treated lightly; "but 
TucuruT is in an area which is flooded annually anyway" (686),"and 
only some areas have large trees of valuable hardwoods"(687). 
To date only one survey has been made of the area to be 
inundated by the Tucurui lake. This was the environmental 
reconnaissance made by Robert Goodland in order to identify and 
assess the potential impact of such inundation. The survey was 
carried out in 1977, when little data was available or made 
available, and many of its conclusions are based on Goodland's own 
extensive experience of tropical rain forest ecology, rather than on 
verified facts. 
Despite the recommendations made in the report, a further survey 
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will not be made until one year prior to inundation. In an agreement 
reached between INPA and CNPq, INPA will make a comprehensive study 
of the area over a period of five years, commencing one year before 
closure of the dam(688). 
It is very difficult to assess the effects of inundation because 
this will be the largest expanse of tropical moist forest in the 
world to be flooded by a reservoir in the world. Only one other of 
the world's large reservoirs is located in a relatively undisturbed 
tropical forest region, Lake Brokopondo in Suriname,(area=1 500 km 2 ). 
A number of detrimental and unpleasant effects were observed after 
the closure of the Brokopondo dam, with noxious gases being generated 
and a eutrophied lake resulting(689). In Brazil itself, there has 
been, no experience of reservoirs under moist tropical conditions. 
Most of the others are situated in cerrado*, savannah or semi-desert 
regions, and a few are in temperate areas of agriculture or disturbed 
forest. (Itaipu is one of these). 
There are two small reservoirs in the Brazilian Amazon. Coaracy 
Nunes was created in 1975, and the small area, 23 m 2 , flooded 
contained a mixture of savannah and some seasonal and riparian 
forest. The floding of such a small area has caused few problems. The 
area of 86 km  of reservoir behind the 20 MW Curua-Una hydroelectric 
power station was not cleared before inundation; and, even during the 
filling process, decomposition gases were noticed by people 60 km 
distant, who complained of a sulphurous smell (690). 
*Cerrado - veoetation correspondino laraely to the Central Brazilian 
Shield. 
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So, furnished only with the 'experience from these two small 
schemes and the example of Surinam's Lake Brokopondo, ELETRONORTE and 
the Brazilian government have had to try to decide on the best policy 
for treating the area of forest to be inundated by Tucurui lake. 
Although the area of inundation of Lake Brokopondo contains features 
similar to those of Tucurui, there is, in the opinion of Goodland, 
one significant difference, Lake Brokopondo has almost never spilled 
water and, in fact, electricity generation has been curtailed in 
order to maintain reservoir levels. The streamfiow through the lake 
is slow, and hence the water retention time in the lake is long.These 
conditions will not be found at Tucurul. The average flow of the rio 
Tocantins is 9 000 m 3s 1 , and when twelve of the UHE Tucurui turbines 
are in operation, the total discharge through them will be 6 900 3-1 
(see appendix 5 ). Over an average year there will be 22% of 
excess water to be spilled resulting in fast circulation and short 
retention time for the water in the reservoir. 
As 	the 	rainfall 	in 	much 	of 	the 	Tocantins 	basin 	is 
seasonal,Tucurui reservoir will be subject to a dry season, during 
which the drawdown on the reservoir will be up to 14 m, in order to 
maintain the power output. This large drawdown is much greater than 
that of Lake Brokopondo, which at most drops 3 m below nominal level 
in a year. Such a large drawdown in Tucurui, coupled with the fast 
river flows in the wet season, will facilitate better aeration of the 
water and thus lead to different mechanisms of decomposition of the 
forest wood should it be flooded(691). 
Before it was dammed, the Suriname river was oligotrophic and 
slightly acidic (pH 6.5). After closure this dropped to-pH 5.3, as a 
result of decomposition of the organic matter from the forest. 
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Hydrogen sulphide was produced and caused an objectionable nuisance 
to people many kilometres down-wind.'This took some years to clear 
and, eventually the pH rose to a level of pH 7.3 eleven years after 
closure. Over the intervening years the lake was dead and odorous. It 
had a very low oxygen content and, in fact, the water was not 
reoxygenated below the dam, thus causing depletion of the fisheries 
in the Suriname River estuary. There was considerable trouble with 
the proliferation of the Water Hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes), 
which, by the third year after closure, covered 40% of the reservoir 
surface. This was dealt with by chemical spraying, resulting in the 
decomposition of poisoned water weeds, which had sunk to the 
reservoir bottom. 
Reoxygenation of the river below the dam has now taken place and 
fish have returned, whether or not to previous levels cannot be 
guaged, as no fish studies were made prior to damming the river. Nor 
were the relative contributions to deoxygenation by forest 
decomposition, floating waterweed rnats(as a physical barrier to 
oxygenation), decomposition of killed waterweed, and little 
turbulence assessed. Although Lake Brokopondo is the most similar 
reservoir to the Tucurui lake to be formed, there is very little 
factual information available about the former , on which to base 
projections on what will happen to the latter if 2 600 km 2 of forest 
are inundated. 
Where timber has been left standing in the water, there are many 
major effects which have been observed(692). The major practical 
contention is whether or not it is economically worthwhile to remove 
the vegetation from reservoirs prior to flooding. Much of this 
argument depends 'upon the proposed use of the reservoir(693). At 
- 299 - 
Tucurul, the commonest concern is that of the decomposition of the 
vegetation which will occur if such a large area is left uncleared 
prior to flooding, and whether the decomposition will be aerobic or . 
anaerobic. 
No oxygen concentrations in the water in the project area had 
been determined at the time of the environmental assessment, but they 
are related to the retention time of the water in the reservoir, the 
depth, the temperature and the speed of circulation. At Tucurui these 
factors favour oxygenation of the water. ELETRONORTE calaculated the 
mean water retention time in the reservoir to be two months. It also 
calculated the average depth of the reservoir to be 20m or less, 
which is, approximately, the greatest depth to which oxygen 
penetrates (694). When the reservoir is at the normal maximum level, 
50% of it wil be less than 17 m deep, and at the low level the depth 
of 50% of the reservoir will be less than 7 m(695). Therefore, most 
of the lake will be shallow enough to be oxygenated from the surface 
by diffusion, turbulence and photosynthesis. 
Goodland considered that much of the forest will decompose 
rapidly under aerobic conditions. The decomposition will be at its 
most rapid during the months of fill, slowing down as the maximum 
operating level is reached and then accelerating again during the 
drawdown period. During the aerobic decomposition, the acidity of the 
water will increase due to carbon dioxide dissolution and by 
formation of acids of the humic series(696). In addition, most of the 
Amazonian trees have highly acidic wood (pH 2.6), and Goodland 
expects that most of the softer parts of the trees will have 
decomposed by the third drawdown period, that is, within three years. 
The fully submerged trees in deep water will take much longer to 
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decompose. 
Some of the vegetation will change as a result of frictional 
ablation of the softer parts due to scouring action of suspended sand 
particles, but the extent of such ablation cannot be estimated as 
there is no relevant data available. Mechanical damage will also 
occur due to falling trees hitting others which are still standing, 
and floating trees which will crash into standing trees downstream 
because of the high river flows which occur. 
Goodland 	assumes 	that there will 	be 	little 	anaerobic 
decomposition within Tucurui lake because of the rapid water 
circulation and the shallow depth. The deepest parts of the reservoir 
will be immediately behind the dam and in the former river channel, 
but the bottom of the penstocks are set low in the dam, and it is 
unlikely that there will be much stagnent water below them. 
Stop-logs protect the diversion galleries and at high water 
these could be opened briefly and periodically to improve aeration by 
turbulance. Thus, the most likely place for anaerobic decomposition 
will be in the deep water behind the eastern section of the dam and 
in the channel behind it. The main problems caused by this will be 
the production of the poisonous and offensively malodorous gas, 
hydrogen sulphide, and the precipitation out of insoluble iron and 
manganese sulphides.(Iron and manganese are abundant in the latosols 
of the area to be flooded). 
Although Goodland considers that anaerobic decomposition in 
Tucurui lake will be restricted, both in area and seasonal duration, 
he recommended that the risk zones should be cleared of major 
vegetation. 
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Eutrophication is unlikely to be a major problem as the water 
flowing into the reservoir is oligotrophic(697) and carries virtually 
no accumulated fertilizer. However, particularly in the upper area of 
the drainage basin, the rapid development and immigration to the area 
will intensify agriculture(and fertilizer use), extensive 
deforestation, burning and erosion. All such activities would augment 
the inorganic nutrient loading in the rivers. Although the forest 
contains only 5% of inorganic nutrients, the bulk of them occurs in 
the leaves, fine twigs and bark - all those parts of trees which are 
susceptible to anaerobic decomposition when in water.Although 
unmeasured, the biomass of the forest is extremely large and the 
release of these inorganic nutrients into the water could be 
significantly high. 
According to Goodland, the physical effects of flooding the 
Tucurui forest need not be too serious. An advantage of leaving the 
trees standing would be the erosion protection offered to the lake 
bed. However, standing trees prevent easy navigation, an earlier aim 
of the scheme, and fishing. Mechanical interference with the dam and 
auxilliary structures could occur due to sunken rolling logs and 
floating timber. Trees left standing in the reservoir will break off 
or fall down from the start of inundation and will continue to do so 
for decades. It is possible that much of this floating timber could 
be exploited commercially at a profit, and the unmarketable wood be 
salvaged for domestic fuel or charcoal production and export(698). 
Accurate estimates of the quantity and variety of the timber to 
be inundated have still to be made, but a large quantity of floating 
timber can be expected, and it will be necessary to incorporate some 
kind of protection system to avoid damage to the reservoir structures 
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such as special spillways for •voiding logs, intake grilles to 
withstand the timber, equipped with grille cleaners or substantial 
trash racks. Similarly, if navigation and fishing are to be 
important uses of the lake, some selective reservoir site clearance 
must be effected prior to inundation in order to provide for net 
fishing and navigation channels. 
The most obvious effect which will be felt if the forest is not 
cleared is the major financial loss due to drowning of commercially 
valuable timber. In 1977, Brazil was a net importer of wood and wood 
products, hence the flooding of some 2 000 km 2 of high grade timber 
would represent a considerable waste of an indigenous resource. 
However, it is not easy to set up logging operations prior to 
flooding in this extensive, isolated region. At the time' of the 
environmental assessment, in 1977, it was planned that the bulk of 
the forest would be abandoned unused. Under the presidential 
"Utilidade Publica" decree the land to be inundated does not become 
the property of ELETRONORTE until the flooding starts; and the 
company, therefore, disclaimed responsibility at the pre-inundation 
phase. It was claimed by ELETRONORTE that forest utilization was not 
"economic" because the land belbnged to others, transport costs 
exceeded benefits, similar timber was more accessible closer to the 
markets, and so on. 
Goodland recommended a specific reservoir clearance plan to be 
designed and executed before closure of the dam. He suggested that a 
detailed study be made to avoid adverse consequences. However, due 
to ELETRONORTE'S refusal to delay the construction schedule there has 
been insufficient time for effective study. 
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Despite the strong recommendations made by Goodland, in 1977, 
there was, by 1980, no indication that any detailed forest inventory 
had been made nor a clearance plan designed. More recently, however, 
there have been many of signs that the Federal Government has 
suddenly become aware of the potential revenue from the forest, and 
hence moves have been made to start exploitation of the wood. 
However, it has become obvious that the clearance will be undertaken 
more or less at random and according to the whim of the firms awarded 
clearance contracts, rather than according to a specific plan which 
has considered navigation channels, erosion, water-weed control and 
areas of anaerobic decomposition, and the needs of the fish. 
The Brazilian authorities have been largely undecided about the 
fate of the wood in the Tucuruf reservoir area. They appear to have 
been overwhelmed by the enormity of the problem and the large number 
of unknown factors. Two years after Goodland's environmental 
assessment, the Instituto Brasileiro do Desenvolvimento Florestal 
(IBDF) and ELETRONORTE signed an agreement under which IBDF would 
supervise the working of the 2 160 km 2 of the forest to be flooded. 
According to the surveys then made, there were approximately 13.5 x 
10  
m3 of first class hardwoods, including mahogany, and 20 x 1O 6 m3 
of potentially exploitable second grade wood for use as charcoal or 
fi rewood(699). 
IBDF required that any companies, bidding for contracts for the 
cutting and processing of the lumber, must have a majority of 
Brazilian capital in order to ensure that Brazilian interests control 
the lumber operations. At one time, it had been feared that the 
Federal Government would open the area to foreign enterprises, and 
that, once the operations in the Tucurul area were complete, they 
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would seize the opportunity to move to other regions of the Amazon, 
creating additional areas of devastation (700). 
In October 1979, it was reported that a competition for the 
rights to extract the timber would be convened by notice to be 
published at the end of the month. Multi-national firms were to be 
allowed to bid so long as they were part of a consortium led by a 
Brazilian enterprise. The only financial requirements called for by 
ELETRONORTE were a minimum capital of Cr$ 20 x 10 6  ($ US 600 x 10 at 
1979 rates) and a bond of security worth 20% of the value of the bid 
entered by the firm. In this way ELETRONORTE was exhibiting caution 
by demanding a banking surity and guaranteeing the financial capacity 
of the interested firms. 
Despite the earlier report, in October 1979, of ELETRONORTE's 
intention to award contracts for the exploitation of the timber, 
the President of IBDF, Carlos Neves Galluf, was obliged, in February 
1980, to place the blame for the short time remaining for extraction 
of the timber on the delay of ELETRONORTE'S decision with respect to 
the bidding.He denied a Federal Government statement that only 40% of 
the wood at Tucurul would be utilized as a direct result of the short 
time remaining for deforestation prior to inundation. He added that, 
despite this short time, the reason that only 40% of the wood would 
be commercially developed was that in accordance with a survey 
completed by SUDAM it represented the percentage of exploitable first 
class timber. The rest would be used as charcoal(701). Galluf 
commented on the rigid terms of the competition for the right to 
extract the timber. By this time there was a demand for a minimum 
capital of Cr$ 500 x 
10  from the firms. This high figure was to 
ensure that the high investment costs, in terms of equipment needed 
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for deforestation, 'could be met. He added that there was no, intention 
to exclude the exporters from the.north of Brazil from the bidding, 
as had been claimed by Paulo Correia, the President of the Associacao 
de Exportadores de Madeira do Para and Amapâ(702). 
By 1980, the township of Tucurui itself had developed interest 
and concern over the utilization of the timber and a number of 
articles appeared in the local newspaper, "A Folha de Tucuru" at 
that time. On the front page appeared a pointed attack on the 
bureaucratic absurdities which were proliferating. The Paraense 
timber firms, and those from Amazonia in general, were finding it 
impossible to compete with overseas interests for the extraction of 
the timber at Tucurul, because of the prohibitive capital demands 
required by IBDF, and the State Governor of Parã, Alacid Nines, had 
pledged himself to the cause of the local companies and was 
attempting to arrange a meeting between IBDF and the Ministers of 
Planning and Agriculture, with the intention of setting a lower 
capital requirement(703). 
Within ELETRONORTE' itself there was no obvious great concern. 
The whole subject was dismissed in a couple of sentences: "There is 
an agreement with IBOF about the inundation question. Certain areas 
will be deforested but, from the experience gained from the Jan 
project, only some area-s contain valuable wood. This will be cut for 
use, but, anyway, Tucurul is in an area which is flooded 
annually"(704). This is neither an informed nor interested view, and 
the last remark clearly demonstrates ignorance or dishonesty. 
Although the Tocantins floods annually, the waters do not rise 
sufficiently to flood the entire 2 160 km  to be inundated by the 
TucuruI reservoir. The speaker also commented that "the vegetation 
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growth is rapid,. if deforestation takes place now,(1980), by the time 
of the dam closure in 1983 the trees will have grown again. At Jan, 
within two years of clearing, the biomass was 60 - 70% of the 
original"(705). This neglects the fact that the biomass cover will be 
of a different nature, and will not include large trees (see page 
233). 
The overall attitude of ELETRONORTE to the use of the wood may 
be summarised by an observation made during a visit to the dam site - 
the wall covering in the offices at Tucurul was made of formica with 
a wood grain pattern! 
A contract, awarded by ELETRONORTE to INPA for a "half billion 
dollars" was principally for studies of health and general 
environmental effects(706). No allowance has been set aside for 
forestry research. Estimates of the quantity and type of wood in the 
forest are incomplete, but even if only three species of hardwood are 
considered, the potential revenue from their extraction is of the 
order of $US 1 to 4 x 10(707). 
Estimates, by one of the INPA forestry experts, put the volume 
of lumber at 115 m 3 per hectare, which gives a total volume of nearly 
24 x106 m3 . Even considered only as firewood, this represents an 
energy content of approximately 300 x 10 GJ (708). 
The figures for the resources potential of the forest are not 
always in agreement (709) thei nventory survey put the incidence of 
castanha de Para(Brazil Nut) at 40 m 3 ha - , but when an official from 
INPA flew over the proposed area of inundation with a taxonomist no 
trees of this variety were observed(710).However, in the opinion of 
the INPA official, the problems being experienced at TucuruT should 
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not occur with the developments of the rio Xingo, because there will 
be more time available for planning and execution of timber 
extraction and environmental protection. In the case of Tucuruf, 
ELETRONORTE will not delay the construction schedule for 
environmental cosiderations, and this, coupled with the lack of a 
basic infrastructure, difficulty of access to the area, and lack of 
necessary deforestation equipment and trained personnel, means that 
economic removal of the timber in so short a time is difficult(711). 
The problem of utilisation of the timber has been considered at 
Federal Government level and, in 1980, a law was under preparation in 
order to define forest policy(712), but it was too late to resolve 
the problem at Tucurul. 
Set-backs were also experienced in the awarding of contracts to 
undertake the necessary work. In May 1980, the process of awarding 
them was cancelled as a result of the inadequate information 
contained in the four proposals presented by bidders. It was revealed 
by Roberto Amaral, Commercial Director of IBDF and head of the 
commission for awarding the contracts, that the proposals received 
were more akin to letters of intent and did not satisfy the demands 
set down by the IBDF. In addition, various undisclosed consortia had 
compromised the requirements laid down, secure in the knowledge that 
more time would be given for submission of proposals. As a result 
IBDF rejected all the proposals and reopened the bidding for 
contracts, with the intention of awarding them in June that 
year(713). 
Although the question of the timber at Tucurul has not been 
resolved, no allowance has been made by ELETRONORTE for the increased 
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time required for deforestation and the construction and lakefill 
schedules will not be adjusted for this reason(714). Also, having 
eventually encouraged the interest of a number of consortia in the 
extraction of the timber at Tucurui, the original area for extraction 
activities has since been extended to a much greater area than that 
to be inundated by the resevoir. 
In the beginning, the pioneering nature of the contract work was 
identified as the principal factor in the poor number of proposals 
presented by interested parties, and this had already forced an 
extension in the time allowed for the submission of proposals. 
Therefore, when the time for the competition was extended, the IBDF 
did not expect new candidates to appear. Although bids for the 
contracts had been slow there had not been complete disinterest; on 
the contrary fourteen firms had met the terms of the competition. The 
president of the Associaco Brasileira dos Produtores de Madeira, 
Nodario Azeredo, was not surprised by IBOF's decision to reopen the 
competition for contracts. He was quoted as having already forseen 
it, and, according to him, the conditions required by IBDF would have 
to be altered so that the local wood industries would be able to 
compete. However, for this to happen the security of capital demanded 
would have to be reduced from the Cr$ 500 x 10  back to a more 
realistic Cr$ 50 x 10 
6
.Azeredo further stated that the "IBDF had 
wanted to resolve the problem in an authoritarian manner"(715). 
Initially, the region to be inundated by the Tucurui reservoir 
was divided into seven plots, to be handed over for private 
development, and a further three experimental areas reserved for the 
IBDF, which had not defined how it would use them. The wood which 
the IBDF could extract from these areas could be exported, in order 
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to open up the market., but principally the areas would be used to 
study the diverse species of trees in the region. Although IBDF had 
not proposed to give one sole bidder a monopoly on the extraction of 
timber, all of the bidders expressed the opinion that they had no 
intention of sharing the contract between seven(716). 
The whole question of the extraction of the timber extends far 
beyond Tucurui. As it is intended that much more of the Amazonas 
Basin will be developed for hydroelectric power production, it is not 
a question which will be easily resolved. 'It is a question of 
negotiations for twenty years' stated the director of IBDF. In that 
time the total area to be inundated will be 15 000 km 
2, 
 which will 
yield approximately 100 x 10 m 3 of extractable wood and generating 
$US 30 x 10 over 20 years. According to calculations by IBDF there 
will be an annual revenue of $US 1.5 x 10 towards the country's 
balance of payments(717). In order to guarantee a good flow of 
exports, the firms involved would have to have a high level of 
operational management, infrastructure and technology in the field 
of extraction. Due to the inexperience of national entrepreneurs, 
foreign expertise and capital will, inevitably, be present in the 
Tucuruf project, although, there was no information available on the 
sources of external capital which the consortia bidding for the 
contracts have access. 
As of 1982, this was the situation, with almost everyone 
concerned having lost sight of the reasons for extracting the wood. 
Inevitably, whatever happens, there will be a great ecological 
disaster. Whether it is deforested or not prior to inundation, the 
area will not be adequately studied, and many species of tree, plant 
and animal will be lost and little new knowledge will result. At 
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worst, it is possible that there will be an extremely large, 
unpleasant and dead environment covering 2 160 km 2 . For the time 
being, it appears unlikely that there will be any effective 
environmental management of this area, although it was strongly 
recommended by Goodland. 
o 
In the last few months of 1982 there were some new developments 
in the saga of deforestation at Tucurui. In order to help fund the 
deforestation programme which is now under way, a Government run 
pension fund has been misappropriated and there are rumours of a 
great scandal. In addition, it is also rumoured a defoliant has been 
used to remove the leaves from the trees. The same defoliant was used 
in Vietnam with devastating effects on both people and environment, 
and it is frightehing to think of the scale of the damage which may 
have been experienced at Tucurui(718). Unfortunately, the scandal 
involved in these activities is such that there is a complete news 
blackout, and it is not possible to discover the extent of what is 
occurring. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
Summary 
When considering the development of hydroelectric power in 
Brazil, it must be remembered that although Brazil is regarded by 
many as a Third World country this is not really the case. Any 
development which takes place in Brazil does so not only against a 
background of urban poverty and rural decline but also against 
another backdrop of indigenous scientific and technological expertise 
and personal wealth. It is a country of extreme differences, 
reflected in its terrain, climate and peoples - from humid tropical 
rainforest and Amerindians in the North, drought ridden plains 
populated by peoples of African descent in the North East, to the 
hilly more temperate and fertile regions colonised by Europeans in 
the South and South East. 
Brazil possesses substantial mineral deposits, including some 
of the world's largest reserves of bauxite in the Amazon region. 
However, despite considerable prospecting, known oil reserves are not 
substantial and this fact colours the whole energy picture in Brazil. 
This paucity of oil reserves, plus the existence of indigenous 
uranium and abundant hydraulic reserves has meant that, like the past 
and present, future energy policies in Brazil will be determined 
principally by the availability of hydroelectric power. 
In Brazil today, the stated aim of the electrical power 
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industry is that it will meet the electricity needs of the country 
whilst 	ensuring that the expansion is compatible with market 
requirements. 	At the same time, the power industry is to contribute 
to the development of Brazil by participating in the rationalization 
of energy use - by promoting the use of renewable and/or other 
national energy sources, by encouraging the appropriate use of 
electricity and by participating in multiple development programmes 
of energy resources. These objectives have developed over the years 
and reflect the consistent path which the electrical power industry 
in Brazil has followed since its inception. 
Commercial electrical energy has been available in Brazil since 
1879, when regular illumination was provided at the central railway 
station in the city of Rio de Janeiro. At the. end of the nineteenth 
century the country was introducing the same electrical services as 
were available in Europe and North America. 
Except for those power stations under the patronage of the 
Emperor, power stations were constructed in order to supply 
electrical energy for industrial purposes - setting the pattern of 
the Brazilian electrical power industry right from the beginning. 
Thus the power industry in Brazil is a major industry which has 
developed hand-in-hand with the manufacturing industries. 
The first Brazilian hydroelectric power station was built by an 
autoproducer, in 1883, in order to extract gravel. At the time, the 2 
km long transmission line was the longest in the world; indicative 
of the pioneering nature of the Brazilian electrical power industry 
which has maintained its impetus for over 100 years. 
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The industrial autoproducers constructed their own distribution 
networks and supplied electricity to the local populations. 	At the 
same time some Brazilian cities installed public supply systems. 	By 
the end of 1892 electricity was widely exploited by Brazilian 
industry, with small industries being established close to falls of 
water. The move from an agricultural base to a substantial 
indigenous manufacturing industry was led by hydropower. 
Most of the early initiatives in the Brazilian power industry 
were in the use of hydraulic energy and, by 1909, the commercial 
potential of this energy source had attracted overseas companies and 
foreign capital. 	The resulting foreign domination was to be 
maintained until the late 1960s. 	By 1962, two companies, Rio Light 
and Sao Paulo Light, both subsidiaries of the Canadian company 
Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (known as 'The 
Light'), were responsible for 46.9% of energy sales whilst supplying 
only 15.2% of the population. 
The first major energy supply crisis occurred in 1924 as a 
result of a severe drought in the industrial South East region. 
Until that time, the electricity supply in Rio de Janeiro and Sao 
Paulo had matched demand with only modest increases in generating 
capacity. 
The first large, modern hydroelectric power station in Brazil, 
UHE Cubatao, was built in the late 1920s as a response to the 
drought, and it formed the first phase of the Serra do Mar 
development. Much of the work on this power station was innovative, 
as it involved the diversion of the headwaters of the rio Tiete over 
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the great scarp of the Serra do Mar. 	On completion, in 1926, UHE 
Cubatao represented the climax of an evolutionary process in Brazil 
by establishing a sustained interaction between energy and 
'progress'. By supplying electrical energy to the fast growing 
industrial region nearby, the hydraulic projects on the Serra do Mar 
transformed the great scarp from being a physical barrier to economic 
growth into a key factor in Brazilian development. 
UHE Fontes, built in 1905, comprised one of the largest dams in 
the world at the time and signified Brazil's constant aim for the 
superlative - the biggest, the best, (often the worst) - whether 
talking about hydroelectric power stations, vistas or drivers. But 
although UHE Fontes on the riberao das Lages was significant due to 
its civil engineering, the final development of the Lages system in 
the early 1960s, signalled the end of the era of hydroelectric 
development close to the industrial centres. Thereafter it was 
necessary to consider hydraulic sites more distant from the load 
centres, such as on the rios Parana and Amazonas. Planning had 
perforce to change from city oriented to river basin oriented. 
Each major hydroelectric power project in Brazil, from UHE 
Fontes to UHE Tucurui, has signified a change in development 
direction, philosophy or mood. 
UHE Paulo Afonso, constructed in the early 1950s, on the rio 
Sao Francisco was an important project for several reasons. The 
expansion of this hydroelectric power station was the first instance 
of water resources planning for power in Brazil. It was the 
beginning 	of government participation in the electrical power 
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industry and with the development of the scheme began the process of 
import substitution in electrical and mechanical equipment 
manufacture. 
At the time of its construction, UHE Tres Marias, built by 
CEMIG at the end of the 1950s, had the fourth largest earth dam in 
the world. Construction in the isolated regions of the headwaters 
of the rio Sao Francisco was difficult, but the regulation afforded 
by the dam permitted an extra 400 MW of capacity to be installed at 
UHE Paulo Afonso. UHE Tres Marias itself boosted the local 
installed 	capacity 	by 	520 MW and, as a result, stimulated 
electrometallurgical and electrochemical industries. 
UHE Furnas, commissioned in 1963, represented a turning point 
in the financing of projects. 	It was the first time that there had 
been a concentration of resources in a large project. The 
construction of this large power station afforded the Federal 
Government its first opportunity to enter the field of electrici.ty 
production in the South East of Brazil, which had previously been 
dominated by state and private utilities. The building of UHE 
Furnas was a move towards overcoming the energy crisis which at that 
time was crippling the economic and industrial centre of Brazil. 
UHE Furnas was considered by the Brazilians as a mark of 
development success. 	In energy terms it was a dynamic component of 
fast escalating development 	and 	an 	indicator 	of 	technical 
achievement. 	It satisfied immediate needs for additional generating 
capacity and, simultaneously, established a basis for meeting future 
demand in the South East as it was part of a larger cascade scheme. 
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It was instrumental in encouraging the electrical interconnection of 
the three major industrial cities, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Belo 
Horizonte, regarded as the vertices of Brazil's economic triangle. 
Although FURNAS never accepted a philosophy of co-operation 
with, or aid to Brazilian industry, it was a pioneer of computer 
optimization of the country's power system, which signified the 
beginning of a planned approach to river basin development for all 
uses, not just power. 
As an individual project, UHE Itaipu undoubtedly has had the 
greatest impact on the Brazilian electrical power industry. The 
full effect of this grand-scale project will not be felt for many 
years, and its final financial, social and environmental costs remain 
a subject for conjecture. 
UHE Itaipu on the rio Parana, will be the largest hydroelectric 
power station in the world with an installed capacity of 12.6 GW. 
This binaional project, owned jointly by Brazil and Paraguay, is 
regarded by the Brazilians as displaying the new, advanced Brazil to 
the world. All national literature emphasises its grandeur. 
However, 	despite 	the 	enthusiastic 	public 	relations 
documentation there has been considerable discord between Brazil and 
Paraguay over the financing of the construction. Brazil has funded 
the Paraguayan share and in return is buying back Paraguay's half of 
the power on very advantageous terms. As a result, Paraguay has 
insisted that half of the power be generated at 50 Hz, in accord with 
its own operating frequency, as opposed to Brazil's operating 
frequency of 60 Hz. Therefore, Brazil has had to transmit some of 
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the power to Sao Paulo by a high voltage direct current link, in 
order to avoid constructing frequency converter stations. 
Not only have international relations with Paraguay been 
strained as a result of this project, it has also caused a number of 
disputes with their downstream neighbour Argentina. It is claimed 
that by using UI-iE Itaipu as a peaking station it will adversely 
affect the operation of UHE Corpus, Argentina's own hydroelectric 
power station on the lower reaches of the rio Parana. 
Despite its escalating costs UHE Itaipu has been 	given 
government priority; the Federal Government , through ELETROBRAS has 
maintained that power from the station is essential in order to 
guarantee electricity supplies to the industrial South East region, 
but FURNAS, which has had to fund the transmission construction costs 
and 	which 	will be responsible for sale 	of 	the power and its 
distribution, 	is not convinced. The state utilities CESP and CEMIG 
have not halted their own hydroelectric power station construction 
programmes and FURNAS fears that this will lead to a surplus of 
electrical power in the South East region. 
Although there would appear to be major problems associated 
with UHE Itaipu, the project is noteworthy, from the Brazilian point 
of view, for more than its size, cost and international problems. 
It has been instrumental in unifying the Brazilian electrical power 
industry, and may be regarded as a landmark in the development of 
Brazil's indigenous electrical power industry. 
The process of unifying the electrical power industry was 
finalised by the Tratado do Itaipu signed in April 1973. This treaty 
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not only created Itaipu Binacional, to co-ordinate the construction 
of the hydroelectric power station, but it also defined a new 
structure for ELETROBRAS, the government electricity utility. 
Although UHE Itaipu is considered by the Brazilians as a 
discrete project, a separate entity from the other hydroelectric 
power stations in the same river basin, the thinking within the 
electrical power industry is moving more towards integrated river 
basin development. 
Although the rio Grande supports a series of hydroelectric 
power stations, including UHE Furnas, its development as a cascade 
system was almost incidental. The site for UHE Furnas was 
identified for exploitation of its hydraulic potential by a single 
power station. However, in the cases of the rio Uruguai and rio 
Amazonas the planned development of the hydraulic potential of these 
rivers has been in terms of integrated schemes. 
The CANAMBRA studies inventoried every site on a 'first-added 
basis and in terms of full river development, but such co-ordinated 
river planning has only now come to the fore with those rivers more 
distant from the markets. The Uruguai basin has become increasingly 
important to the industrial South East as its own regional hydraulic 
potential becomes saturated. 	However, the reaction from local 
interests has not been favourable. 	There has been considerable 
opposition from the farmers whose land will be inundated and who will 
not enjoy any benefit from the power. Also, development of the 
upper reaches of the rio Uruguai is of direct concern to Argentina 
and Uruguay who are worried about the possible downstream effects 
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which may be experienced in their countries. 
The current estimate of hydraulic Dotential for power in the 
Amazon basin of 100 GW+ guarantees this region of Brazil as a 
supplier of abundant renewable energy when technological problems of 
long distance transmission are overcome. The average population 
density in this region is only 1.5 persons per square kilometre, and 
could not warrant exploitation of more than a small fraction of this 
enormous hydraulic potential. 
Although one or two large schemes, such as UHE Tucurui could 
supply sufficient power in the short term, the tributaries of the 
Amazon are being considered for total river development. UHE Tucurui 
is planned as part of a cascade scheme, on the rios Tocantins and 
Araguaia, and a further cascade scheme is planned on the rio Xingu. 
Development of the Amazon region, for power, industry, or 
cattle ranching, is a controversial subject. The rain forest is a 
complex and fragile ecosystem which is nuch less fertile than at 
first believed. Little is known about it, and even less is 
understood about the dynamics of the complex interactions between its 
constituent parts. 
Since the discovery of the river Amazon at the end of the 
fifteenth century, its indigenous inhabitants, the Amerindians, have 
suffered from the activities of pioneering settlers. They have been 
variously enslaved, hunted, chased deeper into the forest, removed 
from their traditional hunting grounds, contaminated with fatal 
diseases and shot. The forest itself has fared little better when 
exposed to the unrestrained assault of pioneers. 
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Commercialisation of rubber, in the 1870s, brought large 
numbers of peoples to the region. The collapse of the rubber boom 
fifty years later left large numbers of unemployed people trying to 
scratch a living in the hostile forest. The main catastrophes which 
have hit the region, and which have become established, are logging 
operations, cattle ranching and mineral exploitation. The highway 
development programme for improving general access and communication 
has also been responsible for providing access to previously 
unexploited areas by peasant settlers as well as large scale 
enterprises. Settlement along the highways and deeper penetration 
into the forest has been disastrous for the Amerindians as well as to 
the adjacent environment. 
The government agency for indian policy, FUNAI, has adopted the 
practice of relocating indians in advance of highway development. 
The same has been true of the hydroelectric development at UHE 
Tucurul where the Amerindians in the area to be inundated by the 
reservoir have been uprooted from their 'ancestral' lands. The 
actual effect on the indians of such relocation can only be guessed 
at, but previous studies of relocated Amerindians indicates that 
their future is on the whole bleak. Equally little is known of the 
long term environmental repercussions of large scale deforestation 
which is occurring as a result of logging operations, cattle ranching 
and highway development. However, there is no doubt that many 
species of flora and fauna have been irrevocably lost and that 
desertification in some areas could become a serious problem and lead 
to climatic changes. Exploitation of the forest for timber by 
foreign enterprises has been done with Federal Government support for 
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the past decade, as extraction of the timber for use overseas has 
been one method of reducing the foreign debt. Accurate data on the 
total area which has been cleared is not available. 
Although the average population density in the Amazon region is 
low its actual distribution is uneven, with the bulk of the 
population resident in a number of towns and cities. The principal 
of these are Manaus, Santarem and Belem, all on the river Amazon. 
They are responsible for the bulk of the electricity consumption in 
Amazonia, comprising only 1.5% of the national total. The lack of 
large scale industrial enterprises is responsible for this low 
demand, and the logistics of operating in the region has led to the 
tendency for the installed capacity to be oil-fired. 
With the move towards exploitation of the mineral and other 
resources, ELETRONORTE maintains that an adequate supply of energy is 
needed, as this is instrumental in progress. It also believes that 
regional development should be to the benefit of Brazil as a whole, 
and this attitude is reflected in the approach taken to energy 
development along the Amazon. 
With the exception of the Hudson Institution's suggestion for a 
dam on the main river Amazon, little attention was paid to Amazonia's 
hydraulic potential until the oil crisis of the early 1970s. The 
costs of fuel and its transportation to the region escalated, and 
earlier experience of its replacement by combustible solids had been 
unsuccessful. As a result the answer to future electricity supply 
was seen to lie with the development of hydroelectric power. 
The principal electricity concession areas in the region are 
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mostly associated companies of ELETROBRAS. 	They are mainly state 
companies, of which CELPA operates principally in the city of Belem 
and CEM in Manaus. However, in order to study and operate the 
exploitation of the hydraulic power in the region ELETRONORTE was 
created in 1973. 
Initially ELETRONORTE continued the work of ENERAM in studying 
the various hydraulic surveys in the Amazon region, in order to 
supplement the previously scanty knowledge of hydrological, 
geological and topographical data. A number of good sites were 
identified, and some large scale schemes for river basin development 
were proposed. The principal of these was in the Tocantins-Araguaia 
basin. 
Six hydroelectric stations were given initial priority for 
construction, the largest of which was UHE Tucurui on the rio 
Tocantins. 	This 
present time. The 
operation in the 
the 10 MW UHE Coru 
in the state of 
electricity to the 
is also the only one under construction at the 
two small hydroelectric stations which are now in 
Amazon region are the 40 MW UHE Coaracy Nunes and 
-Una. UHE Coaracy Nunes began operation in 1976 
the Amapa, and UHE Corua-Una has been supplying 
city of Santarem since 1978. 
Several other small projects are being re-appraised, but the 
only spectacularly important project in the region is UHE Tucurui. 
As the largest hydroelectric power station to be built wholly in 
Brazil, it will, on completion of the first stage, have an installed 
capacity of 3.9 GW. 
Initial studies of the Tocantins-Araguaia basin were made as 
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early as 1964, yet only in 1973. was the site of: UHE Tucurui 
identified. 	It was chosen as offering the best possibilities for 
meeting,. potential market requirements. 	However, even with the 
project well under construction the actual power market has not been 
well defined. 
There is a small domestic and industrial market in the city of 
Belem, there is a very large industrial market, some 3,000 km away, 
in the South East, and there are large reserves of bauxite relatively 
close 	to UHE Tucurul, which would require large supplies of 
electrical energy for their processing. 	The proposal by a Japanese 
company to construct an aluminium smelter in the region acted as a 
spur to go ahead with the development of UHE Tucurui. In the event 
the plan fell through, but the Brazilians still went ahead with the 
construction of this large and isolated hydroelectric power station. 
The power from UHE Tucurul will be used to supply the 
interconnected system of Belem, the northern region of Goias State, 
and a number of industrial projects, yet to be established. These 
will principally involve bauxite processing and iron ore mining. 
The transmission system of UHE Tucurui will also be interconnected 
with that of CHESF through the sub-station at Imperatriz. This will 
permit cheaper hydro-generated electricity to be transmitted from the 
North East to Belem until UHE Tucurui comes into operation. 
Thereafter, power from UHE Tucurui will be transmitted to the North 
East. 
Development of the isolated site of UHE Tucurui on the rio 
Tocantins is one of great technological achievement. Originally only 
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accessible by river, it now possesses an aerodrome and road access - 
both built by ELETRONORTE. The project has involved not only 
construction of a hydroelectric power station and transmission 
network, but also a township for 26,000 people including facilities 
such as schools, hospitals, a church, recreation centres, a water 
treatment plant and a small thermal power station. 
Everything has had to be brought to the area, mainly up river 
by barge. All construction materials, contractors' plant, food, 
clothing and fuel have to be imported from other regions of Brazil, 
principally the South East some 3,000 km away. The time factor 
involved is one of months and necessitates very careful planning. 
Although the facilities provided by ELETRONORTE are wide 
ranging there has been discontent amongst the workforce, with an 
outbreak of rioting in 1980. The old town of Tucurui, 7 km 
downstream of the construction site, has few facilities, however, and 
its people have begun to look to ELETRONORTE for help. 
Not only does the isolation of the site present problems at the 
construction phase, it also posed difficulties at the inventory and 
feasibility stages. Much of the preliminary work on the project has 
proved to be inaccurate and plans have frequently had to be modified 
at the execution stage as a result. On the other hand the diversion 
structure successfully withstood a flood of 60 000 mi s' in 1980, 9 
000 m3 s' greater than the design flood for the diversion discharge 
based on a recurrence interval of 25 years. 
The principal towns to be directly connected to UHE Tucurui are 
Belem, Vila do Conde, Tucurui, Maraba and Imperatriz. Some 720 km of 
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transmission line will be constructed between Belem and Imperatriz 
via Tucurui, much-of it crossing heavily forested and swampy terrain. 
The effects of UHE Tucurui will be extensive. 	A reservoir 
inundating 2,160 km of virgin tropical rain forest will be impounded 
behind the 11.5 km long dam, which will comprise nearly 5 km of 
concrete structures with the rest being earthfill dams. Little is 
known of the area to be inundated. Amerindians live there, although 
precise data on their numbers is not available. An environmental 
assessment was undertaken before construction was started, but it 
appears that little attention is being paid to any of its 
recommendations. 
There is little sympathy shown to those Amerindians and 
posseiros who will have to be relocated as their land is inundated; 
there is even less concern on the part of ELETRONORTE towards the 
destruction of the forest and the flora and fauna which it supports. 
There is considerable controversy over the best method of dealing 
with the wood to be found in the area to be flooded. There are no 
other parallel schemes to turn to for estimates of the extent of the 
full-ecological damage. In Surinam, Lake Brokopondo has many 
features similar to those which will be experienced with Lake 
Tucurui, but they have fundamentally different water retention times 
which could cause a significantly different effect. Wood clearance 
plans at Tucurui have been complicated by corruption and delays and 
little firm information is now available. However, initial moves 
were made for extraction of the timber, although progress has been 
erratic. 
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Although the final cost of the development of UHE Tucurul in 
financial, human and environmental terms will be high, it will still 
represent a remarkable achievement in hydroelectric power development 
in terms of engineering and planning. If, on completion, it is 
deemed successful it will set the scene for further hydroelectric 
development in the Amazon, and its final impact will probably be 
greater than that of UHE Itaipu. 
For over half a century all the planning and development 
initiatives in the Brazilian electrical power industry had been taken 
by private companies, principally of foreign origin. However, in 
1946, for the first time, peak load equalled installed capacity. 
Thereafter, demand continually outstripped capacity as rapid 
industrialization resulted in increased demand. The private foreign 
companies in control of the industry protected their own interests 
and adopted a disguised rationing policy by repressing demand. This 
was achieved by delaying the connection of new users to the supply 
and thus keeping investment in the electrical sector low. 
In order to overcome this situation, aggravated by a drought in 
the 1950s, the Federal Government authorised restrictive measures to 
reduce consumption of electricity. At the same time, it requested 
expansion plans to be put forward by the private companies. This 
was not well received by the foreign enterprises who were not keen to 
invest money in expansion, blaming the rate problem as a factor in 
low investment. Considerable argument raged throughout this period 
between the electricity supply companies and the Government over the 
rate the suppliers were paid for the electricity. 
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The very first generator of hydroelectricity in Brazil was an 
autoproducer, and since that time there has been a significant number 
in the country. In the early 1950s, when electricity demand could 
no longer be met, the numbers of autoproducers and their installed 
capacity increased significantly. The majority using hydraulic 
energy are to be found in the industrialised states of Minas Gerais 
and Sao Paulo, and they exert a significant influence on the market 
of the government concessionires. 
In the case of CBA, it considers its own supply to be cheaper 
and more reliable than that of the state utility, although as an 
autoproducer it is not allowed to sell any of its power and must make 
compulsory energy purchases from 'The Light' at nearly four times its 
own generation cost. In some instances autoproducers must pay a 
compulsory loan of 32.5% of the fiscal tariff, which is only 
recoverable after 20 years. Even so, autoproducers still consider 
the capital expenditure an acceptable economic proposition. 
The establishment of autoproducers in the Brazilian electrical 
power industry was not the only response to deficiencies 	in 
electricity production. 	It precipitated government intervention in 
the industry. 	The first state government participation was in Rio 
Grande do Sul, where the CEEE was created in 1943 in order to develop 
and operate a general electrification plan for the entire state. 
CEEE 	was 	closely followed by CHESF, which had Federal 
Government backing to develop the middle reaches of the rio Sao 
Francisco around Paulo Afonso, in order to try and alleviate some of 
the problems of supplying electricity to the North East region. 
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CEMIG, the state .utility created by the government of Minas 
Gerais, in 1952, successfully answered the need for an expansion of 
electricity supply caused by rapid regional industrial development, 
which was being strangled by an inadequate supply system. As a 
result of CEMIG's immediate building programme, adding a further 168 
MW to the system in four years, industrial development of the state 
was able to accelerate, bringing political power and wealth to the 
region, as well as a large and diverse industrial base. CEMIG was 
also a pioneer of rural electrification, although, taking Brazil as a 
whole, this activity cannot be rated as one of the most successful of 
the Brazilian electrical power industry. 
Although CEMIG still wields considerable power, its Sao Paulo 
state equivalent, CESP is more influential. This is primarily 
because Sao Paulo state is the major economic and industrial centre 
of Brazil. However, in the 1950s it was feared that the rapid 
economic development of this state would be threatened by a lack of 
electrical power. The situation was alleviated by the creation of a 
number of mixed economy enterprises to ensure exploitation of the 
available local hydraulic resources. These enterprises were 
eventually amalgamated in 1966 to form the powerful state company 
CESP. 
The ultimate in governmental participation in the Brazilian 
electrical power industry came with the creation of ELETROBRAS in 
1962. 	It is a corporation backed up both Federal Government and 
private 	capital, and is responsible for the overall planing, 
financing and co-ordination of the whole Brazilian electrical power 
industry. 
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In 1960, the Federal Government had placed administration of 
Brazilian energy policy in the hands of the MME. Whose role was, 
and remains, one of fundamental economic, social and political 
importance in that it has continued to be responsible for the 
exploitation of national energy and mineral resources. 
In 1965,-re-organisation of the MME resulted in the creation of 
a new division, the DNAEE, which was to plan, execute and co-ordinate 
hydrological studies. It also has the responsibility for granting 
of concessions to build power stations and establishing electrical 
power rates. It is ELETROBRAS, however, which is the principal 
instrument of the MME in directing the electrical power industry. 
Although ELETROBRAS was not created until 1962, a decree 
establishing broad guidelines for the development of the available 
hydraulic potential was passed in 1904. It then took until 1934 for 
the Codigo de Aguas to come into force which outlined the use of 
national water resources and gave a sense of unity to the electrical 
power industry. However, a further 23 years elapsed before there 
was full legal regulation of the activities of those organisations 
subject to the code. 
Such tardiness in legally defining the operations of the 
electrical power industry had resulted in its decline, and at the 
time of the appearance of ELETROBRAS on to the scene, there was 
stagnation of private initiative in the industry. This had been 
exacerbated by restrictions due to the Codigo de Aguas and problems 
of importation of equipment. 
The creation of ELETROBRAS was not welcomed by the private 
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electricity utilities, but this has 	not 	prevented 	it 	from 
progressively, and irreversibly, absorbing national and foreign 
electricity enterprises. As a holding company and nucleus of a group 
of concessionaires ELETROBRAS has given the Brazilian electrical 
power industry both an administrative continuity and the ability to 
develop long term planning programmes. 
ELETROBRAS is the legal organ through which the Federal 
Government acts on matters electrical, and as a financing agency 
supporting its subsidiaries and other electricity companies, it is 
responsible for the co-ordination of foreign investment programmes. 
In practice, the company operates through four regional subsidiaries 
- FURNAS, CHESF, ELETROSUL and ELETRONORTE, and three distribution 
utilities - CEM, ESCELSA and CBEE. It is also the major shareholder 
in 'The Light' which was purchased by the Brazilian government from 
its Canadian holding company, Brascan, in 1979. 
FURNAS and CHESF were both operational before the creation of 
ELETROBRAS. Whereas CHESF benefitted from this, as the new company 
shouldered some of its responsibilities giving CHESF greater 
financial freedom to undertake the construction of new power stations 
and transmission lines, FURNAS lost its primary role of a planning 
agency to ELETROBRAS. 
ELETROSUL was created in 1968 by the merger of the existing 
utilities in the rural South region. Although it is still primarily 
rural, it is of increasing importance, in the energy sense, as it is 
to the hydraulic resources of the South which the industrial South 
East is now looking for its electrical power. 	As long distance 
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transmission becomes more economic, ELETROSUL has a greater part to 
play in national electrification; there is already an inter-regional 
link between the South and South East via the Itaipu transmission 
system. 
ELETRONORTE, the most recent of the ELETROBRAS subsidiaries, 
which came into existance in 1972, has, as yet, no self-constructed 
installed capacity. It was created in order to exploit the 
hydraulic potential of the rio Tocantins and to build UHE Tucurui. 
Part of its role is to continue the systematic study of the hydraulic 
potential of the Amazon tributaries as begun by ENERAM. 
As in the case of ELETROSUL, •ELETRONORTE can expect to grow in 
importance as the economic and industrial centres turn to the 
enormous hydraulic potential of the Amazon region as that in the rest 
of Brazil becomes fully exploited. At present its principal markets 
are domestic and commercial in nature, but with increased installed 
capacity it is hoped to attract industry to the region. 
As a result of the lack of infrastructure, terrain and climate, 
much of ELETRONORTES's work in the Amazon region has to be of a 
pioneering nature. At the same time it has to be heavily subsidised 
by Federal Government funds, not only to help it bear the financial 
burden imposed by the construction of UHE Tucurui, but because it has 
no ready source of income due to not generating electricity for sale. 
'The Light' is the largest, and most important, of the 
distribution utilities which comes under the jurisdiction of 
ELETROBRAS. 	It was the last major foreign utility in Brazil, and it 
was purchased because its services had deteriorated. 	This was 
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fairly typical and was the result of the long standing inadequate 
investment by foreign companies in the industry. Although the 
company is now primarily a distribution utility, it does possess its 
own installed capacity. However, its power stations rarely run at 
full capacity as it is compelled to purchase electricity from FURNAS 
and CESP. 
CEPEL is not an electricity utility. 	It was created by 
ELETROBRAS in 1974, and is directly subordinate to it, and also 
responsible to the four subsidiaries. CEPEL stems from Brazil's 
need to develop the technology applicable to electrical systems and 
equipment, and its brief is to provide an infrastructure for 
scientific research and to advance technology in the fields relevant 
to the electricity utilities. One of its recent projects has been 
concerned with the optimisation of energy planning. 
As the optimum size for hydroelectric power stations increases 
with a corresponding increase in capital expenditure, the state 
companies, such as CEMIG, have required Federal Government backing. 
As CEMIG and CESP continue constructing large hydroelectric power 
stations to supply power to the industrial South East, their strong 
influence remains little diminished. CEMIG is indirectly 
responsible for much of the outlook of the present day Brazilian 
electrical power industry as it has been a training ground for many 
of the top men in the state utilities. 
Itaipu Binacionai, created in accordance with the Tratado de 
Itaipu in 1973, is not a subsidiary of ELETROBRAS, but its 
directorate comprises members of ELETROBRAS and its Paraguayan 
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equivalent, ANDE. 	It is responsible for the construction of UHE 
Itaipu. 
The treaty not only defined the activities of the ELETROBRAS 
subsidiaries and their concession areas, it also redefined the 
internal structure of ELETROBRAS. It also created the GCOI, a power 
council which is to co-ordinate the distribution of power from UHE 
Itaipu to the South East and South regions. The council, which 
includes representatives of various state utilities and some of the 
ELETROBRAS subsidiaries, co-ordinates the national interconnections. 
For this reason, ELETRONORTE is not included because at present it 
does not generate electricity. 
	
Although 	the structure of the GCOI mirors that of the 
operations directorate of ELETROBRAS, its principal function is 
interconnection between regions, and it has been responsible for the 
electrical links between the South and South East regions. 
ELETROBRAS is sub-divided into a number of directorates which 
organise certain sectors of the Brazilian electrical power industry 
such as regional integration, finance and economics, operations, 
planning and engineering, and co-ordination.. 
Each directorate is sub-divided into departments, which in turn 
are sub-divided into divisions and sub-committees. These cover all 
facets of the work of the electrical power industry including market, 
load forecasting, environmental issues, maintenance and economic 
planning. As part of the supervisory process the day-by-day 
operations of all the power stations are monitored. 
Once UHE Itaipu and the nuclear power stations at Angra dos 
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Reis are operational, the-Brazilian electrical power system in the 
economic centre of the country will be more sophisticated as there 
will be greater scope to deal with problems, such as periodic low 
rainfall and sudden peak power demands, as the integrated generating 
capacity will be operated with a greater inherent flexibility. 
UHE Itaipu can be regarded as a unifying influence in the 
Brazilian electrical power industry by stimulating inter-regional 
connections and heralding the creation of the GCOI. None of this 
could have occurred if a national transmission frequency had not been 
first established. 
As we have seen, the electrical power industry of Brazil was 
set up piecemeal by a number of private and public, foreign and 
national companies, using equipment from a variety of sources. Thus 
a non-integrated electrical power industry spontaneously developed 
with different systems operating at several different frequencies. 
The need to unify the frequency arose from the need to optimise the 
use of energy resources. The first move in this direction was made 
as early as 1938 but nothing happened until 1954, when a proposal was 
made to adopt 60 Hz as the national standard. However, three years 
later, a dual standard using the 50 Hz and 60 Hz was adopted, and it 
was not until 1964 that a single frequency of 60 Hz was formally 
designated as the national frequency. The changeover, however, 
scheduled for completion in 1971 took until 1977 and, it was not 
until then that widespread regional interconnections became possible. 
The 1960s were the years when effort was made to consolidate 
the power industry. 	These years saw the creation of ELETROBRAS and 
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the adoption of a single operating frequency; they were also witness 
to the first attempts at planning within the industry. 
After the commissioning of UHE Furnas in 1963, some of the 
utilities 	changed their role from that of bulk suppliers to 
generation and transmission utilities. 	Distribution was left to 
other enterprises. 	It was into th's'nstructured system that the 
foreign consortium CANAMBRA was invited to survey the hydraulic 
resources of the South East and the South regions of Brazil. 
The study carried out by CANAMBRA included an evaluation of the 
electrical power sites, an inventory of hydraulic sites, feasibility 
studies of selected sites, re-organisation of regional hydrometric 
services, a power market forecast to 1980, including a generation and 
transmission programme, survey of transmission and distribution 
requirements, and an evaluation of frequency conversion needs. 
In the inventory studies, the potential hydroelectric sites 
were tabulated using economic criteria as the primary basis of 
selection. Any sites which appeared attractive were then subjected 
to a feasibility study. 
	
Little suitable data was available for CANAMBRA to use. 	There 
were few topographical or geological maps, and hydrological data were 
scanty. 	The consortium organised the first Brazilian aerial survey 
for the purpose of its inventories. 	Three types of project were 
studied - power, storage, and power plus storage, and no allowances 
were 	made for expansion of generating capacity or supply of 
facilities such as navigation. 	However, 	the 	indirect 	costs 
considered were those of the camp and construction plant and their 
- 336 - 
operation and maintenance, and the. administration and engineering 
costs. 
It was expected that all projects studied would involve some 
form of foreign equipment, hence the CANAMBRA estimates of costs 
consisted of two currency elements. All equipment and services 
available in Brazil were costed in cruzeiros, and those to be 
obtained from overseas were costed in US dollars. 	The crizeiro 
portion was assumed to be 75% of the total cost. 	As a guideline, 
CANAMBRA adopted a lower inventory limit of minimum capacity of 10 MW 
and, as upper limit, an installation cost of US $ 500/kw. 
The procedures now used follow many of the CANAMBRA guidelines, 
in that inventory and feasibility studies are still carried out. 
Further guidelines issued by ELETROBRAS's Diretoria e Planejamento e 
Engenharia identify the development needs, and the instruments and 
criteria for planning. 
*** 
The major problem which has to be faced today is that of 
expansion of generating capacity. Most of the hydraulic potential 
close to the load centres has been exploited and it has become 
necessary to look to hydraulic resources distant from markets, thus 
requiring transmission of large blocks of energy over large 
distances. There is still the option of construction of some very 
small hydroelectric power stations close to areas of demand, but 
ELETROBRAS and its subsidiaries have tended to concentrate on the 
larger, more distant projects. 
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Three planning stages have been adopted - long, medium and 
short term planning, as ELETROBRAS considers the perspectives for 
medium and long term planning in the Brazilian electrical power 
industry to be quite distinct. In the medium term, it considers the 
choice to lie between hydroelectric development as close as possible 
to the load centres, or the use of coal or nuclear energy as 
electricity sources. In the long term, the problem is seen as one 
of the degree of technological development required, principally in 
terms of energy transfer from the Amazon region and the development 
of nuclear power. 
Foreign consultants were instrumental in starting Brazil's 
steps in planning the electrical power industry. But, in time, 
FURNAS developed a methodology and criteria more appropriate to the 
Brazilian situation. In Brazil, the principal determinant of 
expansion of the electrical power system is the growth of demand, and 
the long term forecasting of this power market uses a single 
reference which is based on the likely increases of economic activity 
and the population. 
A long term plan permits the identification of the principal 
lines of development of a system. In Brazil, a thirty year horizon 
is used to determine the optimal economic participation which 
characterises the main lines of necessary technological and 
industrial development, as a function of minimum programmes of 
improvement. 
Planning horizons of 20 to 30 years are necessary in Brazil in 
order to identify the hydraulic potentials 	and 	river 	basin 
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developments which are distant from the markets. Decisions to build 
large generating plants have a lead time of eight years (for main 
transmission the time from planning to operation is reduced to three 
years) hence it is necessary to analyse the requirements which need 
to be met over at least fifteen years so as to guarantee that they 
are met on time. As most of the expansion of Brazilian generating 
capacity is by means of very large plant, such long lead times are 
likely to continue to be necessary. 
In the long term, the Brazilians believe that nuclear energy 
will become their second major energy source, after hydroelectricity. 
Of fundamental importance to this consideration are the prospects, in 
Brazil, for the use of new technologies including fast breeder and 
thorium reactors. For the hydraulic potential of the Amazon to be 
tapped there must also be further technological advances for the 
transmission of large blocks of energy. 
The vast hydroelectric potential available in Brazil is the 
most important aspect of any of its expansion plans, with long 
distance, high voltage transmission being a feature in the 
electricity supply. Indigenous coal is comparatively little used as 
an energy source for electricity production because of its low 
quality. In the overall planning perspectives it is not considered 
as favourably as hydraulic and nuclear energy sources. Its principal 
use is for thermal complementation in periods of low hydrological 
flows. 
The aim of the Brazilian electricity supply industry is to 
convert other forms of energy to electricity in order to maintain a 
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continuous supply at a stable cost. Therefore, when making market 
projections, an estimated security margin is adopted, so that the 
final value used by the Brazilians in estimating demand is the 
probable market plus the security margin. This security margin is 
progressively reduced as interconnection and integration leads to 
higher operating flexibility. 
Until the Brazilian electrical power industry achieved some 
form of integration, it had to base its forecasts and select its 
projects on non-standard reference data. However, the DEME now 
publishes economic reference data, and ELETROBRAS publishes the 
"Orcamento Plurianual do Setor e Enercia Eletrica" which summarises 
the necessary information for estimate of investment resources over a 
five year period. 	As a result, project selection is more refined 
and system integration is better planned. 	However, the forecasts 
used contain long term uncertainties and can only give probable 
values for each year when estimating future demand. In addition, the 
wide geographical dispersion of the load centres requires detailed 
forecasts to be made at a regional level. 
Other uncertainties inherent in long term planning are the 
relationships between the various costs. For example, hydroelectric 
power stations have a higher capital cost and lower operational costs 
than conventional thermal stations, but over a thirty year period the 
precise relationship between these costs could (and have) changed 
considerably. 
Whereas the long term analysis carried out by the Brazilians 
indicates the general lines of development of their electrical system 
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and establishes the generation projects and principal transmission 
trunks, in the medium term the plans are considered in greater 
detail. There is increased precision in the information on physical 
characteristics, construction periods and costs. 
Using the long and medium term projections, Brazil devizes 
short term plans for the electrical power industry. It evolves a 
plan of action incorporating recommendations for the finacing of the 
short and medium term programmes and for legislative changes. It 
also defines studies necessary for the improvement of the long, 
medium and short term analyses. 
As the bulk of Brazilian electrical power is of hydraulic 
origin, and as there is little over capacity the electricity supply 
is not constant. It largely depends on the randomness of river 
flows, and as a result the supply criteria adopted have dictated that 
in the case of critical hydrological conditions there will be a 
deficit in supply. 
Computational models have been developed in order to calculate 
the probabilities of occurrence of critical hydrological conditions, 
and computer simulation models are used to determine the various 
alternatives for expansion of the system, using cost/benefit indices. 
Most of the operational models are used in order to analyse the use 
of water resources for power, although conventional thermal power 
stations could offer a more flexible choice of operating policy. 
Over Brazil, as a whole, 81% of the installed capacity is 
driven hydraulically. It is only in the Amazon that thermal 
generation is more common - a situation which will change with the 
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commissioning of UHE Tucurui. 
Ever since the 1890s, it has been the case that hydroelectric 
power has always been the major source of Brazilian electrical power. 
During this period the early hydroelectric stations, with outputs 
measured in kilowatts, have been replaced by the computer controlled 
gigawatt complexes of today. 
* ** 
Conclusions 
Brazil 	has 	had 	an electrical power industry based on 
hydroelectric generation since 1883; 	and it has been at the 
forefront of hydroelectric power development since then. 	From this 
study, a number of conclusions may be drawn from the hydroelectric 
power experience in Brazil. 
The dominant factor in the development of Brazilian 
hydroelectric power has been the parallel development of 
Brazilian industry. 	Over the past century the two have 
gone hand-in-hand, and have been responsible for general 
urban development. 
The industrial sector has been the most dynamic in the 
Brazilian economy since the second World War, with the 
adoption, by Brazil, of the energy intensive consumption 
patterns of the western industrial countries. 	This has 
been possible because of the parallel dynamism of the 
electrical power industry, which with the exception of one 
period of low investment, has remained buoyant. The South 
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East was the centre of the post-war economic boom as its 
good electricity supply led to industrial expansion. In 
particular the Kubitschek government gave priority to this 
industrial expansion. 
In developing its hydraulic potential Brazil has successfully 
exploited what is probably its greatest natural resource - 
a renewable energy 	source. 	Until 	recently, 	the 
development of hydroelectric power in Brazil has often 
been in advance of the development of other Brazilian 
resources, but in line with general prevailing conditions. 
However, the current world economic recession together 
with Brazil's balance of payments problems have changed 
this; the recent hydroelectric projects of UHE Itaipu and 
UHE Tucurui have become heavy financial burdens on the 
Federal Government. 
The world oil crisis in the early 1970s, despite its 
recessionary effect, was a great boost to Brazilian 
development 	of 	hydraulic potential and resulted in 
accelerated project development. It also stimulated 
involvement in nuclear technology and experimentation with 
alcohol substitution for petroleum products. 
Future development of Brazil's energy resources will depend 
on advances in technology. 	As 	the 	hydroelectric 
potential in the industrial South East has been almost 
fully exploited, primary energy for future installed 
capacity will either have to be of nuclear origin in that 
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region or of hydraulic origin in the Amazon region with 
long distance transmission. 
The current aim of the Brazilian electrical power industry 
is to meet the country's electricity needs, principally by 
hydraulic means, whilst ensuring that expansion of the 
power industry is compatible with the market requirements. 
This involves long term forecasting, of both demand and 
financial requirements, and is being undertaken using 
computational methods. 	As 	data 	is 	scanty, 	and 
demographic and financial trends uncertain, it is proving 
difficult to identify specific projects which will match 
market needs. 	The over capacity, at both UHE Itaipu, in 
the South, and UHE Tucurui, in the North, indicates the 
extent of the errors in forecasting. 
The greatest single factor in the creation of the current 
perspective of the Brazilian electrical power industry was 
probably the standardization of the operating frequency to 
60 Hz; 	it led to the possibility of inter- regional 
connections and national energy planning. 
Government participation in the Brazilian electrical power 
industry was stimulated as a result of poor investment in 
the industry by the foreign utilities, who operated the 
sector until the 1960s, which resulted in repressed 
demand. 
The objective of ELETROBRAS is to meet all Brazil's 
electrical needs whilst ensuring compatibility between 
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expansion in the electrical sector and consumer demand. 
Since the State and Federal Governments became instrumental 
in the operation of the Brazilian electrical 	power 
industry the method of financing of projects has become to 
depend on foreign capital. 	As the economic situation in 
Brazil has worsened, this has led to a severe balance of 
payments problem which has resulted in 	non-priority 
projects being shelved and others, such as UHE Itaipu and 
UHE Tucurui, being delayed. 	This problem, coupled with 
rapid inflation and hourly changing exchange rates for the 
cruzeiro against the dollar, makes meaningful discussion 
of financial costs of such projects impossible. 	Suffice 
it to say that they are proving very expensive to build. 
The major costs for UHE Itaipu are the interest costs, 
comprising nearly one third of the total construction 
costs. 
The state utilities have shaped the current picture of the 
Brazilian electrical power industry. 	Of these, CEMIG, 
although not the most powerful, has had the greatest 
influence. 	Not only did it identify the Furnas site, it 
has been the training ground for many of the most 
influential men in the industry today. 	In the opinion of 
some, it has surpassed the frontiers of an electricity 
utility by establishing itself as a development agency. 
(xii) With government participation in the electrical power 
industry, in the form of ELETROBRAS, national planning 
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became possible. 	However, this planning procedure is 
complicated by the fact that Brazil is still planning for 
massive expansion in addition to coping with obsolescence, 
together with allowances for improvements and small scale 
expansion. This may be contrasted with the situation in 
most industrial countries with low population growth 
rates. 
Unlike some other developing countries, Brazil has reaped 
positive benefits from the development of its hydraulic 
power. 	The majority of its schemes run smoothly and 
efficiently and, in terms of the large area of land 
inundated by reservoirs, the environmental effects of 
completed schemes, to date, have not been disastrous. 
The main positive benefits include raised levels of direct 
and indirect employment. Improved living conditions and, 
in some cases, improved housing and facilities such as 
hospitals. 
Negative effects experienced as a result of hydroelectric 
power development include the indirect effect of an 
increased migration of rural agricultural workers to the 
urban slums in search of work as industrialization has 
increased, and relocation of small scale farmers and 
Amerindians from their traditional lands with little 
recompense. 
(xv) Of the individual hydroelectric power stations, both UHE 
Itaipu and UHE Tucurui are worthy of mention. 	Although 
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neither is fully operational, and little can be concluded 
about their final impact on Brazil, UHE Itaipu has been 
instrumental in unifying the Brazilian electrical power 
industry, and UHE Tucurui, one of the most ambitious 
projects to be undertaken in the world, will, for good or 
bad, have extensive environmental ramifications. 
Only in recent years has attention been paid to the environ-
mental effects of reservoirs behind dams, and to multiple 
use of these reservoirs. 	To date Brazil appears to have 
been fortunate in suffering no major ecological disasters. 
Whatever lessons are learnt from UHE Tucurui, large scale 
hydroelectric power development of the Amazon basin will 
remain controversial. 	Substantial reservoirs flooding 
large tacts of tropical rain forest, containing many 
thousands of species of flora and fauna and displacing 
indigenous Amerindians, will always be an emotive subject 
for discussion. However, it is clear that, given adequate 
financial resources, Brazil will exploit this region for 
power, for in the long term it is the only option open, 
unless objections to nuclear power are overcome. 
*** 
General Conclusions 
Brazil differs from other developing countries in that it has a 
well established urban middle class with a high level of scientific 
and technological skills, coupled with experience at using these 
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skills. 	This factor alone makes it difficult to draw any direct 
parallels between the Brazilian experience and other hydroelectric 
power developments in the Third World. Similarly the presence of 
large urban and rural poor sectors of the population, many living 
without the benefit of electrical power makes direct comparison with 
western industrial nations difficult. 
Not only does the unique combination of factors present in 
Brazil make comparisons difficult so 	do 	those 	relevant 	to 
hydroelectric power development. Not only is the provision of 
electricity for consumption as much affected by the availability of 
natural resources as by political, economic and institutional 
factors, but the building of hydroelectric power stations differs 
from other construction projects in that each design is site specific 
and no.two hydroelectric power stations are the same. 
Nevertheless, a number of broad general conclusions may be made 
about the development of hydroelectric power in Brazil. 
(i) Brazil has a well developed system of hydroelectric power 
stations, and the general direction taken by the country's 
hydroelectric power development, until the 1970s, could 
profitably be copied by some of the developing nations. 
It was a gradual development of indigenous hydraulic 
potential for power in accordance with the industrial and 
commercial markets. 	The growth of the power industry 
stimulated growth in these markets, and vice-versa. 	The 
two, more or less, developed together, avoiding a great 
build up of surplus capacity or deficit in supply. 	At 
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each stage the Brazilian projects were to the limits of 
available technical expertise and financial resources, 
without being too ambitious. 	On the whole they have 
provided reliable supplies of power without 	serious 
deleterious effect. 
To date most of the hydroelectric power developments in 
Brazil have comprised individual projects and have not 
been part of a wider scheme, although a number of cascade 
developments now exist or have been planned. However, 
these have been purely for power and there has been no 
attention paid to integrated river basin planning as by 
the Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA. 
With the unification of frequency, Brazil now undertakes 
national energy planning, and has developed its own 
planning 	criteria. 	From this country, where rural 
electrification is poorly developed and where regional 
interconnection has only recently become a reality, these 
criteria are more applicable to other developing countries 
than to those used in North America and Europe. 
Brazilian hydroelectric power stations appear to have 
been remarkably free of many of the problems which have 
beset other such stations in the Third World. 	This is 
presumably because of the core of technical expertise 
available, the fact that projects (until recently) have 
been pioneering, but not over ambitious, and that many of 
the actual hydroelectric power stations have been in 
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regions 	of 	low population density and sub-tropical 
climate. 
Resettlement problems have been experienced in Brazil, but 
these have been little publicised and, on the whole, have 
not been major. 	Again, most of the common waterborn 
diseases are endemic in Brazil, but there is lack of 
substantial documentation in this problem which would 
indicate that health problems associated with Brazilian 
impoundment of reservoirs for power are either few (they 
are not in the tropics) or not well studied. 
The more recent, and 'grandiose' projects, appear to have 
more similarities to some of the African projects. 	Both 
Ul-IE Itaipu and UHE Tucurui will supply power surplus to 
forseeable market requirements, and they have both placed 
a severe financial burden on the Brazilian Government. 
However, both provide an example of co-ordination of 
planning, 	construction 	and 	operation 	of 	large 
hydroelectric power stations in isolated situations, and 
will give insight to the civil and mechanical engineering 
required for similar large scaleprojects elsewhere. 
Without a doubt, whether it is a success or a failure, 
UHE Tucurui will provide information on the inundation of 
large tracts of tropical rain forest. It will provide an 
excellent opportunity for 	the 	study 	of 	reservoir 
impoundment under tropical rain forest conditions and 
longer term ecological impacts. 
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(viii) The future perspective of the Brazilian power industry is 
strongly coloured by long distance transmission. 
Transmission from Itaipu is over an HVDC link, and 
improved technology as developed by Brazil will have world 
wide application. 
Prognostication 
From the work contained in this thesis it is apparent that 
there is a large number of potential aspects of the electrical power 
industry of Brazil which would benefit from further study. At the 
present time a number of far-reaching power projects are in the 
construction phase - UHE Itaipu, UHE Tucurui and the nuclear power 
stations Angra I and II. Technical difficulties with long distance 
transmission are being overcome, new planning methodologies are being 
adopted, and there is a growing awareness of environmental effects 
(719). 
Some of these projects are approaching completion such as UHE 
Itaipu (720), other, are suffering financial problems (721) 31  
especially as the economic climate in Brazil is rapidly worsening, 
with galloping inflation and multi-million dollar loans on which the 
country is having difficulty maintaining the interest payments (722). 
There are several aspects of UHE Itaipu which would benefit 
from further study. There is controversy over whether its power is 
really necessary for Brazil. If the state utilities such as CESP and 
CEMIG cannot be disuaded from constructing their own gigawatt power 
stations then the south east of Brazil will have a surfeit of excess 
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capacity. 	This will turn Itaipu into a large white elephant - a 
status that it must, already, have in Paraguay. 	Studies are already 
in progress on the economic and social impact of UHE Itaipu on 
Paraguay, but a similar study of its effect, once operational, on 
Brazil would give an insight into whether Brazil's policy of "the 
largest in the world" has paid divide ids or brought disaster. 
Certainly UHE Itaipu has done much towards unification of the 
Brazilian electrical power industry, but how much impact has the 
share of UHE Itaipu's power had on the relatively non-industrialised 
South Region, receiving its share through the substation at Ivaipora? 
It appears that its impact will be felt more by improving domestic 
and commercial supplies in this region rather than inducing rapid 
industrialisation. However, in the case of a surfeit of power in 
the South East, more of UHE Itaipu's may be diverted to the South 
thus delaying the controversial hydroelectric development of the rio 
Uruguai. 
UHE Itaipu is the first large scale Brazilian project to be 
subject to the policy of indigenisation, as the bulk of materials and 
equipment had to be of Brazilian design and origin. Once UHE Itaipu 
is fully operational and has been so for a reasonable period, it 
would be interesting to do a comparative study between its 
operational progress and that of smooth-running UHE Furnas, which was 
built using foreign expertise and equipment. 
The Brazilians possess a high level of technical ability but, 
in a project of such enormity as the 12.6 GW UHE Itaipu, there 
remains some doubt as to whether the indigenisation policy will have 
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been successful, or whether the technology nationally available was 
not sufficiently adequate to cope with the size of the project. 
Personally, I think that skilled as the Brazilians are, there will be 
problems, probably not of an insuperable nature, as a direct result 
of the innovative nature and shear size of the project. 
UHE Tucurui, another Brazilian hydroelectric power station, 
with a large capacity and not too well defined market, presents a 
number of obvious areas for further study. The most immediate 
consideration is the environmental impact of the 2,160 km lake 
behind the 7 km long dam. 	There has already been considerable 
controversy over the clearance of the tropical rain forest. 	After 
reputed embezzlement of pension fund monies and use of defoliants 
(723) it appears that the vegetation is to be left to rot in the 
waters of the reservoir. No one is certain, under these conditions 
what the outcome will be but whatever- it is, a study of the 
limnology, fish, incidence of waterborn parasites and proliferation 
of water weeds would be beneficial. 
The contentious issue of the displaced Amerindians certainly 
warrants study, as those moved to other reserves are likely to suffer 
social degradation. However, access to relevant information, if it 
exists, may be restricted or difficult of access. Depending upon 
the condition of the water, the lake could become a focus for new 
social groups and the power may improve local industry, and thus 
reduce the level of poverty in towns such as Maraba. 
If the aluminium industry, utilising bauxite from the Trombetas 
region, does develop to any extent it is likely to require only the 
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power from UHE Tucurui. 	Unless the world market for aluminium 
recovers, the extra power from the other proposed stations in the 
cascade scheme will not be necessary. Large scale industrialisation 
of the area is unlikely as it is too isolated and the climate too 
hostile. However, it is possible that with improved long distance 
transmission, the power from the Amazon region could be used in the 
industrial South East, although in the shorter term, further 
hydroelectric power development in South Brazil would present fewer 
problems both in terms of working environment and transmission 
distances. 
If UHE Tucurui does present serious problems, with acidic 
reservoir water for example, then this may prevent hydraulic 
development of the rio Xingo, which would have a controversial, but 
almost certainly, detrimental affect on the many Amerindians in the 
region. It will be interesting to wait and see whether the 
Brazilians will be content to wait to learn lessons from UHE Tucurui 
before embarking on further large hydroelectric power developments in 
the Amazon Basin. Studies of this nature could, however, be clouded 
by the current economic climate which will probably delay the 
initiation of any proposed projects. However, a study of power 
planning for the Amazon region and how this has been affected by the 
interaction of environmental and engineering problems, as recorded at 
Tucurui, and the Brazilian economic status should yield an insight 
into Brazilian mentality and how this has changed over the years. 
- 	 Both UHE Itaipu and UHE Tucurui will have a marked social 
impact on their areas of location; not just on the peoples displaced 
by the reservoirs but on the townships of tens of thousands of people 
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established in the construction areas, with access to reasonable 
facilities such as hospitals and schools. Brazil. has built such 
townships for earlier projects, but not of the size or isolation as 
at Foz do Iguacu and Tucurul. Few of the employees will be needed 
once the power stations are operational - where will the rest go? 
Will they flock to the industrial centres of the South East or back 
to the drought-ridden North East, or will they remain in the 
townships, scraping a living however they can? Traditionally, many of 
these workers are migrant workers, moving from project to project, 
but with the Brazilian economic crisis delaying the initiation of new 
projects, there is little hope of immediate new employment. These 
aspects present ample scope for a detailed social analysis of the 
impact of these two large projects on the workers' past, present and 
future livelihoods. 
In the last decade, the Brazilian electrical power industry has 
become to be planned as an entity, using modern computational 
techniques and methodology. However, much forward planning depends 
on predictions of the future. The demographic and economic 
assumptions are presented in detail in the literature. There is, 
therefore, scope for study of the planning perspectives as adopted by 
Brazil for its electrical power industry and how they have correlated 
with the situations as they have actually arisen. Have the 
demographic assumptions been correct, have they reflected actual 
demand and how has the planning had to be modified in the face of the 
shortage of funds for building new power stations? 
Finally, no picture of the future Brazilian electrical power 
industry is complete without a study of the nuclear question. 	Will 
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Brazil turn to nuclear power, or will improved technology for long 
distance transmission from hydraulic sites preclude this? Do the 
planning perspectives reflect any change in attitude towards nuclear 
power, and its supposed necessity for technological advance or 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, or show a preference for 
hydroelectric power using long distance transmission? When the data 
to answer these questions accumulates further insight will be gained 
into the evolution of the Brazilian idea of "progress. 
- 	 - 
Appendix I - Acronyms 
ALBRAS 	Aluminio Brasileiras 
ALUNORTE 	Alumino do Norte 
AMFORP 	American Foreign Power Company 
AMZA 	 Amaz6nia Minerao S/A 
ANDE 	 Administracion Nacional de Eletricidad 
BELSA 	 Bandeirante de Eletricidade S/A 
ENDE 	 Banco Naciorial de Desenvolvimento EconSmico 
BRDE 	 Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul 
CAEEB 	 Companhia Auxiliar das Empresas Eltricas Brasileiras 
CANAMBRA 	Canambra Engineering Consultants Limited 
CBA 	 Companhia Brasileira do Aluminio 
CBEE 	 Companhia Brasileira de Energia Eltrica 
CCC 	 Conta de Consumo de Combustiveis 
CEA Companhia de Eletr-icidade do Amapa'  
CEARP Comisso de Estudos e Acompanhamento do Rio Paraiba 
CELETRAMAZON Centrais Eltricas de Amazonas 
CELG Centrais Eltricas de Goias 
CELPA Centrais E1tricas do Pars 
CELUSA Centrals Elgtricas de Urubupunga 
CEM Companhia de Eletricidade do Manaus 
CEMAT Centrais Eltricas de Mato Grosso 
CEMIG Centrals Eltricas de Minas Gerais 
CEPEL Centro de Pesquisas de Energia Eltrica 
CEPIC Comisso.de  Estudos de Programao de Intercambios 
e sua Contabilizao 
CER Centrais Eltricas de Roraima 
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CEON Centrais E1tricas de Rondônia 
CESP Centrais Elétricas de So Paulo 
CHERP Cornpanhia Hidreltrica do Rio Pardo 
CHESF Cornpanhia Hidreltrica do So Francisco 
CIBPU Comisso Interstadual da Bacia do Paran-Uruguai 
CIEM Consorcio Itaipu Eletromecânico 
CIVAT Comisso Interstadual dos Vales do Araguaia- 
Tocantins 
CNAEE 	Conseiho Nacional de Aguas e Energia Eltrica 
CNEC 	 Consorcio Nacional de Engenheiros Consultores S/A 
CNEN Conseiho Nacional de Energia Nuclear 
CNP Conseiho Nacional de Petroleo 
CI'TPq Conseiho Nacional de Pesquisas 
COMAM Cornissao de Analise do Mercado 
COMEPA Companhia de Meihoramentos de Paraibuna S/A 
CONEMPA Consorcio de Empresas Constructoras Paraguayas SRL 
COPEL Companhia Paranaense de Eletricidade 
CPFL Companhia Paulista de For2a e Luz 
CPRM Centro de Pesquisas de Recursos Minerais 
CVRD Companhia do Vale Rio Doce 
DAEE Departamento de Aguas e Energia El&rica 
DECOFRE Departamento de Converso de Frequncia 
DEME Departamento de Estudos de Mercado 
DENE Departamento de Estudos Energticos 
DEOP Departamento de Operao Energetico 
DNAEE Departamento Ilacional de Aguas e Energia El&trica 
DNPM Departamento Nacional de Produo Mineral 
DNPVN Departarnento Nacional de Portes e Vias Navigaveis 
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D\JEO Diviso de Engenharia de Operaço 
DVON Diviso de Opera? 'o Energtico 
EIJETROACRE Centrais Eltricas de Acre 
ELETROBRAS Centrais Eltricas Brasileiras S/A 
ELETRONORTE Centrais Eltricas do Norte do Brasil S/A 
ELETROSUL Centrais E1tricas do Sul do Brasil S/A 
ENERAM Comit ê Coordenador de Estudos Energticos da 
Amazonia 
ENERNORDE Comit 	Coordenador de Estudos Energticos da 
Regio Nordeste 
ENERSUL Steering committee, South Brazil 
ERIvIIG Eletrificao Rural de Minas Gerais S/A 
ESCELSA Espirito Santo Centrais Eltricas S/A 
FFE Fundo Federal de 	letrificao 
FINEP Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos 
FUNAI Fundao Nacional do Indio 
FURNAS Centrais E1tricas de Furnas S/A 
GCOI Grupo Coordenador de Operao Interligada 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNP Gross National Product 
GTEH 	 Grupo de Trabaiho de Estudos Hidrol6gicos 
GTEN 	 Grupo de Trabaiho de Estudos Energ6ticos 
GTMC 	 Grupo de Trabaiho de Metodologia e Criterios 
IADB 	 Inter American Development Bank 
IBGE 	 Fundaco Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatstica 
IERD 	 International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank) 
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INCRA Instituto Nacional de Colonizao e Peforma Agraria 
INPA Instituto Nacioial c"e ?s u:Lss d. fi:iaz6nia 
INPE Instituto Nacional de Pesciuisas 	Ispaciais 
I UEE Imposto tinico sobre Energia Eltrica 
LNSA Light Netal Smelter's Association 
!, ME Ministerio de Minas e Energia 
NASA U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NUCLEBRAS Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S/A 
PETROBRAS Petr6leo Brasileiro S/A 
PIN Programa de Integra2o Nacional 
PNA Prograa Nacional do Alcool - Proilcool 
SCEN Sub-comit 	de Estudos Energticos 
SNIEC 	Sindicato Nacional da Industria de Extrago do 
Carvo 
SPVEA 	Superintendncia para a Valorizao Econ6mica•da 
Amaz6ni a 
SUDAM 	Superintendncia de Desenvolvimento da Amazonia 
SUFRAMA 	Superintendncia da Zona Franca de Manaus 
UHE 	 Usina Hidreltrica 
UNDP 	 United Nations Development Programme 
UNICON 	Unio de Construtoras Limitida 
USELPA 	tjsinas Eltricas do Paranapanema S/A 
UTE 	 IJsina Terme1trica 
ou - 
A-ppendix 2 : Dollar - Cruzeiro Exchange nate 
Values given are the numbers of cruzeiros to the US dollar. 
December 1964 1 .850 
it 1965 2.220 









1975 9.070 Note: As can be seen 
from these exchange 
1976 12.345 rates, the rapid 
devaluation of the 
1977 16.050 cruzeiro against the 
US dollar has been 
II 1978 20.920 in progress for 
several years, and 
It 1979 1+2.530 this makes analysis 
of darn costs etc. 	to 
January 1930 1+3.890 be of little value. 
June It  52.315 
January 1981 68.41+o 
June if 91.1+00 
January 1982 132.1+ 1+0 
June 173. 1 90 
January 1983 275. 260 
April 454. 930  
Source : Banco Central do Brasil, monthly re -oortADril 1983. 
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Appendix 3 - ELTROBRAS Subsidiaries and Associated Companies 
ELETRONORTE Centrals 5ltricas do Norte do Brasil S/A 
ELTROSUL Centrals Elétricas do Sul do Brash 	s/A 
FUR AS Centrais E1tricas do Furnas S/A 
CHESF Companhia Hidro Elétrica do So Francisco 
ESCELSA Espirito Santo Centrals E1tricas 
CEM Companhia de Eletricidade do Manaus 
CBEE Companhia Brasileira de Energia Elétrica 
CELETRAi1AZON Centrais Elétricas de Amazonas 
CER Centrals Elétricas do Roraima 
ELETROACRE Centrais Elétricas de Acre 
CEA Comanhia de Eletricidade do Amapa  
CELPA Centrals 1516tricas do Par 
CERON Centrais Elétricas de Rond6nia 
CEMAR Centrais E1tricas do Maranhao 
CEPISA Centrals E1tricas do Piaui 
COELCE 	 Companhia de Eletricidade do Ceara 
COSERN 	 Companhia de Servio8 Elétricos do Rio 
Grande do Norte 
SAELPA 	 Socledade An6nlma de Eletrifica9ao da 
Paraiba 
CELPE 	 Companhia de Eletricidade de Pernambuco 
CEAL 	 Companhia de Eletricidade de Alagoas 
ENERGIPE 	 Empresa Distribulao de Energia em Sergipe 
COELBA 	 Companhia de Eletricidade do Estado da Bahia 
COBER 	 Companhia Baiana de E1etrificaço Rural 
CBS? 	 Centrais Elétricas de .So Paulo 
CPFL 	 Companhia Paulista de For9a e Luz 
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CAIUA Compahia E1trica de Caiva 
CLFSC Companhia Luz e Força Santa Cruz 
CELF Centrais 	ltricas Flurninenses 
CENF Companhia de Eletricidade de NOVO Friburgo 
EEVP Empresa de Eletricidade Vale do 
Paranapanema 
CFLCL Companhia Força e Luz Cataguazes-Leopoldina 
CME Companhia Mineira de Eletricidade 
CEMIG Centrais Eltricas de Minas Gerais 
ERt4IG Eletrificao Rural de iviinas Gerais 
LIGHT Light Serviços de Eletricidade 
COPEL Companhia Paranaense de Energia Eltrica 
CELESC Centrais E1tricas de Santa Catarina 
CEEE Cornpanhia Estadual de Energia Elétrica 
CHEP Companhia Hidro El6trica de Paranapanema 
CEI1AT Centrais El6tricas de Mato Grosso 
CELG Centrais E1tricas de Goias 
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Appendix k : Hydraulic Sites Inventoried in the Amazon Basin 
Note : The dams of the Tocantins-Araguaia cascade are shown in 
capital 13tters. 
Source 	Departamento de Estudos Energeticos, ELETPOBPAS, 1977. 
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Aendix 5 THE Tucurui - Technical Data 
General 
Drainage Area 	 75o 000 km 
Length of dam & concrete structure 	 4 33 ni 
Total volume of excavations 	 18 290 000 rn 
Total volume of infill material 	 39 31+1+ 000 m3 
3 
Total volume of concrete 	 '+ oo 000 in 
Total volume of cofferdam 	 7 302 000 
Left Bank Dam 	 Left Bank Dike 
Tye 	 Rockfill 	 Type 	 Earthf ill 
Length 	 1+60.5 rn Length 	 774 in 
!axin. Height 	58 m 	 Maxin. Height 	71 in 
Right Bank Dam 	 flight Bank Dike 
Type 	 Earthf ill 	 Type 	 Earthf ill 
Length 	 3 1+20 in 	 Length 	 5 850 m CD 
in in 1-lax . Height 	85 in Max. Height 	20 in 
River Flows 	 Heads 
Average 	 9 208 m3s 	 ri lax  in. 	67.60 m 
,rn - 	31 • recorded 	1 711 m s Min . 	51.1+0 m 
i:axin. recorded 	63 00 3-1 
	
Nominal 60.30 in 
River Diversion 	51 000 m 3s 
Spillway Capacity 100 000 m3s_ 1 
Reservoir 
• 	 in N Liax . 	 74.00 in 
NA Normal 	 72.00 in 
'-in 
iA i4 in . 58.00 rn 
Accumulated Volume 	 1+3 x 10  in3 
IJ8uable Volume 	 23 x 10 9 in3 
-, Area at NA ±'Iormal 	 2 10 kin 2  
Length 	 200 km 
S il lway 
Length 	 575 in 
in 0' iIax . Height 	 00 in 
No. radial gates 	 • 	23 
2 
Size 	 20x2Om 
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Powerhouse 
Location 	 Semi-underground 
Length 470 rn 
No. of units (1st stage) 	 12 
Turbines 
Type 	 Francis 
Number 12 
rn Nax . Capacity 	 330 -,Iw 
Capacity under nominal head 	 316 NW 
Capacity under minm.  head 	 250 MW 
Saeed 	 83.72 rpm 
Discharge under nominal head 	 576 m3s 
Generators 
Nominal Capacity (continuous) 	 350 MVA 
Frequency 	 60 Hz 
Nominal Voltage 	 13.8 kV 
Speed 	 83.72 rpm 
Power Factor 	 0.95 
Transformers 
Number 	 9 
Nominal Capacity 	 350 MVA 
Voltage 	 13.8/500 kV 
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